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Abstract 
This thesis reviews the UK life insurance industry comprehensively in terms of performance 
and business behaviour. One major contribution of the thesis is to challenge the conventional 
view on evaluation of investment funds from a shareholders’ perspective. The accounting 
valuation techniques to evaluate investment from the policyholder’s perspective have not been 
advanced to the same extent as methods designed to evaluate investment from the shareholder’s 
perspective, due partly to the accounting complexity of the investment management. Against 
this context, the thesis develops a valuation method on the basis that policyholders’ basic 
expectation that their saved funds shall be invested with value growth higher than inflation in 
the real goods market, and the thesis takes this as the benchmark to assess the reported value 
of policyholders’ assets. The thesis employs this valuation to assess the performance of 
different life assurance products (conventional vs. modern) and examine whether the 
transformation (from conventional to modern) has any impact on insurer performance and 
behaviour. The thesis also examines whether product diversification impacts realised and 
unrealised investment income homogenously; the result suggests that the effect of product 
diversification on performance varies across different measurements of realised and unrealised 
gain. The second major contribution of the thesis is to test the validity of different output 
proxies and compare efficiency scores based ranking for competitive firms to the value creation 
based ranking. Overall, the thesis suggests that different output proxies give consistently 
similar ranking for competitive firms, and cost efficiency based on different proxies are closely 
related to conventional measurers of firm performance and value creation in terms of value and 
ranking. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. The Role of the UK Life Insurance Industry in the UK Economy 
It is assumed that the Lombards from northern Italy introduced the first insurance policy written 
in the UK in the 14th or the 15th centuries. This earliest insurance policy was a marine insurance 
policy and from which came the earliest life assurance policy written in the late 16th century 
on the life of a merchant sailing with his goods (Hardwick and Guirguis, 2007). From this early 
beginning, the UK life assurance industry has developed to become the third largest (after the 
US and Japan) in the world, accounting for 9.4%1 of the total premium income of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2012). Compared 
to the European counterparts, the UK life assurance industry is the largest in Europe; its share 
in the European market was 25.5% of the EU member premium incomes in 2010 (Datamonitor, 
2011). Domestically, the share of the life assurance industry in the UK insurance market 
exceeded 70% in 2010 (ABI, 2011). In addition, the UK life assurance premium incomes as a 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was about 9.5% in 2010, which is the third 
highest worldwide (after Luxembourg and Ireland) (OECD, 2012). Furthermore, it is 
anticipated that the UK life industry will have a compound annual growth rate of 6% over the 
period 2010-2015 (Datamonitor, 2011). 
The life assurance industry is a vital contributor to the UK economy; it is a prime investor, a 
major employer and a significant source of overseas earnings. The UK life insurance industry 
is considered to be an investment and saving vehicle for the UK economy. The proportion of 
the pension segment exceeded 73% of total gross premium income of the UK life industry in 
                                                          
1 The author calculates this information using data published by the OECD concerning life gross premiums on its 
members in 2010 (OECD, 2012). 
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2010 (Datamonitor, 2011). Indeed, the UK had the fourth highest per capita life insurance 
expenditure in the world in 2010 (falling behind Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland) 
(OECD, 2012). The UK life assurance industry had £1,597 billion invested in shares and other 
assets in 2010; amounting to about 24% of the UK total net worth (ABI, 2011). Moreover, it 
paid out around £53.6 billion (an average of £147 million per day) in benefits to pensioners 
and long-term policyholders and around £6.2 billion (an average of £17 million per day) in 
death and disability benefits in 2010 (ABI, 2011). As further indicators of its importance to the 
economy, the total number of employees in the UK insurance industry (life and non-life) was 
290,000 in 2010, accounting for more than a quarter of all financial service jobs (ABI, 2011). 
With regard to overseas earnings, the proportion of premium incomes from overseas was £42 
billion accounting for 38% of total life premium incomes (ABI, 2011). Therefore, it is 
meaningful and important to understand how the UK life insurers behave and perform in 
creating wealth for policyholders and shareholders to assess the performance of the UK life 
insurance industry from shareholders and policyholders perspectives. 
To address these challenging issues concerning assessing life insurer performance, the thesis 
employs regulatory data at the legal entity level over the period 1985-2010. The data is derived 
from the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released) provided by the 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P); this data summarises the annual returns filed to the regulatory 
authority in the UK over the period 1985-2010. The sample consists of three hundred and sixty 
nine companies (see Table 31 in Appendix). The annual returns are required to be submitted in 
specific forms covering revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities and solvency (see Table 1). Using 
this data set, the thesis reviews the developments in the UK life insurance market over the 
period 1985-2010 concerning product and ownership structures as well as assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses, and then goes further to develop a valuation, value creation, for life 
3 
 
assurance funds based on policyholders’ basic expectations. The thesis also examines how life 
assurance product diversification impacts on investment performance concerning realised and 
unrealised gains; employing value creation as performance benchmark compared to 
conventional measure such as investment yield. Finally, thesis compares the value creation 
based ranking of competitive firms to efficiency frontier ranking based on different output 
proxies. 
1.2. Value Creation as an Approach to Measure Life Insurer Performance 
Examining performance in the life insurance business is considered to be fraught with 
problems2 because of the unsatisfactory nature of life insurance company accounts3 (O’Brien, 
2009b). Indeed, existing solvency4 based valuation information is considered to be unable to 
reflect the underlying economies of life insurers due to difficulties arising from the valuation 
of insurer contractual liabilities, and, hence, recognising the associate surplus (Swiss Re, 
                                                          
2 An explanation for the difficulty in using performance measures in the life insurance industry was offered by 
one interviewee in the survey conducted by Diacon et. al. (2005); the interviewee commented that: ‘We still look 
a lot at APE (annual premium equivalent) so volume and share are very important…It’s very difficult to compare 
your performance against competitors… Again it goes back to how transparent an industry we are: it’s very 
difficult to actually get beneath the surface. In terms of APE, you can get the figures from the ABI (Association of 
British Insurers) and you can see where everyone’s going; the proportion of the whole market, that’s very easy to 
do. Profitability is very difficult to monitor (senior development and planning manager, bancassurer)’ (Diacon 
et. al., 2005, p.7). 
3 It is assumed that the current project of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) will be able to 
address this issue; however, the project is still in the development phase. In the UK, the Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB) introduced a new standard for medium-sized and large with-profits life insurers in 2004 (ASB, 
2004a,b; 2005), but this does not identify fully the interest of the shareholders in the assets shown on the balance 
sheet (O’Brien, 2009b). 
4 Proprietary life insurers and some mutual life insurers have employed the Embedded Value (EV) to deal with 
these issues and report their performance since the 1990s (Almezweq and Liu, 2012; 2013). The empirical analysis 
on the value relevance of the EV accounting information provides evidence that accounting information reported 
under the EV is relevant to the market value of life insurance firms (Horton, 2007; Préfontaine, Desrochers and 
Godbout, 2009; 2011; Almezweq and Liu, 2012; 2013). Despite the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in 2005 by the UK listed life insurers, they continue to disclose the EV 
supplementary accounts within their annual reports (Almezweq and Liu, 2012; 2013). However, recent empirical 
evidence by Almezweq and Liu (2013) shows that profits reported under the EV are not value relevant to the 
market value of life insurance firms. Furthermore, the data on the EV is only available at the holding company 
level and the accounting numbers of the EV have to be extracted directly from the firm annual reports because 
these values are not separately reported in any available database to the best of the author’s knowledge. These 
difficulties make an analysis of performance based on the EV accounting information invisible at the level of an 
individual legal entity. 
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2012a). In 2008, the market value of policyholders’ assets was £1,243 billion, £250 billion 
lower than its value in 2007 (£1,493 billion). Similarly, the value of policyholders’ benefits 
(net mathematical reserves) fell by £209 billion in 2008 when compared to their value in 2007. 
This statutory valuation of assets and liabilities is considered to be informative regarding the 
solvency position of life insurers; however, the extent to which these statutory values of assets 
and liabilities are informative regarding answering critical question from policyholders’ 
perspective such as how does the UK life insurance industry perform? Does its saving products 
or investments create value for the policyholders? is questionable. 
Insurance based literature, with respect to policyholders, focuses on the calculation of the value 
of the asset share of with-profits policies (see Ranson and Headdon, 1989; Needleman and 
Westall, 1991; Paul et. al., 1991; Mehta, 1992; Roff, 1992; Eastwood et. al., 1994; Needleman 
and Roff, 1995; Clay et. al., 2001; Hairs et. al., 2002 and O’Brien, 2009a, c; 2012). Asset share 
measures the share of a single policy in with-profits life insurance funds as these funds are not 
unitised. This value of unit (the market value) or the asset share value; gives policyholders 
information regarding the changes in the value of units but it is not clear how this value is 
attributed to premiums paid by policyholders and investment income generated from 
reinvesting these premiums. Furthermore, it does not show how much wealth has been created 
from original investment relative to changes in the purchase power of the monetary unit. 
The basic idea is how much real wealth has been created for policyholders from a single life 
assurance policy over the duration of the contract? This requires accumulation of the 
investment based contributions (realised and unrealised gains) to the value of the unit / asset 
share in real terms, this would help measuring the changes in real wealth created for 
policyholders over the duration of the policy; with the assumption there are no guarantees. This 
measure also enables the policyholders to assess whether life insurers would be able to keep 
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the value of invested assets in line with changes in the purchasing power of monitory unit. The 
excess in real wealth over original investments (paid premiums) can be decomposed into 
realised and unrealised gains. Furthermore, this valuation provides information to classify life 
insurers into: (1) Life insurers that can keep the value of policyholders’ contributions and 
realised gain from investing these contributions in line with the changes in the purchase power 
of the monetary unit, and, hence, achieve positive real capital gain (unrealised gain); all value 
are in accumulative terms. (2) Life insurers that can keep the value of policyholders’ 
contributions but only part realised gain from investing these contributions in line with the 
changes in the purchase power of the monetary unit, and, hence, achieve negative real capital 
gain (unrealised gain) that destroys part of realised gain generated from investing 
policyholders’ contributions; all value are in accumulative terms. (3) Life insurers that cannot 
keep the value of policyholders’ contributions and realised gain from investing these 
contributions in line with the changes in the purchase power of the monetary unit, and, hence, 
achieve negative real capital gain (unrealised gain) that destroys all realised gain generated 
from investing policyholders’ contributions and part of their contributions; all value are in 
accumulative terms. 
By applying this valuation, it is identified that, overall, the UK life insurance firms have created 
value in total5 of £11 billion per annum on average over the period 2001-2010, when compared 
with the average value of £50 billion6 created each year over the 1990s. Apparently, value 
creation relative to the basic expectation of the policyholders has dropped significantly over 
the last decade. This is due to the recent financial turmoil that has lowered the market value of 
policyholders’ assets. For instance, the whole UK life industry lost £209 billion7 of value 
                                                          
5 It is based on value creation in flow terms. 
6 It is based on value creation in flow terms. 
7 It is value creation in flow terms in 2008. 
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relative to the policyholders’ expectations in 2008. Such scale of value losses in a single year 
has never been seen in the history of the industry since 1985. This raises concern regarding the 
future of the industry for its capability in creating real value for the policyholders. Furthermore, 
it is found that a firm with high value creation is likely to perform better in business growth 
compared to a firm that has low value creation. The latter has a precautionary behaviour 
concerning demanding for more liquid assets and the reinsurance purchase. The finding of this 
chapter is interesting for managers of life insurance companies, reinsurance companies, 
policyholders and their agents and regulators. 
1.3. Product Diversification and Performance of the UK Life Insurers 
The amount of loss on revaluation of policyholders’ assets (unrealised gain) was £-18 billion 
(-4% of total assets) in 1990 compared to £-104 billion (-10% of total assets) in 2002 and £-
171 billion (-14% of total assets) in 2008. Most of valuation losses (unrealised gain) are related 
to linked assets, for instance, in 2008, the valuation loss in the value of linked assets was £-160 
billion (23% of the value of linked assets) compared to only £-11 billion (-2% of the value of 
non-linked assets). This raises an interesting and challenging question for research on whether 
the net effect of product diversification on the performance of the UK life insurers is 
homogenous across conventional ratio such as investment income (realised gain) and two value 
creation based measures, namely, capital gain (unrealised gain) and value creation (realised 
and unrealised gains). 
The debate in literature concerning product diversification and firm performance 
interrelationship suggests inconclusive relationship concerning the net effect of product 
diversification on firm performance (see Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Servaes, 1996; Desai and Jain, 1999; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a,b; Laeven 
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and Levine, 2007; Santalo and Becerra, 2008). Similarity, existing insurance based studies tend 
to report inconclusive diversification-performance-relationship regarding various performance 
benchmarks such as efficiency score (see Berger et. al., 2000; Meador, Ryan and Schellhorn, 
2000; Fuentes, Grifell-Tatje and Perelman, 2005; Cummins et. al., 2010 and Chen, Lai and 
Wang, 2012) and investment yield ratio (see Boose, 1993; Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and 
Hoyt, 2001; Adams and Buckle, 2003; Shiu, 2004; Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg 
and Sommer, 2008; Shiu, 2009 and Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende, 2013). 
This chapter examines investment performance and product diversification interrelationships 
using conventional measure of firm performance such as investment income (realised gain) 
and two new measures based on Chapter 3, namely, value creation (realised and unrealised 
gains) and capital gain (unrealised gain). The basic idea is to test whether product 
diversification impacts unrealised gain, realised gain and combined measure (realised and 
unrealised gain) homogenously. This chapter first examines the implications of concentration 
on a certain product, namely, linked or non-linked on business performance of the UK life 
insurers to establish the potential implications of the concentration on a certain product on life 
insurer performance. This chapter goes further to examine the effect of the product 
diversification on the performance of a firm and whether this performance is endogenously 
linked to product diversification, or whether the type of products decides a type of performance. 
It is found that there are significant differences between linked and non-linked products; linked 
products can lead life insurers to be more cost efficient, less capital intensive, purchase less 
reinsurance and to deliver, on average, higher value for policyholders than non-linked products. 
Regarding diversification, the finding of the chapter shows that the effect of product 
diversification on performance varies across three different types of measurements: realised 
gain, unrealised gain and combined measure, namely, value creation (realised and unrealised 
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gains). This evidence supports the endogeneity argument; suggesting that researchers need to 
be careful in interpreting the performance results for different products and product 
diversification. It also shows the result is sensitive to theoretical measure of diversifications: 
dummies, percentages and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). Furthermore, evidence from 
this chapter shows that some products (the value of their backed assets) are very sensitive and 
vulnerable to market shocks, and therefore, it is not recommended for the firm to concentrate 
its entire investment in these products notwithstanding that it has empirically shown its success 
in creating returns. The finding of this chapter is interesting for manager of life insurance 
companies, reinsurance companies, policyholders and their agents and regulators. 
1.4. Defining Output Proxy to Estimate Life Insurer Efficiency 
The main issue regarding using efficiency frontier as a measure of life insurer performance is 
that the result varies according to the output proxy applied by the researchers (see Jeng and 
Lai, 2005; Leverty and Grace, 2010 and Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013). Despite the 
popularity of efficiency frontier measures in insurance based literature, defining the intangible 
output proxy is still considered to be the main issue. It is argued that an output proxy must meet 
all economic properties of output and the production function, and it must be related to 
conventional measure of firm performance such as financial ratios. However, a substantial 
body of insurer-based literature employs output proxies that have not been verified empirically. 
Indeed, the two main theoretical approaches to measure insurer’s output in literature, namely, 
the value-added approach and the intermediation approach, define only insurer objectives and 
leave the output proxy choice for researchers. Surprisingly, this does not promote innovation 
and many researchers tend to use claims, premiums or some ratios such as return on assets and 
solvency to proxy output. 
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However, existing output proxies, such as premiums, claims and financial ratios, are all based 
on different theoretical foundations that are not mutually consist. Furthermore, many of these 
proxies have many theoretical and measurement limitations, such as non-negativity, 
quantifiability and maximizability. For instance, premiums are considered to be price times 
quantity rather than a count of output units (Yuengert, 1993), and price difference between 
small and large insurers may lead to misleading inferences regarding average costs (Yuengert, 
1993, p. 489), whereas high claims imply a firm is efficient rather than inefficient (Diacon, 
Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Brockett et. al., 2004a, 2005; Leverty and Grace, 2010). However, 
accumulative funds have not been utilised as an output proxy by existing studies to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, despite the fact that many life assurance products involve 
accumulation of funds over a relatively long period of time. Indeed, Cummins and Weiss 
(2013) argued that ‘to capture this element of intermediation, average invested assets for life 
insurers is usually included as an output variable. An approach that has not been utilized in 
the existing literature would be to separate incurred benefits from additions to reserves, giving 
rise to a total of ten insurance outputs if by line disaggregation is used. It would be interesting 
to test whether this might raise the average estimated efficiency scores’ (Cummins and Weiss, 
2013; p.820). 
The basic idea is that the output proxy must meet the production function properties, namely, 
maximisation and non-negativity, and incorporate insurer objectives, namely, maximising or 
satisficing. With respect to the production function properties, it is clear that insurers may not 
be willing to maximise their claims, and additions to reserves could violate the non-negativity 
(see Chapter 5), whereas premiums plus investment income (including unrealised gain) may 
violate the non-negativity constraint (see Chapter 5); however, excluding unrealised gain 
creates a bias since policyholders’ payouts and shareholders’ revenues are linked to the market 
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value of assets (see Chapter 5). In contrast, the net value of policyholders’ assets 
(policyholders’ funds), which is equivalent to the present value of future policyholders’ payouts 
plus the solvency margin, meets all the production function properties. Similarly to insurers’ 
objectives or / and shareholders’ and policyholders’ interests, it is clear that insurers, and, 
hence, shareholders may not be willing to maximise claims. As for policyholders, it is argued 
that they are interested in maximising their returns on investments (premiums or price of the 
policy) rather than actual amount paid as this amount more likely to be guaranteed contractually 
or legally. Therefore, policyholders are interested in the growth in the value of their assets in 
terms of realised and unrealised gains, which will increase the value of their payouts. As for 
shareholders, they are also interested in maximising the value of backing assets, as it will 
maximise their revenues (management fees). With respect to insurers, maximising claims will 
not increase their abilities to meet future claims, whereas maximising the value of backing 
assets may help the insurer to meet future claims, suggesting that maximising the value of 
backing assets meets the objective of both proprietary insurers (maximising) and mutual 
insurers (satisficing). 
The fundamental objective of the chapter is to test the validity of three different proxies of 
output, namely, revenue, claims and funds to identify what is an appropriate proxy of the life 
insurer output. To address this, the chapter highlights the theoretical advantages and limitations 
for each of these proxies. The chapter goes further to exam analytically whether each proxy 
can be derived using actual available data on the UK life insurers. The stochastic frontier 
approach is utilised to estimate cost efficiency based on each output proxy. Finally, the validity 
of different proxies is verified using ‘consistency conditions’ regarding efficiency score 
proposed by Bauer et. al. (1998). Furthermore, the chapter tests whether ranking of best 
practice firms based on value creation is consistent with efficiency score based ranking. The 
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result shows that using premiums plus investment income (realised gain) plus valuation gain 
and loss (unrealised gain), change in policyholders’ funds and claims plus addition to reserves 
are not possible practically as these proxies violate non-negativity constraint of outputs, 
including over 50% of sample firms have negative values for some of these variables during 
the period of financial turmoil. As for cost efficiency, it is found that average cost efficiency 
based on revenue is higher and less volatile compared to average cost efficiency based on funds 
or claims. However, three output proxies give consistently similar ranking for competitive 
firms, and cost efficiency based on different proxies are closely related to conventional 
measurers of firm performance and value creation. Indeed, the ranking of best practice firms is 
correlated with the value creation based ranking, indicating more efficient firms also deliver 
higher value to policyholders compared with their basic expectations. The finding of this 
chapter is interesting for manager of life insurance companies, reinsurance companies and 
regulators. 
1.5. The Outlines of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 — this chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter 2 — this chapter reviews the developments in the regulatory and macroeconomic 
environments of the UK life insurers since 1980s, and it also provides detailed explanations 
concerning data, sample and regulatory returns of the Financial Services Authority8 (FSA). The 
chapter also highlights the developments in the UK life assurance market in terms of products, 
segments, legal forms and ownership structures over the period 1985-2010. It also analytically 
                                                          
8 On the 1st of April 2013, the FSA has been replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) due to the prudential regulation reform in the UK (FSA, 2013). 
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illustrates the flow of funds in the life assurance business including detailed analysis of 
revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities using trend and ratio analyses. 
Chapter 3 — this chapter develops a valuation methodology to value funds provided by 
policyholders with the expectation that the value of the funds shall grow above or at least at 
the same rate of inflation in the real goods market. This expected value (by policyholders) is 
regarded as the basic economic value of funds since it retains constant purchasing power of 
money over time. The value perceived by the market in excess of the basic economic value is 
defined as value creation that consists of two basic elements: investment returns (realised gain) 
and capital gains (unrealised gain). With this valuation methodology, it is found that the UK 
life insurance industry lost £209 billion9of value relative to the basic economic value in 2008. 
It is evident that the identified value creation is related to the business performance and 
strategies of life insurers, in particular, their risk-taking attitudes in setting their investment 
portfolio. 
Chapter 4 — this chapter examines the effect of product diversification on the performance of 
the UK life insurers over the period 1985-2010. The chapter first examines the differences 
between linked focused life insurers and non-linked focused life insurers in terms of risk-taking 
attitudes and hedging strategy and business and financial performance. The chapter goes further 
to examine whether the effect of product diversification on the performance of the UK life 
insurers is homogenous across conventional ratio such as investment yield (realised gain) and 
newly proposed measures in Chapter 3, namely, capital gain (unrealised gain) and value 
creation (realised and unrealised gains). The result shows that there is a significant difference 
between the linked and non-linked investment with respect to the firm business behaviour and 
                                                          
9 It is value creation in flow terms in 2008. 
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financial performance, hedging strategies and risk-taking attitude. More investment in the 
linked products leads the firm to improve performance for value creation and be more 
aggressive in asset portfolio setting, but be more fragile against more volatile financial markets 
for its performance. Furthermore, this chapter shows evidence in support of the argument that 
a product decides performance endogenously. 
Chapter 5 — this chapter looks at how value creation is related to efficiency scores based on 
different output proxies. The chapter highlights the theoretical foundation for each existing 
output proxy, and then analytically shows that some of these existing proxies violate the 
principle output characteristic, namely, non-negativity; using data on 369 firms over the period 
1985-2010.This chapter also tests the validity of three proxies to measure life insurer output, 
namely, revenue, claims and accumulative funds. It is found that the average cost efficiency 
based on revenue is higher and less volatile compared to average cost efficiency based on funds 
or claims. However, three output proxies give consistently similar ranking for competitive 
firms, and cost efficiency based on different proxies are closely related to conventional 
measurers of firm performance. It is also found that efficiency score is closely related to value 
creation and ranking of the best practice firms. 
Chapter 6 — this chapter summarises the main contributions of the chapters to the existing 
literature, and highlights key findings. The chapter presents the author’s view on how the 
research findings can be implemented and future research and limitations. 
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2. Chapter 2: Data, Sample and Review of Latest 
Developments of the UK Life Insurance Industry 
over the Period 1985-2010 
2.1. Introduction 
Over the period 1985-2010, the UK life insurance industry has experienced significant changes 
in regulatory and macroeconomic environments. The most noticeable changes are: (1) The 
external and internal shocks which generated deep recessions10. (2) The liberalisation of the 
European insurance market. (3) The deregulation in the UK financial service industry. (4) The 
noticeable decline in interest rates to its lowest level. (5) The harmonisation in the accounting 
standards and solvency requirements. These developments in the external and internal 
environments of the UK British life insurance industry have some key implications reflected 
in the structure of British life insurance providers and their products. 
It is argued that the liberalization of the European insurance market increases competiveness 
pressure leading to cost cutting, and, hence, enhance the overall efficiency and productivity of 
the European insurers (Swiss Re, 1996; Fenn et. al., 2008; Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013). 
Furthermore, the liberalization of the European insurance market and deregulations in the UK 
financial service market led to waves of demutualisation11 and mergers and acquisitions, 
making the whole industry dominated by smaller number of groups (see Armitage and Kirk, 
                                                          
10 The insurance industry has suffered from a severe drop in equity markets, and it is going through a prolonged 
period of historically low interest rates (Van Rossum, 2005). The most noticeable drops in equity markets are 
1989, 2001, 2002 and 2008. 
11 It is argued demutualisation is motived by mutual life insurer capital disadvantages. Indeed, it is well 
documented in the insurance based literature that mutual life insurers have higher costs for raising new capital 
than proprietary counterparts (see Harrington and Niehaus, 2002). 
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1994; Swiss Re, 1999; Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Davutyan and Klumpes, 2008 
Carter and Falush, 2009 and Schertzinger, 2009). It is also argued that these deregulations 
diminished boundaries between individual financial institutions; promoting banks, other 
financial institutions as well as non-financial institution to enter the life UK insurance market 
(Watson, 2004). It is also noted that low interest rates is clearly a significant issue for life 
insurers (see Swiss Re, 2012b and Basse et.al., 2013); interest based income is the major source 
of their earnings (Swiss Re, 2012b). Furthermore, low interest rates may lead to decrease in the 
economic value of insurance companies; Swiss Re (2012b) showed that the market value of 
insurers fell faster than the book value as the interest rates declined over the over the period 
2000-2011; using a sample of global insurers. Furthermore, low interest rates has a negative 
effect on the demand for some life insurance products; it is noted that there have been growing 
dissatisfactions in terms of payouts received from some of the UK life assurance products, 
namely, with-profits products (O’Brien, 2009b). As for insurers; many studies highlight that 
the decline in interest rates has led to many with-profits insurers to close to new business (FSA, 
2004; 2005; O’Brien and Diacon, 2005) and there have been significant changes in ownership 
structures over the period 1985-2010 (FSA, 2004; 2005; O’Brien and Diacon, 2005, Carter and 
Falush, 2009; O’Brien, 2009b). 
This chapter reviews the developments in the regulatory and macroeconomic environments of 
the UK life insurers since 1980s; including financial deregulations at the UK and EU levels, 
growth, inflation, interest rates and changes in accounting and solvency based regulations. It 
goes further to explain the data source concerning the UK life insurers that is based on the 
regulatory returns filed to the FSA over the period 1985-2010; the chapter includes detailed 
explanations for all regulatory return forms as well as all key variables included in the empirical 
chapters of the thesis. The chapter also provides detailed explanations concerning sample firms 
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in terms of number of years for each sample firm and sample period, ownership for each firm 
and changes in the ownership concerning legal form, parents regarding country of origin and 
industry. The chapter also reviews the implications of the changes in the external environment 
in terms of product structures, ownership structures, backed assets and liabilities as well as 
revenues and expenses; the chapter employs analytical approach based on ratio and trend 
analysis using regulatory data about all the UK life insurers over the period 1985-2010. 
Furthermore, the flow of funds account is also constructed to analyse noticeable changes in the 
source and usage of funds in the UK life insurance business. This analysis is also extended to 
liability and backed asset structures. 
It is revealed that there have been significant changes in product structures and product 
segments as well as composition of assets held by insurers to back up their liabilities. The most 
noticeable change is the unparalleled increase in the life assurance products by which 
investment risks transferred to policyholders and payouts linked to the value of underlying 
assets. However, as the proportion of policyholders’ assets held to match linked product 
liabilities increases, the value of policyholders’ assets becomes more sensitive to market 
shocks. Concerning source and usage of funds, the amount by which the value of assets 
increases, valuation gain (unrealised gain), has become a major source of funds to match 
liabilities, whereas investment income (realised gain only) declined steadily over the period. 
However, the valuation gain (unrealised gain) cyclically fluctuated over the period with 
significant increase in amount of valuation losses over the period. It is also revealed that there 
are significant variations between assets held to match linked funds and other assets in terms 
of sensitivity to market shocks, valuation gain (unrealised gain) and investment income 
(realised gain). The chapter also shows that the surrenders claims have become the major cash 
out follow for the industry and over the period 2008-2010 the amount paid to policyholders in 
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terms of claims exceeded premiums received. With regard to ownership structures, the analysis 
shows that the industry is now dominated by proprietary life insurers compared to almost 
equally controlled industry between proprietary and mutual insurers in 1980s. The chapter also 
shows that proprietary life insurers; banks and other financial service owned life insurers as 
well as foreign life insurers operating in the UK life assurance market are predominantly 
focused on linked products; whereas substantial amount of overseas business written by the 
UK life insurers are still in participation forms. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the macroeconomic 
and regulatory environments of the UK saving industry. Section 3 presents the data and sample. 
Section 4 describes life insurance products and summarises the latest developments in the UK 
life insurance market. Section 5 presents the flow of funds and capital structure in the life 
insurance business; it contains an extensive analysis over the period 1985-2010. Section 6 
contains conclusion. 
2.2. The Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environments of the UK Saving 
Industry 
2.2.1. The Performance of the UK Economy since the 1970s 
2.2.1.1. Growth 
From 1949 to 1973, the UK GDP increased rapidly, it grew at an average 3.3% per annum with 
regular and mild cycles see Figure 1. However, the period 1973-2010 characterised with the 
collapse of Bretton Woods and the rise of free-market economics and policies (see Kitson, 
2004), the growth rate slowed to 2.3% (2.7% 1985-2010) with more pronounced and irregular 
cycles see Figure 1. This period was characterised by a number of external and internal shocks 
which generated deep recessions, including the 1973 oil shock, the 1979 shock following the 
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introduction of a new policy regime12 (see Kitson, 2004), a 1989 financial market shock 
followed by the collapse in housing prices, the 2001-2002 dot com bubble and the 2008-2010 
subprime mortgage crisis. 
Figure 1: The UK GDP Growth 1949–2010 (Annual % Change) 
 
Source: the author — the Office for National Statistics (ONS); reference ‘ABMI’ (ONS, 2013a). 
2.2.1.2. Inflation 
By 1970s, the UK governments abandoned having balance-of-payments targets and adopted 
the floating system, giving priority to domestic targets such as employment, growth or inflation 
(see Tomlinson, 2004). Since the 1950, the UK has modest inflation with exception of the 
1970s and early 1980s mainly due to change in the monetary policy (Kitson, 2004; Tomlinson, 
2004), see Figure 2. The period 1993-2010 characterised with low-inflation1314, the Retail Price 
                                                          
12 It includes achieving a monetary target defined in terms of £M3, raising the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 8% 
to 15% and abolishing the exchange control in in 1979 (see Howson, 2004). 
13 There are two main measures of inflation in the UK, namely, the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Services 
Producer Price Index (SPPI). The PPI measures the price changes of goods bought and sold by the UK 
manufacturers, and the SPPI measures the price changes of services provided by the UK businesses to other 
businesses and government (HM Treasury, 2013). Furthermore, the GDP deflator (GDPD)  is viewed as a measure 
of general inflation in the whole economy (HM Treasury, 2013); it includes the price changes of goods bought 
and sold by the UK manufacturers and services provided by the UK businesses to other businesses and government 
as well as the prices. 
14 The GDP deflator is a much broader price index than the CPI, the RPI (which only measures consumer prices) 
or the PPI as it reflects the prices of all domestically produced goods and services in the economy (HM Treasury, 
2013). 
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Index (RPI15) was negative in 2009; see Figure 2. Similarly for other monetary tool, namely, 
interest rates, the interest rates have gradually declined since the 1993 to their lowest level ever 
since 2009 at 0.5% as shown in Figure 3. Low interest rates are clearly a significant issue for 
insurers (see Swiss Re, 2012b and Basse et.al., 2013). This low interest problem is particularly 
significant for life insurers as interest based income is the major source of earnings (Swiss Re, 
2012b). Furthermore, low interest rates have a negative effect on the demand for insurance 
products. Therefore, low interest rates may lead to decrease in the economic value of insurance 
companies. Swiss Re (2012b) showed that the market value of insurers fell faster than the book 
value as the interest rates declined over the period 2000-2011 using a sample of global insurers. 
Figure 2: The Inflation Measured by the CPI, the RPI and the GDP Deflator 1949–2010 (Annual % 
Change) 
 
Source: the author — ONS; reference ‘CZBH’ (RPI), ‘D7G7’ (CPI) and ‘IHYS’ (GDPD) (ONS, 2013a;b). 
                                                          
15 The PRI was first calculated in 1947; it has been replaced by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (introduced in 
1975) since 2011; however, the state pensions would go up by the greater of the CPI, the RPI or 2.5% (HM 
Treasury, 2011). The CPI is estimated using price indices for a basket of goods and services (food and non-
alcoholic beverages, alcohol and tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing and household services, furniture and 
household goods, health, transport, communication, recreation and culture, education, restaurants and hotels and 
miscellaneous good and services) bought by consumers (households), it measures the speed at which the prices 
of these goods and services rise or fall (ONS, 2013c). The CPI is produced according to international standards 
and in line with European regulations (Eurostat, 2013); the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
(introduced in 1997) is used for monetary policy purposes (inflation target) as well as uprating pensions, wages 
and benefits (ONS, 2013c). However, the CPI does not include the owner occupiers’ housing costs (OOH) that 
includes the costs associated with owning, maintaining and living in one’s own home but it exudes utility bills 
included in the CPI (ONS, 2013c), the ONS has published a new measure of the CPI that includes the OOH called 
the CPIH. 
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Figure 3: Changes in Bank Rate, Minimum Lending Rate, Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate, Repo Rate 
and Official Bank Rate 1949–2010 
 
Source: the author — the Bank of England (the Bank of England, 2013). 
2.2.1.3. The Financial Market 
Since the 1980s, the UK financial market indicators, namely, FTSE all shares, FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250, have generally risen over time. However, from 1995 they showed much sharper 
movements reflecting global events as shown in Figure 4. Indeed, during the 1996-1999 period, 
all indices experienced sharp raised driven by the dot com bubble; however, all indices 
plummeted during the 2000-2003 period when the bubble burst. Slimily, all indices increased 
rapidly during the 2004-2007; however, all indices almost fell by 50% during the subprime 
mortgage crisis in 2008. 
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Figure 4: FTSE All Shares, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 Indices 1972-2010 
 
Source: the author — Yahoo Finance (monthly close price). 
The 1985-2010 period characterised with a slow rate of economic growth, decline in the interest 
rates to their lowest level and minimum inflation rate. However, this period experienced many 
financial crises that significantly affected the whole performance of economy in general and 
the financial market in particular. 
2.2.2. Regulatory Developments of the UK Life Insurance Industry 
2.2.2.1. Single Passport 
Regarding the European reform, the UK secured a full membership in the European Economic 
Community in 1973, which was established in the 1958 Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (Rome Treaty) and aimed to secure free movements of goods, services, 
labour and capital within member states (EU, 2014a). However, the European economic 
performance was perceived for being impeded by a failure in pursuing complementary 
economic objectives among the member states in 1980s, leading to the European Commission 
to investigate the issues and publish the White Paper in 1985 (EU, 1985). This paper outlines 
a programme designed to ‘complete the internal market’ by 1992; this has been enforced in the 
Single European Act in 1987 (EU, 1986; 2014b). The objective of this reform is to achieve 
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sustainable economic growth, price stability and high employment; this has been implemented 
by creating a single European market through harmonisation of the financial regulations 
regarding provision of financial services (including insurance) among member states (EU, 
1986; 2014b). There have been several key directives for harmonising financial regulations 
concerning provision of the insurance and other financial services. Foremost of these was the 
third council life insurance directives (92/49/eec partially repealed by 2002/83/EC) or ‘Single 
Passport’ in 1994 (EU, 1992; 2002). Similar directives have been introduced for banking; 
investment services combined with directives to enhance customer protection and financial 
stability (see Watson, 2004). This has established the single financial service institution 
licence; allowing domestically authorised financial institutions (including foreign institutions) 
of any EU member country to operate freely within the EU. This deregulates of the European 
insurance market with the exception of the solvency based regulation that is carried out by the 
insurer’s home country; however, the Solvency II project aims to harmonise the solvency 
regulations in the EU. 
2.2.2.2. Solvency II 
In 1999, the EU decided to review the existing solvency system (solvency I16) based on 
Müller’s (1997) report (EU, 1999); this project later became the Solvency II project. The 
review included six areas, namely, technical provision, assets and investment risk, assets and 
liabilities management, reinsurance, solvency margin requirement and accounting issues (EU, 
1999). A working group was set up to continue the project, at the same time; series of studies 
were conducted to examine solvency issues of the European insurers (see KPMG, 2002; 
McDonnell, 2002 and Sharma, 2002). In 2001, the European Commission (EC) discussed a 
                                                          
16 For life insurance, directives has been combined into a consolidated EU directive (2002/83) on life assurance 
(EU, 2002a). 
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proposal for the Solvency II based on the Basel II project and the Risk-Based Capital (RBC) 
system (EU, 2001). After a series of studies and consultations to build the foundation for the 
project (see Sandström, 2005; 2010), the first proposal was published in 2004 and subsequently 
was amended after consultation among different stakeholders. The first draft of the Solvency 
II Directive was published in 2007, and an amended version was published in 2008; however, 
the Solvency II Directive was adopted in 2009 (EU, 2009a). In accordance with the Article 311 
of the Solvency II Directive (EU, 2009a), the Directive will be in force from 1 January 2016 
(see EU, 2015). 
The Solvency II project is considered to be ‘a ground-breaking revision of the EU insurance 
law designed to improve consumer protection, modernise supervision, deepen market 
integration and increase the international competitiveness of European insurers’ (EU, 2007). 
Under this new system, insurers will be required to consider all risks to which they are exposed 
to enable them to manage these risks effectively. Furthermore, the new system will enable the 
European supervisory authorities to monitor insurance groups as a whole. Following the Basel 
II project, the Solvency II project is structured into three pillars, namely, Pillar I quantitative 
requirements, Pillar II supervisory activities and Pillar II supervisory reporting and public 
disclosure. 
2.2.2.3. Regulatory Reform in the UK 
As for the UK level, there has been ‘internal’ regulatory reforms called the ‘financial 
deregulation’, this has been influenced by the European reforms and high-profile financial 
scandals17 in 1980s. This includes: (1) The lifting of foreign exchange controls in 1979. (2) 
The abolishing of the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme by the Bank of England in 1980. 
                                                          
17 Such as Norton Warburg (investment management) in 1981 and Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984. 
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(3) Abolishing of the Bank of England’s reserve assets ratio in 1981. (4) Lifting all government 
restrictions on hire purchase in 1982 (allowing suppliers of goods to set their own terms for 
loans). (5) Abolishing the fixed commission charges in 1986 (removing the Restrictive 
Practices Act of 1956). (6) Permitting building societies (through Building Societies Act 1986) 
to expand their activities beyond the savings and mortgage markets, such as insurance, pension, 
current-account banking activities and foreign-exchange trading etc. (7) Prompting self-
regulations of the financial institutions; following concerns about adequacy supervisory 
requirements by Wilson committees (Wilson Report, 1981) through The Financial Services 
Act of 1986 (effective in in 1988) by the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) to number of 
the Self-Regulatory Organisations18 (SROs). However, self-regulations have been criticised on 
the ground of effectiveness such as failure to prevent Maxwell pension fraud in 1991 and 
inefficiency due to duplication of activities, it is estimated that self-regulation costed roughly 
9% (£169–£330 million) of premiums of the life assurance industry in 1994 (Harrison, 2000). 
To address this, a single statutory regulatory authority (for the financial services industry) in 
the UK was established; the Securities and Investment Board changed its name to the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) in 1997. The Bank of England Act of 1998 transferred supervisory 
responsibility for banking services from the Bank of England to the FSA, and the 2000 
(effective December 2001) the Financial Services and Markets Act imposed the statutory 
objectives19 to the FSA, namely, market confidence, financial stability, consumer protection, 
reduction of financial crime. In 2004, the FSA took the responsibility to regulate mortgages 
                                                          
18 The Securities Association (TSA); the Investment Regulatory Organisation (IMRO); the Financial 
Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA); the Life Assurance and Unit Trust 
Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) and the Association of Futures, Brokers and Dealers (AFBD). The AFBD 
merged with the TSA to form the Securities and Futures Association (SFA) in 1991, and in 1992 the LAUTRO 
and the FIMBRA merged to form the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) to avoid duplication of supervisory 
activities, and, hence, costs (see Thomas, 2004). 
19 There were supported by regulatory principles, namely, efficiency and economy, role of management, 
proportionality, innovation, international character and competition. 
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and in 2005 took responsibility to regulate general insurance. The FSA received criticisms on 
ground of failure to protect customers such as the Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), handling 
the issues of near collapsed of the Equitable Life Assurance Society in 2001, regulatory failure 
during 2008 financial crisis. To address this, the 2012 the Financial Services Act abolished the 
FSA (from April 2013), and split the supervisory responsibility between two newly established 
agencies, namely, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and the Bank of England. 
2.2.2.4. Financial Reporting Reform 
The long-term nature of the life insurance business implies difficulty in assessing the current 
financial position and financial performance due to uncertainties regarding future interest rates, 
mortality estimates, expected returns on investments and persistency rates (Horton, Macve and 
Serafeim, 2007). In recent years, life insurance accounting has undergone a dramatic change 
due to a combination of many factors: (1) The widespread concern of investment committees 
that life insurance firms were undervalued by the financial market in the late 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s (Salmon and Fine, 1991; Horton, 2007). (2) The conservatism in the 
statutory reporting. (3) The adoption of the unregulated Embedded Value (EV) as the basis for 
supplementary reporting. (4) The adoption of the IFRSs by European life insurers. These 
developments can be subdivided into three main categories: (1) The developments in the 
statutory reporting. (2) The supplementary reporting. (3) The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) project for insurance contracts. 
2.2.2.4.1. The Developments in Statutory Reporting 
Traditionally, the UK jurisdictions require very prudent assumptions for estimating life insurer 
financial positions. The amounts reported in the statutory accounts reflected the Statutory 
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Solvency Basis (SSB), which was introduced by the 1870 Life Insurance Companies Act. This 
methodology required that profits should be distributed in line with a professional actuarial 
valuation to certify a fund adequacy to meet its liabilities. It was oriented towards a delay in 
the recognition and distribution of profits20 by applying overly conservative estimates; in 
particular, the discount rates (O’Brien, 2009b) and initial acquisition costs were written off as 
expenses. Consequently, a new life insurance policy was reported initially at a negative net 
present value, which was called the ‘new business strain’. This initial deficit was covered by 
reserves; consequently, the accounting result for a single policy led to losses for the first three 
to six years of the policy duration (Horton and Macve, 1994; 1995; 1997; 1998; Horton, 2007; 
Horton, Macve and Serafeim, 2007). 
The EU Insurance Accounts Directive (IAD) was introduced in 1991 (EU, 1991) and became 
effective from 1 January 1995 outlaws the SSB and introduces the Modified Statutory Solvency 
Basis (MSSB), which enables life insurers to defer the initial acquisition costs of new life 
business and amortise the costs over the life of the policy, and, hence, eliminates the initial 
deficit. However, the MSSB requires excessively conservative estimation (less than the SSB), 
in particular discount rates that unwind to profits over the life insurance policy life (Horton, 
2007). Moreover, the Value of New Business (VNB) acquired during the period for which the 
financial statements are prepared and the future of profits from existing business are omitted 
from financial statements prepared under the MSSB. As a result, the life insurer financial 
statements are still unable to show whether ‘the current financial result’ is related to business 
                                                          
20 O’Brien (1994) argued that the reported profits under the SSB could not be the profits that reflect a true and fair 
view since: (1) Surplus that was reported as excess of regulatory value of assets and liabilities after deduction of 
claims, expenses and tax was overly conservative because of the prudence of the valuation of assets and liabilities 
on a basis designed to monitor solvency. (2) The amount of surplus distributed to shareholders was related to rules 
on surplus sharing between policyholders and shareholders. (3) High initial expenses meant that profits were 
understated when levels of new business were high. (4) The amount of undistributed surplus was not transferrable, 
and, hence, there was a reduction of the amount of surplus transferred to shareholders. 
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acquired during the period for which financial statements are prepared or business acquired in 
the past periods, and from which business profitability is derived (Horton, 2007). 
2.2.2.4.2. The Supplementary Reporting 
In the early 1990s in the UK, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) proposed an alternative 
methodology with the aims of reporting shareholders’ profits and recognising profits in 
shareholders’ funds. These profits comprise the present value of shareholders’ interest in the 
life assurance business that are related to shareholders’ net assets. However, these efforts are 
constrained by the IAD (EU, 1991), which requires life insurers to report profits that are 
consistent with accounting principles. Consequently, life insurers are only permitted to use the 
MSSB and are prohibited from using the EV that includes the value of profits that have not 
been made (O’Brien, 1994). Meanwhile, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) prohibits the 
UK life insurers from using the EV in statutory accounts. Similarly, the ABI included this 
restriction in the Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) (ABI, 2006). Consequently, life 
insurers voluntarily disclose the EV based information in their supplementary accounts 
(Almezweq and Liu, 2012; 2013). 
The CFO Forum launched a project to standardise21 the financial disclosures of the EV in 2004. 
The project aims are to provide a basis for European insurers for preparing and disclosing their 
EV reports and eliminating diversifications in practice for the EV calculations and disclosures 
(CFO Forum, 2004a;b). The CFO Forum published the European Embedded Value Principles 
(EEVP) in May 2004 (CFO Forum, 2004a;b). Later, they published additional guidance in 
                                                          
21 Prior to 2004, there was no standardised methodology to calculate and report the EV for either European or 
worldwide life insurers with the exception of the UK. The British life insurers had disclosed the EV calculated in 
accordance with the ABI guidance from the 1990s until 2005 (Horton, 2007; Almezweq and Liu, 2012; 2013). 
This traditional EV was subject to criticism, as it did not take into account the time value of options and guarantees 
sold with insurance policies when computing the PVIF, and, hence, the PVIF value was overstated (Almezweq 
and Liu, 2012; 2013). 
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October 2005 (CFO Forum, 2005). In June 2008, the CFO Forum published the Market 
Consistent European Embedded Value Principles (MCEVP) (CFO Forum, 2008a;b). The stated 
aim is to bring a greater consistency and improved disclosure to the EEV disclosures by 
European life insurers. The CFO Forum intended to make the MCEVP the only recognised 
format of the EV reporting from 31 December 2011 and the CFO Forum permitted early 
adoption of the MCEVP. However, in April 2011, the CFO Forum withdrew the requirement 
that the MCEVP is the only recognised format of the EV from 31 December 2011; the reason 
given was that the withdrawal reflects the ongoing development of insurance reporting under 
the Solvency II project and the IASB project for insurance contracts (CFO Forum, 2012). 
The EV gives life insurers a huge advantage compared to statutory reporting. It enables life 
insurers to report the Present Value of In-force Business (PVIF), which is omitted from 
statutory reports. The PVIF provides the basis for assessing the financial performance of life 
insurers; the PVIF enables users to assess the abilities of life insurers to generate future profits. 
Furthermore, the EV also enables life insurers to report the VNB, which is a component of the 
profits reported under the EV (PEV). The VNB shows the proportion of future profits (PVIF) 
attributed to underwriting activities for each financial year. The VNB value shows the future 
profits from new policies that are acquired in each reporting period, and, hence, it provides a 
basis for assessing underwriting performance of life insurers. As for management use, decision 
makers in life insurance companies consider the EV to be a very useful tool for management 
purposes, such as, decision-making and valuation (Horton, Macve and Serafeim, 2006). 
2.2.2.4.3. The IASB Project for Insurance Contracts 
The European law has required all European listed companies to adopt the IFRSs in their 
consolidated accounts since January 1st 2005 (EU, 2002b). The IFRSs made limited 
improvements to accounting practices for insurance contracts as the main accounting standard 
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is still under development. This project began in 1997 when the Board’s predecessor 
organisation, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), commenced work on 
a project on insurance contracts because: (1) The IASC had not issued any standards on 
insurance contracts. (2) Insurance contracts were excluded from the scope of other relevant 
IASC standards. (3) There was diversification in accounting practices for insurance contracts. 
(4) The accounting practice for insurance contracts was often different from practices in other 
sectors. (5) Users of insurer financial statements argued that they were difficult to understand 
(IASB, 2007). 
The first output of the project appeared in 1999 when the IASC Steering Committee published 
an issue paper, which attracted 138 comment letters. The Steering Committee concluded its 
work by developing a ‘draft statement of principles’. The IASB included this project in its 
initial work plan in 2001. The project was divided into two phases mainly due to it not being 
feasible to complete the project for implementation in 2005, the time when all listed companies 
adopted the IASB standards. 
Phase I was completed in 2004, when the IASB issued ‘IFRS 4 insurance contracts’. The main 
objectives of the phase were: (1) To make limited improvements to accounting practices for 
insurance contracts. (2) To avoid requiring major changes that Phase II might reverse. (3) To 
achieve this, IFRS 4 permits most previous accounting practices for insurance contracts to 
continue. IFRS 4 also exempts insurers from a hierarchy of criteria, specified in International 
Accounting Standard 8 (IAS 8): accounting policies, changes in accounting estimates and 
errors (IASB, 2003). (4) To require an insurer to disclose information relating to insurance 
contracts (IASB, 2004). 
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The first output of Phase II was in 2007, when the board published a discussion paper 
‘Preliminary views on insurance contracts’ (IASB, 2007). The paper proposed that life insurers 
should measure their insurance contracts at the current exit value (CEV), representing the 
amount insurers would expect to pay on reporting date to transfer their remaining contractual 
rights and obligations immediately to another entity. The discussion paper proposed that 
insurers should determine this amount using the following three building blocks: (1) Explicit, 
unbiased, market-consistent, probability-weighted and current estimates of the contractual cash 
flows. (2) Current market discount rates that adjust the estimated future cash flows for the time 
value of money. (3) An explicit and unbiased estimate of the margin that market participants 
require for bearing risk (a risk margin) and for providing other services (a service margin), if 
any (IASB, 2007). 
The respondents for the discussion paper in general found the three building blocks a helpful 
tool for analysis; however, almost all the respondents had concerns regarding the CEV 
measurement approach. They suggested that the measurement approach should reflect the fact 
that insurers generally expect to fulfil their liabilities as they become due over time by paying 
benefits and claims to policyholders, rather than reflect an estimate of the price for a transfer 
of the liabilities to a third party. They stated that a transfer objective is the wrong principle for 
items that will not be, and often cannot be, transferred (IASB, 2010a;b). 
Consistent with respondents’ suggestions, the board modified the measurement approach in the 
exposure draft published in July 2010 (IASB, 2010a; b). The new approach measures life 
insurance contracts as the sum of: (1) The expected present value of the future cash outflows 
less future cash inflows that will arise as insurers fulfil insurance contracts, adjusted for the 
effects of uncertainty with respect to the amount and timing of those future cash flows (present 
value of the fulfilment cash flows). (2) A residual margin that eliminates any gain at inception 
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of the contract, which arises when the present value of the fulfilment cash flows is less than 
zero (for instance, when the expected present value of the future cash outflows plus the risk 
adjustment is less than the expected present value of the future cash inflows) (IASB, 2010a;b). 
However, on 28/09/2012, the IASB realised news that the board has decided to make 
adjustments to the current proposal through republishing a new exposure draft in 2013 (IASB, 
2012). The new exposure draft published on 20th of June 2013 (IASB, 2013a), this includes the 
exposure draft (IASB, 2013b), the basis for conclusion (IASB, 2013c), illustrative examples 
(IASB, 2013d) and summary (snapshot) (IASB, 2013e). The new exposure draft maintains the 
fulfilment cash flow model for measuring insurance contracts; however, the IASB proposed 
amendment regarding presentation, accounting treatments for adjustments in future value, 
determinant of expense and the requirements for first time adoption (IASB, 2013b; c; d; e). It 
is expected the new standard will enhance the transparency and reduce complexity of insurer 
financial statements (IASB, 2013b, c, d, e); however, it is expected the new standard to increase 
the volatility of the profit/loss and equity (KPMG, 2013). 
2.2.3. The British Insurance Industry Since 1970s 
Historically, it is argued the financial agglomeration22 in the London in 19th century attracted 
financial intermediaries such as life insurance companies (Quinn, 2004), these companies held 
about 20% of total financial intermediary assets in 1873 (Davis and Gallman, 2000; Quinn, 
2004). It is argued that life insurance companies were most important groups in the London 
Stock Exchange in the early 20th century, they held over £450 million value of assets in 1910, 
accounting to more than 20% of national income (Clapham, 1938; Thomas, 2004). The life 
insurance companies grew by 3.3% over the period 1913-1938 (Clapham, 1938; Thomas, 
2004). Since 1980, there has been considerable increased in the contributions of the insurance 
                                                          
22 The value of securities on the London Stock Exchange was £2.3 Billion in 1873 (Michie, 1999). 
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industry (and financial sector in general) to the British economy measured using the Gross 
Value Added23 (GVA) as shown in Figure 5 with average 2% of the total UK GVA over the 
same period compared to about 8% for the financial sector. 
Figure 5: The GVA of the British Insurance Industry 1987-2010 
 
Source: the author — the ONS, reference ‘NRHH’ and ‘KKK9’ (ONS, 2013d). 
It is argued three factors are the key for the developments of the British insurance industry 
since 1980s. These factors are: (1) the significant increase in the demand for insurance products 
in particular pension since 1980s. (2) The liberalisation of the European insurance market as 
well as the globalisation of the insurance industry. (3) The technological changes. 
As for significant increase in the life insurance demand since 1980s, the life insurance business 
has grown significantly since 1945, this can be related to the adopting of life cover and 
mortgage based investment products (Watson, 2004), which has created a significant growth 
in the long-term financial instruments, such as fixed-interest mortgages and loans. However, 
life insurers have moved towards investment in equity, it is argued this trend is evidenced 
during the interwar period; however, the most of adopting of the equity instruments took place 
post the war period (see Watson, 2004). As for pension, it is argued that the demographic 
                                                          
23 It measures the contribution of a sector to the economy net of intermediate consumption. 
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changes, social changes, economic incentives and fiscal incentives influence the significant 
expansion in the private pension sector; this expansion is evident in 1980s as individuals were 
allowed / encouraged to contract out of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (see 
Watson, 2004). Statistically, insurance providers (including pension funds) have become key 
active institutional investors in the UK since 1980s; holding over 40% of the value of the UK 
quoted shares in 1981 and over 50% in 1990 see Figure 6, whereas all British institutional 
investors were only hold a third of the equities issued by British companies in 1958 (see 
Watson, 2004). However, since the 1992 the proportion of shares held by insurance providers 
(including pension funds) has been falling gradually to reach its lowest level just over 14% in 
2010. This can be related to the fact that insurance providers have broadened their portfolios 
to spread risk and seek higher return. 
Figure 6: The Proportion of the UK Quoted Shares Held by Insurers 1963-2010 
 
Source: the author — the ONS, reference ‘DEYG’ and ‘DEYH’ (ONS, 2013e). 
Regarding the liberalisation of the insurance market, this can be divided into internal reform 
and European reform; however, both reforms are closely linked (see regulatory developments 
of the UK life insurance industry). 
Finally technological changes, it is argued the increasing the usage of computer-based service 
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and using this information in marketing and market segmentation. However, the lower cost 
financial services has attracted interest from retailers such as supermarkets to enter the British 
insurance market; creating a new source of competition for conventional market players (see 
Thomas, 2004) (a detailed analysis of the UK insurer ownership by the non-insurance 
institutions is provided in Table 31 in Appendix). Furthermore, access to customer information 
enables life insurers to focus on relations to increase their retentions and target desirable 
customers with products which reward loyalty (Thomas, 2004; Ennew and Waite, 2007). 
These developments in the in British financial services market (including the insurance 
industry) have some key implications reflected in the structure and delivery of insurance 
products. (1) Since the early 1980s, the activities of the individual financial institution have 
become more varied, making distinction between banks such building societies and non-banks 
such as asset management and insurers less sharp (Watson, 2004). In contrast, the 
developments of the financial intermediary in the UK during the 19th century characterised by 
existence of clear market segmentations, including banks, brokers, building societies, insurance 
companies (Thomas, 2004). The dimension of the financial service market segments on the 
institutional and functional levels has led to broaden the scope of operations which 
intermediaries can access; creating intensively competitive market and putting pressure on 
firms to reduce the unit costs of their delivery (Thomas, 2004); a detailed analysis of the UK 
insurer ownership by non-insurance institutions is provided in Table 31 in Appendix. (2) The 
European directives treat foreign financial institutions (from non-member states) that are 
authorised to operate within a single member state as member states financial institutions 
(home institutions); permitting the foreign financial institutions operating in the UK to access 
the European market. This has promoted competition between financial institutions in Europe 
and increased the attraction of the London base (Thomas, 2004). (3) The liberalization of the 
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European insurance market increases competiveness pressure leading to cost cutting, and, 
hence, enhance the overall efficiency and productivity of the European insurers (Swiss Re, 
1996; Fenn et. al., 2008; Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013). (4) Increase in the concentration 
within the industry, making the whole industry dominated by smaller number of groups (see 
Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien 2002 and Davutyan and Klumpes, 2008) (see Table 31 in 
Appendix). 
2.3. Data and Sample 
This section introduces the regulatory returns and then explains the data and final sample for 
all empirical chapters of this thesis. 
2.3.1. The FSA Returns 
Part of the regulatory requirements for the UK life insurers, they must submit annual returns to 
the supervisory authority (the FSA and formerly the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)) 
on the legal entity level (not the group level) including braches operating in the UK. The returns 
are submitted in separate statutory forms for general and life insurance businesses (see FSA, 
2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). Given that 
this thesis focuses on the life insurance industry using data from the SynThesys life database 
(version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released), only forms that are available in the SynThesys life 
database will be explained briefly below, see Table 1.  
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Table 1: The Classification of the FSA Returns as in the SynThesys Life Database 
Classification Classification  Form Name  
Solvency and 
Capital 
General  Form 01 Statement of solvency - general insurance business 
Form 11 Calculation of general insurance capital requirement - premiums amount and brought forward amount 
Form 12 Calculation of general insurance capital requirement - claims amount and result 
 
Life  Form 02 Statement of solvency - long-term insurance business (see Table 16 in Appendix)  
Form 03 Components of capital resources 
Form 10 Statement of net assets 
Form 60 Long-term insurance capital requirement 
 
Assets and 
Liabilities 
Policyholders Form 13 Analysis of admissible assets (see Table 17 in Appendix) 
Form 14 Long-term insurance business liabilities and margins (see Table 20 in Appendix) 
Form 17 Analysis of derivative contracts (see Table 19 in Appendix) 
Form 18 With-profits insurance capital component for the fund 
Form 19 Realistic balance sheet 
Form 44 Long-term insurance business: Linked funds balance sheet (see Table 18 in Appendix) 
Form 48 Long-term insurance business: Assets not held to match linked liabilities 
Form 49 Long-term insurance business: Fixed and variable interest assets 
Form 50 Long-term insurance business: Summary of mathematical reserves (see Table 21 in Appendix) 
Form 51 Long-term insurance business: Valuation summary of non-linked contracts (other than accumulating with-profits contracts) 
Form 52 Long-term insurance business: Valuation summary of accumulating with-profits contracts 
Form 53 Long-term insurance business: Valuation summary of property linked contracts 
Form 54 Long-term insurance business: Valuation summary of index linked contracts 
Form 56 Long-term insurance business: Index linked business 
 
Shareholders Form 13* Analysis of admissible assets (see Table 17 in Appendix) 
Form 15 Liabilities (other than long-term insurance business) 
Form 17* Analysis of derivative contracts (see Table19 in Appendix) 
 
Income and 
Expense 
Policyholders Form 40 Long-term insurance business: Revenue account (see Table 22 in Appendix) 
Form 41 Long-term insurance business: Analysis of premiums (see Table 23 in Appendix) 
Form 42 Long-term insurance business: Analysis of claims (see Table 24 in Appendix) 
Form 43 Long-term insurance business: Analysis of expenses (see Table 25 in Appendix) 
Form 45 Long-term insurance business: Revenue account for internal linked funds (see Table 27 in Appendix) 
Form 46 Long-term insurance business: Summary of new business (see Table 28 in Appendix) 
Form 47 Long-term insurance business: Analysis of new business (see Table 29 in Appendix) 
Form 58 Long-term insurance business: Distribution of surplus (see Table 26 in Appendix) 
Form 59A Long-term insurance business: With-profits payouts on maturity (normal retirement) 
Form 59B Long-term insurance business: With-profits payouts on surrender 
 
Shareholders Form 16 Profit and loss account (non-technical account) (see Table 30 in Appendix) 
Source: the author. 
Where:  
Forms 13 and 17 are available separately for the LTIB (life) and the OLTIB (general’s and shareholders’ assets). 
Forms report separately for assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and capital; they also report 
separately for policyholders’ (long-terms insurance business (LTIB)) assets, liabilities, 
revenues, expenses and capital; and shareholders’ (other than long-term insurance business 
assets (OLTIB)) assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and capital. The OLTIB includes 
shareholders’ assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and capital and the general insurance 
business’s assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and capital if the life insurer is a composite 
insurer (life and general insurer). It is surprising that the SynThesys life database version 10.1 
15-August 2011 released includes forms for the general insurance business only, namely, Form 
1; Form 11 and Form 12, these forms are related to general insurer capital (see FSA, 2008a; 
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KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). There are two 
forms, namely, Form 13 and Form 17 are available separately for the LTIB and the OLTIB. 
For purpose of this analysis, forms are subdivided into three main categories, namely, solvency 
and capital, assets and liabilities, income and expense, see Table 1. Firstly solvency and capital 
forms, these forms are available for general and life insurers separately. For the general 
insurance business, Form 11 and Form 12 present the detailed calculation of the general 
insurance business minimum capital requirements, whereas Form 2 summaries the capital 
resource and capital requirements as well as solvency margin for general insurers (see FSA, 
2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012), it is 
noticeable these forms are blank in the SynThesys life database version 10.1 unless the life 
insurers are composite insurers. As for the life business, there are four forms for solvency and 
capital, namely, Form 2, Form 3, Form 10 and Form 60. Form 60 presents the detailed 
calculations of the capital requirements of the life insurance business, whereas Form 2 presents 
a summary of the capital resources, capital requirements and solvency margin for the life 
insurance business (see FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 
and KPMG, 2012). Form 10 is used to present the financial position of the entity including the 
capital requirements; however, this form has been replaced by Form 3 since 2004, which 
summaries the capital requirements subdivided into different tiers as part of the FSA efforts to 
enhance the solvency requirements following the near collapsed of the Equitable Life in 2000 
(see FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). 
However, Form 10 is still required from some branches as they are exempted from Form 3 (see 
FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). 
Given that Form 2 is a key form for this thesis and many variables are based on this form, it is 
presented in Table 16 in Appendix. 
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Regarding asset and liability forms, they are available for policyholders’ assets and liabilities 
only, namely, Form 13, Form 14, Form 17, Form 18, Form 19, Form 44, Form 48 and Form 
50; and for shareholders only Form 13, Form 15 and Form 17. As for assets, Form 13 (LTIB) 
summaries in details assets held by life insurers, namely, policyholders’ admissible assets and 
it reconciles the admissible value of these assets to the GAAP / IFRSs value (see FSA, 2008a; 
KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012); see Table 17 in 
Appendix. This form is also available for shareholders’ assets (including the general insurance 
business based assets for composite insurers) (OLTIB). For purpose of this thesis, admissible 
assets reported in the Form 13 has been classified into nine categories, namely, land and 
buildings, affiliates (investments), equities, linked assets, other assets, mortgages and loans, 
cash, debtors and accrued income based on the classification reported in the Standard and 
Poor’s guidance for the SynThesys life database, (Standard and Poor’s, 2010), see Table 17 in 
Appendix. Admissible assets reported in this form is also classified into assets held to back up 
linked liabilities and assets held to back non-linked liabilities, see Table 17 in Appendix. Form 
44 reports assets held to back linked liabilities (property unit-linked) in details see Table 18 in 
Appendix, whereas Form 48 reports assets held to back non-linked liabilities in details; 
unfortunately Form 48 has only become available for non-profit, with-profits and unitised with-
profits since 2005 (see FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 
and KPMG, 2012), prior to this it was only available at the aggregated level for all non-linked 
products based assets. Similarly, Form 56 reports assets held to back up linked liabilities (index 
unit-linked); however, it has become only available since 2008. 
Finally, Form 17 reports assets and liabilities under derivative contracts separately, it also 
reports derivative has been bought or sold over the financial year; see Table 19 in Appendix. 
Similar to Form 13, Form 17 is also available for the LTIB and the OLTIB. In 2008, the FSA 
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has changed the requirements with respect to Form 17 (FSA, 2008b); this change provides 
more details to the derivative instruments that are being used by UK life insurers. Finally, prior 
to 1994, derivatives reported only in Form 13 in a single line as there was no Form 17. As for 
liabilities, Form 14 reports policyholders’ liabilities and reconciles admissible value of these 
liabilities to its GAAP / IFRSs based valuation, see Table 20 in Appendix, whereas Form 15 
reports shareholders’ liabilities; the OLTIB. The mathematical reserves are reported in Form 
50 (see Table 21 in Appendix), which summaries the valuation of mathematical reserves 
reported in Form 51, Form 52, Form 53, Form 54 at the product line level. Finally, the FSA 
introduced a new valuation (‘the realistic balance sheet’) for with-profits funds in 2004 (FSA, 
2003b; Sheldon and Smith, 2004; O’Brien, 2009a). This valuation requires with-profits 
insurers to value with-profits assets and liabilities on a market-consistent basis, if the with-
profits liabilities exceed £500 million. Unlike the premium (conventional) valuation, the new 
valuation includes the value of future bonuses in insurers’ liabilities, and it values guarantees 
and options in the same method capital markets would value them (modern portfolio theory; 
taking into account time value of option and guarantees) . The realistic balance sheet has been 
reported in Forms 18 and 19 since 2004 (see FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; 
Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). 
Income and expense, these forms report revenue and expense streams for the LTIB and the 
OLTIB separately as well as the distribution of funds for the LTIB. There is one form, Form 
16 (see Table 30 in Appendix), reports revenue and expense streams for shareholders, the 
OLTIB, it is similar to profit and loss account, it only reports amount of surplus transferred to 
non-technical accounts as the main revenue stream for shareholders. Unfortunately, this form 
does not report fees charged to linked funds as part of shareholders revenues as they are 
reported as part of expenses in Form 40 (see Table 22 in Appendix); making linked based life 
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insurers report almost no revenues from the LTIB in Form 16. As for policyholders’ forms, it 
is noticeable that these forms report stream of revenues and expenses related to policyholders; 
this makes it is possible to examine the revenue and expense streams from policyholders’ 
perspective. As for Form 40 (see Table 22 in Appendix); this is a summary form concerning 
premiums reported in Form 41 (see Table 23 in Appendix); claims reported in Form 42 (see 
Table 24 in Appendix) and expenses reported in Form 43 (see Table 25 in Appendix), it also 
shows the realised and unrealised gains as well as tax and other expenses. This form also 
reconciles the available funds at the beginning of the period (value of policyholders’ assets) 
and new funds (raised during the current period). This form reports shareholders’ shares in 
surplus as the amount transferred to non-technical account (transferred to Form 16) but it 
reports fees charged to linked funds as part of expense. This form is linked to Form 58 (see 
Table 26 in Appendix), which shows the distribution of funds to mathematical reserves and 
surpluses. Form 41 (Table 23 in Appendix), Form 42 (Table 24 in Appendix) and Form 43 
(Table 25 in Appendix) report premiums, claims and expenses, respectively at the aggregated 
level and the segmental level, namely, life, pension and overseas; however, the segmental level 
in Form 43 has become only available since 2005. 
Furthermore, new premiums (including number of new policyholders) are reported in Form 46 
(Table 28 in Appendix) and Form 47 (Table 29 in Appendix). Form 46 can be considered as 
summary for Form 47; however, Form 46 reports new premiums and number of new 
policyholders at aggregated and segmental levels; whereas Form 47 reports new premiums and 
number of new policyholders by product lines, namely, with-profits, non-profit, unitised with-
profits, property unit-linked and index unit-linked, and by segments. Moreover, Form 45 (Table 
27 in Appendix) reports revenues and expenses related to the unit-linked business; it is similar 
to Form 40. Finally, Form 59 A and B report maturity payouts and surrenders payouts for with-
41 
 
profits life assurance policies, respectively. Form 49 reports interest revenues on different class 
of policyholders’ assets since 2005; however, it is only available at the aggregated level prior 
to 2005. 
2.3.2. Data and Sample 
The data is derived from the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released) 
provided by the Standard and Poor’s (S&P); the data is available in separate forms (see Table 
1). All variables used in this thesis are based on the following forms: Form 2 (Table 16 in 
Appendix), Form 13 (Table 17 in Appendix), Form 14 (Table 20 in Appendix), Form 17 (Table 
19 in Appendix), Form 40 (Table 22 in Appendix), Form 41 (Table 23 in Appendix), Form 42 
(Table 24 in Appendix), Form 43 (Table 25 in Appendix), Form 44 (Table 18 in Appendix), 
Form 45 (Table 27 in Appendix), Form 46 (Table 28 in Appendix), Form 47 (Table 29 in 
Appendix), Form 50 (Table 21 in Appendix) and Form 58 (Table 26 in Appendix). 
The sample consists of three hundred and sixty nine companies; however, one firm has no data, 
namely, Legal and General Pensions Ltd, the remaining initial sample is 368 firms. A firm is 
only included in the sample if it reports Form 40 and Form 13, and Line 59 (fund carried 
forward) in Form 40 has non-zero value (it cannot be negative) for a particular period (during 
the terminal year the sum of negative value reported in Line 39 in From 40 (Increase /decrease 
in fund in financial year) and positive value reported in Line 49 in From 40 (Fund brought 
forward) is equally to zero). The sample consists of 5601 observations for 368 firms over the 
period 1985-2010. The Table 31 (in Appendix) shows that the sample period for each firm; 
including which years and how many years are included for each firm. It shows whether the 
firm is mutual or proprietary, the UK based or overseas based and whether the firm is an 
insurer, a bank, other financial services or non-financial services for each year over the sample 
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period. The author classifies insurers to mutual and proprietary; the UK and international; 
insurers, banks, financial services and non-financial services based on the parent status; noting 
for some firms the parent is the firm itself such as some mutual firms or individually operating 
firms (neither branch nor subsidiary). All original parents and changes in the parents; 
ownership, over the period 1985-2010 information / data is collected manually for each firm 
based on the SynThesys life database user guide (Standard and Poor’s, 2010: pp. 36-53), the 
individual firm website (if it is available), parent website (the group website), Fame database, 
Thomson one Banker, companies house, ABI website, relevant previous publications or reports 
about the industry, Google, etc. This has been done by determining the parent (s) for each firm 
for each year over the sample period, then determining whether the parent is mutual or 
proprietary; the UK based or overseas based (firms based on these countries were found: 
Australia, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Russian, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, 
USA); and whether the parents are insurer, bank, other financial services (such as asset 
management) and non-financial services (mainly retailers). A comprehensive list is presented 
in Table 31 in Appendix showing the mutual / proprietary status, the UK / international status 
and insurer / bank / other financial services and non-financial services status for each firm over 
the period 1985-2010; a completed copy is also available upon request. 
The sample includes independently operating and reporting the UK based life insurance 
companies (including composite insurers). It also includes six branches filing their annual 
returns concerning their UK operations and one reinsurer branch filing its returns regarding the 
UK and overseas operations. The data covers the authorised UK life insurers; however, it does 
not cover the European Economic Area (EEA) based life insurers operating in the UK. These 
insurers are no longer required to submit returns since the adoption of the third council life 
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insurance directives (92/49/eec partially repealed by 2002/83/EC) or 'Single Passport' in 1994 
(EU, 1992; 2002). 
The number of the UK life insurers has declined considerably over the period since 1980s due 
to the M&A (Swiss Re, 2006; Carter and Falush, 2009). It went down from 229 (1985) to 143 
(2010). The number includes the proprietary and mutual UK life insurers; however, the number 
of mutual life insurers has declined considerable due to demutualisation and the M&A activities 
(Swiss Re, 1999; Carter and Falush, 2009). 
In this chapter, to ensure inter-temporal comparability of figures and tables the financial data 
were deflated by the UK GDP deflator index (HM Treasury, 2012). This means all of variables 
are in real value term of the 2010 price. 
2.4. Products, Ownership and their Developments 
2.4.1. The UK life Insurance Products 
The life insurance business products can be subdivided into non-linked and unit-linked life 
assurance business products as shown in Figure 7 (see Table 29 in Appendix). The non-linked 
business is the life assurance business in which the financial health of insurers is directly 
connected to liabilities contained within tranches of the business. This business can be 
subdivided into with-profits and non-profit. The unit-linked business, it is the life insurance 
business in which the benefits paid to policyholders are related to the performance of the 
underlying assets that are invested in a linked fund; this business is subdivided into property 
unit-linked and index unit-linked. There is a hybrid life insurance business called unitised with-
profits that combines some features of the unit-linked and the with-profits business. 
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Figure 7: The Structure of the UK Life Insurance and Products 
 
Source: the author. 
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2.4.1.1. The With-Profits Life Insurance Business 
The with-profits life insurance business is also referred as ‘Participating Business’ or 
conventional with-profits. A with-profits life insurance contract is typically a long-term saving 
contract; premiums are invested in a pooled fund made up of a range of assets, such as equities 
and property. It contains a certain minimum guarantee regarding the payout, which usually 
increases over the lifetime of the policy as annual bonuses24 are declared and added to the 
policy amount of premium funds invested by insurers. Moreover, it has a payout that reflects 
‘smoothing’ to cushion policyholders from the extreme fluctuations in the property and equity 
markets, and gives policyholders the right to share in a certain amount of profits or losses, 
which include those arising from mortality risks and expense risks and any distributions from 
‘inherited estate’25. With-profits policies are long-term in nature and serve as a general 
investment / saving vehicle, the majority of policies have one of the following aims: repaying 
a mortgage; financing a pension; providing a regular income from savings. 
A policyholder purchases a with-profits policy through the payment of premiums, either as 
single premiums (single lump sum) or recurrent single premiums (a series of non-contractual 
lump sums) or regular premiums (a series of regular contractual amounts). A with-profits 
policy has as a clearly defined initial guaranteed amount (known as the sum assured on non-
pension policies) which increase from the initial level throughout the duration of the policy by 
the addition, usually annually, of regular bonuses which once added cannot be removed (FSA, 
2001). The bonuses are the share of with-profits policyholders in with-profits funds surpluses, 
which can be subdivided into three main types, namely, reversionary bonuses, interim bonuses 
                                                          
24 The Equitable Life Assurance Society was the first to grant the first bonuses to holders of with-profits policies 
in 1781; the Society distributed the accumulated surplus rising as result of better than expected mortality 
experience (Needleman and Roff, 1995). 
25 The excess of with-profits fund assets over and above liabilities. 
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and terminal bonuses. Unlike interim and terminal bonuses, reversionary bonuses once 
declared are added to life insurer liabilities, while terminal bonuses are additional payments at 
the time of a claim, and interim bonuses are additional payments to policyholders who have a 
claim between declarations of reversionary bonus as these policyholders might otherwise be 
treated unfairly (O’Brien, 2004). Moreover, bonuses may be paid in cash form, instead 
policyholders can use dividends to buy additional benefits, or they may use the dividends to 
reduce the amount of regular premiums payable under their policies (Ramlau-Hansen, 1991; 
O’Brien, 2004). 
The current guaranteed amount (the initial guaranteed amount plus the total of any regular 
bonuses and interim bonus added) will be paid when a claim is made on death, maturity, 
retirement, or some other specified date usually together with an additional, discretionary, 
terminal bonus either a cash amount, or an annuity. However, if a policyholder elects to 
surrender, the surrender benefit will usually be subject to life insurers’ discretions. 
Regarding with-profits surplus distribution, 100% of surplus is distributed to policyholders of 
mutual life insurers. In contrast, only 90% of surplus from the with-profits fund is distributed 
to policyholders of proprietary life insurers (O’Brien, 2009b). Concerning with-profits policies, 
there are many types and legal forms with respect to how long they last, what events will trigger 
a claim payment, and how any guaranteed benefits are expressed. The main with-profits policy 
types are: whole life policy, endowment policy, pension policy and with-profits annuity. 
2.4.1.2. The Non-Profit Life Insurance Business 
The non-profit life insurance business consists of non-profit insurance contracts at which life 
insurers make all decisions with respect to asset allocation, switching and timing. Moreover, 
life insurers determine investment policy in accordance with the FSA regulations. Holders of 
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non-profit policies are entitled to promised benefits under the contractual terms; however, they 
do not have a share of any surplus. The policies come in a variety of types and legal forms; the 
main non-profit policy types are non-profit annuity, critical illness cover and income 
protection. 
2.4.1.3. The Unitised With-Profits Life Insurance Business 
The unitised with-profits life insurance business emerged in the early 1980s as a means to offer 
a hybrid solution. It can be made to combine some of the capital advantages to insurers of the 
unit-linked business, while freeing policyholders and their financial advisers from making asset 
allocation decisions (Richards, 2004). Moreover, it provides policyholders with greater 
flexibility over the timing of premiums payments and facilitates, through a single policy, partial 
investment in with-profits funds and in other, unit-linked funds offered by the insurer. The 
premiums paid by a policyholder are used to purchase units in the unitised with-profits fund at 
the current unit price. The guaranteed amount receive under a unitised with-profits policy is 
the number of units allocated to the policy times the current unit price (this is known as the 
face value of units) and the terminal bonus may then be added to this amount. However, the 
guaranteed payment to the policyholder could be reduced in certain circumstances, at the 
discretion of the insurer, below the face value of units; this is can be done through the 
application of the Market Value Reduction (MVR). 
The main difference between with-profits and unitised with-profits is the guaranteed benefits. 
In the with-profits business, the guaranteed benefit is determined with reference to the total 
sum of the premiums paid through the lifetime of the policy. In unitised with-profits, in 
contrast, the guaranteed benefit is determined with reference to units bought only as each 
premium payment is used to buy units in a unitised with-profits fund that provide a guaranteed 
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benefit. Therefore, the guaranteed benefit of unitised with-profits grows more slowly than with 
with-profits (Myners, 2001; O’Brien, 2009b). On the other hand, the main difference between 
unitised the with-profits and unit-linked business is that the value of a unitised with-profits 
policy depends on the bonuses added and the market value of the units bought, while the value 
of the unit-linked business depends directly on the market value of the underlying assets. The 
unitised with-profits policies come in a variety of types and legal forms with respect to how 
long they last, what events will trigger a claim payment and how any guaranteed benefits are 
expressed. The main unitised with-profits policy types are whole life policy, endowment 
policy, pension policy and unitised with-profits annuity. 
For purpose of this thesis, the unitised with-profits life insurance business will be considered 
as part of the with-profits life insurance business, and, hence, the non-linked life insurance 
business. This can be justified as follows: (1) The unitised with-profits life insurance business 
was developed in the 1980s but separate data has become only available since 1996. (2) The 
market share of the with-profits business including the unitised with-profits life insurance 
business was about 5% of new premiums in 2010 (see Figure 8). 
2.4.1.4. The Unit-Linked Life Insurance Business (Property and Index) 
The unit-linked insurance business involves the policyholders (or their financial advisers) in 
determining the investment strategies for their individual policies. In the unit-linked business, 
life insurers maintain a separate and explicit asset account for each policy, and, hence, each 
policy can be invested entirely and independently of the others. Moreover, in the unit-linked 
business the investment flexibility is under the control of policyholders, not the life insurers 
(Richards, 2004). The value of a unit-linked policy is directly linked to the investment 
performance of the unitised funds selected by the policyholders (Richards, 2004). 
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The unit-linked contracts give policyholders (or their financial advisers) greater investment 
choice and flexibility, combined with greater clarity over charging structures and freedom from 
seemingly arbitrary changes in bonus rates (Richards, 2004). Moreover, it allows policyholders 
to take more aggressive (or defensive) investment stances than life insurers may be willing or 
able to take. Similarly, the unit-linked business enables financial advisers to tailor the 
investment strategies of their clients. 
The unit-linked business gives life insurers a number of very important advantages compared 
to the non-linked business: (1) It transfers the investment risk to policyholders (Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1976; Knights and Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2006a,b; Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011; Aviva Plc, 2008; 2009; 
2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). (2) It is much less capital intensive than the non-linked business. For 
instance, the non-linked business demands a solvency margin (in accordance with European 
regulation) of 4% of the basic technical provision, whereas a unit-linked business without 
investment or expense guarantees can have a solvency margin rate of 0% (Diacon et. al., 2004; 
Richards, 2004). (3) Life insurers can deduct unit-linked policy fees directly from the unit-
linked funds irrespective of premiums payments, which means that life insurers have reduced 
the risk of premiums not being paid by policyholders, assuming that sufficient premiums have 
been paid to provide a fund from which to deduct such charges in the first place. The non-
linked policies come in a variety of types and legal forms with respect to how long they last 
and what events will trigger a claim payment. 
The differences between non-profit, with-profits, unitised with-profits and unit-linked products 
can be summarised as follows as shown in Table 2: 
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Table 2: The Structure of the UK Life Insurance Products 
 Non-linked Unit-linked 
 Non-Profit With-Profits  Unitised With-Profits  Property Unit-Linked Index Unit-Linked  
Risks Risks are borne 
by insurers. 
Risks are usually borne 
by insurers. 
Risks are usually borne by 
insurers. 
Risks are usually borne 
by policyholders. 
Risks are usually 
borne by 
policyholders. 
Payouts to 
Policyholders 
Contractual 
terms. 
Sum assured plus 
accumulating 
reversionary bonuses 
plus terminal bonus. 
Market value of units 
bought plus reversionary 
bonuses. 
Market value of units at 
maturity. 
Market value of 
units at maturity. 
Exit and 
Persistency 
Very high exit 
penalty. 
Very high exit penalty. Very high exit penalty. Designed to be flexibly 
concerning exit. 
Designed to be 
flexibly concerning 
exit. 
Guarantees and 
Capital Intensity  
Payouts are 
guaranteed. 
Policyholders’ 
contributions and 
reversionary bonuses 
are guaranteed so it is 
very capital intensive. 
Policyholders’ contributions 
(the value of units when 
policyholders bought them) 
are guaranteed plus 
reversionary bonuses; 
however, the original 
guaranteed payment could 
be discretionarily reduced in 
certain circumstances. Less 
capital intensive compared 
to with-profits as 
guaranteed amount are 
based on unit bought not 
original sum assured. 
There are no guarantees 
unless it is bough 
separately. No guarantees 
concerning returns. Zero 
capital requirements if 
there are no guarantees.  
There are no 
guarantees unless it 
is bough separately. 
No guarantees 
concerning returns. 
Zero capital 
requirements if 
there are no 
guarantees. 
Transparency 
and Discretion   
Payouts are 
specified in 
contractual 
terms. 
Insurers have the 
discretion over surplus 
distribution rates 
(reversionary bonuses), 
terminal bonus as well 
as investment decisions. 
Policyholders or / and their 
agents make investment 
decisions but insurers still 
have discretion over bonus 
and policyholders could be 
paid lower than the face 
value of units (original 
price). 
Policyholders or / and 
their agents make 
investment and 
policyholders bear 
investment risks; the price 
of units is published on a 
daily basis. 
Policyholders or / 
and their agents 
make investment 
and policyholders 
bear investment 
risks; the price of 
units is published 
on a daily basis. 
Fund Structures  Funds are 
managed and 
controlled by 
insurers. 
Funds are managed and 
controlled by insurers. 
The funds are unitised and 
policyholders buy units in 
the funds that are managed 
by insurers. 
The funds are unitised 
and policyholders buy 
units in the funds that are 
managed by insurers. 
The funds are 
unitised and 
policyholders buy 
units in the funds 
that are managed by 
insurers. 
Basis for 
Insurers’ 
Revenue 
Insurers make 
revenue on the 
basis of pooling 
risk and then 
price it to 
customers 
through 
contractual 
terms. 
Reported surpluses 
following a statutory 
solvency valuation are 
distributed on a 9:1 
basis (9 for 
policyholders to 1 for 
insurers) for proprietary 
and 100% for 
policyholders 
concerning mutual. 
Reported surpluses 
following a statutory 
solvency valuation are 
distributed on a 9:1 basis (9 
for policyholders to 1 for 
insurers) for proprietary and 
100% for policyholders 
concerning mutual. 
There is no surplus. The 
policyholders will receive 
the value of units (assets 
and liabilities are linked 
together). Insurers make 
revenue through charging 
discretionary 
management fees on 
either a monthly or a 
yearly basis. These fees 
consist of actual spending 
on running the funds plus 
profits. 
There is no surplus. 
The policyholders 
will receive the 
value of units 
(assets and 
liabilities are linked 
together). Insurers 
make revenue 
through charging 
discretionary 
management fees 
on either a monthly 
or a yearly basis. 
These fees consist 
of actual spending 
on running the 
funds plus profits. 
Source: the author. 
51 
 
2.4.2. The Market Trend in the UK Life Insurance Business 1985-2010 
2.4.2.1. The Market Trend for Life Insurance Products 
There has been a radical change in the compositions of product portfolios and segmental26 
distributions of new premiums in the British life market since 1985. The pension segment has 
become the dominant segment, while unit-linked products have become the dominant business 
in the UK life insurance market since 1997. The proportion of unit-linked new premiums, 
measured using the Annual Premiums Equivalent (APE)27 (Diacon et. al., 2004), increased 
substantially over the period 1985-2010; it went up from £2.8 billion (41% of the total APE) 
in 1985 to £15 billion (80% of the total APE) in 2010. Moreover, the share of the pension 
segment in new premiums reached an unparalleled level in 2010 at 82% of the total APE (£15.4 
billion) compared to 41% (£2.7 billion) in 1985. In contrast, the shares of the life segment and 
the with-profits business declined dramatically over the period 1985-2010. The share of the 
with-profits business in new premiums went down from 41% (1985) to only 4% (2010), while 
the share of the life segment in new premiums fell from 52% (1985) to 14% (2010) as shown 
in Figures 8 and 9 (see Table 32 in Appendix). 
The segment-product analysis confirm above result as shown in Figures 10, 11 and 12 (see 
Table 32 in Appendix). The growth in the share of the pension segment combined with 
paralleled growth in the share of linked products in the pension segment. For instance, the share 
                                                          
26 There are three segments, namely, life, pension and overseas. The overseas business means the life insurance 
business, which is the overseas life assurance business or the overseas permanent health insurance and sickness 
business as defined by the Incomes and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 or business written overseas by an insurer, 
which does not report its overseas life assurance business separately for taxation purposes (FSA, 2008). 
27 It is common in the long-term insurance business to use the APE to allow comparisons of the amount of new 
business gained in a period by insurance companies with different proportions of single premium and regular 
premium business. Since the regular premiums involved series of payment at fixed intervals during the life of the 
policy, the APE is used to allow comparisons of the amount of new business gained in a period by life insurance 
companies. The APE is the total amount of regular premiums from new business plus 10% of the total amount of 
single premiums on business written during the year. 
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of the pension segment in the UK market went up from 41% (1985) to 82% (2010), at the same 
time the share of unit-linked products in the pension segment increased from 51% (1985) to 
88% (2010); in 2010 the pension segment had about 91% of unit-linked products. In contrast, 
the decline in the market share of the life segment combined with the decline in the share with-
profits products in the life segment as show in Figures 10, 11 and 12 (see Table 32 in 
Appendix). As for the overseas segment, the analysis shows that the UK life insurers wrote 
most of their overseas businesses in with-profits forms; however, in recent years the share of 
linked products increased significantly. 
Figure 8: The Segmental Distribution of the APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3), Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1) and Overseas (F46; 
L24+L28*10%, C3). 
Figure 9: The Share of Business Lines in the APE 1985-2010 
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Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + 
(L100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, 
OS_RE and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked 
(F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, 
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%; 
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see 
Table 29 in Appendix). 
Figure 10: The Share of Business Lines in the Life Segment APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and 
UKL_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and 
UKL_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and 
UKL_RG. Property linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and 
UKL_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and 
UKL_RG see (see Table 29 in Appendix). 
Figure 11: The Share of Business Lines in the Pension Segment APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and 
UKP_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%; UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG. 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG. 
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG. Index 
Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG (see Table 29 
in Appendix). 
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Figure 12: The Share of Business Lines in the Overseas Segment APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Unitised With-
Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked 
(F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-
915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Table 29 in Appendix). 
The continuous deterioration in the market share of the with-profits products can be related to 
policyholder and insurer factors. Regarding policyholders, the near collapse of a predominantly 
with-profits insurer (the Equitable Life in 2000), complexity and lack of transparency and the 
failure in achieving the aims of investment through with-profits products become common 
knowledge after disappointing payouts to policyholders have caused significant reputational 
damage of these products (Clay et. al., 2001; Penrose, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a; O’Brien, 2009b). 
With respect to insurers, with-profits insurers may not be willing to offer with-profits products 
due to significant increase in the cost of guarantees attached to these products as a result of 
unparalleled fall in interest rates. Indeed, many with-profits insurers experienced financial 
difficulties leading to cease writing new policies, whereas the with-profits life assurance market 
noticed substantial consolidation and changes in ownership structures (FSA, 2004; 2005; 
O’Brien and Diacon, 2005; Carter and Falush, 2009; O’Brien, 2009b). 
In contrast to the with-profits, the analysis shows that the unit-linked business (particularly 
property unit-linked) has become the dominant business in the UK life insurance industry. This 
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can be related to some factors: (1) the British taxation regime has played a main role (Carter 
and Falush, 2009); for instance, British tax payers find it makes more sense to invest indirectly 
in the unit-linked contracts because of tax relief available on pension contributions (personal 
and occupational) than invest their savings in a unit trust directly. (2) Unit-linked products 
enable policyholders to form their individual fund (their own account), and, hence, free 
themselves from the rules of surplus distribution in the participation fund (with-profits fund). 
Indeed, the unit-linked life insurance business is considered to be a solution to complexity and 
lack of transparency of the participating life insurance business (Müller and Steffensen, 2007). 
(3) Life insurers and agents have their own incentives to sell unit-linked contracts. For instance, 
the unit-linked business enables life insurers to reduce the capital requirement for a given 
volume of business or write a greater volume of business for a certain amount of capital, 
whereas agents can receive greater commissions from selling unit-linked contracts than from 
selling the same volume of business as a unit trust (Richards, 2004). 
2.4.2.2. Mutuality Status 1985-2010 
The British life insurance industry is an example of a business in which competing companies 
differ in their ownership structures; however, they offer the same range of products. Mutual 
life insurers are owned by their policyholders; proprietary life insurers are owned by their 
shareholders. There has been a long-standing debate in insurance-based literature concerning 
the relative merits of these different forms of an organisation. However, the share of mutual 
life insurers in new premiums (measured using the APE) declined dramatically over the period 
1985-2010; it went down from about 46% (1985) to about 5% (2010). Similarly, the share of 
mutual life insurers in admissible assets (policyholders’ assets) fell from 52% (1985) to 6% 
(2010) as shown in Figure 13 (see Table 32 in Appendix). This can be related to the fact that 
many mutual insurers demutualised such as Standard Life Plc. in 2006 (Standard Life Plc., 
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2007) or been acquired by proprietary insurers, banks, fund management over the period 1985-
2010 (Armitage and Kirk, 1994; Swiss Re, 1999; Carter and Falush, 2009; Schertzinger, 2009). 
Figure 13: The Share of Mutual Life Insurers in the APE and Assets 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — the APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4) and Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) (see Table 31 in 
Appendix). 
The decline in the market share of mutual life insurers also can be related to the fact that mutual 
life insurers tend to focus on with-profits products compared to propriety life insurers that 
mainly focused on unit-linked products as shown in Figure 14 and 15 (see Table 32 in 
Appendix). The changes in the external environments in terms of unparalleled decline in 
interest rates and consequently significant increase in the costs of options and guarantees 
attached to these products as well as the near collapsed of the Equitable Life and deteriorations 
of the reputation of with-profits products due to disappointing payouts and lack of transparency 
have led many mutual with-profits insurers to close to new business as well significant changes 
in ownership (FSA, 2004; 2005; O’Brien and Diacon, 2005; Carter and Falush, 2009; O’Brien, 
2009b). 
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Figure 14: The Share of Business Lines in the Proprietary APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 
100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE 
and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, 
UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked (F47; L580-
800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, 
OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Tables 29 and 
31 in Appendix). 
Figure 15: The Share of Business Lines in the Mutual APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + 
(L100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, 
OS_RE and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property linked 
(F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, 
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); 
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see 
Tables 29 and 31 in Appendix). 
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2.4.2.3. Parental Issues 1985-2010 
Bancassurance can be defined as the joint effort of banks and insurers to provide insurance 
services to the bank’s customer base (Swiss Re, 2003; 2007; Carter and Falush, 2009). 
Alternatively, Bancassurance is ‘strategy adopted banks or insurance companies aiming to 
operate in the financial market in a more or less integrated manor’ (Swiss Re, 2007). 
Bancassurance emerged as a force in the British life insurance market, it can be considered as 
one of the products of the 1990s financial services revolution (Carter and Falush, 2009). There 
has been considerable increase in the share of bancassurance in the British life insurance 
market. In 2010, 23% of the APE written by bank owned subsidiaries compared to only 11% 
in 1985. However, the bancassurance share in the British life insurance is considerably limited 
compared to the European counterparts (such as France, Italy, etc.) due the restrict regulations 
against miss-selling of life assurance products and the strong role of the IFA (Swiss Re, 2007). 
Furthermore, it was found that bancassurance were mainly focused on selling ‘simple and 
standardised life assurance products’ such as unit-linked products, and they were less 
successful in selling more complex products (Swiss Re, 2007). In the UK, the existence of a 
mature private pension and the emergence of complex assurance products have created an 
important competitive advantage of non-banks brokers and limited the role of the banks in the 
UK life insurance market (Swiss Re, 2007). Indeed, the product analysis of banks owned 
insurers compared to insurers owned insurers shows that bancassurance focused on less 
complex products (and less capital intensive) such as unit-linked products as shown in Figures 
17, 18 and 19 (see Table 32 in Appendix). 
Banks are not the only financial institution having life insurance subsidiaries, assets 
management, retailers and other institutions control small proportion in the British life 
insurance market; for purpose of this analysis non-bank and non-insurer parents are called other 
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parents. Similar to banks; these firms entered to the UK life assurance market via less complex 
products (and less capital intensive) such as unit-linked products as shown in Figures 17, 18 
and 19 (see Table 32 in Appendix). 
On the other hand, foreign groups control some subsidiaries operating in the UK life insurance 
market, the share of overseas-owned subsidiaries in the APE increased from 18% (1985) to 
29% in 2010 as shown in Figure 16 (see Table 32 in Appendix). It sees that the argument that 
banks and other financial and non-financial groups enter the UK life assurance market for less 
complex and less capital intensive products holds for overseas insurers enter the UK life 
assurance market as shown in Figures 20 and 21 (see Table 32 in Appendix). 
Figure 16: The Distribution of the APE among Different Ownership Forms 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4), Other (other financial services; other than insurers and 
banks; see Table 31 in Appendix) and Overseas (overseas based parents; see Table 31 in Appendix). 
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Figure 17: The Share of Business Lines in the Insurer Parent in APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 
100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE 
and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, 
UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked (F47; L580-
800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, 
OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Tables 29 and 
31 in Appendix). 
Figure 18: The Share of Business Lines in the Bank Parent APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 
100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE 
and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, 
UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked (F47; L580-
800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, 
OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Tables 29 and 
31 in Appendix). 
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Figure 19: The Share of Business Lines in the other Parent APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 
100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE 
and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, 
UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked (F47; L580-
800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, 
OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Tables 29 and 
31 in Appendix). Other: (other financial services and non-financial services; see Table 31in Appendix). 
Figure 20: The Share of Business Lines in the UK Parent APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + 
(L100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, 
OS_RE and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked 
(F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, 
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); 
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see 
Tables 29 and 31 in Appendix). 
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Figure 21: The Share of Business Lines in the Overseas Parent APE 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%), UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 
100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE 
and OS_RG. Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, 
UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Property Linked (F47; L580-
800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, 
OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG. Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, 
UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG (see Tables 29 and 
31 in Appendix). 
2.5. The Flow of Funds, Assets and Liabilities 
The flow of funds is constructed to analyse the funds cycle in the life insurance business and 
link this cycle to capital structure. Analysing the flow of funds as well as capital structure over 
the period 1985-2010, gives the opportunity to analyse changes in funds cycle and capital 
structure of the UK life insurers. The flow of funds, as shown in Figure 22, can be subdivided 
into two main accounts; the policyholders’ account (technical account) and the shareholders’ 
account (non-technical account). For the proprietary life insurers, these two accounts are 
connected through transfer of funds from the technical account to non-technical account and 
vice versa. Moreover, assets and liabilities related to shareholders and policyholders in the life 
insurance business shown in Figure 23 and Table 3. 
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Figure 22: The Flow of Funds Account 
 
Source: author. 
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L15+L16-L17-L18-L19-L20) 
Other Income (F16, L21) 
 
Profit or Loss before Tax (F16, L29+L41) 
Taxation (F16, L31+L42+L43) 
Profit or Loss for the Financial Year (F16, 
L49) 
Retained Earnings (F16, L52) Dividends (F16, L51) 
 
Other Bonuses 
(F58, L44 +L45) 
Revisionary 
(F58, L43) 
Interim 
(F58, L41) 
Cash (F58, 
L42) 
Valuation Gains (F40, L13+L14) 
Investment Income (F40, L12) 
Gross Recurring Premiums (F41, 
L19, C4) – (F46, L24 + L28, C4) 
 
Source of Funds  Usage of Funds 
Fees Charged to Linked Funds 
(F45, L22) 
Commission Expenses (F43, 
L16, C4) - (F45, L22) 
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Table 3: The Flow of Funds Account 
£(m) Line 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
Gross New Premiums (F46, L24+ L28; C4) 1 44% 45% 147% 49% 45% 39% 43% 41% 94% 58% 44% 37% 31% 28% 29% 24% 43% 25% 33% 28% 43% 25% 28% 34% 28% 25% 
Gross Recurring Premiums (F41, L19; C4) - (F46, L24+ L28; C4) 2 11% 10% 74% 30% 28% 11% 14% 13% 30% 19% 14% 13% 12% 14% 20% 24% 39% 25% 27% 27% 43% 25% 28% 28% 25% 31% 
Investment Income % Total Source of Funds (F40, L12) 3 15% 15% 62% 15% 15% 13% 16% 15% 35% 20% 14% 14% 14% 16% 22% 22% 30% 15% 21% 21% 35% 20% 25% 24% 22% 26% 
Valuation Gains % Total Source of Funds (F40, L13+L14) 4 29% 29% -187% 5% 11% 30% 15% 19% -80% -32% 3% 25% 29% 28% 14% 24% -17% 31% 16% 15% -23% 24% 16% 10% 20% 13% 
Other Income % Total Source of Funds (F40, L15) 5 1% 1% 4% 1% 1% 7% 12% 12% 21% 34% 25% 10% 14% 14% 15% 6% 5% 4% 3% 9% 2% 5% 3% 3% 5% 5% 
Total Source of Funds (1+2+3+4+5) 6 293972 315957 91741 369942 342524 382195 298993 301666 130342 214343 313604 300475 294531 239698 178627 163792 104293 199578 141365 138039 79899 131021 92472 86687 91321 73183 
Fees Charged to Linked Funds %Total Usage of Funds (F45, L22) 7 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Commission Expenses %Total Usage of Fund (F43, L16;C4) - (F45, L22) 8 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 10% 9% 8% 12% 11% 12% 14% 15% 15% 15% 18% 19% 21% 22% 22% 21% 19% 20% 
Gross Claims Incurred %Total Usage of Fund (F42, L16;C4) 9 89% 86% 85% 84% 76% 91% 71% 77% 78% 71% 64% 74% 72% 74% 77% 74% 67% 62% 67% 62% 66% 67% 68% 74% 67% 69% 
Interest Payable %Total Usage of Fund (F40, L22) 10 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Other Expenditure %Total Usage of Fund (F40, L25) 11 1% 1% 0.5% 0% 0% 1% 4% 5% 1% 9% 18% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 8% 1% 11% 3% 2% 3% -6% 5% 1% 
Net Reinsurance Payable %Total Usage of Fund 12 3% 6% 8% 9% 15% -2% 15% 8% 10% 9% 6% 8% 9% 6% 2% 3% 11% 10% 10% 4% 5% 4% 2% 5% 4% 4% 
Taxation % Total Usage of Fund (F40, L24) 13 1% 1% -0.5% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% -1% 0% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
Total Usage of Funds (7+8+9+10+11+12+13) 14 209014 223972 263477 272384 253274 203490 197154 186501 168053 190353 189060 129539 119715 103862 85630 78960 83792 90599 74811 72556 63390 58605 52419 47691 48402 39270 
Increase (Decrease) in Fund in Financial Year (6-14) 15 84959 91984 -171736 97558 89250 178705 101839 115164 -37710 23989 124544 170936 174815 135836 92997 84832 20501 108979 66554 65483 16509 72416 40053 38996 42919 33914 
Funds Brought Forward (B/F) (F40, L49) 16 1207067 1143378 1351320 1317233 1308713 1153401 1095930 1017636 1100490 1145626 1061150 921731 783181 678735 627947 566727 561958 466797 413522 369430 384619 333653 305550 283983 247907 203508 
Net Business Transfers in/out (15+16-18) 17 -35609 -24823 -34931 -57980 -75301 -20255 -44256 -37595 -45658 -66825 -38170 -30725 -35642 -30812 -41504 -22131 -13985 -12433 -12546 -20045 -30482 -20331 -11079 -16467 -5972 11226 
Total Funds Available for Distribution (F40, L59) 18 1256417 1210540 1144653 1356811 1322661 1311852 1153513 1095206 1017121 1102790 1147524 1061943 922355 783759 679440 629428 568473 563343 467531 414868 370646 385739 334524 306513 284853 248648 
Mathematical Reserves %Total Funds Available for Distribution (F58, L21) 19 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 96% 96% 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 
Surplus % Total Funds Available for Distribution (F58, L59) 20 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Undistributed Surplus (F58, L49) % Surplus 21 50% 46% 38% 33% 39% 50% 58% 55% 31% 27% 23% 26% 24% 25% 22% 15% 15% 14% 14% 13% 13% 16% 17% 15% 17% 16% 
Policyholders’ Bonuses (F58, L46) % Surplus 22 36% 36% 56% 45% 39% 36% 41% 48% 71% 66% 72% 71% 74% 73% 75% 78% 77% 80% 83% 80% 81% 78% 79% 79% 77% 79% 
Transfer to (from) Non-Technical Account (F40, L26) % Surplus 23 14% 18% 6% 22% 22% 14% 1% -3% -2% 7% 6% 3% 2% 2% 3% 6% 8% 6% 3% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6% 5% 
Funds Carried Forward (C/F) (F58, L15) 24 1253562 1207067 1143378 1351320 1317233 1308713 1153401 1095930 1017636 1100490 1145626 1061150 921731 783181 678735 627947 566727 561958 466797 413522 369430 384619 333653 305550 283983 247907 
Source: the author. 
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The technical account, as shown in Figure 22 and Table 3, illustrates the source of funds, 
namely, premiums28 (are subdivided into new premiums and recurring premiums), investment 
income29 (subdivided into investment income (realised gain) and valuation gain (unrealised 
gain30)) and other income31, and the usage of funds, namely, claims32, expense payable33 (is 
subdivided in fees charged to linked funds and commissions), net reinsurance payable34 and 
other expense35 and the distributions of funds, namely, mathematical reserves36 and surplus; 
the surplus is distributed to with-profits policyholders’ bonuses, undistributed surplus and 
                                                          
28 It is defined as considerations made by policyholders into their policies. It is subdivided into a single premium 
(a single lump sum) or a regular premium (regular payment at fixed interval usually monthly) or a recurrent single 
premium (additional payments made by policyholders on a non-contractual basis). The FSA defines single 
premiums as premiums under contracts insurance when there is no expectation of continuing premiums being paid 
at regular intervals, additional single premiums paid in respect of existing individual contracts and national 
insurance rebate received from the department of work and pensions (FSA, 2008). Furthermore, the FSA states 
that a premium is considered to be regular premiums if it one of a series of payments under the contract: (1) Which 
are payable over a period that exceed one year in length and dates of payments are certain or ascertainable at the 
time the contract is made, with the assumption that the contract is not surrendered. (2) or Which the first payment 
is obligatory and subsequent payments, calculated according to an agreed formula, are payable over a period that 
exceeds one year in length (FSA, 2010a). 
29 This income is generated from investing policyholders’ assets (realised gain). It consists of cash items (interests 
or dividends) and non-cash items (unrealised gain) (capital gain and loss on revaluation of invested assets). 
30 Life insurers are required to do statutory solvency valuation for assets and liabilities; the market value of assets 
is matched to the present value of future claims, suggesting an increase / decrease in the market value of the assets, 
which is also called valuation gain and loss, is fundamental part of the value of the assets to match the value of 
the liabilities, and, hence, valuation gain and loss (unrealised gain) can be considered as source of funds for life 
insurers. Furthermore, the value of assets and liabilities is linked together in the linked funds, suggesting an 
increase in the value of assets will lead to increase in the value of policyholders’ benefits, and, hence, insurers’ 
liabilities. 
31 Consist of all incomes other than investment incomes and premiums, such as management fees, surrender 
charges earned, etc. (Canada Life Limited, 2010). 
32 It is defined as a claim against an insurer under a contract of insurance. It is subdivided into five categories, 
namely, death or disability lump sums, disability periodic payments, surrender or partial surrender and annuity 
payments and lump sums on maturity. 
33 Expense is subdivided into acquisition and maintenance. The acquisition expense includes commissions paid 
to the IFA (FSA, 2007; 2008; 2010a), and expense paid to the AR/CR (FSA, 2008). The maintenance expense is 
consistent of management non-acquisition expense and other expense that is consist of a nonrecurring nature 
expense, such as those incurred in developing new systems or new premises or the costs of corporate restructuring 
(FSA, 2008). 
34 It is reinsurance premiums paid to reinsurers less the amount received from reinsurers with respect to claims 
and expense. 
35 Consist of all expenses other than claims and expense payable, such as bad debt provisions (Canada Life 
Limited, 2010). 
36 Mathematical reserves are established on the basis of gross premiums, which represent the total risk borne by 
life insurers with respect to a financial year. However, life insurers usually transfer part of their risks to a reinsurer, 
the reinsurance share in the mathematical reserves, which represent the risk transferred to a reinsurer, is deducted 
for the total mathematical reserves to give the amount that an insurer must established to meet the future 
policyholders’ benefits (FSA, 2010b). 
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surplus transferred to non-technical account. As for nontechnical accounts, it is similar to the 
Income statement. 
Figure 23: Assets and Liabilities in the Life Insurance Business 
 
Source: the author. 
 
Asset Held to Match Non-Linked Liabilities 
and Minimum Capital and Other Assets  
(F13; L89 – (L58 + L59); LTIB) 
Assets Held to Match Linked Liabilities 
(Index and Property Linked) 
(F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) 
Total Policyholders’ Assets) (F13; L89; 
LTIB) 
Assets Held to Match Shareholders’ Capital  
(F2; L12) 
Total Shareholders’ Assets (F13; L89; 
LTIB) + (F2; L12) 
Mathematical Reserves (Net) (F14; L11) 
Margin (F14; L13 + L51) 
Other Insurance and Non-Insurance 
Liabilities (F14; L12 + L49) 
Total Policyholders’ Liabilities (F14; L59) 
Capital (F2; L12) 
Total Liabilities (F14; L59) + (F2; L12) 
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Table 4: Assets and Liabilities in the Life Insurance Business 
£(m) 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
Asset Held to Match Non-Linked Liabilities and Minimum  
Capital (F13; L89 – (L58 + L59); LTIB) 
39% 40% 43% 41% 45% 48% 53% 56% 61% 60% 60% 61% 65% 68% 68% 69% 70% 71% 73% 74% 75% 74% 75% 75% 75% 77% 
Assets Held to Match Linked Liabilities (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) 61% 60% 57% 59% 55% 52% 47% 44% 39% 40% 40% 39% 35% 32% 32% 31% 30% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 25% 25% 25% 23% 
Total Policyholders’ Assets (£m) (F13; L89; LTIB) 1378547 1316858 1242998 1492914 1460741 1434243 1236981 1161848 1063148 1180891 1271278 1227118 1048226 908695 784059 726238 639176 668445 536417 473481 428405 492991 420343 387686 372360 315641 
Total Shareholders’ Assets (F2; L12) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
Total Assets (Policyholders’ and Shareholders’ Assets)% 
 Policyholders’ Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) + (F2; L12)) / (F13; L89; LTIB) 
102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Other Insurance and Non-Insurance Liabilities (F14; L12 + L49) 5% 5% 6% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Margin (F14; L13 + L51) 5% 5% 4% 7% 8% 7% 6% 5% 3% 6% 9% 13% 11% 13% 13% 13% 11% 16% 13% 13% 14% 22% 20% 20% 23% 21% 
Mathematical Reserves (F14; L11) 90% 90% 90% 89% 89% 90% 91% 92% 93% 91% 88% 84% 85% 83% 83% 83% 85% 81% 83% 83% 82% 74% 75% 75% 72% 74% 
With-profits % Mathematical Reserves (F50; L41, C4) 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 12% 14% 15% 18% 19% 19% 20% 24% 25% 27% 43% 44% 42% 45% 45% 46% 43% 45% 44% 43% 45% 
Non-profit % Mathematical Reserves (F50; L42, C4) 12% 11% 12% 11% 11% 13% 14% 14% 15% 13% 13% 13% 15% 15% 15% 18% 18% 19% 20% 20% 21% 20% 21% 21% 22% 23% 
Accumulative With-Profits % Mathematical Reserves 
(F50; L43, C4)    
12% 14% 15% 13% 15% 17% 20% 22% 24% 23% 21% 20% 19% 19% 19%            
Property Linked %Mathematical Reserves (F50; L44 + L45, C4) 66% 65% 61% 64% 61% 56% 50% 46% 41% 43% 45% 44% 40% 38% 37% 40% 38% 38% 35% 34% 33% 37% 34% 35% 35% 32% 
Index Linked %Mathematical Reserves (F50; L46 + L47, C4) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%            
Total Policyholders’ Liabilities (£m) (F14; L59) 1378547 1316858 1242998 1492914 1460741 1434243 1236981 1161848 1063148 1180891 1271278 1227118 1048226 908695 784059 726238 639176 668445 536417 473481 428405 492991 420343 387686 372360 315641 
Shareholders’ Capital (F2; L12) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
Total Policyholders’ Liabilities and Shareholders’ Capital)%  
Total Policyholders’ Liabilities ((F14; L59) + (F2; L12)) / (F14; L59) 
102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Capital Resources (F14; L13 + L51) + (F2; L12) 7% 7% 6% 9% 10% 9% 7% 7% 5% 7% 10% 14% 12% 14% 14% 14% 12% 16% 14% 14% 14% 22% 21% 21% 23% 21% 
Capital Requirements (F2; L40) 4% 4% 3% 5% 6% 6% 5% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Free Assets (F14; L13 + L51) + (F2; L12) – (F2; L40) 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 4% 6% 10% 8% 10% 10% 11% 9% 14% 11% 10% 11% 19% 18% 17% 20% 18% 
Source: the author. 
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Figure 23 and Table 4 show assets and liabilities related to policyholders and shareholders (for 
proprietary life insurers). Mathematical reserves and backing assets37 are the main assets and 
liabilities38 related to policyholders, while assets and liabilities related to shareholders are 
similar to the Statement of Financial Position’s items. 
The detailed analysis of flow of funds and assets and liabilities of the UK life insurers over the 
period 1985-2010 as shown in Table 32 in Appendix demonstrates that: 
The composition of policyholders’ assets ― Most of policyholders’ assets are invested in 
linked funds; the amount of linked assets exceeded 60% of total admissible assets in 2010. The 
proportion of linked assets (mainly property linked) increased substantially over the period; it 
went up from 23% (£72 billion) in 1985 to 61% (£841 billion) in 2010. Furthermore, the 
proportion of assets invested in bonds remained constant over the period at about 20%, whereas 
the proportion of assets invested in shares fell considerable over the period 1985-2010; it 
decreased from 33% (1985) to only 12% in 2010 as shown in Figure 24. This result suggests 
transformation from with-profits products to unit-linked products may play a role in shifting 
investment portfolio composition of the UK life insurers. Given that regulatory investment 
policies of life insurers vary across life assurance products, changing in product portfolio 
composition, and, hence, related regulatory requirements may influence changes in investment 
portfolio composition. This result is consistent with Henebry’s and Diamond’s (1998) findings 
concerning the relationship between regulatory requirements and the investment portfolio 
composition of life insurers. 
 
                                                          
37 Backing policyholders’ liabilities and the minimum capital requirements. 
38 Consists of predominantly mathematical reserves; however, there are other liabilities such as deposit received 
from reinsurers, claims outstanding, provisions, etc. 
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Figure 24: The Composition of Policyholders’ Assets 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Assets Held to Cover Linked Liabilities (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB), Bonds (F13; L45, L46, 
L47 + L48; LTIB), Equities and Other Shares and Affiliates (F13; L21, L22, L23, L24, L25, L26, L27, 
L28, L29, L30, L41, L42 + L43; LTIB), Mortgages and Loans and Debtors (F13; L50, L51, L52 + L53; 
LTIB), Cash (F13; L54, L55, L57, L81 + L82; LTIB) and Other Assets (F13, L11 L44; L49, L56, L60, 
L61, L62, L63, L80 + L83; LTIB). 
The cyclical fluctuation in the value of policyholders’ assets ― The value of policyholders’ 
assets fluctuated cyclically over the period 1985-2010. Moreover, the amount of loss on 
revaluation (unrealised gain) of policyholders’ assets increased dramatically over the period 
1985-2010 (see Table 32 in Appendix). For instance, the amount of loss on revaluation 
(unrealised gain) of policyholders’ assets was £-18 billion (-4% of total assets) in 1990 
compared to £-104 billion (-10% of total assets) in 2002 and £-171 billion (-14% of total assets) 
in 2008. Most of valuation losses related to linked assets, for instance, in 2008, the valuation 
loss in the value of linked assets was £-160 billion (23% of the value of linked assets) compared 
to only £-11 billion (-2% of the value of non-linked assets) as shown in Figure 25. These 
massive losses (unrealised gain) in value of policyholders’ assets raise the question of whether 
the UK life insurers create value for policyholders. Furthermore, the ratio of investment income 
(realised gain only) to policyholders’ assets fell considerable over the period 1985-2010. It 
went down from 6% (1985) to only 3% in 2010. This downward trend can be related to the fact 
that the UK life insurance industry has experienced the lowest rates of interest since the mid of 
1990s. 
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Figure 25: Valuation Gain and Investment Income and Loss as % of Policyholders’ Assets 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Investment Income (F40; L12) / (F13; L89; LTIB) and Valuation Gain (F40; L13+L14) / 
(F13; L89; LTIB). 
Figure 26: Valuation Gain and Loss as % of Policyholders’ Assets Subdivided into Linked and Non-
Linked Assets 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Linked (F45; L13) or (F40; L14) / (F13; L58+L59; LTIB) and Non-Linked (F40; L13) / 
(F13; L89-(L58+L59); LTIB). 
Figure 27: Investment Income as % of Policyholders’ Assets Subdivided into Linked and Non-Linked 
Assets 1985-2010 
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Source: the author — Linked (F45; L12) / (F13; L58+L59; LTIB) and Non-linked ((F40; L12) - (F45; L12)) / 
(F13; L89-(L58+L59); LTIB). 
The analysis of valuation gain (unrealised gain) and investment income (realised gain) for 
linked and non-linked assets as shown in Figures 24 and 27 shows that linked assets are more 
sensitive to market shocks such as 1990, 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2008 compared to non-linked 
assets. Furthermore, linked assets on average have lower investment yield (realised gain) than 
non-linked but higher valuation gain and loss (unrealised gain). Therefore, it can be concluded 
transferring investment risks to policyholders has effects on insurers’ investment strategies; 
they are now focus on assets that can generate higher growth (unrealised gain) such as shares 
and property compared to traditional secure investment in bonds to achieve investment yield 
(realised gain). However, changing in investment strategies comes with costs as these assets 
seem to generate less investment yield (realised gain) and are more sensitive to market shocks. 
The claims are mainly paid in form of surrender39 and partial40 surrender claims― The 
amount of surrender and partial surrender claims increased dramatically over the period 1985-
2010. It accounted to almost three quarters of total claims41 in 2010 (£136 billion) compared 
to only about half of claims paid in 1985 (£14 billion). 
The premiums are the main source of funds ― Premiums are the major source of funds for 
the industry, suggesting the industry is still growing and attracting new premiums. 
                                                          
39 The surrender is the situation at which a policyholder has withdrawn from long-term commitments before his / 
her contract has expired, and has consequently received a surrender value, that represents poor value for money 
as it is determined at the discretion of the life insurers. The surrender value is : (1) The amount payable by the life 
insurer issuing the contract on surrender of the policy, where the contract is a contract of life assurance or a 
contract for an annuity. (2) The amount payable on the transfer of the investor’s accrued rights under that contract 
to another personal pension scheme or stakeholder pension scheme, where the contract is a personal pension 
scheme or stakeholder pension scheme. (3) The amount payable by the firm on surrender or before the projection 
date for the policy; where the contract is a Holloway sickness policy. (4) The amount payable by the firm on the 
surrender of the policy where the contract is for any other matter (FSA, 2010a). However, the FSA requires 
insurers to include lump sums on maturity claims paid to other insurers as part of the surrender and partial 
surrenders claims (FSA, 2010a). 
40 Partial surrender is the removal of a portion of the original cash balance of an insurance policy or annuity. 
41 Gross claims are subdivided into net claims and reinsurance claims. Net claims are the amount of gross claims 
less reinsurance claims recovered from reinsurers. 
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Furthermore, it seems single premium products are the main source of premiums for life 
insurers as shown in Figure 28. 
Figure 28: New Single Premiums and Gross single Premiums 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Gross Single Premiums (F 41, L12; C4) and New Single Premiums (F 46, L28; C4). 
The expense distribution among segments ―The amount of expense related to the pension 
segment was almost equal to the life segment. However, during the period 2005-2010 for which 
the spreadable data for expense in each segment has become available, the proportion of new 
premiums, gross premiums and net mathematical reserves related to the life segment was less 
than 20% compared to about 80% for the pension segments. Furthermore, the expense related 
to life and pension segments as % of premiums relate to each segment, respectively, showed 
that average expense to premiums for the life segment over the period 2005-2010 was 17% 
compare to 4% for the pension segment. This raises the question of whether the life and pension 
segments are equally efficient. 
The size — There has been a considerable increase in the average size of the UK life insurers 
measured using gross premiums or total admissible assets (Armitage and Kirk, 1994; Genetay, 
1999; Hardwick and Letza, 2000; Letza, Hardwick and Kowalski, 2001). The average sample 
size measured using gross premiums was £1,122 million in 2010 compared to £179 million in 
1985. Similarly, the average sample size measured using admissible assets increased from 
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£1,378 million in 1985 to £9,640 million in 2010. This may be partially related to waves of 
consolidation in the UK life insurance industry over the period 1985-2010 (Carter and Falush, 
2009), for instance, the number of life insurers regulated by the FSA fell from 229 in 1985 to 
143 in 2010. 
The reinsurance dependency ― There has been a considerable increase in the number of 
reinsurance transactions measured using premiums ceded. More fundamentally, most of the 
reinsurance transactions in the UK life insurance market can be considered as inter-group42 as 
shown for the period for which separable data for external and inter-group reinsurance has 
become available (2005-2010). For instance, the proportion of reinsurance premiums in gross 
premiums has increased considerable over the period, it went up from 7% (£3 billion) in 1985 
to 20% (£33 billion) 2010. Furthermore, the proportion of inter-group reinsurance premiums 
paid to total reinsurance premiums was about 70% over the period 2005-2010. 
The use of derivatives― There has been a considerable increase in the amount of assets and 
liabilities under derivative contracts; the amount of assets under the derivative contracts for 
British life insurers in 2010 was £8,288 million (0.6% of admissible assets ) compared to only 
                                                          
42 Reinsurance is regarded as a method whereby an insurer transfers part of its insurance risks to anther insurer 
(Berger, Cummins and Tennyson, 1992). The reinsurance transaction can be either within insurance groups (inter-
group reinsurance) or with external reinsurers (external reinsurance). Mayers and Smith (1990) argued that 
reinsurance transaction within insurance groups has many advantages compared to external reinsurance. (1) It 
allows the affiliated insurers to transfer profits within the group, allowing recognition of profits so that group 
taxes are reduced. (2) It provides the affiliated insurers by mechanism for lowering expected bankruptcy costs 
through pooling. (3) It facilitates intra-firm specialization in investment management, for firms with subsidiaries, 
asset control is maintained by the parent company while regulatory requirements are met by the subsidiary through 
reinsurance with the parent company, the assets ultimately backing the policy sold by a subsidiary appear on the 
parent’s, not the subsidiary's balance sheet. However, empirically evidence suggests that adverse section and 
moral hard exist in inter-group reinsurance transactions (Adams and Diacon, 2006), whereas captive insurance 
was found to have no effects on systematic and unsystematic financial risks (Adams and Hillier, 2000). In the UK, 
the FSA proposed to change the reporting of reinsurance, which was not split between intra-group and external 
reinsurers. They proposed by CP202 to split the reinsurance between external and intra-group to ‘facilitate 
analysis of the more complex groups of insurance firms. In cases where there is significant intra-group 
reinsurance the split of premiums, expenses, new business and in force business is needed to allow us to calculate 
group ratios. It will also make it easier for us and external users to identify potential risks from intra-group 
reinsurance’ (FSA, 2003a). 
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£39 million in 1985. In 2010, one third of the UK life insurers that had either obligation 
(liabilities) or right (assets) under derivative contracts compared to only 5% in 1985. Moreover, 
the proportion of proprietary life insurers that have had either obligation (liabilities) or right 
(assets) under derivative contracts increased considerable over the period to exceed 40%, 
whereas the proportion of mutual life insurers with either obligation (liabilities) or right (assets) 
under derivative contracts levelled off at 20% over the period. This evidence is inconsistent 
with the findings of Hardwick and Adams (1999) that suggested that mutual life insurers had 
a greater propensity to use derivatives than proprietary life insurance firms. This can be related 
to the fact that mutual life insurers are more risk-averse (Smith and Stutzer, 1990; Lamm-
Tennant and Starks, 1993) as well as they have limited access to capital market to deal with 
adverse economic conditions (Hardwick and Adams, 1999), and, hence, they are more likely 
to actively use derivative instruments as a risk management tool (Hardwick and Adams, 1999). 
The premiums less claims ― The amount of gross premiums were less than gross claims for 
the first time in 2008, 2009 and 2010 as shown in Figure 29.  
Figure 29: Premiums and Claims for the UK Life Insurers 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — Premium (F 41, L19; C4) and Claims (F 42, L16; C4). 
Surplus ― There has been considerable increased in the amount of surpluses transferred to 
non-technical account of proprietary life insurers (see Table 32 in Appendix). It went up from 
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£677 million in 1985 to £3,593 million in 2010. Similarly, the amount of fees charged to linked 
funds increased from £245 million in 1985 to £3,451 million in 2010. Furthermore, in 2008 
property life insurers transferred £3,472 million to non-technical account compared to £2,568 
million transferred from non-technical account (net transferred to non-technical account £904 
million). This shows that the industry has managed to deliver value for shareholders despite 
the financial turmoil. In contrast, 14% of admissible assets (23% of linked assets and 2% of 
non-linked assets) written off as valuation losses, while the £3,694 million were charged to 
linked funds as management fees. This suggests the proprietary life insurers were able to make 
profit despite the dramatic decline in the value of assets under management (23% of the value 
of linked funds). These raise the question of whether the transformation from the participation 
life insurance business (with-profits) to the unit-linked business has made proprietary life 
insurers more profitable. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presents the latest developments in the UK life insurance market regarding 
macroeconomic and regulatory environments, products, segments and ownership structures. 
This chapter also provides detailed analysis concerning regulatory returns and sample. It also 
employs ratio and trend analyses to assess the performance of the UK life insurers with respect 
to investment performance, cash flow and hedging strategies over the period 1985-2010. 
It is found that proprietary life insurers regarding ownership, the unit-linked business with 
respect to products and the pension concerning segmental issues have dominated the UK life 
insurance market. This change in product structures comes as a response to the changes in the 
external environment, in particular unparalleled fall in interest rates. The change in market 
conditions led to many with-profits insurers, in particular mutual, to close to new business and 
changes in ownership structures in terms of demutualisation, consolidation with other mutual 
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insurers and the acquisition of mutual insurers by proprietary counterparts. This leads to having 
predominantly proprietary life insurance industry compared to almost equality controlled 
industry by mutual and proprietary life insurers in 1980s. It also sees that proprietary life 
insurers have managed to deal with adverse effects of changes in economic conditions through 
focusing on less capital intensive products, such as unit-linked products. The analysis of the 
market trend shows that banks and other financial and non-financial groups as well as foreign 
groups enter the UK life assurance market through unit-linked products as well as non-profit 
products, suggesting that these firms focus on standardised and less capital intensive products. 
In contrast, the UK life insurers still write substantial part of their overseas business in terms 
of with-profits products. 
The analysis is also shows that the UK life insurers have experienced some common features 
during the period financial turmoil, such as sharp drop in the value of linked assets, increase in 
proportion of claims paid in terms of surrender or partial surrender claims and excess in the 
amount of claims over premiums. The trend analysis shows that the amount of valuation losses 
(unrealised gain) increased in line with the increase in the proportion of assets invested in 
linked funds. In contrast, it seems that transformation from the participation business to the 
unit-linked business has enhanced profitability of proprietary life insurers. 
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3. Chapter 3: Does Saving-Investment Create Value 
for the Savers? – a Case of the UK Life Insurance 
Firms 
3.1. Introduction 
Valuation is one of the central issues in corporate performance assessment. There are many 
valuation techniques in identifying business value to indicate the performance of a firm from 
different perspectives. The EVA is one example of a financial accounting technique that has 
been widely applied to evaluate the financial performance of firms in using capital invested by 
shareholders. In contrast, to evaluate funds managed by investment management firms from a 
policyholder’s perspective, such as life insurance companies and asset management firms, the 
current accounting techniques have not advanced to the same extent as methods designed to 
evaluate investment from a shareholder’s perspective, due partly to the accounting complexity 
of the investment management. This makes a difficulty in judging the performance of the 
investment firms in managing policyholders’ assets. For instance, how does the UK life 
insurance industry perform? Does its saving products or investments create value for the 
policyholders? In 2008, the reported value43 of total assets owned by the UK policyholders was 
£1,243 billion, £250 billion lower than its value in 2007 (£1,493 billion). Similarly, the value 
                                                          
43 Ernst & Young (2011) found that ‘insurers who are predominantly active in continental Europe and the US 
market classify more than 60% of their investments (other than unit-linked assets) as available for sale’(Ernst & 
Young 2011, p.7). This suggests that these non-linked assets (only about 40% of the UK insurers’ assets in 2010) 
must be valued using current prices and must have an active market (IASB, 1999; 2009), whereas less than 40% 
of non-linked assets are valued using other methods such as fair value through comprehensive income (IASB, 
1999; 2009) or amortised cost (IASB, 1999; 2009) (such discounted cash flow, Bowie, 2004). Given that unit-
linked assets (60% of the UK insurer assets in 2010) are valued using current prices (market value). Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that the reported value of assets reflects the market value of assets. Indeed, in the UK, life 
insurers assets are valued as available for sale and trading, whereas liabilities are the present value of future claims 
against the assets (discounted using asset return) (Swiss Re, 2012b). 
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of policyholders’ benefits (net mathematical reserves) fell by £209 billion in 2008 when 
compared to their value in 2007 (see Figure 30). 
A change in the value of assets over time is commonly regarded as an indication of the creation 
or reduction of value for saving products invested by policyholders. This indication is 
measured, partly, by the amount of new additional cash generated from the returns on 
investment to the policyholders’ assets over the period of time, and partly, by the market 
perception of the assets in terms of their cash worth at any point in time. 
The generation of investment returns as a measurement of value creation has been applied by 
many studies looking at performance in the industry (Boose, 1993; Adams, 1996b; Browne, 
Carson and Hoyt, 2001; Adams and Buckle, 2003; Shiu, 2004; 2009; Elango, Ma and Pope, 
2008; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008). The measurement is effective in helping to reveal a 
considerable amount of information on the effort of management in searching for the best 
investment strategies to improve investment through higher yield. The incomes generated from 
investment contribute significantly to insurers’ operating results and enables them to achieve 
competitive advantages by reducing premiums and increasing bonus payments to policyholders 
(Pesando, 1974; Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum, 1983; Smith, 1989; Boose, 1993; Cummins 
and Grace, 1994; Adams, 1996b). 
The second measurement reflects the value of capital gains perceived by the market for the 
uses of policyholders’ funds on investing in various assets that constitute the portfolio of the 
investment. The market value of policyholders’ assets implies the amount of cash that the 
policyholders can receive if all of their invested assets are liquidated at a point in time. 
Furthermore, the market value of assets is a vital determinant of the solvency of the life 
insurance firm. If the value is higher than the amount of the liabilities taken by the business, 
technically called ‘mathematical reserves’, the firm is solvent; otherwise, if the value is lower 
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than the amount of the liabilities, unless the shareholders of the firm pump equity funds into 
the business, the firm is insolvent. Therefore, the value of assets determines the financial 
capability of the firm to serve its contractual commitment to the policyholders. 
Although both the market perception of the worth and the cash flow generation are prevalent 
in asset valuation, the two measurements of value have a limit in revealing how much value 
has been meaningfully created for policyholders in terms of their financial and economic 
expectation to their invested funds. For instance, a comparison of market value of assets with 
that of the value of liabilities is commonly used as an indication of financial solvency of a life 
insurer. When these two values move in the same direction, as shown in Figure 30, the 
comparison can be misleading as regards an assessment of the financial performance of the 
firm. Furthermore, the measurement of a change in the value of assets over time can help 
indicate improvement in value creation but it cannot reveal more as to whether the 
improvement is sufficiently above policyholders’ expectations. From the policyholders’ 
perspective, this failure makes for a difficulty or ambiguity in explicitly answering questions 
such as whether the saving products create value for the policyholders. Quite often, value 
creation means the value grows incrementally over time but how this increment is meaningful 
for the policyholders remains unclear. Recently, there has been a significant increase in the 
popularity of the life insurance products by which the payouts are linked directly to the value 
of the underlying assets. As such this requires additionally a good understanding of value 
performance, which challenges this current valuation methodology and points the way for 
further research. 
To address this need, it is argued that good valuation of the life insurance business shall 
combine all of the information regarding cash generation, market perception and policyholder 
80 
 
expectation of their invested funds. With this combined information embedded in the 
measurement, the valuation can be meaningful from the perspective of policyholders. 
What is the expectation of a policyholder for its invested saving products? Does the expectation 
mean the fulfilment of the contractual commitment to investment returns and financial 
compensation in the event of the unexpected losses of the life? Are there any other 
expectations? Different policyholders may have different utility functions of investment and 
therefore their expectations can vary. The expectation for the contractual fulfilment is essential 
for every policyholder. The law protects this expectation, but a level of investment return is 
often unspecified or ambiguous in the contract, for example, the unit-linked contract, which 
depends on the market value of the particular invested assets. Obviously, the legal expectation 
cannot be equivalent or a proxy for the financial or economic expectation of a policyholder. 
For the latter expectation, it is argued that any risk-neutral policyholders will expect that the 
value of its saving shall remain at least constant in terms of the real wealth that the value 
presents. It is argued here, in this chapter, that this value shall be regarded as the basic economic 
value of the funds. Any value in excess of the basic economic value implies a gain in terms of 
wealth creation for the policyholders. The basic economic value is the basic expectation of the 
value of the policyholders for their invested funds. 
In this chapter, to measure the basic expectation of value, the concept of the constant 
purchasing power of money is taken as an indication of real wealth to value the funds of the 
policyholders. On the basis of this idea, it is possible to evaluate the funds in real terms. This 
valuation provides a meaningful value measurement from the perspective of the policyholders. 
When this value, expected by the policyholders, is compared with the value perceived by the 
market, the discrepancy will indicate a change in real wealth for the policyholders, since the 
discrepancy reflects value creation or value losses against the basic economic value expected 
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by the policyholders. Informatively, the valuation on the basis of this comparative approach 
has an advantage since it combines information of both market perception and policyholders’ 
expectation. 
By applying this new valuation, it is identified that, overall, the UK life insurance firms have 
created value in total44 of £11 billion per annum on average over the period from 2001 to 2010, 
when compared with the average value of £50 billion45 created each year over the 1990s. 
Apparently, value creation relative to the basic expectation of the policyholders has dropped 
significantly over the last decade. This is due to the recent financial turmoil that has lowered 
the market-perceived value. For instance, the whole UK life industry lost £209 billion46 of 
value relative to the policyholders’ expectation in 2008. Such scale of value losses in a single 
year has never been seen in the history of the industry since 1985. This raises concern about 
the future of the industry for its capability in creating real value for the policyholders. 
After the introduction of the value creation approach to measure life insurer performance from 
policyholders’ perspective, the chapter moves further to look at how value creation is related 
to business strategies and performance from three broad perspectives: investment strategies, 
the performance of business growth and finance and risk-taking attitudes. It is found that a firm 
with higher value creation is likely to perform better in business growth and finance when 
compared with one that has lower value creation. The latter has a precautionary behaviour in 
the demand for more uses of liquid assets, and the reinsurance purchase in investing 
policyholders’ funds. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the theory and accounting calculation of value creation. Section 4 explains 
                                                          
44 It is based on value creation in flow terms. 
45 It is based on value creation in flow terms. 
46 It is value creation in flow terms in 2008. 
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the data and sample. Section 5 applies the valuation methodology to assess value creation of 
the UK life insurance firms. Section 6 discusses how value creation is related to business 
strategies and performance. The final section summarises and concludes the findings of the 
chapter. 
Figure 30: The Reported Value of Policyholders’ Assets, Net Mathematical Reserves and Valuation Gain 
and Loss for the UK Life Insurers over 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — this is based on full sample (see Table 31 in Appendix): Valuation gain and loss (F4, 
L13+L14); Net mathematical reserves (F50, L48, C4) and Policyholders’ assets (F13, L89; LTIB). 
3.2. Existing Valuation of Savings Products 
Valuing an investment or a firm requires stetting a benchmark, a discount rate, to reflect the 
time value of money, and, hence, using this rate to assess the performance of the firm or a 
particular investment. For instance, Miller and Modigliani47 (1961) and Ohlson48 (1990; 1995) 
used the risk free rate to discount excess profits and residual income, respectively, to estimate 
the firm value. However, the cost of capital is considered to be a measure for return required 
by capital providers, suggesting the rate of cost of capital can be considered to be a target to be 
achieved to satisfy the capital providers (Exley and Smith, 2006). Modiglian and Miller (1958) 
                                                          
47 Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that the value of a firm is the discounted value of the cash flow from 
existing assets plus discounted the excess profits from future investment opportunities (future assets) over the 
return would be generated from investing the value of assets in a risk free assets. 
48 Ohlson (1990; 1995) stated that the value of the firm is the value of current book value plus discounted the 
excess in the value of future income generated from current and future investment over the return would be 
generated from investing the value of assets in a risk free assets. 
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argued that the cost of capital for capital providers is the rate of interest for this capital; 
suggesting a firm will tend to push investment to the point that marginal yield on physical 
assets is equal to the market rate of interest. They stated that an asset is worth acquiring if it 
will increase net profits (expected return on the asset must be higher than rate of interest) or 
market value of firm (market value of the asset plus market value of return generated from the 
asset must be higher than cost of acquisition plus rate of interest on the asset). In the life 
insurance business, insurers raise capital from two main source, namely, shareholders and 
policyholders; it is less likely that life insurers to be leveraged by taking debts. It is argued that 
deposits paid by the holders of life insurance policies (premiums) can be considered to be as a 
cheap source of capital for life insurance companies; however, assigning a cost of capital / 
discount rate to policyholders’ assets is challenging. Babbel and Merrill (1999) argued that the 
valuation (discount rate) of life assurance products, in particular, inflation-indexed pension 
products, should be made using a valuation model focusing on inflation with a reference real 
or nominal rate of interest as insurers’ liabilities concerning these products are strongly 
influenced by inflation and interest rates. 
Using the rate of inflation to value an investment is well documented in the economics and 
finance literature. The main stream of literature focuses on benchmarking the market value of 
the firm against inflated value of the invested assets to assess firm performance (see Brainard 
and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969; Tobin and Brainard, 1977; Tobin, 1978 and Lindenberg and 
Ross, 1981). Brainard and Tobin (1968) argued that an asset is worth acquiring if the value of 
asset is valued higher than replacement cost measured using purchase cost adjusted to reflect 
the changes in the purchasing power of the monetary unit, inflation. The ratio of market value 
of shareholders’ assets to replacement costs, Tobin’s Q thereafter (see Brainard and Tobin, 
1968; Tobin, 1969; Tobin and Brainard, 1977; Tobin, 1978 and Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) 
has been found to be outperformed accounting profits in measuring firm performance 
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(Simirlock, Gilligan and Marshall, 1984); Tobin’s Q has also been found to be closely related 
to firm performance (Simirlock, Gilligan and Marshall, 1984; Salinger, 1984; Stevens, 1990; 
Stevens, 1991). 
Furthermore, the literature also examines whether the equity market adjusts the market value 
of the firm to reflect changes in the purchase power of the unit. Indeed, it is argued that the 
equity market can act as an effective hedging against inflation (see Bodie, 1976 and Basse and 
Reddemann, 2011); suggesting inflation would lead to higher share prices and higher 
corporation earnings. Empirically, it is reported that share return is negatively related to 
inflation (see Bodie, 1976; Fama and Schwert, 1977 and Schwert, 1981); however, the opposite 
view is also reported (see Boudoukh and Richardson, 1993; Kolari and Anari, 2001 and Luintel 
and Paudyal, 2006). However, Modigliani (1982) reported that earnings-payout ratio increased 
by inflation but share price did not change, whereas Basse and Reddemann (2011) showed that 
dividends are positively related to inflation. However, the net effect of inflation on firm 
performance / value is inconclusive. It is argued that (see Campbell and Shiller, 1988 and 
Schotman and Schweitzer, 2000) higher inflation increases dividends, and, hence, expected 
return on shares; however, higher inflation increases discount rate, and, hence, decreases 
expected return on shares. 
With respect to insurance based literature, it focuses on the calculation of the value of the asset 
share for with-profits policyholders (see Ranson and Headdon, 1989; Needleman and Westall, 
1991; Paul et. al., 1991; Mehta, 1992; Roff, 1992; Eastwood et. al., 1994; Needleman and Roff, 
1995; Clay et. al., 2001; Hairs et. al., 2002 and O’Brien, 2009a, c; 2012). Asset share measures 
the share49 of a single policy in the with-profits life insurance funds as these funds are not 
                                                          
49 The value of unit / asset share is calculated as follows: 
ASt+1 = ASt + Pt + It − Gt − Tt − Ct − Ft     
Where: P = premiums, I = investment return (including capital gain), G = charges for guarantees, X = expenses, 
C = claims, T = taxes and F = transfers of profit to shareholders. 
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unitised50. This value of unit (market value) or asset share value; gives policyholders 
information regarding the changes in the value of units but it is not clear how this value is 
attributed to premiums paid by policyholders and investment income generated from 
reinvesting these premiums. Furthermore, it does not show how much wealth has been created 
from original investment relative to changes in the purchase power of the monetary unit. 
The basic idea is how much real wealth has been created for policyholders from a single life 
assurance policy over the duration of the contract? This requires accumulating51 the investment 
based contributions (realised and unrealised) to the value of the unit / asset share in real terms, 
this would enable the author to measure the changes in real wealth created for policyholders 
over the duration of the policy; with the assumption there are no guarantees. This measure is 
also enable the policyholders to assess whether life insurers would be able to keep the value of 
invested assets in line with changes in the purchasing power of monitory unit. The excess in 
the real wealth over original investments (paid premiums) can be decomposed into realised 
gain and unrealised gain. 
Given that life insurers are required to make payments to the policyholders according to 
contractual agreements (O’Brien, 2009c), shareholders run the risk that payments to 
policyholders exceed backed asset value (Moller and Steffenson, 2007; O’Brien, 2009c); the 
owners of the insurance company must eventually cover the loss on the insurance portfolio 
(Moller and Steffenson, 2007). Therefore, a valuation of policyholders’ assets that provide 
                                                          
For simplicity of discussion, Gt = 0 the insurance contract does not provide any guarantee. Tt = 0 there is no tax 
implications and Ct − Ft = CFt where CFt is net cash outflow such as expense and amount transferred to 
shareholders’ account (for with-profits funds only). Therefore, the above equation can be written as: 
ASt+1 = ASt + Pt + It − CFt                            
50 Most modern life assurance products such unit-linked based products and unitised with-profits, funds are 
unitised and an account is held for each unit and the prices of these units are published on a daily basis. 
51 It is argued that investors are interested in the magnitude of growth rather than the rate of growth as starting 
with a low initial value is less attractive compared to a lower rate of growth starting from a higher initial value 
(Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1959). The author believes accumulating the returns (realised and unrealised) 
would be more informative. 
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information that the assets are kept in line with a particular benchmark, such as inflation, would 
provide valuable information to shareholders as it may reduce the risk exposure regarding 
financing the deficient in the value of policyholders’ assets compared to contractual 
liabilities52, which reduces the overall risk exposure for insurers, and, hence, maximising 
shareholders wealth by maximising the franchise value53 of the firm (see Babbel and Merrill, 
1999 and Exley and Smith, 2006).   
                                                          
52 The market value of insurance company owners’ equity is the difference between the market value of assets 
and the market value of liabilities (Babbel and Merrill, 1999; O’Keeffe et. al., 2005). 
MVt
E = MVt
A −MVt
L  
Where: 𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐸 the market value of equity, 𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐴 the market value of assets and 𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐿 the market value of liabilities. 
This can be rewritten based on the economic balance sheet (see O’Keeffe et. al., 2005): 
MVt
E = FVt +MVt
TA − PVt
L + 𝑃𝑂𝑡           
Where: 𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐸 the market value of equity, 𝐹𝑉𝑡     Franchise value, 𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝑇𝐴 market value of tangible assets, 𝑃𝑉𝑡
𝐿 
present value of liabilities and 𝑃𝑂𝑡  put option value. 
The franchise value is the present value of ‘economic rents’ that an insurer is expected to generate because it has 
scarce resources, scarce capital, charter value, licenses, a distribution network, personnel, reputation, etc. These 
value dependents on firm insolvency risk (Babbel and Merrill, 1999). 
MVt
TA − PVt
L : can be netted together to get net tangible value; it is the market value of tangible assets less the 
present value of liabilities (Babbel and Merrill, 1999). This value is independent of kind of assets held by insurer 
and solvency risks but it depends on risk (Babbel and Merrill, 1999). 
The value of put option, from the limited liability enjoyed by equityholders, increases in value as the insurer takes 
on more risk. 
Assets Liabilities 
Market Value of Tangible Assets. 1 Market Consistent Value of Policyholders’ Liabilities (100% Credit Risk Free). 6 
Franchise Value. 2 Pension Scheme Deficit. 7 
Tax Shields. 3 Debt and Current Liabilities. 8 
Limited Liability Put Option. 4 Frictional Costs (Cost of Double Taxation, Cost of Double Investment Expenses, Tax 
Asymmetries, Regulatory Capital Costs, Agency Costs and Cost of Raising Capital in the Market). 
9 
Costs of Financial Distress (Including ‘Burn Through’ Cost). 10 
Economic Value (Market Value of Owners’ Equity) (5- (6+7+8+9+10)). 11 
Total Assets (1+2+3+4). 5 Total Liabilities (6+7+8+9+10+11). 12 
Source: the author  
53 The market value of the firm is related to its risk exposure. As the firm increases in insolvency risk, firm market 
value increases, and as it decreases in risk, again there is an increase in firm value. This because the franchise 
value is inversely related to risk, whereas put option value is positively related to risk. In contrast, the market 
value of tangible asset and present value of liabilities is independent from risks (Babbel and Merrill, 1999). It is 
argued that shareholders’ wealth is maximised by maximising the franchise value53 (Exley and Smith, 2006). 
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3.3. Theory of Value Creation 
From the perspective of policyholders’ interest, the excess in the market value of invested 
policyholders’ assets over the basic expectation of the policyholders can be regarded as value 
created by life insurers for policyholders. The value creation in this regard can be written as 
follows: 
ΔVt = Vt
M – Vt
E                                                                                                                                                                         (1) 
Where 
ΔVt: the value creation. 
Vt
M : the market value of policyholders’ assets at time t; Vt
M  ≥ 0. 
Vt
E: the basic expected value of policyholders ’assets at time t; Vt
E  ≥ 0; it is assumed to be based on premiums 
(contributions from policyholders), and, hence , it represents the principle funds. 
The concept of the constant purchasing power of money is employed to measure the basic 
expected value of policyholders’ assets as the amount of real wealth that shall at least remain 
unchanged over time. This measure can be written as follows: 
Vt
E  = F0
p
 r
t
+ F1
P r
t−1
+ F2
P r
t−2
+ F3
P  r
t−3
 + ⋯+ Ft−1
P  r + Ft
P                                                                                   (2) 
Where 
Ft
p
: the initially received premiums denoted as F0
p
 at time 0, and subsequently received premiums from 
policyholders denoted, respectively, as F1
p
 at time 1, F2
p
 at time 2, F3
p
 at time 3 …Ft−1
p
 at time t−1 and Ft
p
 
at time t . 
Vt
E: the basic expected value of policyholders ’assets at time t; Vt
E  ≥ 0; it is assumed to be based on premiums 
(contributions from policyholders), and, hence , it represents the principle funds. 
r: the inflation rate, it is assumed to be constant over time, and  r = 1 + r. 
Concerning the market value of policyholders’ assets, using the same methodology, the market 
value of policyholders’ assets can be decomposed into four elements: 
Vt
M  =  F0
p
 [ g
t
+ i̅t] +  F1
P[ g
t−1
+ i̅t−1] + F2
P[ g
t−2
+ i̅t−2] + F3
P[ g
t−3
+ i̅t−3] + ⋯+ Ft−1
P  [ g + i]
+ Ft
P                                                                                                                                                     (3)  
Where 
g: the growth in the market value of policyholders’ assets (valuation / unrealised gain) at time t; g = 1 + g. 
Vt
M : the market value of policyholders’ assets at time t; Vt
M  ≥ 0. 
i: the rate of return (realised gain) on policyholders’ assets at time t; i ≥ 0; and i̅t = (1 + i)t − 1. 
g and i: are assumed to constant over time. 
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Ft
p
: the initially received premiums denoted as F0
p
 at time 0, and subsequently received premiums from 
policyholders denoted, respectively, as F1
p
 at time 1, F2
p
 at time 2, F3
p
 at time 3 …Ft−1
p
 at time t−1 and Ft
p
 
at time t . 
In (3), the Ft
p is influenced by both the growth in the market value of assets g (valuation / 
unrealised gain) and investment returns (realised gain); these returns are assumed to be 
reinvested at the same rate i. 
By subtracting (2) from (3), the theory of value creation relative to the basic expected by the 
policyholders for their assets can be obtained as follows: 
ΔVt = {F0
p
[ g
t
 –   r
t
] + F1
P[ g
t−1
– r
t−1
] + F2
P [ g
t−2
 –  r
t−2
] + F3
P [ g
t−3
 – r
t−3
] + ⋯+ Ft−1
P  [ g – r]}  
+  { F0
p
i̅t + F1
Pi̅t−1 + F2
P i̅t−2 + F3
P i̅t−3 + …+ Ft−1 
P i }                                                                   (4) 
Where 
g = 1 + g. 
r = 1 + r. 
Obviously, (4) provides theoretical foundation in explaining what determines the value creation 
from the policyholders perspective. First, g as the growth in the market value of assets 
(valuation / unrealised gain) shall be higher than the rate of price inflation in the real goods 
market r ≥ 0, indicated by  g  − r > 0. Secondly, the rate of investment returns (realised gain) 
on invested policyholders’ assets i ≥ 0. The two theoretical properties of the valuation in (4) 
implies that, for the creation of real wealth from policyholders’ assets invested by insurers, the 
value creation consists of two basic determinants: capital gains (unrealised gain) and 
investment returns (realised gain). On the basis of these two properties, the value creation in 
(4) can be written as follows: 
∆Vt    =   Vt
M − Vt
E =  ∆Vt
K   +   ∆Vt
I                                                                                                                          (5) 
Where 
∆Vt
K: the first part of (4) capturing the capital gains (unrealised gain) from the growth in the value of invested 
policyholders’ assets relative to the inflation. 
∆Vt
I: the second part of the (4) measuring the investment returns made by life insurers from investing 
policyholders’ assets. 
Vt
ET: the total economic value; Vt
ET = ∆Vt
I   + Vt
E   𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆Vt
K =   Vt
M − Vt
ET; Vt
ET represents the economic value of 
premiums (principle funds) plus investment income. 
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The relationship among four elements in (5), namely, real capital gains ∆Vt
K, economic value 
of investment income ∆Vt
I, the market value of policyholders’ assets Vt
M and the economic 
value of principle funds Vt
E can be illustrated in Figure 31 below, which identifies three value 
creation scenarios: 
A. Full value creation when  ∆Vt ≥ 0 with both ∆Vt
K ≥ 0 and ∆Vt
I ≥ 0 
B. Semi value creation when ∆Vt ≥0 with ∆Vt
I ≥ 0 and ∆Vt
K  <0 and ∆Vt
I ≥ |∆Vt
K| 
C. Value destroying when ∆Vt <0 with Vt
M < Vt
E , possibly due to a large loss in capital gains, 
implying ∆Vt
I ≥ 0 and ∆Vt
K  <0 and ∆Vt
I < |∆Vt
K|. 
Figure 31 illustrates the three cases above in classifying the value creation of the life insurance 
business. 
Figure 31: The Three Scenarios of Value Creation 
A: Full Value Creation B: Semi Value Creation C: Value Destroying  
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Source: the author. 
Table 5 provides simple numerical illustration of value creation compared to Tobin’s Q. 
Furthermore, Figure 32 illustrates how value creation is derived from the FSA returns; 
including illustration of the relationship between value creation and Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 32: The Calculation of Value Calculation and Tobin's Q Based on the FSA Returns 
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I  
Net Cash Flow: Fit = Fit
P + Fit
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Total Economic Value of Funds at time t: Vit
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M   (1 + rt) 
N
t=1 + Fit (1 + rt)
N
t=2 +⋯+ Fitn−1rtn + Fitn   
𝑟𝑡 = RPI 1985-1988 (ONS, 
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PP (F40, 
L11) 
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Fit
I = Fit
II − 𝑎𝑖 ∗ Fit
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Economic Value of Principle Funds at time t: Vit
E = Vi0
MP   (1 + rt) 
N
t=1 + Fit
P (1 + rt)
N
t=2 +⋯+ Fitn−1
P rtn + Fitn
p  
Economic Value of Investment Income at time t: ∆Vit
I = Vi0
MI   (1 + rt) 
N
t=1 + Fit
I  (1 + rt)
N
t=2 +⋯+ Fitn−1
I rtn + Fitn
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The Market Value of Policyholders’ Funds at time t: Vit
M (F40, L59) = Vi0
M + (∆VitM + FitNt=1 ) 
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MReal Capital Gain in Accumulative Terms at time t: ∆Vit
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M − Vit
ET 
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∆Vit
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ET  
Investment Income Fit
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K) =   ∆Vit
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Economic Value of Investment Income in Flow Terms at time t Δ (∆Vit
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I  
Other Income: Fit
𝑂 (F40, 
L15) 
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Source545556: the author. 
                                                          
54 Regarding αit the author tried differecnt methods to split Fit and Vi0
M into investment and premium (principle) 
elements; however, the author believes average cash flow from investment to sum of cash flow from investment 
and premiums is the best available option as: (1) Policyholders’ funds are formed either from policyholders’ 
contributions or investment income generated from investing these contributions. (2) All the UK life insurers 
involved, at least once, in the M&A and most parents (groups) used to transfer funds between subsidiaries, 
suggesting it is not possible to follow the source of the funds (principle or investment income); the amount of 
funds transferred include premium elements and investment income elements. (3) Not only transferred funds 
between subsidiaries but also surrender and partial surrender claims paid for policyholders (73% of 2010 claims; 
see Table 32 in Appendix); making the lag assumption between the date of receiving investment income and date 
of claim payments for policyholders is not applicable practically. 
55 Regarding αit, the 26-year-average asssmption is valide as: (1) Only 55 out of 368 firms have data from 26 
years; with sample average around 15 years. (2) Long-term average reduces the effect of the volatility caused 
trasfering funds between firms on αit. 
56 The main issue of the calculation Vit
TE and Vit
T is the treatment of negative cash flow (Fit = Fit
P + Fit
I < 0). In 
this case, part of funds transferred out of the business, and, hence, Vit
TE <Vit−1
TE . For instance, if Vit−1
M = 15, Vit−1
TE =
10 and consequently ∆Vit−1
K  =  Vit−1
M − Vit−1
TE =  5, and at time t it is assumed that Fit = −5 and  g = r = 1.03. 
This means that Vit
TE = 10 ∗ 1.03 − 5 =  5.3 , Vit
M = 15 ∗ 1.03 − 5 = 10.45 and ∆Vit
K = 10.45 − 5.3 = 5.15 . 
However, the firm transferred about the third (5/15.45= 0.324) of its funds, and, hence, the third of the economic 
value of the funds (10.3*0.324 = 3.33) should be transferred only not (-5) or the market value of funds transferred. 
This means that Vit
TE = 10.3 − 3.33 = 6.967  and ∆Vit−1
K = 10.45 − 6.967 = 3.48 . This adjustment is very 
important for downsizing firms, having negative cash flow (Fit < 0), for relatively long period of time. Indeed, 
ignoring this adjustment will inflate ∆Vit−1
K  for firm having negative cash flow. This adjustment assumes that 
transfer of negative cash flow took place the end of the period. 
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Table 5: A Simple Example Illustrating the Calculation of Value Calculation 
Time t 1/1/2XX1 31/12/2XX1 31/12/2XX2 31/12/2XX3 31/12/2XX4 31/12/2XX5 
The initially received premiums (principle funds) at time t : Ft
p
 100 25 25 25 25  
The growth in the market value of policyholders’ assets 
(unrealised gain) at time t : g 
0.02      
The inflation rate at time t: r 0.01      
The rate of return (realised gain) on policyholders’ assets at time t: i  0.04      
 
The Market Value of Policyholders’ Funds at time t: Vit
M  131 164 199 236 250 
Economic Value of Principle Funds at time t: Vit
E  126 152 179 206 208 
Total Economic Value of Funds at time t: Vit
ET  130 162 195 229 241 
Economic Value of Investment Income at time t: ∆Vit
I   4 9 16 24 33 
Real Capital Gain in Accumulative Terms at time t: ∆Vit
K  1 2 4 6 9 
Value Creation in Accumulative Terms at time t: ΔVit  5 12 20 30 42 
Tobin’s Q at time t: Qit  1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q at time t: Qit  1.04 1.08 1.11 1.15 1.20 
Source: the author. 
The caclculation is based on Equation 1-5, using the same assumption addressed in the discussion with respect to g, r and i. 
All values are assumed to be in pound (£). 
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3.4. Sample and Data  
The data is obtained from the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). 
The sample is based on the initial sample in Chapter 2 and Table 31 in the Appendix; it consists 
of 368 firms over the period 1985-2010. The calculation of the value creation is still possible 
even when the firm has one observation given the value of policyholders’ funds at the 
beginning of the period is reported in From 40; Line 49 (see Table 22 in the Appendix) as well 
as the value of policyholders’ funds at the end of period Form 40; Line 59. The value creation 
has been calculated for 368 firms as it has been described in the previous section, all values are 
reported in Tables 33, 34 and 35 in Appendix and they are available upon request from the 
author. No adjustment has been made with the exception of: (1) Any negative net premiums 
(Form 40; L11) are reported as cash outflow. (2) The value of policyholders’ assets at the end 
of the period (Form 40; L59) is reconciled with the value of policyholders’ funds at the 
beginning of the period (Form 40; L49) to ensure all adjustments have been recorded. A 
conformation from the S&P’s SynThesys life data base has been obtained to confirm that some 
adjustments used to be reported in the notes of the FSA returns prior to 2005 (it is available 
upon requests), and, hence, it needs to be added or removed to reconcile opening and closing 
balances; all these adjustments, if any, are added to Form 40; Line 31 if it is cash inflow and 
Form 40; Line 32 if it is cash outflow. In this chapter, to ensure inter-temporal comparability 
of figures and tables the financial data were deflated by the UK GDP deflator index (HM 
Treasury, 2012). This means all real values are in 2010 prices. 
Given that the calculation of value creation and real capital gain have been made for all firms 
over the period 1985-2010, it was possible to include all sample (368 firm and 5,601 
observation; see Table 31 in the Appendix). However, for empirical analysis, all firms with 
less than 5 observations (25 firms) are excluded, and any firm with less than 5 million average 
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value of assets over period are also excluded (20 firms). The Final sample regarding the 
empirical analysis includes 5,181 observations for 323 firms. 
3.5. Value Creation of Life Insurance Firms in the UK 
3.5.1. The Overall Value Creation of the UK Life Industry 
Figure 33: Comparison between Market Value and Economic Value of Policyholders’ Assets for all the 
UK life Insurers over 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — market value (F40, L59) and remaining values are derived by the author. 
Figure 34: Tobin’s Q for all the UK Life Insurers over 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — all values are derived by the author. 
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Figure 35: Capital Gain and Value Creation as % of the Market Value of the UK life Insurers over 1985-
2010 (All Values are in Accumulative Terms) 
 
Source: the author — market value (F40, L59) and remaining values are derived by the author. 
Figure 36: Capital Gain and Value Creation as % of the Market Value of the UK life Insurers over 1985-
2010 (all Values are in Flow Terms) 
 
Source: the author — market value (F40, L59) and remaining values are derived by the author. 
Figure 37: The Number of Firms with the Full Value Creation, Semi Value Creation and Value 
Destroying over 1985-2010 
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Source: the author — all values are derived by the author. 
Figure 36 shows that the amount of value creation (in flow terms) in 2008 was negative at £-
209 billion, indicating that the UK life insurance industry lost value for policyholders’ funds 
that amounted to 18% of the 2008 market value of the assets. This implies that, with other 
things unchanged, £1 invested in the UK life insurance industry at the beginning 2008 would 
only be worth £0.82, a loss of £0.18 relative to the constant purchase power of money, if the 
one pound invested in the past was cashed in at the end of 2008. Similarly, the market of 
policyholders’ assets relative to replacement costs, Tobin’s Q as shown in Figure 34 (see 
Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969; Tobin and Brainard, 1977; Tobin, 1978 and 
Lindenberg and Ross, 1981), was 91% in 2008 increased to 97% in 2009 and just exceeded 
100% in in 2010 (detailed analysis is provided in Tables 33, 34 and 35 in Appendix). 
Furthermore, Figure 37 shows that non-value creating firms (semi value creation and value 
destroying) have risen to 52% on average over the period 2001-2010 from 43% in the 1990s. 
Three times over the 1985-2000 period and three times in the last decade over 60% of the UK 
life insurers are classified either semi value creation or value destroying. Apparently, the 
overall productivity of value creation by the UK life insurance industry has declined in recent 
years. The decline was particularly serious in 2008 when 51% of the firms became semi value 
creation and 20% became value destroying. The decline in value creation may imply that the 
UK savings industry needs a significant review of its investment strategies. 
3.5.2. Value Creators vs. Value Destroyers 
In Table 6, the top 10 and the bottom 10 of the UK life insurance firms in terms of their value 
creation in 2010 are listed. For a policyholder, on average, it could receive 40% more than the 
basic economic value of his/her invested funds if the top 10 firms had been invested in and the 
funds were redeemed in 2010. Otherwise, he/she could receive only 5% more than the basic 
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economic value of his/her invested funds if the bottom 10 firms had been invested in and the 
funds were redeemed in 2010. 
Although the two groups for their value creation in 2010 are compared, it is interesting to notice 
that the scenario of full value creation occurred in 24 out of the 26 years during 1985-2010 for 
the firms ranked in the top 10 on average. In contrast, the value destroying or semi value 
creation appeared in 20 out of the 26 years for the bottom group. The firms in the latter group 
appeared as value destroying in 2008; (detailed analysis is provided in Tables 33, 34 and 35 in 
Appendix). 
Regardless of value creation between the two groups, their cyclical patterns of creation of value 
over time have been very similar as shown in Figure 38, reflecting the effect of economic 
conditions on value creation and financial performance. This phenomenon is consistent with 
the view argued by Browne and Hoyt (1995); Browne, Carson and Hoyt (1999; 2001), Shiu 
(2004; 2005; 2009) and Brewer et. al. (2007). 
In Table 6, the best value creator in the industry over the last decade has been Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd in contrast to the lowest one that has been American Life Insurance Co UK 
Branch. The comparison of the two firms in Figure 39 highlights further the power of the value 
creation based valuation to distinguish firms through persistent underperformance and 
persistent outperformance for value creation over time. 
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Table 6: The Top vs. Bottom Value Creating Firms 
Company(1) 
Number 
of Years 
The  
Full  
Value 
Creation 
Semi  
Value  
Creation 
Value 
Destroying 
Average 
Size 
£(m)(2) 
Capital 
Gain(3) 
£(m) 
Value 
Creation(4) 
£(m) 
Tobin’s Q Top/Bottom 
Top 10 
Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 69% 31% 0% 10213 974 2143 108% top 
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd 26 62% 38% 0% 17901 996 4631 107% top 
Legal and General Assurance  
(Pensions Management) Ltd 
26 85% 15% 0% 70125 12367 89378 111% top 
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 36425 4187 15097 109% top 
National Farmers Union Mutual 
 Insurance Society Ltd 
26 85% 15% 0% 4543 455 2610 116% top 
Pearl Assurance Ltd 26 92% 8% 0% 16007 1575 4104 128% top 
Phoenix and London Assurance Ltd 26 96% 4% 0% 8713 612 2080 119% top 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The) 26 100% 0% 0% 76213 17116 41013 122% top 
Scottish Widows Unit Funds Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 7896 775 4358 114% top 
Wesleyan Assurance Society 26 62% 38% 0% 2840 357 1506 108% top 
  
Bottom 10 
American Life Insurance Co UK Branch 26 0% 73% 27% 4159 -1196 -1196 90% bottom 
Friends Provident Life Assurance Ltd 26 35% 65% 0% 2646 -516 718 95% bottom 
Guardian Assurance plc 26 27% 73% 0% 7595 -1305 606 95% bottom 
Hannover Life Reassurance (UK) Ltd 26 0% 77% 23% 170 -41 33 90% bottom 
Liverpool Victoria Life Co Ltd 26 42% 46% 12% 866 -69 -69 97% bottom 
London Life Ltd 26 54% 46% 0% 2033 -455 51 98% bottom 
Pacific Life Re Ltd 26 0% 46% 54% 179 -28 9 81% bottom 
Pinnacle Insurance plc 26 15% 50% 35% 297 -23 -23 87% bottom 
Suffolk Life Annuities Ltd 26 50% 50% 0% 757 -160 718 101% bottom 
UNUM Ltd 26 4% 92% 4% 899 -376 111 88% bottom 
  
Average Top 10 26 81% 19% 0% 25088 3941 16692 114%    
Average Bottom 10 26 23% 62% 15% 1960 -417 96 92%   
Difference (T-Value )(5) n/a 
-0.5846***(6) 
(-16.4186) 
0.4308*** 
(11.1192) 
0.1538***  
(6.8623) 
-23127.6** 
(-10.1719) 
4358.367 
** 
(-2.3050 
16596.41* 
(-1.8677) 
-0.2206 
*** 
(-17.3430) 
  
 
Top 1 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The) 26 100% 0% 0% 76213 17116 41013 122% top 
Bottom 1 
American Life Insurance Co UK Branch 26 0% 73% 27% 4159 -1196 -1196 90% bottom 
Difference (T-Value )(7) n/a -1 
0.7308 
*** 
(8.2375) 
0.2692***  
(3.0349) 
-72054.12*** 
(-12.3650) 
-
18311.72 
-42208.88 
-
0.3135*** 
(-11.8610) 
  
Source: the author. 
Where: 
(1) A firm ranked top 10 or bottom 10 if: (1) The data is available in 26 out of 26 year over 1985-2010. This because 
there has been considerable fluctuation in the wealth creating ability over the period 1985-2010, such as 
the considerable increase in the wealth creating ability in the 1990-2000 and then the significant decline in 
the real wealth creating ability over the period 2000-2010. To examine the characteristics of life insurers 
delivered the best/ worst value to policyholders during the period 1985-2010, the author decided to include 
only the life insurers for which the data is available over the period 1985-2010. (2) The firm with respect 
to top 10 should have been classified as a full value creation for more than 13 years over 26 years. In 
contrast, bottom 10 firms should have been classified either value destroying or semi value creation over 
13 years of 26 years57 (full rankling for 369 firms over the period 1985-2010 with respect to value creation 
and capital gain as well as the actual values in 2010 prices are provided in Tables 33, 34 and 35 in 
Appendix ). (3) The firm has constant ranking over the period 1985-2010. (4) The firms is classified full 
value creation in 2010 for top 10, and value destroying/ semi value creation with respect to bottom 10. 
Given that only 54 firm out of 369 firms included in the chapter have data over the period 1985-2010, the 
analysis is restricted to top 10 and bottom 10. 
 (2)  It is the average value of policyholders’ assets over the period 1985-2010 (F13, L89, LTIB). 
(3)  It is capital gain in accumulative terms in 2010. 
(4)  It is value creation in accumulative terms in 2010. 
(5) H0: difference (mean of bottom 10 - mean of top10 = 0). The t-value is calculated under the assumption that 
two samples have different variances. 
(6) ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
(7) H0: difference (mean of bottom 1 - mean of top 1 = 0). The t-value is calculated under the assumption that two 
samples have different variances. 
 
                                                          
57 London Life Ltd is classified value destroying/ semi value creation for 12 out 26 years, this is the only 
exception. 
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Figure 38: Top10 vs. Bottom 10 — Value Creation 
 
Source: the author — Value Creation as % of market value of assets (F40, L59). 
Figure 39: Top 1 vs. Bottom 1 — Value Creation 
 
Source: the author — Value Creation as % of market value of assets (F40, L59). 
3.5.3. Value Creation and Corporate Governance 
Interestingly, many of the two opposite value creators in Table 6 come from two distinct classes 
of ownership in the UK life insurance industry. There is a long-standing debate in the literature 
about the relative merits of these two forms of organisations, see Mayers and Smith (1981; 
1982; 1986; 1988; 1990; 1992; 1994), Smith and Stutzer (1990), Lamm-Tennant and Starks 
(1993), Wells, Cox and Gaver (1995), Adams (1995; 1996a; 1996b), Adams and Hossain 
(1998) and Adams, Hardwick and Zou (2008). Furthermore, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999), 
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Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi (2004), Brockett et. al. (2005), Jeng and Lai58 (2005) and 
Erhemjamts and Leverty59 (2010) identified that the proprietary insurers were more cost 
efficient than the mutual insurers since the ownership structure of the mutual implies 
management under less pressures from policyholders who own the firm. This result differs 
from the result of some existing studies (Fukuyama, 1997; Hardwick, 1997; Greene and Segal, 
2004; Hardwick, Adams and Zou, 2011) that compared the (efficiently based) performance and 
report that those mutual and proprietary insurers were equally efficient. In contrast to efficiency 
based argument, the valuation provides further evidence that for the mutual firms outperform 
the propriety firms in terms of value creation over both the entire 1990s and the period before 
2005, see Figure 40. Clearly, the two opposite arguments for efficiency has its empirical 
supports although the chapter has added further evidence in favour to the mutual firms; 
(detailed analysis is provided in Tables 33, 34 and 35 in Appendix). 
The discussion above shows that value creation is the same as other performance measurements 
that can be affected by corporate governance with respect to ownership. This view can be 
further highlighted by comparing value performance between life insurers owned by non-
insurers (banks, other financial services and non-financial services) and those owned by 
insurance companies. It is evident that non-insurers created less value than insurer-owned 
insurers over the last decade; see Figure 41. This result is consistent with evidence presented 
by the studies of Swiss Re (2007) and Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011) that there is no advantage to 
banks entering to the life insurance business due to their cost efficiency. Indeed, as OECD 
(2011) pointed out, the failure of financial conglomerates containing major banking institutions 
and insurers has confirmed that the combination of different financial activities within a group 
creates contagion risks, such as reputation risks, concentration risks, operational risks and other 
                                                          
58 Jeng and Lai (2005) compared between keiretsu firms, non-specialized independent firms and specialized 
independent firms. 
59 They found that demutualisation has a positive effect on efficiency. 
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possible risks. This suggests that bank ownership of insurers can cause a negative impact on 
their performance60 of value creation. Finally, the result as shown in Figure 42 suggests the UK 
based life insurers consistently outperformed the non-UK based life insurers. 
Figure 40: Proprietary vs. Mutual — Value Creation 
 
Source: the author — Value Creation as % of market value of assets (F40, L59); for Mutual and proprietary 
classification see Table 31 in Appendix. 
Figure 41: Insurers vs. Non-Insurers — Value Creation 
 
Source: the author — Value Creation as % of market value of assets (F40, L59); Non-Insurers include banks, 
other finance services and non-finance services based parents (Table 31 in Appendix). 
 
 
                                                          
60 It is argued that participating in capital market and holding bank shares expose insurers to banking sector risks 
and link insurer performance to the performance of the banking sector (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011). 
Indeed, Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons (2011) found that banks and insurers had similar performance during the 
financial turmoil in 2008. 
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Figure 42: The UK vs. the Non-UK — Value Creation 
 
Source: the author — Value Creation as % of market value of assets (F40, L59); for the UK and the non-UK 
(overseas) classification see Table 31 in Appendix. 
3.6.  The Implication of Value Creation 
How can value creation be related to business performance and strategic behaviour of a firm? 
The strength of the relation between value creation and strategies implies the amount of 
information that can be embedded in or captured by value creation. For instance, the value of 
profits indicates financial performance because it is directly related to incomes that can be 
generated by a firm. In the last section the relationship between ownership structures and value 
creation is demonstrated, implying that ownership matters for value creation. To explore more 
business and performance implications to the valuation, the author investigates further here by 
examining how value creation is related to business elements that can be grouped according to 
three broad issues, namely, business strategies in choosing investment products, business 
performances in terms of both growth and finance and risk-taking attitudes. The result of value 
creation is also compared to capital gains and Tobin’s Q as shown in Table 7; the result for 
value creation, capital gain and Tobin’s Q is consistent. 
The investigation is made through three stages: (1) Comparing the top 10 value creating firms 
with the bottom 10 firms for each element in relation to the three respective issues above. The 
significant difference between the two groups for an element suggests that the element tends 
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to be related to, or embedded in, value creation. (2) Comparing the value creating firms (full 
value creation) with the non-value creating firms (semi value creation and value destroying) 
on 5-year interval and full period for each element in relation to the three respective issues 
above. The significant difference between the two groups for an element suggests that the 
element tends to be related to, or embedded in, value creation. Thirdly, the initial finding from 
stage one and two on the implication of a business element to value creation will be further 
verified statistically by using the whole sample of observations to calculate Pearson correlation 
coefficient matrix (pairwise correlation) between value creation, capital gain and Tobin’s Q 
and all predetermined variables to test the value creation impact on the relevant element of a 
related issue. The three-stage investigation will enable the author to check the robustness and 
consistency of the findings between the group comparison and the sample test of the 
relationship. 
Table 7 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the chapter, whereas 
Panel B shows the tabulated results of the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix (pairwise 
correlation) between value creation, capital gain and Tobin’s Q and all predetermined 
variables, t-test for mean differences between top 10 and bottom 10 as well as test for mean 
differences between value creating (full value creation) and non-value creating (semi value 
creation and value destroying). It is found that overall value creation is closely related to 
business strategies and performance as seen in Table 7. 
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Table 7: The Business Implications of Value Creation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value Creation 5181 0.2768 0.2192 -0.9948 0.9740 
Capital Gain 5181 0.0141 0.2069 -0.9765 0.9735 
Tobin’s Q 5181 1.0518 0.2260 0.0005 1.9925 
Overseas 5181 0.2822 0.4501 0 1 
Linked 5181 0.4373 0.4116 0 1 
Non-Linked 5181 0.5627 0.4116 0 1 
HHI Liability 5181 0.7275 0.2508 0.2088 1 
Assets 5181 13.3409 2.3251 3.1128 19.2317 
Reserves 5181 13.2307 2.4891 1.3921 19.2308 
Premiums 5181 11.2700 2.5902 0.1793 18.1441 
Market Share 5181 0.0027 0.0079 0.0001 0.1632 
Growth Assets 4858 0.1354 0.2767 -0.9999 0.9965 
Growth Premiums 4858 0.1542 0.5361 -0.9998 1.9918 
Expense 5181 0.0609 0.1360 0.0001 0.9892 
Free Asset 5181 0.1020 0.1650 0.0001 0.9875 
Liquidity 5181 0.0792 0.1575 0.0001 0.9986 
Capitalization 5181 0.0499 0.0992 0.0001 0.9870 
Reinsurance 5181 0.1239 0.2222 0.0001 0.9994 
With-Profits 5181 0.1876 0.2871 0 1 
Non-Profit 5181 0.2778 0.3332 0 1 
Unitised With-Profits 2752 0.0764 0.1635 0 0.9817 
Property Linked  5181 0.4775 0.4164 0 1 
Index Linked 2752 0.0305 0.1012 0 1 
Product Line 5181 0.5808 0.4935 0 1 
Instability 5181 0.0001 0.0331 -0.3585 0.5750 
Source: the author. 
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Panel B: the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix and T-Test  
 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
Variables Top 10 vs. Bottom 10 Value Creating vs. Non-Value Creating Pairwise Correlation 
1985-2010 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1985-2010 
Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Diff T-Value Value 
Creation 
Capital 
Gain 
Tobin’s Q 
Value Creation 0.2836*** 16.8115 0.0929*** 9.922 0.1859*** 18.4112 0.2868*** 18.7248 0.2784*** 19.4196 0.2488*** 17.9366 0.2193*** 39.4011       
Capital Gain 0.2155*** 16.8441 0.1909*** 26.7581 0.2726*** 35.0654 0.3416*** 29.242 0.3018*** 27.9733 0.3269*** 29.5586 0.2897*** 68.3942       
Tobin’s Q 0.2207*** 17.3430 0.1997*** 30.9736 0.2740*** 29.1872 0.3694*** 34.6362 0.3209*** 29.3343 0.3416*** 27.976 0.3055*** 68.6315       
Issue I: Choice of Business Strategies: Diversification vs. Concentration of Investment and Product Compositions 
Overseas -0.2077*** -4.8397 -0.1231*** -4.4748 -0.0567*** -2.1314 -0.0443 -1.4804 -0.0745** -2.4863 -0.1361*** -4.4294 -0.0837*** -6.6326 -0.023* -0.0761*** -0.0793*** 
Linked 0.0088 0.2589 0.4236*** 19.3703 0.2864*** 11.8633 0.3253*** 14.8106 0.1159*** 4.5322 0.2838*** 10.9637 0.2718*** 25.327 0.0459*** 0.2777*** 0.2685*** 
Non-Linked -0.0088 -0.2589 -0.4236*** -19.3703 -0.2864*** -11.8633 -0.3252*** -14.8106 -0.1159*** -4.5322 -0.2838*** -10.9637 -0.2718*** -25.327 -0.0459*** -0.2777*** -0.2685*** 
HHI Liability -0.1214***  -5.3152 0.0887*** 6.5702 0.0570*** 4.2266 -0.003 -0.1788 -0.0236 -1.3822 0.0524*** 2.898 0.0285*** 4.0929 -0.1724*** 0.046*** 0.0718*** 
With-Profits  0.2876*** 12.2983 -0.1057*** -5.5837 -0.0537*** -2.8165 0.0101 0.5426 0.0001 0.0038 -0.059*** -3.6164 -0.0439*** -5.4352 0.2564*** -0.0439*** -0.0468*** 
Non-Profit -0.3796*** -15.0231 -0.3052*** -16.3261 -0.2220*** -13.2333 -0.3386*** -14.3646 -0.1159*** -5.146 -0.1407*** -6.2219 -0.2140*** -23.3977 -0.2636*** -0.2715*** -0.2643*** 
Unitised With-Profits 0.1313*** 8.8017     0.0176** 1.7961 -0.0023 -0.2144 -0.036*** -2.9774 -0.0148** -2.2748 0.0834*** -0.0444** -0.0594*** 
Property Linked  0.0287 0.8352 0.4109*** 18.2408 0.2758*** 11.4412 0.3113*** 13.0702 0.1094*** 4.1727 0.2400*** 9.0956 0.2547*** 23.1089 0.0261* 0.2453*** 0.2435*** 
Index Linked -0.0216*** -3.0058     -0.006 -0.7827 0.0088 1.4496 -0.0043 -0.5873 0.0001 0.0184 -0.0694*** -0.0258 -0.0406** 
Product Line 0.3192***  8.0486 0.1014*** 3.4161 -0.0062 -0.2132 0.1582*** 4.8268 0.0447 1.3864 -0.1026*** -3.0884 0.0348** 2.5213 0.1058*** 0.0162 -0.0183 
Issue II: Business and Financial Performance 
Size: Value Creation is Positively Related to the Size of Business 
Assets 3.2315*** 21.0661 0.5593*** 4.3306 0.9619*** 8.1158 2.0526*** 12.6925 1.1844*** 7.4722 1.0171*** 6.3252 1.0669*** 16.6241 0.2746** 0.2217*** 0.1773*** 
Reserves 3.0537*** 19.8022 0.6094*** 5.019 0.9839*** 8.4523 2.0997*** 11.3918 1.1803*** 6.6827 0.9825*** 5.6762 1.0564*** 15.3805 0.2482*** 0.2086*** 0.1677*** 
Premiums 2.2958*** 12.4987 0.4074* 3.1613 0.7593*** 5.5534 1.594*** 8.4687 0.5589*** 3.1363 0.5333*** 2.7359 0.6742*** 9.3938 0.0534*** 0.0934*** 0.0369*** 
Market Share: Value Creation is Positively Related to the Market Share of the Firm 
Market Share  0.0142*** 9.4853 0.0001 0.0578 0.0005*** 2.888 0.0017*** 6.2329 0.0022*** 4.4984 0.0033*** 3.2725 0.0013*** 6.3499 0.1119*** 0.069*** 0.0504*** 
Growth: Value Creation is Positively Related to Business Growth 
Growth Assets -0.02493 -0.1898 0.0430** 2.3826 0.0794*** 4.7842 0.0356 1.6037 -0.027 -1.5423 0.0681*** 3.8118 0.0534*** 6.7022 0.0775*** 0.1139*** 0.0579*** 
Growth Premiums -0.0025 -0.9415 0.0026 0.0684 0.0602* 1.9419 -0.0475 -1.1769 -0.0061 -0.1754 0.0777** 2.1455 0.0335*** 2.1778 -0.0079 0.0272* 0.0022 
Efficiency: Value Creation is Positively Related to Cost Efficiency 
Expense -0.0711***  -7.2838 -0.0246*** -3.7383 -0.0345*** -5.7454 -0.1067*** -7.6061 -0.0589*** -5.768 -0.0600*** -6.3061 -0.0512*** -13.0147 -0.3522*** -0.2002*** -0.1803*** 
Issue III: Risk-taking Attitudes in Use of Assets 
Capitalisation, Liquidity and Free Assets: Value Creation is Negatively Related to Over-Capitalization, High Level of for Liquidity and Free Assets 
Free Asset 0.0523*** 5.6575 -0.0895*** -8.9141 -0.0367*** -4.5373 -0.0962*** -6.733 -0.0632*** -5.5766 -0.0569*** -5.2417 -0.0604*** -12.779 -0.1525*** -0.1696*** -0.1484*** 
Liquidity -0.0836***  -7.7962 -0.0639*** -6.492 -0.0784*** -9.8067 -0.1327*** -8.8933 -0.0697*** -6.817 -0.0692*** -7.0604 -0.0779*** -17.1381 -0.3474*** -0.2405*** -0.2093*** 
Capitalization -0.0257*** -5.6022 -0.0580*** -6.6132 -0.0319*** -6.9365 -0.0684*** -7.0121 -0.0264*** -4.7198 -0.0363*** -7.2324 -0.0408*** -13.9471 -0.2361*** -0.2007*** -0.1783*** 
Use of Reinsurance: Value Creation is Negatively Related to Demand for Hedging through Reinsurance  
Reinsurance -0.0663*** -3.7809 -0.0603*** -5.2365 -0.0539*** -5.2766 -0.0560*** -3.9049 -0.0281* -1.7568 -0.0488*** -2.5115 -0.0519*** -8.2493 -0.18*** -0.1683*** -0.1452*** 
Risk: Value Creation is Inversely Related to Risk 
Instability -0.0036 -1.5864 -0.0088*** -5.0192 -0.0066*** -3.0951 -0.0150*** -10.0429 -0.0088*** -3.3628 -0.0156*** -6.4525 -0.0102*** -10.9152 -0.1644*** -0.2034*** -0.2017*** 
Source: the author. 
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Where: 
H0: Mean of the Top 10 - Mean of the Bottom 10 = 0. The t-value is calculated under the assumption that two 
samples have different variances. 
H0: Mean of the Value Creating - Mean of the Non-Value Creating = 0. The t-value is calculated under the 
assumption that two samples have different variances. 
Number of observations is 5,181 for 323 firms over the period 1985-2010. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Unitised With-Profits and Index Linked based data has become available since 1996. 
Growth Assets and Growth Premiums: one observation is lost to calculate the growth rate. 
Overseas: 1 for an insurer that has overseas operations and 0 otherwise for firm i time t. (it is based on F50, L18, 
C3). 
Linked: the linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Non-Linked: the non-linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L89- (L58+L59), 
LTIB)/ (F13, L89, LTIB). 
HHI Liability: HHI score is expressed as the sum of the squared share of each business line (Non-Profit, With-
Profits, Unitised With-Profits, Property Unit-Linked and Index Unit-Linked) in gross mathematical 
reserves. With-Profits (F50; L11, C4), Non-Profit (F50; L12, C4), Accumulative With-Profits (F50; L13, 
C4), Property Linked (F50; L14+L15, C4) and Index Linked (F50; L16+L17, C4). 
Assets: the natural logarithms of total admissible assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Reserves: the natural logarithms of total gross mathematical reserves for firm i time t (F50; L18, C4). 
Premiums: the natural logarithms of total gross premiums for firm i time t (F41; L19; C4). 
APE: the natural logarithms of the APE for firm i time t (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4). 
Market Share: the value of policyholders’ assets for firm i time t expressed as a share of total policyholders’ assets 
for all firms at time t. (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Growth Assets: the growth rate of policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Growth Premium: the growth rate of gross premiums for firm i at time t (F41; L19). 
Expense: the ratio of gross expense to admissible assets for firm i at time t (F43, L16, C4)/ (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Free Asset: Amount of reported free assets divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L42)/ (F13, L89, 
LTIB). 
Liquidity: Liquid assets (the sum of the cash in hand, deposits not subject to time restriction on withdrawal, bank 
and approved credit and financial deposits <= 1 month, bank and approved credit and financial deposits > 
1 month and deposits with ceding undertakings (see classification of admissible assets in Table 17 in 
Appendix) divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F13; L54+L55+L57+L81+L82; LTIB)/ (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Capitalisation: Minimum capital requirement divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L36)/ (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Reinsurance: Premiums ceded to gross premiums written for firm i time t (F41; L20; C4)/(F41; L19; C4). 
Non-Profit products: the proportion of non-profit product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, L12, 
C4)/ (F50, L18, C4). 
With-Profits Products: the proportion of with-profits product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, 
L11, C4)/ (F50, L18, C4). 
Unitised With-Profits Products: the proportion of unitised with-profits product reserves to total reserves for firm 
i at time t (F50, L13, C4)/ (F50, L18, C4). 
Property Unit-Linked Products: the proportion of property unit-linked product reserves to total reserves for firm i 
at time t (F50, L14+L15, C4)/ (F50, L18, C4). 
Index Unit-Linked Products: the proportion of index unit-linked product reserves to total reserves for firm i at 
time t (F50, L16+L17, C4)/ (F50, L18, C4). 
Product Line: 0 for insurer writes over 90% of new premiums from a single line, namely, Non-Profit, With-Profits, 
Unitised With-Profits, Property Unit-Linked or Index Unit-Linked and 1 otherwise for firm i time t. With-
Profits ((F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + 
(L300-445, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and 
OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)); 
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) Table 29 
in Appendix; Property Linked ((F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); and Index 
Linked ((F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, 
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix). 
Instability: a dummy is set 1 in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2008 (during these 
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years change in real capital gain and sometimes change in value creation were negative) and 0 otherwise 
multiplied by the absolute values of weighted average capital gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets 
|((F40, L14)/(F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*((F13, L58+L59, LTIB)/(F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, L13)/(F13, L89-
(L58+L59), LTIB))|*( (F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB)/(F13, L89, LTIB). 
Product investment strategies and value creation — For the first issue on business strategies 
of investing products, product composition is taken to measure the diversification of products. 
The result suggests value creation is closely related to unit-linked life assurance products. 
However, comparisons based on HHI index and product line suggests value creation is related 
to product composition rather than diversification strategy of insurers. 
A similar view to the claim is reported by existing studies for the relationship of insurance 
diversification with investment returns61, diversification premium (discount)62, abnormal 
returns63 or efficiency gain64 (Boose, 1993; Adams, 1996b; Berger et. al., 2000; Meador, Ryan 
and Schellhorn, 2000; Villalonga 2004 a, b; Browne, 2001; Shiu, 2004; Fuentes, Grifell-Tatje 
and Perelman, 2005, Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Shiu, 2009). However, an opposite view on 
investment yield, diversification premium (discount) or efficiency gain and diversified 
strategies were agued by another school of studies (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; 
Desai and Jain, 1999; Berger et. al., 2000; Kedia and Campa, 2002; Levine and Laeven, 2007; 
Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; Cummins et. al., 2010; Shim, 2011a; Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and 
Wende, 2013). The different arguments may be due to different performance measures 
employed in these studies. The valuation developed by this research includes both realised and 
unrealised gains. This may explain why the results are different from some of existing studies65 
that focus only on investment yield. 
                                                          
61 Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), Shim (2011a) and Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende (2013). 
62 Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Campa and Kedia (2002) and Levine and Laeven (2007). 
63 Desai and Jain (1999). 
64 Berger et. al. (2000) and Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2008). 
65 Boose (1993), Adams (1996b), Browne (2001), Shiu (2004), Elango, Ma and Pope (2008) and Shiu (2009). 
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Furthermore, the life insurers concentrated on non-linked life insurance products which 
underperform their counterparts that concentrated on linked life insurance products. This 
suggests non-linked life insurance products deliver lower value for policyholders than linked 
products. Indeed, the market share of with-profits products (non-linked products) fell from 41% 
(1985) to only 4% (2010) due to the lower value created for the policyholders when compared 
with the linked products, in which the customers realised the poor performance of such 
investments (O’Brien, 2009b). 
Business performance and value creation — For the second issue on business growth and 
financial performance in relation to value creation, the impact of the value on size, market 
share, growth of assets and insurance premiums for business growth performance is tested. The 
impact is further tested for financial performance on cost efficiency measured by the 
operational costs per unit of asset managed by a firm. As expected, overall, the test results show 
that value creation is highly related to the performance of a firm, in which this empirical claim 
as the second one can be explained further below. 
Firstly, the value impact on size identified by this chapter is because large insurance companies 
have advantages in gaining both economies of scale in employing resources and greater 
capacity for dealing with adverse market fluctuations than small insurance companies. For 
instance, Boose (1993), Adams (1996b) and Browne (2001) cite evidence from the US and the 
New Zealand life insurance industries to indicate a positive relationship between firm size and 
the yield on invested assets. Their evidence is consistent with the finding, although this claim 
may be called into question by recent studies reported by Adams and Buckle (2003) on the 
Bermuda insurance market along with Shiu (2004; 2009) on the UK general and life insurance 
market respectively in arguing that insurers’ performance, measured by investment yield, is 
independent of the size of the firm. 
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Secondly, if life insurance market is efficient, then it will observe that the firms with higher 
value creation shall attract more demand and so increase their market shares. This expectation 
is supported by evidence shown in Table 7 from both the group comparison and the whole 
sample test: value creation is significantly and positively related to the market shares of assets. 
Further, this relationship is consistently shown by the positive impact of value creation on the 
growth of assets and the growth of premiums, shown in Table 7. This result seems to contradict 
Hardwick’s and Adams’s (2002) findings where they show that the growth of the UK life 
insurers over the late 1980s and the early 1990s was independent of financial performance of 
profitability measured using the ratio of the surplus to premiums. However, taking profitability 
as a measure of performance in the life insurance business can be problematic, or even 
considered as fraught, because the surplus is regarded as a part of firm’s own choice in how to 
distribute cash flow funds generated from both operations and investment. Further, one recent 
paper demonstrates that the profitability of the life insurers is not relevant to the market value 
of life insurance firms (Almezweq and Liu, 2013). 
Thirdly, on the one hand, the finding of value creation related to financial performance can be 
explained by the fact that high value creators attract more demand to generate more insurance 
policy sales and so increase premium incomes. However, on the other hand, a high value creator 
works harder in search of the best investment strategies to increase investment yield that can 
raise further cash to the firm. 
Risk-taking attitudes and value creation — For the third issue on risk-taking attitude, when 
the relationship of value creation with financial strength is identified, it is expected that the 
high value creator will behave differently from the low value creator in managing risks. This 
expectation is evident in Table 7; both the group comparison and the sample tests show 
consistent and statistically significant results that value creation is inversely related to the asset 
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liquidity ratio, free asset ratio and capitalisation ratio. This finding suggests that a firm with 
lower value creation intends to hold more liquid assets in its investments as a precautionary 
measure to prevent a potential asset liquidity crisis. Furthermore, the value creators may be 
able to utilise their capital more efficiently, and, hence, reduce the capital requirements, as 
argued by Cummins and Nini (2002) and Cummins et. al. (2009) that insurers that over-utilise 
their capital for risk management are less efficient and had a lower rate of return on assets. 
The inverse relationship between value creation and capitalisation requirement is consistent 
with another finding in Table 7 that value creation is related to linked assets positively; linked 
life insurance products are less risky with a lower requirement for the solvency margin 
compared to non-linked products (Swiss Re, 2003; Diacon et. al., 2004; Richards, 2004), 
because the linked products can help transfer investment risk to policyholders (Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1976; Knights and Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2006a,b; Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011 and Aviva Plc, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 2013). Therefore, it is expected that life insurers can gain more capital 
efficiency for value creation improvement by investing more in linked assets that helps lower 
both capitalisation requirement and free asset ratios. 
It is argued that the low value creating firms have a precautionary behaviour, which is further 
evident in Table 7; value creation is negatively related to the amount of reinsurance purchase. 
The evidence implies that a low value creator is more risk adverse in managing its low-value-
creating investment through taking more reinsurance purchase as hedging to diversify the high 
risks of the low value creation business. This claim is consistent with an argument for use of 
reinsurance as hedging devices made by Berger, Cummins and Tennyson (1992), Adams 
(1996a), Adiel, (1996), Chen, Hamwi and Hudson (2001), Powell and Sommer (2007), Adams, 
Hardwick and Zou (2008) and Shiu (2011a). These studies identified the intention of insurers 
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with financial constraints, such as a higher leverage ratio or a higher insolvency66 risk to 
purchase more reinsurance.  
In short, on the basis of the evidence in Table 7 for the three issues in relation to value creation, 
it is evident that a firm with high value creation is likely to perform better in business growth 
and finance when compared with one that has low value creation. The latter has a precautionary 
behaviour in demand for liquid assets and reinsurance purchase for investment of 
policyholders’ funds. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The chapter develops a valuation methodology to measure value creation from the perspective 
of policyholders. The valuation is based on comparing the market-perceived value of 
policyholders’ assets with the basic economic value that retains the constant purchasing power 
of money over time. The market value in excess of the basic economic value is value creation 
since it indicates a change in the real wealth of saved funds. The advantage of the value creation 
approach is to combine information from both the market perception and the policyholders’ 
expectation to measure value creation. The value creation consists of two basic elements: 
investment income (realised gain) and capital gains (unrealised gain). The development of this 
new valuation is motivated by a major change in the UK life insurance market during the period 
1985-2010: (1) A significant increase in the popularity of life insurance products in which the 
payouts are linked directly to the value of the underlying assets; and (2) Life insurers transfer 
the investment risk to the policyholders through increasing sales of linked investment products. 
Recently, the life insurance business experienced a radical change in the value of the assets 
                                                          
66 A. M. Best (1991) showed that more than 7% of insolvent US property liability insurers over the period 1969 
to 1990 were direct result of failure of reinsurers, suggesting the reinsurance transactions may have significant 
impact on direct insurers. Indeed, Chen, Hamwi and Hudson (2001) showed that demand of reinsurance is 
negatively related to solvency status of direct insurers, suggesting that an insurer with high insolvency probability 
is more likely to purchase more reinsurance. 
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during the period of financial turmoil. This raises a question of whether policyholders have 
been appropriately informed of the investment risks for the linked products and whether they 
have a good understanding of the performance of their invested saving products. 
By applying the value creation approach to assess the current performance of the UK life 
insurance industry, it is found that the whole industry loses its value relative to the basic 
expectation of policyholders during periods of financial turmoil. With a further analysis on the 
implication of the valuation to business, it is revealed that value creation is closely related to 
certain composition, business growth, the strength of finance and risk-taking attitudes of the 
firm. Furthermore, it is worth noticing an interesting phenomenon that value destroyers are 
more precautionary in using funds for investment, evident by the way in which the value losers 
demand more liquid assets in business and more reinsurance purchases as extensive hedging 
against the risk of low value creation that may bring a potential crisis. With these findings, the 
business implication of the value creation is obviously significant in addition to its theoretical 
foundation. 
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4. Chapter 4: An Investigation into the 
Diversification- Performance Relationship in the 
UK Life Insurance Industry 
4.1. Introduction 
The effect of product diversification on firm performance is well documented in the accounting 
and finance literature (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Desai and 
Jain, 1999; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a,b; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Santalo 
and Becerra, 2008). However, empirical evidence on the net effect of product diversification 
on firm performance is far from conclusive; suggesting the effect of diversification on 
performance is not homogeneous across industries (Santalo and Becerra, 2008). As for 
insurance based literature, empirical evidence concerning the net effect of product 
diversification on firm performance is inconclusive regarding various performance 
benchmarks such as efficiency score (see Berger et. al., 2000; Meador, Ryan and Schellhorn, 
2000; Fuentes, Grifell-Tatje and Perelman, 2005; Cummins et. al., 2010 and Chen, Lai and 
Wang, 2012) and investment yield ratio (see Boose, 1993; Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and 
Hoyt, 2001; Adams and Buckle, 2003; Shiu, 2004; Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg 
and Sommer, 2008; Shiu, 2009 and Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende, 2013). 
This chapter re-examines product diversification firm performance interrelationship with 
respect to investment performance using three measures of insurers’ performance, namely, 
conventional investment yield and two value creation based measures, namely, value creation 
and real capital gain (see Chapter 3). The basic idea is to test whether product diversification 
impacts investment yield (realised gain), capital gain (unrealised gain) and value creation 
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(realised and unrealised gain) homogenously. The chapter firstly examines whether 
concentration on a particular product, namely, unit-linked products or non-linked products (see 
Figure 43), would impact life insurers concerning business and financial performance and risk 
taking attitudes to establish the link between product diversification and firm performance. The 
chapter goes further to test empirically the effect of product diversification on these measures 
and whether these measures are endogenously linked to product diversification, or whether the 
type of products decides a type of performance measure. If the endogenous property exists, 
then it is argued that different products need different measurements. The implication of this 
argument to research on product diversification and performance is clear: product 
diversification impacts performances differently, depending on the type of performance used 
in assessment and the dominance of a particular product in the diversification. 
The finding from this chapter shows there are significant differences between linked and non-
linked products. Linked products can lead the life insurers to be more cost efficient, less capital 
intensive, purchase less reinsurance and to deliver, on average, higher value for policyholders 
than non-linked products. Regarding diversification, the finding of the chapter shows that the 
effect of product diversification on performance varies across three different types of 
measurement: investment yield, capital gain and value creation. This evidence is in support of 
the endogenous argument; suggesting that researchers need to be careful in interpreting the 
performance results for different products and product diversification. It also shows that the 
result is sensitive to theoretical measure of diversifications: dummies, percentages and 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). Furthermore, evidence from this chapter shows that some 
products are very sensitive and vulnerable to market shocks, and therefore, it is not 
recommended for the firm to concentrate its entire investment in these products 
notwithstanding that it has empirically shown its success in creating returns. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews existing studies on the 
issues. Section 3 explains the sample and the data. Section 4 examines the performance and 
business behaviours of linked-based insurers with reference to non-linked-based insurers. In 
section 5, further robustness tests are conducted on the effect of linked products on the 
performance of the firm while taking into account the endogenous argument of products with 
performance. The final section concludes the findings of the chapter. 
Figure 43: The Share of Unit-Linked Products in the New Premiums (APE) and in Total Admissible 
Assets over the Period 1985-2010 
 
Source: the author — this is based on full sample (see Table 31 in Appendix): Assets (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) / 
(F13; L89; LTIB) and APE ((F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) 
see Table 29) + ((F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 
29)/(F46; L24+L28*10%, C4). 
4.2. Existing Studies on the Issue 
There has been a long standing debate in literature on whether the value of diversified firms is 
valued at premiums/ discount relative to specialized firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and 
Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Desai and Jain (1999) and Laeven and Levine (2007) found that 
diversified firms are traded at a discount compared to specialized counterparts. In contrast, 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a,b) cited evidence that diversified firms are 
traded at a premium compared to specialized counterparts. However, the empirical evidence 
on the net effect of diversification is far from conclusive. Indeed, Santalo and Becerra (2008) 
showed that the effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries. 
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As for the insurance industry, the diversification-performance relationships have been 
examined from three main angles, namely, firm value, efficiency and investment yield. 
Regarding firm value and diversification67, Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991) cited evidence that 
specialized insurers (focusing on either life or property liability) performed better than 
diversified counterparts. In contrast, Thombs and Hoyt (1994) cited evidence that diversified 
insurers performed better than specialized counterparts (focusing on either life or property 
liability). 
With respect to efficiency, empirical evidence concerning the effect of diversification on 
insurer efficiency is far from conclusive. Cummins et. al. (2010) cited evidence that specialists 
are more efficient than joint producers. However, an opposite view on the efficiency-
diversification relationship was argued by Meador, Ryan and Schellhorn (2000) and Fuentes, 
Grifell-Tatje and Perelman (2005). On the other hand, Berger et. al. (2000) and Chen, Lai and 
Wang (2012) found that neither strategy (specialization or joint production) is universally more 
efficient. 
As for investment performance, there has been a substantial body of literature examining the 
diversification investment performance interrelationship in the insurance industry (Boose, 
1993; Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001; Adams and Buckle, 2003; Shiu, 2004; 
Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; Shiu, 2009; Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt 
and Wende, 2013). The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between performance 
and diversification strategies is inconclusive. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Shim 
(2011a) provided empirical evidence that undiversified insurers consistently outperformed 
diversified insurers. In contrast, Boose (1993) reported evidence that diversified insurers 
                                                          
67 Share price return is used as a measure of performance. 
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outperformed strategic focused counterparts. The argument that diversification strategies do 
not have any effect on financial performance is well documented in the insurance-based 
literature (Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001, Shiu, 2004; 2009). However, 
Elango, Ma and Pope (2008) cited evidence that the effect of business line diversification on 
firm performance is nonlinear and depends on an insurer’s degree of geographic diversification, 
while Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende (2013) showed that the effect of diversification on 
performance is not homogeneous across industries. 
While all of these previous studies are helpful in understanding the efficiency and performance 
implications of insurer diversification, they do not shed light on net effect of product 
diversifications on the performance of life insurers and whether this effect is consistent across 
various performance benchmarks, such as investment income (realised gain), capital gain 
(unrealised gain) or a combined measure such as value creation (realised and unrealised gains). 
In the UK, conventional life assurance products, such as with-profits life assurance policies, 
have been criticised for complexity, lack of transparency from policyholders’ perspective 
(Richards, 2004; Müller and Steffensen, 2007), and capital inefficiency with respect to life 
insurers (Swiss Re, 2003; Diacon et. al., 2004; Richards, 2004). A new form of life assurance 
products have been developed to address transparency and complexity of conventional 
products (Richards, 2004) as well as the capital intensity of conventional products (Richards, 
2004). In 2010, 80% new premiums of UK life insurers are related to unit-linked products, 
whereas about 60% of assets held by UK life insurers are to back unit-linked liabilities. Unit-
linked products enable life insurers to transfer investment risks to policyholders through linking 
the policyholders’ benefits to the market value of invested assets (Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; 
Knights and Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a,b; 
Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011; Aviva Plc, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012); 
suggesting the growth in the market value of policyholders’ assets shall be incorporated to 
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measure life insurers performance. This raises the question on whether unit-linked life 
assurance products would impact realised gain and unrealised gain differently. This chapter 
focuses on three key measures of performance, namely, real capital gain, investment yield and 
value creation as these measures enable the author to test whether product diversification would 
impact these measures (realised and unrealised gains) differently. To introduce the key issues 
and potential impacts of product diversification on overall performance of life insurers, the 
chapter first examines the difference between linked based life insurers and non-linked based 
life insurers against series of performance indicators, and then the chapter goes further to 
empirically test the impact of product diversification on three measures of realised and 
unrealised gains. 
4.3. Sample and Data 
The data is obtained from the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). 
The sample is based on the initial sample in Chapter 2 and Table 31 in the Appendix; it consists 
of 368 firms (5,601 observations) over the period 1985-2010. Given that the calculation of 
value creation and real capital gain have been made for all firms over the period 1985-2010 (as 
it has been explained in details in Chapter 3), it was possible to include all sample (368 firm 
and 5,601 observations; see Table 31 in the Appendix); however, one observation needs to be 
excluded for growth based variables (only) and all negative ‘value’ of some variables are 
excluded such as net premiums, free assets, expenses, claims etc. Furthermore, all firms with 
less than 5 observations (25 firms) are excluded, and any firm with less than 5 million average 
value of assets (based on F13, L89, LTIB) over period are also excluded (20 firms). Therefore 
the final sample regarding the empirical analysis includes 5,181 observations for 323 firms. In 
this chapter, to ensure inter-temporal comparability of figures and tables the financial data were 
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deflated by the UK GDP deflator index (HM Treasury, 2012). This means all real values are in 
2010 prices. 
4.4. What is the Linked Distinctive from the Non-Linked? 
Two groups of life insurance firms are compared according to whether 70% of their assets are 
invested in linked products (these are ‘linked firms’), and alternatively whether 70% of assets 
are invested in non-linked products (these are ‘non-linked firms’). The differences between 
two groups, linked-based and non-linked-based insurers, are examined with respect to business 
and financial performance, hedging strategies and risk-taking attitudes. 
The strength of the relation of a product with performance, hedging and risk implies the 
importance of the strategic decision in choosing a product for business. For instance, the choice 
of a particular product may enable the firm to reduce risk, and, hence, its capital requirements. 
Figures 44, 45 and 46 show that linked and non-linked products have very different impacts on 
hedging strategy, capitalization, efficiency and capital gain of life insurance firms. It seems 
that the linked products improve cost efficiency, capital gain, and reduce considerably capital 
requirement and reinsurance costs. However, linked based firms seem to pay most of their 
claims as surrender and partial surrender claims. 
Figure 44: Linked vs. Non-Linked Life Insurers — Value Creation 
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Source: the author — it is based on 5,181 observation for 322 firm sample, Value Creation (see Chapter 3) / (F13; 
L89; LTIB), Capital Gain (see Chapter 3) / (F13; L89; LTIB) and Linked Assets (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) 
/ (F13; L89; LTIB). 
Figure 45: Linked vs. Non-Linked Life Insurers — Reinsurance, Capitalization, Efficiency and Free 
Assets 
 
Source: the author — it is based on 5,181 observation for 323 firm sample, Surrender (F42, L13; C4) / (F42, L16; 
C4), Reinsurance (F41; L20; C4) / (F41; L19; C4), Capitalisation (F2, L36) / (F13, L89, LTIB), Free 
Asset Ratio (F2, L42) / (F13, L89, LTIB), Expense (F43, L16, C4) / (F13, L89, LTIB) and Linked Assets 
(F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) / (F13; L89; LTIB). 
Figure 46: Linked vs. Non-Linked Life Insurers — Investment Yield and Valuation Gain 
 
Source: the author — it is based on 5,181 observation for 322 firm sample, Investment Income (F40, L12) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB), Valuation Gain (F40, L13+L14) / (F13, L89, LTIB) and Linked Assets (F13; L58 + L59; 
LTIB) / (F13; L89; LTIB). 
To explore further the business and performance implications of investment in linked products, 
this chapter investigates how the linked product is related to business elements with reference 
to the non-linked products. This question is addressed by grouping business elements or 
strategies according to two broad issues: first, business performances in terms of both growth, 
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finance and investment performance, and secondly, risk-taking attitudes, hedging strategies 
and business risk. 
The investigation is made through two stages: (1) Comparing the linked based firms with the 
non-linked based firms on a 5-year interval and full period for each element in relation to the 
two respective issues above. The significant difference between the two groups for an element 
suggests that the element tends to be related to linked or non-linked investment strategies. (1) 
The initial finding from stage one on the implication of linked and non-linked investment 
strategies will be further verified statistically by using the whole sample of observations to 
calculate Pearson correlation coefficient matrix (pairwise correlation) between linked assets 
and all predetermined variables to test the impact of the linked products on an element of a 
related issue. The two-stage investigation enables the author to check the robustness and 
consistency of the findings from group comparison to sample tests. 
Table 8 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the chapter, whereas 
Panel B shows the tabulated results of the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix (pairwise 
correlation) between linked assets and all predetermined variables, t-test for mean differences 
between linked firms and non-linked firms. It is found that overall linked assets is closely 
related to business performance and capital and cost efficiency but inversely related to business 
risk and investment income (realised gain) as shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8: The Business Implications of Linked Assets 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Linked 5181 0.4373 0.4116 0 1 
Non-linked 5181 0.5627 0.4116 0 1 
Value Creation 5181 0.2428 0.1890 -0.9948 0.9700 
Capital Gain 5181 0.0169 0.1739 -0.9765 0.9614 
Tobin’s Q 5181 1.0518 0.2260 0.0005 1.9925 
Assets 5181 13.3409 2.3251 3.1128 19.2317 
Reserves 5181 13.2307 2.4891 1.3921 19.2308 
Premiums 5181 11.2700 2.5902 0.1793 18.1441 
Growth Assets 4858 0.1354 0.2767 -0.9999 0.9965 
Growth Premiums 4858 0.1542 0.5361 -0.9998 1.9918 
Expense 5181 0.0609 0.1360 0.0001 0.9892 
Free Asset 5181 0.1020 0.1650 0.0001 0.9875 
Liquidity 5181 0.0792 0.1575 0.0001 0.9986 
Capitalization 5181 0.0499 0.0992 0.0001 0.9870 
Derivatives 5181 0.2235 0.4166 0 1 
Reinsurance 5181 0.1239 0.2222 0.0001 0.9994 
Volatility 5181 0.0678 0.0658 0.0001 1 
Valuation Gain 5181 0.0258 0.0943 -0.8567 1 
Investment Income 5181 0.0497 0.0435 0 1 
Surrender 5181 0.4545 0.3330 0 1 
Source: the author. 
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Panel B: the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix and T-Test 
 Stage I Stage II 
Variables 
Linked vs. Non-Linked Pairwise 
Correlation 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010 1985-2010 
Diff. T-Value Diff. T-Value Diff. T-Value Diff. T-Value Diff. T-Value Diff. T-Value Linked 
Issue I: Business and Financial Performance 
Size: Linked Investment Strategy Positively Related to the Size of the Business 
Assets -0.0965 -0.7311 0.0548 0.4076 1.2312*** 8.4483 1.5438*** 9.9026 2.088*** 13.8976 0.8386*** 12.5291 0.2001*** 
Reserves 0.0717 0.5711 0.1953 1.4746 1.7019*** 10.2089 1.7499*** 10.3409 2.2047*** 13.7945 1.0617*** 14.9642 0.2315*** 
Premiums 0.0173 0.1285 0.0042 0.0278 1.1304*** 6.5303 1.437*** 7.6835 2.1981*** 11.2839 0.8539*** 11.1841 0.1819*** 
Growth: linked Investment Strategy is Positively Related to Business Growth 
Growth Assets 0.0774*** 4.0308 0.0672*** 3.8442 0.0905*** 4.9966 0.0199 0.978 0.0647*** 3.1664 0.0703*** 8.1022 0.1239*** 
Growth Premiums 0.0136 0.3515 0.0352 1.1563 0.0246 0.6363 0.0427 1.0509 0.0719* 1.7046 0.0408** 2.4199 0.0394*** 
Efficiency: Linked Investment Strategy is Positively Related to Cost Efficiency 
Expense -0.0278*** -4.4698 -0.0278*** -4.1785 -0.0861*** -9.5002 -0.0782*** -9.109 -0.0811*** -9.2462 -0.0586*** -16.0897 -0.2157*** 
Investment Performance: Linked Investment Strategy is Positively Related to Value Creation but Negatively Related to Investment Income 
Valuation Gain 0.0523*** 9.9157 0.0027 0.4122 0.0526*** 11.0675 -0.0338*** -4.722 0.0231*** 2.666 0.0222*** 7.2809 0.113*** 
Investment Income -0.0269*** -13.3222 -0.0242*** -9.8058 -0.0214*** -6.3422 -0.014*** -6.6873 -0.0092*** -3.2162 -0.0183*** -15.097 -0.2017*** 
Value Creation 0.0761*** 8.9244 0.0508*** 4.4842 0.1274*** 11.6635 0.0052   0.3849 0.0347** 2.1857 0.0593*** 10.6872 0.1669*** 
Capital Gain 0.1161*** 16.1597 0.1025*** 10.2442 0.1752*** 17.2794 0.0469*** 3.4555 0.1056*** 7.4247 0.1082*** 21.3637 0.2973*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.1397*** 15.6418 0.111*** 9.9324 0.2027*** 13.1952 0.0777*** 4.546 0.1239*** 7.3769 0.128*** 19.8362 0.2685*** 
Issue II: Risk-taking Attitude and Hedging Strategy 
Capitalization, Liquidity and Free Assets: Linked Investment Strategy is Negatively Related to Over-Capitalisation 
Free Asset -0.1612*** -18.3825 -0.1317*** -15.8857 -0.1724*** -17.6505 -0.1043*** -10.7291 -0.1418*** -14.6346 -0.1429*** -34.3263 -0.4326*** 
Liquidity -0.0859*** -9.3993 -0.09*** -9.4429 -0.1109*** -11.6956 -0.1*** -11.9838 -0.1198*** -13.4261 -0.1006*** -24.6208 -0.3163*** 
Capitalization -0.0664*** -8.3381 -0.0564*** -10.0866 -0.0748*** -13.6892 -0.0548*** -8.8423 -0.0728*** -16.2028 -0.0649*** -24.3319 -0.3208*** 
Using of Derivatives and Reinsurance: Linked Investment Strategy is Negatively Related to Reinsurance and Derivatives 
Derivatives -0.108*** -7.3568 -0.1588*** -7.8831 -0.1551*** -5.5245 -0.1954*** -6.5231 -0.2019*** -6.3036 -0.1751*** -15.3144 -0.1742*** 
Reinsurance -0.0799*** -7.46 -0.0776*** -7.4632 -0.0697*** -5.8349 -0.1217*** -8.0636 -0.1204*** -6.1637 -0.0959*** -15.7365 -0.2054*** 
Business Risk: Linked Investment Strategy is Related to Risk 
Surrender 0.4605*** 28.2715 0.4399*** 27.632 0.5111*** 33.1787 0.5392*** 33.9342 0.5106*** 28.4547 0.4907*** 65.939 0.7128*** 
Volatility 0.0672*** 17.3951 0.0719*** 18.8497 0.0439*** 12.1189 0.0635*** 13.633 0.0641*** 11.767 0.062*** 32.5241 0.445*** 
Source: the author. 
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Where: 
The linked / non-linked firms are defined as those where linked / non-linked assets are at least 70% of their 
admissible assets (based on F13, L89, LTIB), which is well above the ratio employed by O’Brien (2009b) 
to define with-profits insurers as those where with-profits liabilities are at least 40% of their long-term 
liabilities. The linked insurer group includes life insurers where linked assets are at least 70% of their 
admissible assets (based on F13, L89, LTIB). Non-Linked insurers group includes life insurers where non-
linked assets are at least 70% of their admissible assets (based on F13, L89, LTIB). The groups only include 
firms for the period at which the linked/non-linked assets are at least 70% of their admissible assets as most 
life insurers transformed from non-linked to linked insurers over the period 1985-2010, such as Zurich 
Assurance Ltd. This is very important since the main aims of the chapter are to observe behaviour of the 
firms and examine the implication of the investment strategy on performance. The two groups represent 
more than 85% and 90% of the sample observations and assets, respectively. The non-linked group 
dominated the linked group with respect to its share of admissible assets over the period 1985-2002; 
however, the share of the linked group in the sample of admissible assets exceeded the non-linked group 
over the period 2003-2010. As for the number of observations, the number of observations of the non-
linked group exceeded the linked group; however, the variation between the two groups fell considerably 
over the period 1985-2010. 
H0: Mean of the Linked - Mean of the Non-Linked = 0. The t-value is calculated under the assumption that two 
samples have different variances. 
Number of observations is 5,181 for 323 firms over the period 1985-2010. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Growth Assets and Growth Premiums: one observation is lost to calculate the growth rate. 
Overseas: 1 for an insurer that has overseas operations and 0 otherwise for firm i time t (it is based on F50, L18, 
C3). 
Linked: the linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Non-Linked: the non-linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L89- (L58+L59), 
LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Assets: the natural logarithms of total admissible assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Reserves: the natural logarithms of total gross mathematical reserves for firm i time t (F50; L18, C4). 
Premiums: the natural logarithms of total gross premiums for firm i time t (F41; L19; C4). 
Growth Assets: the growth rate of policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Growth Premium: the growth rate of gross premiums for firm i at time t (F41; L19). 
Expense: the ratio of gross expense to admissible assets for firm i at time t (F43, L16, C4) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Free Asset: Amount of reported free assets divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L42) / (F13, L89, 
LTIB). 
Liquidity: Liquid assets (the sum of the cash in hand, deposits not subject to time restriction on withdrawal, bank 
and approved credit and financial deposits <= 1 month, bank and approved credit and financial deposits > 
1 month and deposits with ceding undertakings (see classification of admissible assets in Table 17 in 
Appendix) divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F13; L54 + L55 + L57 + L81 + L82; LTIB) / 
(F13, L89, LTIB). 
Capitalisation: Minimum capital requirement divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L36) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Derivative: 1 for use of derivative in business and 0 otherwise for firm i time t (it is based on (F17; L51, C1; 
LTIB), (F17; L51, C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994)). 
Reinsurance: Premiums ceded to gross premiums written for firm i time t (F41; L20; C4) / (F41; L19; C4). 
Volatility: the absolute values of weighted average valuation gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets for 
firm i, time t |((F40, L14) / (F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*( (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, 
L13) / (F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB))|*((F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Valuation Gain: Valuation gain and loss deflated by the value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, 
L13+L14) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Investment Income: Investment income deflated by the value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, L12) / 
(F13, L89, LTIB). 
Surrender: the value of gross surrender and partial surrender claims to total gross claims for firm i, time t (F42, 
L13; C4) / (F42, L16; C4). 
Value Creation: It is based on Chapter 3 calculation deflated by total admissible assets (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Capital Gain: It is based on Chapter 3 calculation deflated by total admissible assets (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Tobin’s Q: It is based on Chapter 3 calculation. 
For the first issue on business growth and financial performance in relation to the linked 
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investment strategy, the strategy impact on size, growth of assets and insurance premiums is 
tested. The impact of the linked investment strategy on performance is further tested, and the 
performance is indicated respectively by the cost efficiency measured by the operational costs 
per unit of assets, investment returns and value creation. As expected, overall, the test results 
show that the unit-linked investment strategy is positively related to most types of performance, 
but negatively related to the performance of investment yield. This finding implies that the 
linked products are designed in favour of a particular type of performance. 
The strategy impact on size is clearly shown regardless how the size of business is measured. 
It is found that the business size of a firm is positively related to the linked investment strategy. 
This indicates that linked-based life insurance firms focus on fast growing product lines, and, 
hence, they have advantages in gaining economic scale. Indeed, both the group comparison 
and the whole sample test with respect to size support the evidence that life insurers with 
focusing on provision of linked products can gain fast growth. This is consistent with the view 
that the holders of with-profits policies lost confidence in the economic viability of savings 
through with-profits products (the expected maturity returns on with-profits policies were 
insufficient to cover outstanding mortgages for instance). This can be mainly related to the 
considerable fall in interest rates that forced with-profits life insurers to reduce bonus rates 
(Grosen and Jorgensen, 2000; O’Brien, 2009b; Carter and Falush, 2009). The result is also 
consistent with the view that firms may diversify to other product lines in order to seek more 
growth opportunities (Berry-Stölzle et. al., 2012). 
Similarly, the linked investment strategy is positively related to financial performance 
measured by valuation gain, capital gain, Tobin’s Q and value creation; however, it is inversely 
related to investment income. This result shows that linked assets are mainly held for capital 
growth, and, hence, the evaluation of investment performance using investment yield (realised 
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gain) will give misleading results. Indeed, Shiu (2009) cited evidence from the UK life 
insurance industry which showed that investment yield is negatively related to the proportion 
of assets invested in linked funds. Similarly, Adams (1996b) reported evidence from the New 
Zealand life insurance industry that investment yield is negatively related to non-financial 
assets. As for capital gain and value creation, the amount of value creation increases with linked 
assets. This is consistent with the view that with-profits life assurance products failed to deliver 
value expected by policyholders (O’Brien, 2009b; Carter and Falush, 2009). Finally, with 
reference to efficiency gain, the result shows that there is a substantive efficiency gain as the 
proportion of assets invested in linked funds increases. Indeed, the type of product that insurers 
concentrate on may play a major role with respect to efficiency gain. This result suggests that 
the linked product strategic-focused life insurers are more cost efficient than non-linked 
focused counterparts and diversified insurers. Therefore, the type of products on which life 
insurers are focused determines efficiency at which a firm operates. This result is consistent 
with the efficiency insurance-based literature, showing that neither strategy (specialization or 
joint production) is universally more efficient (Berger et. al., 2000; Chen, Lai and Wang, 2012). 
For the second issue of the discussion on capitalization, hedging strategies and business risk, 
when the relationship of the linked investment strategy with financial strength is identified, it 
is expected that the linked-based life insurers will behave differently from the non-linked 
counterparts in managing risks. This expectation is supported by evidence shown in Table 8: 
both the group comparison and sample tests show consistently and statistically significant 
results that a linked investment strategy is inversely related to the liquidity ratio, free asset ratio 
and capitalisation ratio. This finding suggests that linked life insurers can reduce the risk, and, 
hence, their capital requirements. This suggests that there are significant variations in the UK 
life insurer business line risks (linked and non-linked), which is consistent with Cummins’s 
and Phillips’s (2005) findings showing that that US insurer risk and cost of capital varies 
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significantly among insurer business lines. 
The result shows that linked life insurers are able to reduce their capital requirements as the 
proportion of linked assets increases. The result can be interpreted that linked life assurance 
products are less risky and require lower solvency margins (Swiss Re, 2003; Diacon et. al., 
2004; Richards, 2004), and, hence, life insurers manage to reduce their capital requirements 
relative to the volume of business written. The counterarguments are that life insurers transfer 
investment risk to policyholders through writing unit-linked products. Furthermore, the 
payouts to the policyholders of the unit-linked life assurance are linked to market value of the 
underlying assets (market price of the policyholder’s share (units) in unitised linked funds) 
(Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; Knights and Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; 
Richards, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a,b; Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD; 2011; Aviva 
Plc, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 2013). Therefore, life insurers have managed to transfer 
part of their investment risk to policyholders, and, hence, to reduce their risks, and, hence, 
capital requirements. This result is consist with existing studies examining the relationship 
between capital-to-asset ratio and product and assets risks; some empirical evidence shows that 
there is a positive relationship between product risks and the capital-to-asset ratio (Cummins 
and Sommer, 1996; Baranoff and Sager; 2002; 2003). 
Furthermore, the risk argument is further evident by the estimated result in Table 8 that a linked 
investment strategy is negatively related to the amount of reinsurance purchase and the use of 
financial derivatives. Since linked-based life insurers transfer investment risk to policyholders, 
they reduce the investment risk and hedging costs, such as reinsurance purchase and the use of 
derivatives. This claim is consistent with an argument for the use of reinsurance and derivatives 
as hedging tools, made by Berger, Cummins and Tennyson (1992), Adams (1996a), Adiel, 
(1996), Chen, Hamwi and Hudson (2001), Powell and Sommer (2007), Adams, Hardwick and 
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Zou (2008) and Shiu (2011a) that identified the intention of insurers with a higher leverage 
ratio or higher insolvency risk to purchase more reinsurance. Shiu (2011a) further finds a 
positive interrelationship of the leverage with reinsurance purchase and the use of derivatives.68 
As for business risk, the unit-linked investment strategy has negative implications for life 
insurers. Clearly, the persistency risk and performance volatility are positivity related to the 
proportion of assets invested in linked funds. As for the persistency, the proportion of surrender 
and partial surrenders claims in total claims paid increases as the proportion of assets invested 
in linked funds increases. This is consistent with the view that there is a significant level of 
variation in persistency rates between linked and non-linked life assurance policies (the 
Securities and Investment Board, 1991; Diacon and O’Brien, 2002). This can be interpreted as 
meaning that unit-linked life assurance policies are designed to be more flexible and transparent 
than their with-profits counterparts, and usually have lower withdrawal penalties (Diacon and 
O’Brien, 2002). However, although life insurance companies have long-term liabilities that 
imply that their exposure to liquidity risk is generally much lower than in the case of other 
financial institution, such as banks (Schich, 2009; Geneva Association, 2010; Baluch, Mutenga 
and Parsons, 2011; Vaughan, 2012), the perception on the part of policyholders of the growing 
financial stress at life insurance companies may affect policyholder behaviour69. In particular, 
it cannot be ruled out that policyholders concerned about the company’s financial health exit 
more frequently from their contracts even if they have to accept termination fees and 
investment losses (Harrington, 2009; Schich, 2009; Lehmann and Hofmann, 2010; Weiss, 
2010). Indeed, in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the amount of gross claims exceeded gross premiums 
                                                          
68 He finds that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher 
reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. Similarly, he finds that insurers that use derivatives 
have higher leverage than those that do not. 
69 The effect of the deterioration in the financial position of an insurer may not only have effects of existing 
policyholders but also prospective policyholders. It may lead to reduction in the new business due to policyholders 
gravitate to higher quality insurers (Epermanis and Harrington, 2006); they empirically showed that insurers 
experienced significant premium declines following rating downgrade. 
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for the life insurance industry; this confirms the findings of Russel, Fier, Carson and Dumm 
(2013) that macroeconomic variables are vital determinants for policyholder surrenders. 
As for asset stability, it is argued that, as linked-based life insurers transfer investment risk to 
policyholders, the holders of unit-linked life assurance policies will inversely be affected by 
asset volatility. However, the main sources of revenues for linked based insurers are asset 
management fees, which depends on the market value of linked assets, and, hence, the 
fluctuation in the value of linked assets represents as business risk for linked based insurer 
(Swiss Re, 2003). 
In short, on the basis of the discussion above, it is claimed that a linked investment strategy has 
a wide range of business and performance implications. A firm with more investment in linked 
funds performs better in business growth and value creation when compared with one that has 
a low proportion of assets invested in non-linked funds. The latter seems more capital intensive 
and less cost efficient; in addition, it purchases more reinsurance and it is more likely to use 
derivatives. However, the linked investment strategy has negative implication to investment 
yield (realised gain), and it is positively related to the persistency risk and the volatility in the 
value of assets. 
4.5. The Effect of the Linked Products on Performances  
The analysis in the previous section shows a particular product concentration/ diversification 
has different implications on capital gain (unrealised gain), investment yield (realised gain) and 
combined measure such as value creation (realised and unrealised gains). Furthermore, this 
effect seems to vary according to economic conditions such during the sub-period 2000-2004 
the linked did outperform non-linked assets in terms of valuation gain and difference regarding 
value creation becomes insignificant as shown in Table 8. To further export how a particular 
product diversification/ concentration influence various investment performance indicators and 
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whether this relationship is consistent under various economic conditions, the chapter employs 
multivariate and dynamic panel data analyses to further explore the relationship. 
4.5.1. Development of Hypotheses 
4.5.1.1. Unit-Linked Products 
Historically, the UK life insurers offered with-profits life assurance products that entitled 
policyholders and life insurers to share surpluses and risks. However, the UK life insurers have 
gradually shifted from with-profits products to unit-linked products since the 1980s. In 2010, 
80% (£15 billion) of new premiums70 were written in linked form, while the investments in 
linked assets exceeded 60% (£839 billion) of admissible assets (see Figure 43). It is argued that 
unit-linked products are the effective solution to the complexity and lack of transparency of 
conventional products for policyholders (Richards, 2004; Müller and Steffensen, 2007). Unit-
linked products are also able to address the problem of expensive guarantee costs and 
overcapitalisation to life insurers (Diacon et. al., 2004; Richards, 2004). However, unit-linked 
products enable life insurers to transfer investment risks to policyholders through linking the 
policyholders’ benefits to the market value of invested assets (Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; 
Knights and Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a,b; 
Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011; Aviva Plc, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
The same is true for life insurers; linked products enable them to generate their incomes by 
taking negotiable management fees as a percentage of the value of the policyholders’ assets 
(Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; Swiss Re, 2012a). As a result, the rapid growth of linked 
products in the business suggests that the market value of the policyholders’ assets has become 
the main basis for determining both policyholders’ payouts and the shareholders’ incomes 
(fees). In contrast, a conventional measure for insurer performance such as investment yield 
                                                          
70 Measured using the APE. 
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(based on realised gain only) may have become less important when compared with the growth 
of the market value of invested assets (unrealised gain) (see Figure 46). The analysis in the 
previous section, as shown in Table 8, suggests that the impacts on linked assets on value 
creation (realised and unrealised gains), investment yield (realised gain) and capital gain 
(unrealised gain) in not homogenous; see also Figure 44. 
4.5.1.2. Product Diversification 
The effect of diversification (measured using the HHI) on financial performance (measured 
using investment yield) is inconclusive (Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001; 
Adams and Buckle, 2003; Shiu, 2004; Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Shiu, 2009; Berry-Stölzle, 
Hoyt and Wende, 2013). The main issue is that the HHI measures product concentration rather 
than diversification (Berry-Stölzle et. al., 2012). However, it does not capture the effect of 
particular product line concentration. Indeed, two firms that concentrated on different product 
lines will be assigned similar scores using the HHI. In contrast to using the HHI as a measure 
of diversification, Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) employ a dummy set equal to 0 for single 
line insurers and 1 otherwise following literature that examines diversification 
discount/premiums (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Desai and 
Jain, 1999; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a,b; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Santalo 
and Becerra, 2008). 
To address this issue, three measures of diversification are employed to capture the effect of 
product line diversification/ concentration on performance. Firstly, the HHI of liabilities71 
concentration of five product lines (Non-Profit, With-Profits, Accumulative With-Profits, 
Property Linked and Index linked) is calculated. Secondly, diversification is measured as a 
                                                          
71 The data for admissible assets regarding some product lines are only available on the aggregate level; therefore, 
the HHI is calculated based on gross reserves. 
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dummy set equal to 0 for single line insurers and 1 for multiline insurers following Berger and 
Ofek (1995) and Liebenberg and Sommer (2008). Furthermore, the issue of a particular line 
concentration is addressed by dividing the product lines into linked assets (property linked and 
index linked assets) and non-linked assets (with-profits, non-profit and accumulative with-
profits); then, concentration is measured as the percentage of linked assets to total admissible 
assets. 
4.5.1.3. Firm Size 
It has been suggested that in the life insurance market, a high return on invested assets could 
be due to scale and scope economies in the investment function emanating from larger firm 
size. It is commonly believed that larger size enables companies to diversify their investment 
portfolios and thereby reduce business risk. Large life insurance companies are also expected 
to employ specialist fund managers who are adept at maximising return on invested assets. 
Moreover, large insurance firms normally have greater capacity for dealing with adverse 
market fluctuations than small insurance companies. Indeed, Boose (1993), Adams (1996b) 
and Browne, Carson and Hoyt (2001) cite evidence from the US and New Zealand life 
insurance industry indicating a positive statistical relationship between firm size and the yield 
on invested assets. 
In contrast, small life insurance companies can be expected to hold a less diversified portfolio 
of assets and, as a consequence, are less likely to generate high yield on their investment as a 
result of economies of scale and of scope. Moreover, small companies are unlikely to afford 
the management expertise needed to maximise investment returns in highly competitive 
international investment markets. However, recent empirical evidence by Adams and Buckle 
(2003) on the Bermuda insurance market and Shiu (2004; 2009) on the UK general and life 
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insurance market (respectively) suggests that insurers’ performance, measured as investment 
yield, is independent from firm size. 
One interpretation of this result lies in the fact that financial performance might have been 
measured as investment income (realised gain) that ignores capital gain (unrealised gain). The 
new measure of financial performance, value creation, addresses this issue as it combines 
realised and unrealised gains. Therefore, a positive association is expected between size and 
value creation but a negative association between investment income (realised gain) and size. 
4.5.1.4. Ownership 
Two main forms of organisation dominate the British life insurance markets– mutual life 
insurance firms, which are owned by policyholders, and proprietary life insurance firms, which 
are owned by shareholders. Mayers and Smith (1981; 1982; 1986; 1988; 1990; 1992; 1994), 
Adams (1995; 1996a; 1996b), Adams and Hossain (1998) and Adams, Hardwick and Zou 
(2008) contend that managerial decision-making in the insurance industry partly depends on 
whether a firm is a proprietary or mutual insurance firm. 
In mutual insurance firms, there are two main contracting groups, namely, managers and 
policyholders. In contrast, in propriety insurance firms, there are three main contracting 
groups—managers, shareholders and policyholders. The investment decisions are expected to 
vary between proprietary and mutual insurance firms as a direct result of their different 
ownership structures, contracting interests and internal governance. 
In mutual insurers, the main contracting problem that policyholders have is to ensure that funds 
are sufficient to meet contractual benefits for policyholders when they fall due (Adams and 
Hossain, 1998). Therefore, managers of mutual life insurers may follow a precautionary 
investment and financing strategy. On the other hand, proprietary insurers’ shareholders have 
134 
 
incentives to dilute policyholders’ funds, and they are more likely to undertake risky 
investment strategies that promise to give them profitable yield in the short-term (Mayers and 
Smith, 1982; Adams, 1995). Indeed, Adams (1996b) cites evidence from the New Zeeland life 
insurance industry indicating a negative statistical relationship between mutuality and yield on 
invested assets. Thus, mutual life insurance firms are expected to be systematically more 
conservative and follow precautionary investment policies for policyholders’ funds than for 
proprietary life insurance firms. Therefore, a positive association is expected between 
mutuality and investment yield; however, it is not clear whether mutuality status has any impact 
on value creation. 
It is not clear whether other forms of ownership, such as banking ownership of insurers or 
whether the UK-based or overseas-based parents will influence the performance of the insurers. 
4.5.1.5. Reinsurance and Derivatives 
Several researchers (see Adams, 1996b and Adams and Buckle, 2003) provide evidence that 
the capital structure of insurance firms has effects on investment yield. They found that 
leveraged insurers outperform their counterparts (non-leveraged) regarding investment yield. 
Similarly, Shiu (2005) cites evidence that the capital structure (leverage) is associated with 
insurers’ solvency. 
Moreover, the finance literature on the insurance business provides evidence that the capital 
structure of insurance firms is influenced by the financial transaction of reinsurance and use of 
derivatives. Indeed, Adams (1996a), Adiel (1996), Powell and Sommer (2007), Adams, 
Hardwick and Zou (2008) and Shiu (2011) find that insurers with a higher leverage ratio tend 
to purchase more reinsurance. Shiu (2011) confirms the interrelationship between the leverage 
and reinsurance purchase and provides evidence that there is positive interrelationship between 
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leverage and derivative72 usage. On the other hand, insurance based-literature provides 
evidence that the use of derivatives serves as a substitute to reinsurance purchase. Hardwick 
and Adams (1999) and Shiu (2011) provided evidence that the use of derivatives is negatively 
related to reinsurance purchase. 
This implies that reinsurance transaction and use of derivatives are determinates of the capital 
structure of insurers, and, hence, are expected to influence the financial performance of 
insurers. Indeed, Shiu (2004; 2009) cited evidence that investment yield of the UK general and 
life insurers are negatively related to reinsurance transactions. Therefore, a significant 
association is expected between the financial performance and use of derivatives and 
reinsurance dependence. 
4.5.1.6. Economic Conditions 
Changes in market conditions may have a significant impact on insurers’ abilities to deliver the 
promised benefits to policyholders, for instance the significant fall in interest rates, and, hence, 
investment income in the UK in the 1990s forced with-profits insurers to reduce bonus rates 
(Grosen and Jorgensen, 2000; O’Brien, 2009; Carter and Falush 2009). Moreover, this decline 
in interest rates has negatively affected the financial positions73 of many with-profits life 
insurers leading many firms to close to new business, and the market has seen substantial 
consolidation, with several changes of ownership (FSA, 2004; 2005; O’Brien and Diacon, 
2005; Carter and Falush, 2009; O’Brien, 2009). 
                                                          
72 He finds that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher 
reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. Similarly, he finds that insurers that use derivatives 
have higher leverage than those that do not. 
73 The insurer’s ability to reinvest surplus and create value for policyholders and shareholders is an indication of 
the insurers’ financial health. Indeed, the financial performance of an insurer has become an indication of financial 
solidity. BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990), Kim et. al. (1995), Kramer (1996), Lee and Urrutia (1996), Chen and 
Wong (2004) and Leadbetter and Dibra (2008) found that investment performance is negatively correlated to 
insolvency. Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003) reported that the probability an insurer will be rated by credit 
rating agencies is positively related to investment yield. 
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Browne and Hoyt (1995), Browne, Carson and Hoyt (1999, 2001), Shiu (2004; 2005; 2009) 
and Brewer et. al. (2007) showed that economic and market variables are vital determinants of 
solvency and financial performance of insurers. Browne, Carson and Hoyt (2001) cited 
evidence that the financial performance for US life insurers was negatively related to 
unanticipated inflation. Similarly, the financial performance of the UK non-life insurers was 
negatively related to unanticipated inflation (Shiu, 2004). Similarly, the financial turmoil in 
2008 was found to have negative impacts of the UK insurer solvency and financial performance 
(FSA, 2009; EU, 2009b; O’Brien, 2010; Parsons and Mutenga, 2010; Baluch, Mutenga and 
Parsons, 2011). 
4.5.2. Research Design 
To examine the effect of product diversification, following Berger and Ofek (1995), the OLS 
estimator of pooled time series and cross sectional data is estimated with control for time 
dummies. However, pooled OLS may lead to an inconsistent result if the main explanatory 
variable is endogenous (Wooldridge, 2008). To address this issue, the Hausman Test 
(Hausman, 1978) is employed to test whether the ‘Linked Assets’ variable is endogenous; the 
estimated result shows that linked assets variable is exogenous (failed to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 10% level). This suggests that the OLS pooled estimator result is consistent. 
The model to be estimated is written as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                               (6) 
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations  of the terms see Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations  of the term see Table 9. 
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Exogenous Variables: Product Mix (PM); Product Line (PL); Overseas (OV); Size (SZ); Parents (PA); Legal 
Form (LF); Industry (ID); Reinsurance (RE); Derivative (DE); Instability (IS) and Volatility (VO); for 
detailed explanations  of the terms see Table 9.  
The main issue with the OLS pooled estimator is that it does not control to unobserved firm 
specific effects (Wooldridge, 2008; 2010). To address this issue, the result of pooled estimator 
is compared to an estimator that controls unobserved firm specific effects. To determine the 
most appropriate estimator to be used, the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman, 1978) is 
conducted to examine whether the Fixed Effects or Random Effects estimator is the appropriate 
estimator. The null hypothesis that the unobservable firm-specific effects are random 
(uncorrelated with the explanatory variables) is rejected (see Table 11). The Fixed Effects 
estimator controls for time and firm specific effects that are not controlled by other independent 
variables included in the model. Furthermore, it also makes it possible to examine the 
interactive impact of diversification and change in the economic condition on firm 
performance. The model is specified in lagged form74 to control for potential endogeneity. The 
model to be estimated is written as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                               (7) 
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations of the terms see Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations of the term see Table 9. 
Exogenous Variables: Product Mix (PM); Product Line (PL); Overseas (OV); Size (SZ); Parents (PA); Legal 
Form (LF); Industry (ID); Reinsurance (RE); Derivative (DE); Instability (IS) and Volatility (VO); for 
detailed explanations  of the terms see Table 9.  
Some of the control variables, namely, Overseas, Parents, Legal Form, Industry and Derivative 
are time-invariant and rarely changing variables; suggesting that the fixed effects estimator 
                                                          
74 The model is specified in lagged form can be justified as follows. (1) The long-term nature of the life insurance 
business. (2) Diversification is a strategic decision, and, hence, it may take reasonable time to affect performance. 
(3) Using a lag structure makes it possible to control potential endogeneity. 
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may lead to imprecise estimates75 (Wooldridge, 2010; Green, 2011). To deal with this issue, 
the model is also estimated using the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) approach 
of Plümper and Troeger (2007). This approach is used to address the problems of estimating 
time-invariant and rarely changing variables in panel data analysis with unit effects.  
Furthermore, the 2SLS estimator is also employed to estimate the effect of linked assets on 
performance; assuming the linked assets variable is endogenous. The instrumental variables 
for linked assets: Capitalisation, Surrender and Liquidity are closely linked to linked assets as 
shown in Figure 47 and Table 8, and their credibility is assessed by performing a range of 
diagnostic tests, namely, (a) Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, which is a test of whether the 
equation is identified, i.e. the excluded instruments are all relevant. (b) Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic, which is a generalization of the first stage F-statistic; the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are weak. (c) The Hansen–Sargan test or Hansen J test, which is a test of 
over-identifying restrictions, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation. The model to be estimated is written as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                           (8.1) 
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆3𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                              (8.2)  
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations of the terms see Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations of the term see Table 9. 
Exogenous Variables: Product Mix (PM); Product Line (PL); Overseas (OV); Size (SZ); Parents (PA); Legal 
Form (LF); Industry (ID); Reinsurance (RE); Derivative (DE); Instability (IS) and Volatility (VO); for 
detailed explanations of the terms see Table 9.  
                                                          
75 This is because the time-invariant variables are swept away in the time-demeaning process that eliminates the 
time-invariant unobserved firm specific effects. 
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Instruments: Capitalisation (CA); Surrender Claims (SC) and Liquidity (LI); for detailed explanations of the terms 
see Table 9. 
Figure 47: Instrumental Variables 
 
Source the author — it is based on 5,181 observation for 323 firm sample, Surrender (F42, L13; C4) / (F42, L16; 
C4), Capitalisation (F2, L36) / (F13, L89, LTIB), Liquidity (F13; L54, L55, L57, L81 and L82; LTIB) / 
(F13, L89, LTIB) and Linked Assets (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) / (F13; L89; LTIB). 
Capital gain and value creation are measured in accumulative terms, see Chapter 3. Therefore, 
the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in a short panel (small T and large N) (Nickell, 
1981); however, the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant for a large T, and, hence, OLS 
estimators may give consistent result (Roodman, 2009). This chapter employs relatively large 
T, 26 years over the period 1985-2010, and, hence, the OLS estimator is expected to give a 
consistent result. However, there are additional methodological issues; the diagnosis tests, 
namely, the augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test76 (DWH) and the Autocorrelation test77 
show that the financial performance based variable is endogenous and there is serial correlation 
in the residuals. Thus, to address these problems and to check whether the bias has significant 
effects on the result of the OLS estimator, the difference and system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
                                                          
76 The augmented regression DWH test is performed as suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) through 
including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a 
regression of the original model. 
77 Wooldridge (2002 pp. 282–283; 2010 pp. 319-320) derives a simple test for autocorrelation in panel-data 
models; Drukker (2003) provides simulation results showing that the test has good size and power properties in 
reasonably sized samples. Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is also performed using ‘ABAR 
Stata model’ (Roodman, 2004). 
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(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) are employed. 
The result is based on the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2003) in Stata (called 
xtabond2) including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. The model to be estimated 
is written as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (9.1) 
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆3𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                              (9.2)  
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations  of the terms see Table 9. 
Lagged Financial Performance (FPt-1): Capital Gain lagged one period; Value Creation lagged one period or 
Investment Yield lagged one period; noting a separate regression run for each Dependent Variable, 
namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; for detailed explanations of the terms see 
Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations of the term see Table 9. 
Exogenous Variables: Product Mix (PM); Product Line (PL); Overseas (OV); Size (SZ); Parents (PA); Legal 
Form (LF); Industry (ID); Reinsurance (RE); Derivative (DE); Instability (IS) and Volatility (VO); for 
detailed explanations  of the terms see Table 9.  
Instruments: Capitalisation (CA); Surrender Claims (SC) and Liquidity (LI); for detailed explanations of the terms 
see Table 9. 
Economic condition effects on performance are tested using interaction terms of Instability 
(See Table 9). To further show the robustness of the estimations, the sample (see 4.3 data and 
sample) is split, first, yearly, and then, market-condition-based time periods, namely, 1986-
1989, 1990-1991, 1992-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008-2010. These two approaches 
for analysis will help in checking the sensitivity of the findings in terms of full sample period, 
yearly estimations and market conditions based periods. It is expected that effect of market 
conditions to be captured by the interaction term, namely, ‘Instability’, whereas sub-periods 
and yearly estimations based results are expected to provide evidence that relationship varies 
according to market conditions. 
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For the yearly estimations, all predetermined performance variables are estimated against the 
linked assets with control for firm size and legal form. The model to be estimated is written as 
follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢                                                         (10) 
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations  of the terms see Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations of the term see Table 9. 
Exogenous Variables: Size (SZ) and Legal Form (LF); for detailed explanations of the terms see Table 9.  
For the sub-periods estimations, the test is made on the basis of the system GMM estimator for 
the within-time-period observations. The model to be estimated is written as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                         (11.1) 
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆3𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                              (11.2)  
Where: 
Financial Performance (FP): Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; noting a separate regression run 
for each Dependent Variable, namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or  Investment Yield; for detailed 
explanations  of the terms see Table 9. 
Lagged Financial Performance (FPt-1): Capital Gain lagged one period; Value Creation lagged one period or 
Investment Yield lagged one period; noting a separate regression run for each Dependent Variable, 
namely, Capital Gain; Value Creation or Investment Yield; for detailed explanations of the terms see 
Table 9. 
Endogenous Variables: Linked Assets (LA); for detailed explanations of the term see Table 9. 
Exogenous Variables: Size (SZ) and Legal Form (LF) for detailed explanations of the terms see Table 9. 
Instruments: Capitalisation (CA); Surrender Claims (SC) and Liquidity (LI); for detailed explanations of the terms 
see Table 9. 
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Table 9: Description of Variables and Instruments 
Variables Abbreviation Description 
Dependent Variables 
Capital Gain FP Capital gain (based on Chapter 3) deflated by the value of assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Value Creation FP Value creation (based on Chapter 3) deflated by the value of assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Investment Yield  FP Investment income deflated by the value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, L12) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Endogenous Variables 
Linked Assets LA The linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Lagged Dependent Variable FPt-1 The lagged dependent variable. 
Exogenous Variables 
Product Mix  PM 
The HHI score is expressed as the sum of the squared share of each business line (non-profit, with-profits, unitised with-profits, property unit-linked and index unit-linked)  
in gross mathematical reserves With-Profits (F50; L11, C4), Non-Profit (F50; L12, C4), Accumulative With-Profits (F50; L13, C4), 
 Property Linked (F50; L14+L15, C4) and Index Linked (F50; L16+L17, C4). 
Product Line PL 
0 for insurer writes over 90% of new premiums from a single line, namely, Non-Profit, With-Profits, Unitised With-Profits, Property Unit-Linked or Index Unit-Linked and 1 otherwise for firm i time t. With-Profits 
 ((F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29); Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6));  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 );  
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29;  
Property Linked ((F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG,  OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29);  
and Index Linked ((F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29). 
Overseas OV 1 for an insurer that has overseas operations and 0 otherwise for firm i time t. (it is based on F50, L18, C3). 
Size SZ The natural logarithms of total admissible assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Parents PA 1 for British-based parents 0 for international-based parents for firm i time t (see Table 31 in the Appendix). 
Legal Form LF 1 for proprietary insurers; 0 for mutual insurers for firm i time t (see Table 31 in the Appendix). 
Industry ID 0 for insurer parents, 1 for bank parents, 2 for other financial institution parents and 3 for non-financial parents for firm i time t (see Table 31 in the Appendix) 
Reinsurance RE Premiums ceded to gross premiums written for firm i time t (F41; L20; C4) / (F41; L19; C4). 
Derivative DE 1 for use of derivative in business and 0 otherwise for firm i time t (it is based on (F17; L51, C1; LTIB), (F17; L51, C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994). 
Instability (1) IS 
A dummy is set 1 in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2008 (during these years change in real capital gain and sometimes change in value creation were negative)  
and 0 otherwise multiplied by the absolute values of weighted average capital gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets  
|((F40, L14) / (F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*( (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, L13) / (F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB))|*((F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Volatility VO 
The absolute values of weighted average valuation gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets for firm i, time t  
|((F40, L14) / (F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*( (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, L13) / (F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB))|*((F13, L89 - (L58+L59), LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Instruments 
Capitalisation CA Minimum capital requirement divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L36) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Surrender Claims SC The value of gross surrender and partial surrender claims to total gross claims for firm i, time t (F42, L13; C4) / (F42, L16; C4). 
Liquidity: LI 
Liquid assets (the sum of the cash in hand, deposits not subject to time restriction on withdrawal, bank and approved credit and financial deposits <= 1 month, 
 bank and approved credit and financial deposits > 1 month and deposits with ceding undertakings (see classification of admissible assets in Table 17 in Appendix)  
divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F13; L54+L55+L57+L81+L82; LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Source: the author. 
Where: 
(1)Using a multiplicative interaction term as an explanatory variable is more likely to create multicollinearity among the constituent parts (Gordon, 1968; Aiken and West, 
1991). In order to mitigate the multicollinearity issues between the interaction term (Instability) and its component parts, namely, Financial Turmoil and Stability, the 
mean centre of component variables are employed and then the interaction term is calculated as the product of mean centred component variables (Cronbach, 1987; 
Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan, 1990; Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). 
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4.5.3. Results 
4.5.3.1. The Univariate Analysis 
Panel A in Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the chapter, whereas 
Panel B shows the pairwise correlation for all explanatory and dependent variables. In Panel 
A, it is not surprising that the industry average of capital gain (unrealised gain) is 0.0176 as the 
UK life insurance market suffered from the collapse in the financial market in 2001-2002 and 
2008. Investment yield (realised gain) as a measure of performance is more stable than value 
creation (realised and unrealised gains) and capital gains (unrealised gain) as they are less 
sensitive to the fluctuation in the market value of the asset under management; the standard 
deviation of investment yield (realised gain) is 2% compared to 16% and 17% for capital gain 
(unrealised gain) and value creation (realised and unrealised gains), respectively. 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF 
Dependent Variables 
Capital Gain 5181 0.0176 0.1582 -0.4996 0.4996  
Value Creation 5181 0.2443 0.1699 -0.4995 0.6961  
Investment Yield  5181 0.048 0.0231 0.0001 0.1497  
Endogenous Variables 
Linked Assets 5181 0.4373 0.4116 0 1 1.88 
Exogenous Variables 
Product Mix 5181 0.7275 0.2508 0.2088 1 1.9 
Product Line 5181 0.5808 0.4935 0 1 1.31 
Overseas 5181 0.2822 0.4501 0 1 1.25 
Size 5181 13.3409 2.3251 3.1128 19.2317 1.73 
Parents 5181 0.7196 0.4493 0 1 1.13 
Legal Form 5181 0.5852 0.4927 0 1 1.3 
Industry 5181 0.2696 0.618 0 3 1.07 
Reinsurance 5181 0.1239 0.2222 0.0001 0.9994 1.16 
Derivative 5181 0.2235 0.4166 0 1 1.63 
Instability 5181 0.0002 0.0331 -0.3585 0.575 1.03 
Volatility 5181 0.0678 0.0658 0.0001 0.9998 1.28 
Instrumental Variables 
Surrender Claims 5181 0.4545 0.333 0.0001 1 1.1 
Capitalisation 5181 0.0499 0.0992 0.0001 0.987 1.27 
Liquidity 5181 0.0792 0.1575 0.0001 0.9986 1.31 
Source: the author. 
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Panel B 
 
Capital  
Gain 
Value  
Creation 
Investment 
Yield  
Linked  
Assets  
Product  
Mix  
Product  
Line Overseas Size Parents 
Legal  
Form Industry Reinsurance Derivative Instability  Volatility  
Capital Gain 1               
Value Creation  1              
Investment Yield   1             
Linked Assets 0.3185*** 0.1946*** -0.3126*** 1            
Product Mix 0.0739*** -0.1155*** -0.0541*** 0.4422*** 1           
Product Line 0.0098 0.0897*** 0.0079  -0.0688*** -0.4331*** 1          
Overseas -0.0796*** -0.0474*** 0.0131  -0.1837*** -0.2424*** 0.1903*** 1         
Size 0.2365*** 0.2966*** -0.2551*** 0.2001*** -0.28*** 0.2924*** 0.2822*** 1        
Parents 0.0395*** 0.1227*** 0.0140 -0.0548*** -0.1017*** 0.0182 -0.1165*** 0.0075 1       
Legal Form -0.0027 -0.1113*** -0.0255* 0.2054*** 0.1176*** -0.0595*** 0.1335*** 0.1312*** -0.2849*** 1      
Industry -0.0168 -0.0872*** -0.0456*** 0.0759*** 0.0678*** -0.0578*** -0.0272 0.0119 0.045*** 0.2051*** 1     
Reinsurance -0.1538*** -0.1934*** 0.0743*** -0.2054*** -0.1234*** 0.0555*** 0.2079*** -0.0412*** -0.1306*** 0.2053*** 0.0179 1    
Derivative 0.0086 0.1002*** -0.1109*** -0.1742*** -0.4614*** 0.237*** 0.271*** 0.4957*** 0.042*** 0.0577*** 0.0493*** 0.1244*** 1   
Instability -0.2276*** -0.1736*** 0.0148 -0.0008 -0.0116 -0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0089 0.0123 0.008 -0.0032 0.0148 1  
Volatility 0.2042*** 0.1185*** -0.1376*** 0.445*** 0.1949*** -0.0315** -0.107*** 0.0812*** -0.0443*** 0.0576*** 0.0399*** -0.0921*** -0.0803*** 0.1371*** 1 
Source: the author. 
Panel C 
 Linked Assets  Liquidity Capitalisation Surrender Claims 
Linked Assets  1    
Liquidity -0.3163*** 1   
Capitalisation -0.3208*** 0.4494*** 1  
Surrender Claims 0.7128*** -0.2887*** -0.2219*** 1 
Source: the author. 
Where: 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Mean VIF 1.39. 
Number of Observations: 5,181 over the period 1985-2010 for 323 firms. 
Mean VIF (instruments) 1.23. 
Some variables, namely, Capital Gain, Value creation, Investment yield, Reinsurance, Capitalisation, Surrender Claims and Liquidity are winsorized at 98%-99% levels to 
avoid extreme outliers. 
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Table 10 (Panel B) shows the tabulated results of the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix 
(pairwise correlation). Consistent with expectations, the value creation is positively related to 
size, the proportion of assets invested in linked funds and negatively related to economic 
conditions. In contrast, investment yield is negatively related to the proportion of assets 
invested in linked funds. Overall, the absolute values for the correlation coefficients between 
pairs of explanatory variables are generally modest. None of them exceeds 50%. Furthermore, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) values are also calculated for each explanatory variable. The 
calculated VIF values are less than 10 (mean VIF 1.39), suggesting that problems associated 
with multicollinearity are unlikely in the analysis (Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2008) (Table 
10 Panel A). Furthermore, the multicollinearity issues concerning the interaction terms 
(Gordon, 1968; Aiken and West, 1991) have been mitigated by applying the centring 
transformation procedures (Cronbach, 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan, 1990; Aiken and West, 
1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). 
Table 10 (Panel C) shows the tabulated results of the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix 
(pairwise correlation) between the instrumented variable (linked assets variable) and the 
instrumental variables. The result indicates that there is a strong correlation between the 
instrumented variable and instrumental variables. Moreover, the absolute values for the 
correlation coefficients between each pair of instrumental variables are generally modest; none 
of these exceeds 50%. Furthermore, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are also 
calculated for each instrumental variable. The calculated VIF values are less than 10 (mean 
VIF 1.23), suggesting that problems associated with multicollinearity are unlikely in the 
analysis (Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2008); Table 10 (Panel A). 
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4.5.3.2. The Multivariate Analysis 
The estimated results are reported in Table 11. The coefficients and the associated standard 
errors are reported for all explanatory variables and time dummies. The estimated results are 
consistent with the hypotheses previously discussed and the result of the analytical analysis. 
The result of pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, FEVD, 2SLS and GMM is mainly consistent. It shows 
that the effect of product diversification on financial performance is not homogeneous across 
different financial performance and diversification measurers. Furthermore, the result shows 
that linked based life insurers outperform non-linked based counterparts with respect to value 
creation (realised and unrealised gains) and capital gain (unrealised gain) as a measure of 
performance. This provides evidence that there is linked assets diversification (concentration) 
premium with respect to value creation and capital gain. Indeed, the estimated linked asset 
concentration premium is about 6.5% and 8% for capital gain (unrealised gain) and value 
creation (realised and unrealised gains), respectively; (see Tables 11 Panels A and C); this 
result is mainly consistent for pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, FEVD, 2SLS and GMM estimators. 
However, the linked based insurers suffer from the diversification (concentration) discount 
with respect to investment yield (realised gain). The result (see Table 11 Panel B) shows that 
there is about -2% investment yield (realised gain) discount for linked based insurers compared 
to their non-linked counterparts. However, value creation (realised and unrealised gains) is 
superior to investment yield (realised gain) as a measure of performance as it incorporates 
investment yield (realised gain) and capital gain (unrealised gain). This suggests that the linked 
assets outperform non-linked assets. This result is consistent with insurance-based literature 
that shows that investment yield is negatively related to linked assets (Shiu, 2009). The plot of 
the investment yield (realised gain) against linked products further shows a general trend of a 
negative relationship between the two variables, see Figure 48. One explanation to this 
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phenomenon is that the linked products provide policyholders with investment returns on the 
basis of the market value of the linked assets (capital gain or unrealised gain), rather than cash 
generated from investment (realised gain), in which this investment-awarding incentive leads 
the firm to seek opportunities in investing policyholders’ funds in assets with good potential to 
raise value (such as growth in the market value of invested assets) rather than to generate cash 
(such as dividends or interests). With this value-driven mechanism, it is expected that the value 
of assets will grow faster than the amount of the cash incomes (realised gain) generated by the 
investment. This will inevitably slow down the growth of the investment yield (realised gain) 
with more investment in linked assets over the long run. It is understood that the firm will also 
be better off since its fee incomes are linked to the market value of invested assets. The result 
is consistent with the market trend in the UK life insurance business. Indeed, many non-linked 
based life insurers (with-profits insurers) were forced to reduce bonus rates following the 
significant decline the interest rates in 1990s and 2000s, with many firms being closed to new 
business, and the market has seen substantial consolidation, with several changes of ownership 
(O’Brien and Diacon, 2005; Carter and Falush, 2009; O’Brien, 2009b). Furthermore, there has 
been an unparalleled decline in the proportion of life insurance business written in with-
profits78 form (only 4% of new premiums79 in 2010). In contrast, the unit-linked business has 
become the dominant business in the UK life insurance market; about 80% of new premiums 
were written in linked form in 2010. 
As for other measures of diversification, the result is far from conclusive. It demonstrates that 
some measures of diversification, such as the HHI (see the result for Product Mix variable in 
Table 11), may not be able to capture the effect of a particular product concentration on 
performance. Given the outfermentation nature of life assurance products, HHI may sign the 
                                                          
78 It includes conventional with-profits (1% of new premiums in 2010) and accumulating with-profits (3% of new 
premiums in 2010). 
79 Measured using the APE. 
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same rank (score) for life insurers concentrated / diversified across outfermentation products. 
This result is consistent with previous evidence on the diversification-performance insurance 
based-literature (Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001; Adams and Buckle, 2003; 
Shiu, 2004; Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; Shiu, 2009; Berry-
Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende, 2013). Finally, measuring diversification using a dummy, the result 
seems to support the view there is diversification discount that is consistent with diversification 
discount literature (see Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Desai 
and Jain, 1999 and Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
Value creation (realised and unrealised gains) and capital gain (unrealised gain) as a measure 
of financial performance compared to investment yield (realised gain) is very sensitive to the 
change in economic conditions, such the periods of financial turmoil. The result shows that 
value creation and capital gain are positively related to fluctuation (growth) in the market value 
of admissible assets (Assets volatility variable); however, they are negatively related to changes 
in the market value of assets during the period of financial turmoil. This suggests that the return 
on policyholders’ assets is positively related to growth in the market value of assets but 
negatively to adverse movement in the markets. In contrast, investment yield is negatively 
related to fluctuation in the value of assets under management; however, the adverse 
movements in the market value of assets under management do not have negative impact on 
investment yield. The result generally supports the view that the economic and market variables 
are determinants of financial performance and solvency of life and general insurers (Browne 
and Hoyt, 1995; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 1999; 2001; Shiu, 2004; 2005; 2009). This result 
is further evidenced in Panels E and D, it shows that the ability of linked products to positively 
influence the performance of life insurers is subject to market conditions; suggesting these 
products are more vulnerable to adverse movements in financial markets. 
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As for other control variables: (1) Firm size variable — the estimate of the coefficient of the 
variable is mainly positive, as expected, and mostly statistically significant. Thus, there is 
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that larger life insurance firms outperform small size 
counterparts with respect to value creation, capital gain and investment yield. This is because 
larger firms can allocate policyholders funds’ to less risky assets, and/or benefit from 
diversification. It is also likely that larger firms will be able to employ specialized personnel 
and so be able to ensure that they have responsibility for the control of investment strategies. 
This result is consistent with Boose’s (1993), Adams’s (1996b) and Browne’s, Carson’s and 
Hoyt’s (2001) findings concerning the positive statistical relationship between firm size and 
investment yield. However, the result is in direct contradiction of Adams’s and Buckle’s (2003) 
and Shiu’s (2004; 2009) findings. 
(2) Reinsurance and derivatives — insurance based literature (Adams, 1996a; Adiel, 1996; 
Powell and Sommer, 2007; Adams, Hardwick and Zou, 2008; Shiu, 2011) leveraged insurers 
purchase reinsurance to reduce their liabilities, and, hence, write a higher volume of business 
to a given amount of capital. Moreover, insurance based literature (Hardwick and Adams, 
1999; Shiu, 2011) strongly supports the hypothesis that insurers use derivatives as a substitute 
to reinsurance purchase. However, in the UK life insurance industry, more than 80% of 
reinsurance transactions are intergroup80 reinsurance, which implies that parent groups retain 
the risk. Indeed, the estimated coefficients of the use of derivatives and reinsurance purchase 
                                                          
80 In the UK, the FSA proposed to change the reporting of reinsurance, which was not split between intra-group 
and external reinsurers. They proposed by CP202 to split the reinsurance between the external and intra-group to 
‘facilitate analysis of the more complex groups of insurance firms. In cases where there is significant intra-group 
reinsurance, the split of premiums, expenses, new business and in-force business is needed to allow us to calculate 
group ratios. It will also make it easier for us and external users to identify potential risks from intra-group 
reinsurance’ (FSA, 2003). The author calculates, (see Table 31 in Appendix), the reinsurance transaction 
regarding the reinsurance new premiums, gross premiums, liabilities and expense for total reinsurance, external 
reinsurance and intergroup (separable data has become available only since 2005) for life insurers (excluding pure 
reinsurers) using data derived from regulatory return. The result indicates that there was a substantial increase in 
the amount of reinsurance transaction over the period 1985-2010. However, more than 80% of the reinsurance 
transaction is inter-group reinsurance during the period for which separable data is available. 
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are negative. Thus, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that financial performance of 
life insurers is negatively related to reinsurance purchase and use of derivatives. 
(3) Overseas diversification — the coefficients are mostly negative and sometimes significant 
suggesting that insurers that focus on the domestic market outperform insurers that expend 
their operations overseas. 
Figure 48: The Plot of the Investment Yield against the Linked Assets as Proportion of the Total Assets 
 
Source the author — Linked Assets: the linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. 
(F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB) and Investment Yield: the investment income deflated by the 
value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, L12) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
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Table 11: The Effect of the Linked Products on the Performances - Multivariate Analysis 
Panel A 
 
Capital Gain 
OLS Fixed Effects  FEVD 2SLS (Fixed Effects) 2SLS (FEVD) System GMM Difference GMM 
Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Lagged Dependent Variable                     0.8613*** 0.0227 0.607*** 0.0419 
Linked Assets 0.0825*** 0.0078 0.1069*** 0.0271 0.1052*** 0.0225 0.0954*** 0.0354 0.1836*** 0.0242 0.0339*** 0.0067 0.0696*** 0.0216 
Product Mix  -0.0082 0.0113 0.0173 0.0272 0.0176 0.0306 0.0228 0.0151 0.0176 0.0315 -0.016** 0.0078 -0.0082 0.0153 
Product Line 0.0043 0.0047 -0.008 0.0074 -0.0082 0.0068 -0.0085** 0.0041 -0.0086 0.007 0.0047** 0.0023 -0.0013 0.0034 
Overseas -0.0178*** 0.0048 -0.011 0.0135 -0.0136 0.0137 -0.0112 0.0072 -0.0016 0.0141 -0.0001 0.0031 -0.0068 0.0072 
Size 0.0139*** 0.0011 0.0088* 0.0052 0.0088* 0.005 0.0101*** 0.0029 0.0082 0.0058 0.0002 0.0008 -0.00023 0.0023 
Parents 0.0132*** 0.005 -0.0069 0.0178 0.0152 0.0122 -0.0077 0.0091 0.0153 0.0124 0.0026 0.0032 0.005 0.0095 
Legal Form -0.016*** 0.0044 -0.0137 0.0184 -0.0217* 0.0116 -0.0142* 0.0083 -0.0359*** 0.0118 -0.0062** 0.0028 -0.0113 0.0095 
Industry -0.0109*** 0.0039 -0.0028 0.0132 -0.0126 0.0089 -0.0031 0.0066 -0.0151* 0.0091 0.0001 0.0023 -0.00061 0.0071 
Reinsurance -0.0369*** 0.0109 0.0003 0.0148 0.0001 0.0155 -0.0033 0.0104 0.0027 0.0159 -0.0015 0.0052 0.0021 0.0084 
Derivative -0.0224*** 0.0059 -0.0039 0.0083 -0.0045 0.0215 -0.0044 0.0047 0.0067 0.0226 -0.0027 0.003 -0.0028 0.0041 
Instability  -0.8368*** 0.1026 -0.584*** 0.0528 -0.5813*** 0.0502 -0.5877*** 0.0503 -0.581*** 0.0505 0.0529 0.0528 -0.1152** 0.0499 
Volatility  0.4236*** 0.0695 0.0716* 0.0422 0.0696** 0.034 0.0807** 0.0382 0.0664* 0.0363 0.073** 0.0328 0.0429 0.027 
Year 1986 0.0725*** 0.0149         0.0451*** 0.0143     0.02*** 0.0065 0.0232** 0.0107 
Year 1987 0.04*** 0.0151 -0.0267*** 0.0055 -0.0266*** 0.009 0.0182 0.0141 -0.0263*** 0.009 -0.0429*** 0.007 -0.0296** 0.0114 
Year 1988 0.0355** 0.0153 -0.0379*** 0.005 -0.0378*** 0.0095 0.0089 0.0133 -0.0354*** 0.0096 -0.0281*** 0.0066 -0.0226** 0.01 
Year 1989 0.0838*** 0.0153 0.0155** 0.0067 0.0156 0.0098 0.0617*** 0.0132 0.0171* 0.01 0.0132* 0.0072 0.0241** 0.0107 
Year 1990 -0.0725*** 0.0158 -0.1264*** 0.009 -0.1249*** 0.0103 -0.0795*** 0.0136 -0.1219*** 0.0106 -0.1492*** 0.0087 -0.1302*** 0.0119 
Year 1991 -0.0598*** 0.0158 -0.1154*** 0.0082 -0.1148*** 0.0106 -0.0699*** 0.0129 -0.1139*** 0.0109 -0.0463*** 0.0055 -0.0569*** 0.0094 
Year 1992 -0.0275* 0.016 -0.0942*** 0.0086 -0.0942*** 0.0108 -0.0485*** 0.0129 -0.0938*** 0.0109 -0.0028 0.0057 -0.0218** 0.0088 
Year 1993 0.0668*** 0.0162 -0.0012 0.0099 -0.0012 0.0112 0.0438*** 0.0126 -0.002 0.0114 0.059*** 0.007 0.0494*** 0.0092 
Year 1994 -0.0308* 0.0162 -0.076*** 0.0108 -0.076*** 0.0116 -0.0304** 0.0124 -0.0756*** 0.0118 -0.0806*** 0.0067 -0.0689*** 0.0098 
Year 1995 0.0467*** 0.0166 -0.0219* 0.0116 -0.0225* 0.0118 0.0244* 0.0125 -0.022* 0.0118 0.0187*** 0.0063 0.0156* 0.0089 
Year 1996 0.0545*** 0.0161 -0.0067 0.0115 -0.0069 0.0119 0.0395*** 0.0122 -0.006 0.0119 -0.0111 0.007 -0.00081 0.0094 
Year 1997 0.131*** 0.0162 0.053*** 0.0124 0.0527*** 0.0124 0.0998*** 0.012 0.0539*** 0.0124 0.0312*** 0.0066 0.0471*** 0.0097 
Year 1998 0.1345*** 0.0158 0.0765*** 0.0129 0.0763*** 0.0128 0.1227*** 0.0118 0.0775*** 0.0129 0.0276*** 0.0064 0.0534*** 0.0105 
Year 1999 0.1619*** 0.0163 0.1028*** 0.0146 0.1016*** 0.013 0.1484*** 0.0122 0.1028*** 0.0131 0.0177*** 0.0068 0.0555*** 0.0116 
Year 2000 0.1293*** 0.0166 0.0767*** 0.0162 0.0754*** 0.0134 0.1238*** 0.0119 0.0787*** 0.0135 -0.0269*** 0.0076 0.0175 0.012 
Year 2001 0.0703*** 0.0169 0.0149 0.0159 0.0146 0.0139 0.0619*** 0.0116 0.0172 0.0141 -0.0644*** 0.0085 -0.0276** 0.0108 
Year 2002 -0.0186 0.0181 -0.0675*** 0.0178 -0.0678*** 0.0142 -0.0194 0.0135 -0.0636*** 0.0144 -0.1085*** 0.0091 -0.0825*** 0.0113 
Year 2003 0.0348** 0.0169 -0.0094 0.0161 -0.0097 0.0144 0.0365*** 0.0115 -0.0083 0.0146 0.0134*** 0.0048 0.0212*** 0.006 
Year 2004 0.0528*** 0.0168 0.0004 0.0164 0.0001 0.0142 0.0474*** 0.0115 0.0026 0.0145 -0.0016 0.0051 0.0132* 0.0068 
Year 2005 0.1123*** 0.0171 0.0535*** 0.017 0.0531*** 0.0148 0.0997*** 0.0112 0.0555*** 0.0151 0.0315*** 0.0058 0.0513*** 0.0078 
Year 2006 0.0789*** 0.0174 0.0353** 0.0178 0.035** 0.0152 0.0815*** 0.0111 0.0382** 0.0157 -0.0184*** 0.0049 0.0123 0.0078 
Year 2007 0.0829*** 0.0184 0.0252 0.0202 0.0246* 0.015 0.0713*** 0.0123 0.0269* 0.0153 -0.0285*** 0.007 0.0008 0.0081 
Year 2008 -0.0753*** 0.0201 -0.1308*** 0.0218 -0.1311*** 0.015 -0.0828*** 0.0145 -0.1269*** 0.0152 -0.1485*** 0.0114 -0.1303*** 0.0109 
Year 2009 -0.0161 0.0194 -0.052** 0.0213 -0.0523*** 0.0153 -0.0063 0.0137 -0.0501*** 0.0156 0.0051 0.0061 0.003 0.0054 
Year 2010     -0.0462** 0.0212 -0.0465*** 0.0151     -0.0447*** 0.0151         
Constant -0.2563*** 0.0235 -0.1273* 0.0691 -0.1338** 0.0555     -0.151** 0.0649 0.0129 0.0168     
R-Squared 0.3357   0.3017   0.7184       0.7227           
Number of Firms 323   323   323   323   323   323   323   
Number of Observations 4850   4850   4850   4850   4850   4850   4527   
F-Test 61.43***   61.74***   45.33***   75.39***   46.58***   373.45***   180.89***   
Wald –Test                             
Hausman Specification Test     14.33**                       
Kleibergen-Paap Rk LM Statistic 
(Underidentification) 
        
    
157.694***   
    
        
Kleibergen-Paap Rk Wald F Statistic 
(Weak Identification) 
        
    
81.723   
    
        
Hansen J Statistic (Overidentification) (P>χ2)             0.1949       0.41   0.194   
Endogeneity (Hausman Test) (Linked Assets)             1.707               
Endogeneity (Hausman Test) 
(Lagged Dependent Variable) 
        
    
    
    
0.34       
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1)                     -10.70***   -10.12***   
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)                     1.3   1.59   
Source: the author. 
  
152 
 
Panel B 
 
Investment Yield 
OLS Fixed Effects  FEVD 2SLS (Fixed Effects) 2SLS (FEVD) System GMM Difference GMM 
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Lagged Dependent Variable                     0.5018*** 0.0515 0.4261*** 0.0465 
Linked Assets  -0.0161*** 0.001 -0.0268*** 0.0044 -0.0269*** 0.003 -0.0281*** 0.0078 -0.0301*** 0.0031 -0.0072*** 0.002 -0.021*** 0.0065 
Product Mix  -0.0009 0.0017 -0.0099** 0.0049 -0.0098** 0.004 -0.0105*** 0.0032 -0.0093** 0.0041 -0.0008 0.002 -0.0059* 0.0035 
Product Line -0.0038*** 0.0007 -0.0024** 0.001 -0.0024** 0.0009 -0.0022*** 0.0007 -0.0022** 0.0009 -0.0027*** 0.0006 -0.0022*** 0.0008 
Overseas -0.0006 0.0006 0.0014 0.0015 -0.0047*** 0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 -0.0049*** 0.0018 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 
Size -0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0018*** 0.0007 0.0018*** 0.0007 0.0016*** 0.0005 0.002*** 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002 0.0027*** 0.0006 
Parents 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0069*** 0.0022 -0.0006 0.0015 -0.0065*** 0.0011 -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0045*** 0.0016 
Legal Form 0.0043*** 0.0007 -0.001 0.0024 0.0059*** 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0015 0.0062*** 0.0015 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0019 
Industry 0.0006 0.0005 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0011 0.0013 0.0009 0.0015 0.0011 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 
Reinsurance 0.0027* 0.0016 0.0011 0.003 0.0011 0.0021 0.0015 0.0021 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.0019 0.0023 
Derivative 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.0094*** 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0098*** 0.0029 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0009 
Instability  0.0171 0.0109 0.0113* 0.0068 0.0105 0.0078 0.0117 0.0074 0.0104 0.0077 0.0006 0.0115 0.0022 0.0092 
Volatility  -0.035*** 0.0071 -0.0134** 0.0053 -0.0128** 0.0051 -0.0136** 0.0056 -0.0102* 0.0053 -0.0294*** 0.0085 -0.019** 0.0075 
Year 1986 0.0278*** 0.0023         0.0284*** 0.0022     0.0114*** 0.0023 0.0164*** 0.0026 
Year 1987 0.0258*** 0.0022 -0.0025** 0.0012 -.0025* 0.0015 0.0259*** 0.0021 -0.0026* 0.0014 0.0122*** 0.0021 0.0165*** 0.0023 
Year 1988 0.0264*** 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0015 0.0266*** 0.0021 -0.002 0.0015 0.0136*** 0.0021 0.0183*** 0.0022 
Year 1989 0.0281*** 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0015 0.0281*** 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0015 0.0146*** 0.0021 0.0188*** 0.0023 
Year 1990 0.0404*** 0.0021 0.0116*** 0.0015 0.0113*** 0.0016 0.0394*** 0.0021 0.0103*** 0.0016 0.0265*** 0.0022 0.0303*** 0.0023 
Year 1991 0.0361*** 0.0021 0.0071*** 0.0014 0.0071*** 0.0016 0.0353*** 0.0021 0.0065*** 0.0016 0.0168*** 0.0024 0.0216*** 0.0024 
Year 1992 0.0261*** 0.002 -0.0019 0.0017 -0.0019 0.0016 0.0263*** 0.002 -0.0022 0.0016 0.009*** 0.0024 0.0141*** 0.0024 
Year 1993 0.0164*** 0.002 -0.0119*** 0.0016 -0.0119*** 0.0017 0.0165*** 0.002 -0.0119*** 0.0017 0.0035 0.0021 0.0075*** 0.0022 
Year 1994 0.02*** 0.002 -0.0102*** 0.0017 -0.0102*** 0.0017 0.0179*** 0.0019 -0.0106*** 0.0017 0.0113*** 0.0017 0.0134*** 0.0019 
Year 1995 0.0209*** 0.0021 -0.0077*** 0.002 -0.0075*** 0.0018 0.0204*** 0.0019 -0.0077*** 0.0017 0.0127*** 0.002 0.0152*** 0.002 
Year 1996 0.0195*** 0.0022 -0.0093*** 0.0022 -0.0093*** 0.0018 0.0187*** 0.0021 -0.0097*** 0.0017 0.011*** 0.002 0.0129*** 0.0021 
Year 1997 0.0113*** 0.002 -0.0156*** 0.0021 -0.0156*** 0.0018 0.0124*** 0.0018 -0.0158*** 0.0018 0.0048*** 0.0016 0.0069*** 0.0017 
Year 1998 0.011*** 0.002 -0.0173*** 0.0022 -0.0173*** 0.0019 0.0107*** 0.0018 -0.0177*** 0.0018 0.0062*** 0.0019 0.0072*** 0.0018 
Year 1999 0.0042** 0.0019 -0.0235*** 0.0023 -0.0234*** 0.0019 0.0048*** 0.0018 -0.0237*** 0.0019 0.0011 0.0016 0.0021 0.0015 
Year 2000 0.0063*** 0.0021 -0.0224*** 0.0023 -0.0223*** 0.0019 0.0055*** 0.0018 -0.0232*** 0.0019 0.0051*** 0.0017 0.0054*** 0.0017 
Year 2001 0.0048** 0.0021 -0.0235*** 0.0024 -0.0235*** 0.002 0.0044** 0.0018 -0.0241*** 0.002 0.0025 0.0018 0.0033* 0.0017 
Year 2002 0.0064*** 0.0019 -0.0225*** 0.0025 -0.0224*** 0.002 0.0051*** 0.0017 -0.0235*** 0.002 0.0047*** 0.0014 0.0049*** 0.0013 
Year 2003 0.0052*** 0.0019 -0.024*** 0.0025 -0.024*** 0.0021 0.0041** 0.0017 -0.0245*** 0.0021 0.0033** 0.0015 0.0032** 0.0014 
Year 2004 0.0053*** 0.002 -0.0233*** 0.0026 -0.0233*** 0.002 0.0046*** 0.0017 -0.024*** 0.002 0.0037** 0.0015 0.0039*** 0.0015 
Year 2005 0.0037* 0.0021 -0.0244*** 0.0028 -0.0244*** 0.0021 0.0038** 0.0018 -0.0248*** 0.0021 0.0025 0.0017 0.0025* 0.0015 
Year 2006 0.0048** 0.0021 -0.0243*** 0.0031 -0.0243*** 0.0022 0.0037** 0.0019 -0.0251*** 0.0022 0.0036** 0.0016 0.003** 0.0015 
Year 2007 0.0039* 0.0022 -0.0243*** 0.003 -0.0244*** 0.0022 0.0039** 0.0019 -0.0249*** 0.0022 0.0032* 0.0017 0.0031* 0.0016 
Year 2008 0.0107*** 0.0023 -0.0172*** 0.0031 -0.0172*** 0.0022 0.0105*** 0.002 -0.0181*** 0.0022 0.0087*** 0.0016 0.0091*** 0.0015 
Year 2009 0.0043* 0.0024 -0.0257*** 0.0031 -0.0257*** 0.0022 0.0025 0.002 -0.0263*** 0.0022 -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0009 0.0017 
Year 2010     -0.0282*** 0.0031 -0.0282*** 0.0022     -0.0285*** 0.0022         
Constant 0.0469*** 0.0034 0.0623*** 0.0103 0.0571*** 0.0073     0.0536*** 0.0084 0.0186*** 0.0052     
R-Squared 0.3545   0.2551   0.5873       6077           
Number of Firms 323   323   323   323   323   323   323   
Number of Observation 4850   4850   4850   4850   4850   4850   4527   
F-test 65.03***   25.22***   28.27***   48.70***   29.38***   64.83***   42.68***   
Wald –Test                             
Hausman Specification Test     105.73***                       
Kleibergen-Paap Rk LM Statistic 
(Underidentification) 
            157.694***               
Kleibergen-Paap Rk Wald F Statistic 
(Weak Identification) 
            81.723               
Hansen J Statistic (Overidentification) (P>χ2)             0.3217       0.517   0.358   
Endogeneity (Hausman Test) (Linked Assets)             2.048               
Endogeneity (Hausman Test)  
(Lagged Dependent Variable) 
                    9.267**       
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1)                     -6.07***   -5.99***   
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)                     1.53   1.49   
Source: the author. 
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Panel C 
  
Value Creation 
OLS Fixed Effects  FEVD 2SLS (Fixed Effects) 2SLS (FEVD) System GMM Difference GMM 
Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Lagged Dependent Variable                     0.8356*** 0.0251 0.6219*** 0.0464 
Linked Assets  0.0656*** 0.0088 0.094*** 0.0271 0.0942*** 0.0259 0.072* 0.0421 0.0441* 0.0244 0.0172** 0.0071 0.0522** 0.0256 
Product Mix  -0.1127*** 0.0132 0.0214 0.0265 0.0216 0.0351 0.0285* 0.0169 0.0173 0.0354 -0.0128 0.0085 0.0102 0.0151 
Product Line -0.0088* 0.0053 0.0002 0.0075 -0.0002 0.0077 -0.0002 0.0043 -0.0006 0.0077 0.0061** 0.0026 0.0036 0.0038 
Overseas -0.0283*** 0.0052 -0.0065 0.0144 -0.025 0.0159 -0.0062 0.008 -0.0362** 0.0159 -0.0046 0.0034 -0.0065 0.0078 
Size 0.0189*** 0.0014 0.0274*** 0.0055 0.0269*** 0.0058 0.0288*** 0.0033 0.0266*** 0.0065 0.0021** 0.001 0.0048* 0.0028 
Parents 0.0279*** 0.0053 -0.0085 0.0193 0.0316** 0.0142 -0.0088 0.0097 0.0307** 0.0141 0.0055 0.0037 0.0045 0.0105 
Legal Form -0.0315*** 0.0049 -0.0227 0.018 -0.0484*** 0.0135 -0.024*** 0.0088 -0.0372*** 0.0135 -0.0076** 0.0033 -0.0144 0.0095 
Industry -0.0214*** 0.0037 -0.0043 0.01 -0.0235** 0.0104 -0.0048 0.0065 -0.0232** 0.0103 -0.0036 0.0025 -0.00046 0.0061 
Reinsurance -0.0666*** 0.0131 -0.0437*** 0.0165 -0.0438** 0.0175 -0.0484*** 0.0124 -0.0372** 0.0176 -0.0072 0.0058 -0.0115 0.0085 
Derivative -0.0052 0.0065 0.0116 0.0079 0.0069 0.0248 0.0113** 0.0048 -0.0008 0.0255 -0.0013 0.0032 0.003 0.0041 
Instability  -0.6797*** 0.1154 -0.4873*** 0.058 -0.4844*** 0.0539 -0.492*** 0.0569 -0.4814*** 0.0537 -0.0053 0.0513 -0.1145** 0.0478 
Volatility  0.2751*** 0.076 0.0264 0.0457 0.0238 0.0372 0.0404 0.0437 0.01 0.0393 0.04 0.036 0.0113 0.0315 
Year 1986 0.1383*** 0.0175         0.1291*** 0.0155     0.0272*** 0.0068 0.0459*** 0.0128 
Year 1987 0.115*** 0.0173 -0.0219*** 0.0052 -0.0217** 0.0094 0.107*** 0.0144 -0.0213** 0.0093 -0.0117* 0.0063 0.0132 0.0122 
Year 1988 0.1063*** 0.0173 -0.0365*** 0.0051 -0.0363*** 0.0101 0.0941*** 0.0139 -0.0338*** 0.01 -0.0038 0.006 0.0141 0.0112 
Year 1989 0.1425*** 0.0169 -0.0024 0.0081 -0.0022 0.0105 0.1277*** 0.0137 -0.0004 0.0105 0.0273*** 0.0078 0.0469*** 0.0123 
Year 1990 0.0315* 0.0173 -0.1016*** 0.0101 -0.0996*** 0.0111 0.0288** 0.0137 -0.0958*** 0.0113 -0.0838*** 0.008 -0.0574*** 0.012 
Year 1991 0.0415** 0.0173 -0.0905*** 0.0098 -0.0899*** 0.0114 0.0386*** 0.0132 -0.0878*** 0.0116 -0.0164*** 0.0051 -0.0065 0.0102 
Year 1992 0.0532*** 0.0173 -0.0856*** 0.0102 -0.0853*** 0.0117 0.044*** 0.0133 -0.0847*** 0.0117 0.0082 0.0055 0.0128 0.01 
Year 1993 0.1099*** 0.0177 -0.0313*** 0.0117 -0.0311** 0.0122 0.0977*** 0.013 -0.0319*** 0.0122 0.0459*** 0.0071 0.0556*** 0.01 
Year 1994 0.0432** 0.0178 -0.0847*** 0.0133 -0.0842*** 0.0127 0.0446*** 0.0128 -0.084*** 0.0127 -0.0412*** 0.0062 -0.021** 0.0103 
Year 1995 0.0954*** 0.0178 -0.0492*** 0.0135 -0.0491*** 0.0129 0.0811*** 0.0129 -0.0497*** 0.0128 0.0223*** 0.0072 0.0333*** 0.0099 
Year 1996 0.0972*** 0.0173 -0.0392*** 0.0132 -0.0389*** 0.013 0.0909*** 0.0124 -0.0387*** 0.0128 0.0044 0.0073 0.0234** 0.0107 
Year 1997 0.1464*** 0.0176 0.0002 0.0131 0.0005 0.0137 0.1311*** 0.012 -0.0001 0.0135 0.0389*** 0.0066 0.059*** 0.0101 
Year 1998 0.1449*** 0.017 0.0111 0.0135 0.0116 0.0142 0.1411*** 0.0117 0.0114 0.014 0.0332*** 0.0062 0.0602*** 0.0105 
Year 1999 0.1563*** 0.0178 0.0221 0.015 0.022 0.0145 0.1518*** 0.012 0.0215 0.0142 0.0217*** 0.0066 0.0555*** 0.0112 
Year 2000 0.1287*** 0.0182 -0.0008 0.017 0.0001 0.0149 0.1301*** 0.0119 0.0016 0.0147 -0.0059 0.0079 0.0295** 0.0116 
Year 2001 0.089*** 0.0187 -0.0456*** 0.0163 -0.045*** 0.0155 0.0854*** 0.0115 -0.0446*** 0.0154 -0.0327*** 0.008 -0.0028 0.0104 
Year 2002 0.0306 0.0191 -0.1014*** 0.0177 -0.1008*** 0.0158 0.0303** 0.0126 -0.0981*** 0.0157 -0.0616*** 0.0071 -0.0385*** 0.0094 
Year 2003 0.0724*** 0.0186 -0.0545*** 0.0169 -0.0539*** 0.016 0.0752*** 0.0114 -0.0537*** 0.016 0.0229*** 0.0059 0.037*** 0.0071 
Year 2004 0.0775*** 0.0185 -0.0566*** 0.0173 -0.056*** 0.0158 0.0743*** 0.0114 -0.0553*** 0.0158 0.0063 0.0051 0.0244*** 0.0072 
Year 2005 0.1168*** 0.0188 -0.0211 0.0178 -0.0206 0.0164 0.1092*** 0.0114 -0.0205 0.0165 0.0307*** 0.006 0.0515*** 0.0088 
Year 2006 0.082*** 0.0182 -0.0424** 0.0188 -0.0417** 0.0169 0.0878*** 0.011 -0.0405** 0.0171 -0.0068 0.0047 0.019** 0.0076 
Year 2007 0.079*** 0.0196 -0.057** 0.0223 -0.0564*** 0.0166 0.0734*** 0.0126 -0.0563*** 0.0166 -0.016** 0.0074 0.0072 0.0075 
Year 2008 -0.0393* 0.0208 -0.1746*** 0.023 -0.1739*** 0.0166 -0.0425*** 0.0144 -0.1723*** 0.0165 -0.1012*** 0.0101 -0.0881*** 0.0097 
Year 2009 0.0032 0.0211 -0.1167*** 0.0231 -0.1161*** 0.0169 0.013 0.0139 -0.1159*** 0.0169 0.0047 0.0048 0.008* 0.0047 
Year 2010     -0.1306*** 0.0221 -0.1299*** 0.0167     -0.1315*** 0.0164         
Constant -0.0329 0.0273 -0.1054 0.0759 -0.1017 0.0639     -0.0652 0.0728 0.0112 0.0158     
R-Squared 0.2657   0.2003   0.7362       0.7437           
Number of Firms 323   323   323   323  323   323   323   
Number of Observation 4850   4850   4850   4850  4850   4850   4527   
F-Test 39.95***   38.55***   24.17***   42.17***  22.37***   246.19***   137.59***   
Wald –Test                            
Hausman Specification Test     41.89***                      
Kleibergen-Paap Rk LM Statistic  
(Underidentification) 
            157.694***              
Kleibergen-Paap Rk Wald F Statistic 
(Weak Identification) 
           81.723              
Hansen J Statistic (Overidentification) (P>χ2)             0.6892      0.41   0.309   
Endogeneity (Hausman Test) (Linked Assets)             4.513**              
Endogeneity (Hausman Test)  
(Lagged Dependent Variable) 
                    0.5247       
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1)                     -8.80***   -8.22***   
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2)                     0.545   1.11   
Source: the author. 
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Panel D 
Period Market 
Capital Gain Investment Yield Value Creation 
Linked Assets Firm Size Legal Form Linked Assets Firm Size Legal Form Linked Assets Firm Size Legal Form 
Year 1986 Bull 0.1435***  0.0041** 0.0017 -0.0289***   -0.0037*** 0.0054* 0.0875*** 0.0021 -0.003 
Year 1987 Bull 0.1142***  0.0054 -0.0014 -0.031***  -0.003***   0.0098*** 0.0633*** 0.0066 -0.0034 
Year 1988 Bull 0.1204*** 0.0112*** -0.0223 -0.0224***  -0.0033***   0.0051**  0.0568*** 0.0104** -0.0201 
Year 1989 Bull 0.2069***  0.0132*** -0.0317** -0.0235***  -0.0049***  0.0071** 0.1396*** 0.0079* -0.0337 
Year 1990 Bear 0.0384** 0.0105** -0.0321*  -0.0199*** -0.0044*** 0.0072***  -0.008 0.0118**  -0.0541*** 
Year 1991 Bull 0.0744***  0.0178*** -0.0346**  -0.0268***  -0.0044*** 0.007***  0.0359 0.0182***  -0.0658***  
Year 1992 Bull 0.1229***  0.0137*** -0.0404**  -0.0262*** -0.0019***  0.0077***  0.0756***  0.0166***  -0.0817*** 
Year 1993 Bull 0.2005***  0.0205***  -0.0399** -0.0311***  -0.0024*** 0.0096***  0.1536*** 0.0231***  -0.0804***  
Year 1994 Bear 0.1543*** 0.023*** -0.0452**  -0.0251*** -0.0012 0.0026 0.0931*** 0.0322***  -0.1014*** 
Year 1995 Bull 0.1828*** 0.0253***  -0.0416** -0.0179***  -0.0023***  -0.0043 0.1165***  0.0299*** -0.0886***  
Year 1996 Bull 0.1755***  0.0201*** -0.0273 -0.0136*** -0.0005 -0.0066** 0.1137*** 0.027***  -0.0761***  
Year 1997 Bull 0.1843*** 0.0189***  -0.0404**  -0.0137***  0.0001 -0.0026 0.155***  0.0245*** -0.0752*** 
Year 1998 Bull 0.161*** 0.0225*** -0.0597***  -0.0162*** -0.0012* 0.0003 0.1335***  0.0291*** -0.0882*** 
Year 1999 Bull 0.2348*** 0.0225***  -0.0528** -0.0192*** -0.0005 0.005**  0.182***  0.0319*** -0.0766*** 
Year 2000 Bear 0.1711***  0.0207*** -0.0454* -0.0171***  0.0001 0.0012 0.122***  0.0311***  -0.0702**  
Year 2001 Bear 0.0369 0.0178*** -0.0229 -0.0119***  0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0326 0.035***   -0.0494* 
Year 2002 Bear -0.1131***  0.0121** 0.0101 -0.011***  0.001** -0.0012 -0.1445***  0.0349*** -0.0353 
Year 2003 Bear 0.0101 0.0032 0.0096 -0.0166***  0.0011***  0.0004 -0.0653*  0.025***  -0.0477*  
Year 2004 Bull 0.0667**   0.0047 0.0002 -0.0159***  0.001** 0.0003 -0.0236 0.0265***  -0.0471* 
Year 2005 Bull 0.1316***  0.0056 -0.0138 -0.0122***  0.0008 0.0031 0.0449 0.025***  -0.0486* 
Year 2006 Bull 0.1884***  0.0003 -0.0237 -0.0084* 0.0009 0.0004 0.0988***  0.0195*** -0.0604**   
Year 2007 Bull 0.164*** -0.0013 -0.0391 -0.0124***  0.0009 0.0015 0.0516 0.0197***  -0.0839*** 
Year 2008 Bear -0.0051 -0.0034 0.0176 -0.0092** 0.0016** 0.0001 -0.0561 0.0175**  -0.0552 
Year 2009 Bull 0.1138*** -0.006 0.0271 -0.0114** 0.0017** 0.0033 0.0249 0.0168* -0.0583 
Year 2010 Bull 0.188***  -0.0022 -0.0306 -0.0133*** 0.0021***  -0.0047 0.0915**  0.0241***  -0.1266*** 
Source: the author. 
Panel E 
Period Market 
Capital Gain Investment Yield Value Creation 
Lagged  
Dependent  
Variable 
Linked  
Assets 
Firm 
Size 
Legal 
Form 
Lagged  
Dependent 
Variable 
Linked  
Assets 
Firm 
Size 
Legal  
Form 
Lagged  
Dependent 
Variable 
Linked  
Assets 
Firm  
Size 
Legal 
Form 
1986-1989 Bull 0.9184***  0.0359*** 0.0004 -0.0041 0.4961*** -0.0069*  -0.0016** 0.0073***  0.7249***  0.0311*** 0.0018 -0.0038 
1990-1991 Bear 0.6905** -0.0253 0.0044 -0.0141 0.8657***  -0.0072 -0.0002 0.0005 1.241*** -0.0737***  0.0007 -0.0008 
1992-1999 Bull 0.8539***   0.0532*** 0.0041**  -0.0039 0.3045*** -0.0137*** -0.0006** 0.0018*  0.8995***  0.0428***  0.0039***  -0.0093** 
2000-2003 Bear 0.6336***   -0.0134 0.0026 0.008 0.6299***  -0.0093***  0.0015***  -0.0015 0.7613*** -0.0456***  0.0078*** -0.0159*  
2004-2007 Bull 0.8572*** 0.0542***   -0.0001 -0.0094* 0.4485***  -0.0101*** 0.0009 0.002 0.9697***  0.0245*  -0.0025 -0.0067 
2008-2010 Bear 0.5465*** 0.0402* -0.0042 0.0172 0.1549 -0.0115** 0.0017**  0.0004 0.7421***  0.0111 0.0018 -0.0193* 
Source: the author. 
Where: 
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
For 2SLS, the instrumental variables for Linked Assets are: Surrender Claims, Capitalisation and Liquidity; see 
Figure 47. 
The following diagnostic tests are presented: F-test (H0: all coefficients jointly equal to zero), Wald –Test (H0: all 
coefficients jointly equal to zero), Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) (H0: firm specific effect is 
random), Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic81 (H0: the equation that excludes that instruments is 
underidentified), Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic82 (H0: instruments are weakly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors), Sargan-Hansen statistic or Hansen J statistic (H0: the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term) and Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic (H0: linked assets variable, and lagged dependent 
variable concerning GMM, is endogenous). 
GMM estimators: the result is generated using the Xtabond2 command in Satata (Roodman, 2003, 2009), with 
small sample adjustment for standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005), forward orthogonal deviations and 
                                                          
81 This is an LM test of whether the equation is identified (that excludes the instruments). It is the test of the rank 
of a matrix. Under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified, the matrix of reduced form coefficients 
on the L1 excluded instruments has rank=K1-1 where K1=number of endogenous regressors. Under the null, the 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom = (L1-K1+1) (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2010). 
82 The excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly (Stock and Yogo, 
2005). Stock and Yogo (2005) computed critical values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic for several different 
estimators. However, in this chapter, the i.i.d. assumption is dropped and the robust option is utilised, and, hence, 
the Cragg-Donald-based weak instruments test is not valid (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2010), instead ivreg2 
reports a correspondingly-robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic. Furthermore, Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 
(2010) stated that the critical values reported by ivreg2 for the Kleibergen-Paap statistic are the Stock-Yogo 
critical values for the Cragg-Donald i.i.d. case. However, an exact rejection rule for weak identification is not yet 
established; Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) suggested using the old ‘rule of thumb’ rule that the F-statistic 
for weak identification should be at least 10; otherwise, weak identification can be considered a problem. 
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assuming exogeneity for all independent variables and instrumental variable for linked assets (lagged one 
period) including time dummies with the exception for lagged dependent variable.  
Endogeneity (Hausman Test): Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic (H0: linked assets variable, and lagged dependent 
variable concerning GMM, is endogenous). 
Standards errors: heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported with respect to Fixed Effects estimator, 
whereas Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample corrected standard errors are reported regarding the GMM 
estimators, namely, System and Difference. 
The results above have the following implications: 
Is investment yield (based on realised gain) is an appropriate measure of performance for linked 
assets in particular and life insurers in general? The result highlights the weakness of 
investment yield as a measure of performance of life insurers. It shows that it is unable to reflect 
the changes in economic conditions and its consequence on the performance of life insurers. 
Given that life insurers transfer the investment risk for policyholders through selling unit-
linked life assurance products (Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; 
Richards, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a;b; Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011), the 
importance of the changes in the market value of assets under-management (unrealised gain) 
has increased. Indeed, 23% of the value of linked assets was written down in 2008, which 
suggests that many holders of unit-linked life assurance policies may have suffered from poor 
equity market performance. Despite this unparalleled loss in the value of assets under-
management, life insurers reported about 5% (on average) return on admissible assets (based 
on realised gain). 
Empirically, the result shows the interaction term (instability) is negative and significant at the 
1% level with coefficient of -0.584 when capital gain is used as the dependent variable and -
0.4873 for value creation. In contrast, the sing of the interaction term becomes positive and 
statistically significant (the coefficient is 0.0113) for investment yield. The result clearly 
indicates that investment yield should be combined with other measures of performance that 
reflect the changes in the market value of assets under-management (capital gain) or a 
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combined measure that takes into account investment yield and capital gain such as value 
creation. 
This result is consistent with the OECD’s analysis and recommendations with respect to the 
implication of the 2008 financial turmoil on the life insurance industry. The OECD stated that 
‘the growth of unit-linked business, and attendant risks to policyholders, many of whom may 
have suffered from poor equity market performance, raises the question as to whether 
consumers have been appropriately informed of the risks of investing in these types of products 
and properly understand the options available to them within the product structures’. The 
OECD recommended that ‘governments should work to identify and address any financial 
education or literacy issues raised by the financial crisis, for instance, in relation to unit-linked 
insurance products and other types of investment products offered by insurers. Such efforts 
should be incorporated into the country’s broader financial education strategy’ (OECD, 
2011). 
Is the effect of product diversification on financial performance consistent across different 
measurers of diversification? The effect of diversification is not homogeneous across 
performance and diversification measures, namely, the HHI (Product Mix), dummy measured 
as 1 multiline insurers and 0 otherwise (Product Line) and proportion of assets invested in a 
particular line (Linked Assets). Similarly, the result is not homogenous across performance 
benchmarks based on realised and unrealised gains, namely, investment yield, capital gain and 
value creation. It may not be appropriate to use only one measure for performance and 
diversification to examine diversification-performance interrelationships. 
Is linked assets concentration a sustainable investment strategy that can consistently deliver 
value for policyholders? The result clearly indicates the value creation and capital gain are 
positively related to linked assets. Furthermore, the value creation and capital is positively 
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related to and growth in the market value of assets, which suggests that a higher growth in 
market value of the assets the higher the value creation and vise versa. However, the result also 
shows that assets with higher market value growth are more vulnerable to adverse movement 
in the market value of the assets. Given that life insurers transfer investment risk to 
policyholders (Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003; Richards, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2006a;b; Carter and Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011), policyholders may 
suffer from a poor equity market performance, such as the financial turmoil in 2000, 2002 and 
2008.  
4.6. Conclusion 
The main objective of life insurers is to provide financial security to policyholders by providing 
benefits upon death, retirement or maturity of the life insurance policies. Traditionally, life 
insurers achieve that by offering with-profits products (non-linked) with fixed and guaranteed 
benefits. However, the unparalleled decline in interest rates in the 1990s and 2000s and its 
consequence on the cost of grantees and even the financial position of life insurers, as well as, 
the bonus rates has led to an increase in the popularity of life assurance products by which 
benefits are linked to market value of equities and indices. These policies can be considered to 
be investment policies rather than protection policies as insurers transfer most of the investment 
risk to policyholders. These developments in the UK life insurance market require, from the 
academics and practitioners prospective to renovate the traditional measures of performance 
based on realised gain to incorporate unrealised gain. Indeed, the investment side, in particular 
changes in the market value of invested assets (unrealised gain), has not been regarded as 
important as other issues such as solvency, risk such as mortality and morbidity risks. 
The chapter examines the effect of product diversification on investment performance of the 
UK life insurers over the period 1985-2010; aiming to test whether 
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concentration/diversification on certain product line (s) would impact realised and unrealised 
gain differently. This chapter firstly tests the effect of the concentration on a particular product 
line on financial performance and risk and hedging strategy to establish the basis for the 
empirical analysis. It is revealed that linked investment strategy has a wide range of business 
and performance implications. A firm with a high level of assets invested in linked funds 
performs better in business growth and value creation when compared with one that has a low 
proportion of assets invested in non-linked funds. The latter seems more capital intensive and 
less cost efficiency; in addition, it purchases more reinsurance and it is more likely to use 
derivatives. However, linked investment strategy has negative implications on investment yield 
(based on realised gain), and it is positively related to persistency risk and assets volatility. 
The chapter goes further to test empirically the effect of product diversification on realised and 
unrealised gains using three measures, namely, investment yield (realised gain), capital gain 
(unrealised gain) and value creation (realised and unrealised gains). The result shows that the 
effect of product diversification on the financial performance is not homogeneous across 
realised and unrealised gains, and it also depends on how diversification is measured. 
This chapter shows that unit-linked products outperform non-linked products; however, unit-
linked products are more vulnerable to adverse movement in the market value of the assets, 
and, hence, the policyholders, who bear the investment risk of linked products, may suffer from 
adverse movement in the equity market. 
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5. Chapter 5: The Robustness of Output Proxies in 
Life Insurance Efficiency Studies: Empirical 
Evidence from the UK 
5.1. Introduction 
Frontier efficiency has become state of the art in measuring firm performance ever since the 
significant contributions of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977)83 and Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978)84. Frontier efficiency measures have been derived from microeconomic theory 
to develop meaningful and reliable measures for performance that controls differences in inputs 
and outputs of the firm. This gives frontier efficiency the theoretical advantage relative to more 
traditional measures of performance, such as ratio analysis. Not surprisingly, Eling and Luhnen 
(2010a) identified more than 100 efficiency articles85 written or published in the 1990-2010 
                                                          
83 Internet search on December 16, 2012 on www.scholar.google.com yielded 5416 citations for Aigner’s, Lovell’s 
and Schmidt’s (1977) paper. 
84 Internet search on December 16, 2012 on www.scholar.google.com yielded 13578 citations for Charnes’s, 
Cooper’s and Rhodes’s (1978) paper. 
85 Eling and Luhnen (2010a) indentified 10 different application areas for insurance-based efficiency studies, 
namely, distribution systems (see Berger, Cummins and Weiss , 1997; Brockett et. al., 1998; Carr et. al., 1999; 
Ward, 2002; Klumpes, 2004; Gamarra, 2007; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2011 and Klumpes and Schuermann, 2011), 
financial and risk management and capital utilization (see Cummins and Nini, 2002; Brockett et. al., 2004a; 
Cummins et. al., 2009 and Huang and Paradi, 2011), general level of efficiency and evolution over time (see 
Weiss, 1991b; Cummins and Weiss, 1993; Fecher et. al., 1993; Gardner and Grace, 1993; Cummins, Turchetti 
and Weiss, 1996; Hardwick, 1997; Bernstein, 1999; Cummins, 1999; Mansor and Radam, 2000; Noulas et. al., 
2001; Chaffai and Ouertani, 2002; Worthington and Hurley, 2002; Leverty, Lin and Zhou, 2004; Barros, Barroso 
and Borges, 2005; Tone and Sahoo, 2005; Barros and Obijiaku, 2007; Hao and Chou, 2005; Qiu and Chen, 2006; 
Hao, 2007; Huang, 2007; Yao, Han and Feng, 2007; Bikker and Leuvensteijn, 2008; Luhnen, 2009; Kader, Adams 
and Hardwick, 2010; Shahroudi, Taleghani and Mohammadi, 2011; Ansah-Adu, Andoh and Abor, 2012; Bikker, 
2012; Gaganis and Hasan and Pasiouras, 2013), inter-country comparisons (see Weiss, 1991a; Delhausse, Fecher, 
and Pestieau, 1995; Donni and Fecher, 1997; Rai, 1996; Diacon, 2001; Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Eling 
and Luhnen, 2010b; Zanghieri, 2008; Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013; Biener and Eling, 2012; Khalid, Said 
and Saeed, 2012 and Huang and Eling, 2013), market structure (Choi and Weiss, 2005; Choi and Weiss, 2008; 
Fenn et. al., 2008 and Berry-Stölzle, Weiss and Wende, 2011), mergers (see Kim and Grace, 1995; Cummins, 
Tennyson and Weiss, 1999; Cummins and Xie, 2008; Davutyan and Klumpes, 2008; Shim, 2011b and Xiea et. al, 
2011), methodology issues and comparison of different techniques or assumptions (see Weiss, 1986; Cummins 
and Zi, 1998; Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé and Perelman, 2001; Fukuyama and Weber, 2001; Brockett et. al., 2004b; 
Yang, 2006; Wu et. al., 2007; Hwang and Kao, 2008a;b; Leverty and Grace, 2010; Shi and Zhang, 2011 and Sabet 
and Fadavi, 2013), organisational form and corporate governance issues (see Fukuyama, 1997; Cummins, Weiss 
and Zi, 1999; Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi, 2004; Greene and Segal, 2004; Brockett et. al., 2005; Jeng and Lai, 
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period on life and non-life insurance industries alone compared to 21 studies identified by 
Cummins’s and Weiss’s (2000) survey and 8 studies in Berger’s and Humphrey’s (1997) 
survey. Similarly, Cummins and Weiss (2013) also identified 74 studies over the period 1983 
to 2011, including 37 papers published in ‘upper tier journals’ over the period 2000 - 2011. 
Measuring firm efficiency, however, is challenging, especially for insurance firms in which 
many outputs are intangible (premiums, claims, etc.) and many prices are implicit, making 
observed revenue flows imprecise guides for selecting the principal outputs to include in the 
analysis (Leverty and Grace, 2010). Nevertheless, the validity of frontier efficiency as a 
measure of insurer performance depends on the validity of the proxy utilised to measure output. 
Indeed, frontier efficiency hypothesis tests are considered to be a joint hypothesis such tests 
for financial market efficiency; a failure to utilise a valid proxy for output could be misleading 
and may give unreliable results for the tested hypotheses (Leverty and Grace, 2010). 
There has been a huge debate in insurance-based literature as to whether premiums or claims 
should be used as an output proxy. The premiums are considered to be price times quantity 
rather than a count of output units (Yuengert, 1993), and price difference between small and 
large insurers may lead to misleading inferences regarding average costs (Yuengert, 1993, p. 
489). In contrast, the sum of incurred claims plus additions to reverses is utilised to measure 
output in literature (see Yuengert, 1993; Berger et. al., 2000; Cummins and Weiss, 2000; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2013). However, high claims imply a firm is efficient rather than 
                                                          
2005; Diboky and Ubl, 2007; Jeng, Lai and McNamara, 2007; Wende, Berry-Stolzle and Lai, 2008; Erhemjamts 
and Leverty, 2010; Xie, 2010; Hardwick, Adams and Zou, 2011; Chen, Lai and Wang, 2011; Huang et. al., 2011; 
Ismail, Alhabshi and Bacha, 2011; Bhloul, Hachicha and Bouri, 2013 and Kader et. al., 2013), regulation change 
(see Rees et. al., 1999; Mahlberg and Url, 2000; Ryan and Schellhorn, 2000; Boonyasai, Grace and Skipper, 2002; 
Mahlberg and Url, 2003; Ennsfellner, Lewis and Anderson, 2004; Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006; Hussels and 
Ward, 2006; Turchetti and Daraio, 2004; Gamarra, 2008; Yuan and Phillips, 2008; Badunenko, Grechanyuk and 
Talavera, 2009 and Singh and Kumar, 2011) and scale and scope economies (Fecher, Perelman and Pestieau, 
1991; Grace and Timme, 1992; Yuengert, 1993; Toivanen, 1997; Berger et. al., 2000; Meador, Ryan and 
Schellhorn, 2000; Hirao and Inoue, 2004; Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé and Perelman, 2005; Hwang and Gao, 2005; 
Cummins et. al, 2010 and Choo, 2012). 
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inefficient (Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Brockett et. al.; 2004a, 2005; Leverty and 
Grace, 2010). Furthermore, Leverty and Grace (2010) raised a theoretical concern regarding 
using claims as a proxy for insurer output, as this measure is not validated empirically. Given 
that life insurance products involve accumulation of funds over a relatively long period of time; 
changes in these accumulative funds or even the accumulative funds have not been utilised to 
proxy output in the existing studies to be best of the author’s knowledge. Indeed, Cummins and 
Weiss, (2013) argued that ‘to capture this element of intermediation, average invested assets 
for life insurers is usually included as an output variable. An approach that has not been 
utilized in the existing literature would be to separate incurred benefits from additions to 
reserves, giving rise to a total of ten insurance outputs if by line disaggregation is used. It 
would be interesting to test whether this might raise the average estimated efficiency scores’ 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2013; p.820). 
The fundamental objective of the chapter is to test the validity of three different proxies of 
output, namely, revenue, claims and funds to identify what is an appropriate proxy of the life 
insurer output. To address this, the chapter highlights the theoretical advantages and limitations 
for each of these proxies. The chapter goes further to examine analytically whether each proxy 
can be derived using actual available data on the UK life insurers. The stochastic frontier 
approach is utilised to estimate cost efficiency based on each output proxy. Finally, the validity 
of different proxies is verified using ‘consistency conditions’ regarding efficiency score 
proposed by Bauer et. al. (1998). The chapter goes further to examine whether efficiency based 
ranking of best practice firms is consistent with the value creation based ranking (see Chapter 
3). The result shows that using premiums plus investment income (realised gain) plus valuation 
gain and loss (unrealised gain), change in policyholders’ funds and claims plus addition to 
reserves are not possible practically as these proxies violate non-negativity constraint of 
outputs, including over 50% of sample firms have negative values for some of these variables 
162 
 
during the period of financial turmoil. As for cost efficiency, it is found that average cost 
efficiency based on revenue is higher and less volatile compared to average cost efficiency 
based on funds or claims. However, three output proxies give consistently similar ranking for 
competitive firms, and cost efficiency based on different proxies are closely related to 
conventional measurers of firm performance and value creation. Indeed, the ranking of best 
practice firms is correlated with the value creation based ranking, indicating more efficient 
firms also deliver higher value to policyholders compared to their basic expectations. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
discusses the theory concerning output proxies. Section 3 present data and sample as well as 
explains the estimated variables. Section 4 constructs an empirical framework employed in the 
analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical result and discusses the implication of the findings. 
The final section summarises and concludes the findings of the chapter. 
5.2. Literature Review 
5.2.1. Introduction 
There has been an extensive and unresolved debate in literature concerning the appropriate 
measure of insurers’ outputs (Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; Leverty and Grace, 2010; Cummins 
and Weiss, 2000; 2013). Researchers have applied two main86 approaches to measure outputs 
in efficiency insurance-based studies, namely, the intermediation approach and the value-added 
approach. The value-added approach views an insurer as a profit maximizing firm (Cummins 
and Weiss, 2000; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; Leverty and Grace, 2010), whereas the 
                                                          
86 There have been few innovations with regard to output measurement. Hwang and Kao ( 2008; a, b) introduced 
new relational two-stage production process, in which the outputs of the first production stage (called premium 
acquisition) are the inputs for the second production stage (called profit generation). Moreover, few studies 
applied physical outputs such as number of product units produced as output (Weiss, 1986; Toivanen, 1997; 
Bernstein, 1999; Brockett et. al., 2004b); however, using number of units (policies) is criticised on the ground that 
this simple output proxy does not take into account differences between life assurance products, such as the policy 
size (O’Brien, 1991). 
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intermediation approach considers the single objective of maximizing profits as inadequate for 
evaluating life insurer performance and instead it identifies multiple objectives centred on 
solvency of the insurer (Brockett et. al., 2004b; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; Leverty and Grace, 
2010). 
The value-added approach (also called the production approach) — in this approach, the main 
objective of an insurer is considered to be profit maximisation; insurers use production factors 
(capital and labour) to provide financial services that are valued by individuals and businesses 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; Leverty and Grace, 2010). Insurers are 
assumed to provide three main services, namely, risk-pooling and risk-bearing, real financial 
services and financial intermediation (Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Leverty and Grace, 2010; 
Eling and Luhnen, 2010a). The first service, risk-pooling and risk-bearing, is considered to be 
the main function of insurers. They provide a system for businesses and individuals to transfer 
their risks for predetermined prices (premiums) and then reallocate the majority of collected 
premiums to those who insure their risks and encounter losses (pay out claims). Insurers add 
value by reducing these risks through diversification; however, they incur expenses, such as 
underwriting, actuarial, etc., in the servicing risk-pooling and risk-bearing function. 
Furthermore, insurers also add value by holding collected funds (policyholders’ funds) to 
provide economic security against financial turmoil and insolvency of insurers. With respect 
to the second service, real financial services, insurers can add value through providing some 
services such as financial planning. Regarding the third service, financial intermediation, the 
time lag between receiving premiums from policyholders and paying claims to those incurred 
losses enables insurers to add value by investing policyholders’ funds to generate returns that 
can be reallocated to policyholders in terms of bonuses, discounted premiums, etc. 
The intermediation approach (also called the flow approach) — in contrast to the value-added 
approach, the intermediation approach considers the single objective of profit maximisation as 
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inadequate (Leverty and Grace, 2010). In the intermediation approach, the main objective of 
an insurer is considered to be to solvency; insurers utilize the production factors to balance 
three goals, namely, maximizing solvency, financial return and claims-paying ability against 
each other to serve the interests of regulators and policyholders (Brockett et. al., 2004b; Eling 
and Luhnen, 2010a; Leverty and Grace, 2010). An insurer in the intermediation approach is 
considered to be a financial intermediary that borrows funds from policyholders, transforms 
collected funds into investments and pays out principles plus any returns less management fees 
to policyholders (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Leverty and Grace, 
2010; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a). 
5.2.2. Output Proxies 
From the perspective of a life insurer interest, insurers will make gain from trading if a revenue 
achieved from a life insurance contract is higher than related expenses to that contract E(C) ≥
0 . Therefore, the value added by insurer from this trading can be written as follows: 
V =  R − E                                                                                                                                            (12) 
Where: 
V: the value added by the insurer. 
𝑅: the life insurer revenue ; R ≥ 0. 
𝐸: the life insurer expense; E ≥ 0. 
Given the time lag between the date when the policyholder pays the premiums P and the date 
of payouts (claims) C payments, the insurer invests the P, and, hence, an investment income 
(realised and unrealised gain; assuming realised and unrealised gain r ≥ 0) is generated from 
investing P from the date the premiums P is paid to the date of the payment of C. Given that 
regulators require insurers to hold a certain level of capital K at time 0 to be able to write 
insurance policies, both K and P are invested at time 0 at rate r ≥ 0 (realised and unrealised 
gain); assuming there is no tax for simplicity. With the assumption that C is paid at time 1, P 
can be rewritten as follows (see Cummins, 1990 and Cummins and Weiss, 2013): 
165 
 
𝑃 =
(𝐶 + 𝑎𝑀)
(1 + 𝑟)
                                                                                                                                     (13) 
Where: 
𝑀: the asset under-management 𝑀 = 𝑃 + 𝐾, M ≥ 0. 
𝛼: the management charges (fees) as a proportion of 𝑀. 
C: the claims; C ≥ 0. 
P: the insurance premiums. 
r: the return on invested assets; r > 0. 
𝐾: the capital committed to the policy. 
The life insurer revenue can also be rewritten as follows: 
R = P + rM =  P + r(P + K)   = (1 + r)P + rK                                                                          (14) 
Where: 
𝐾: the capital committed to the policy. 
𝑅: the revenue; R ≥ 0. 
P: the insurance premiums P ≥ 0. 
r: the return on invested assets; r > 0. 
𝑀: the asset under-management 𝑀 = 𝑃 + 𝐾, M ≥ 0. 
With the assumption that C is paid at time 1, life insurer expense can be rewritten as follows  
E = C + βK + e M                                                                                                                              (15) 
Where: 
𝐸: the life insurer expense; E ≥ 0. 
𝑀: the asset under-management 𝑀 = 𝑃 + 𝐾, M ≥ 0. . 
𝑒: the management expenses as a proportion of 𝑀. 
𝛽: the risk premium received by shareholders for bearing insurance risk. 
C: the claims; C ≥ 0. 
P: the insurance premiums. 
r: the return on invested assets; r > 0. 
𝐾: the capital committed to the policy. 
Therefore 12 can be rewritten as follows: 
V =  R − E    =   (1 + r)[
(𝐶 + 𝑎𝑀)
(1 + 𝑟)
 ] + rK − C − βK − e M  
=  (r − β)K +    (a − e) M                                                                                  (16) 
Where: 
𝐸: the life insurer expense; E ≥ 0. 
𝑀: the asset under-management 𝑀 = 𝑃 + 𝐾, M ≥ 0. 
𝑒: the management expenses as a proportion of 𝑀. 
𝛽: the risk premium received by shareholders for bearing insurance risk. 
C: the claims; C ≥ 0. 
P: the insurance premiums. 
r: the return on invested assets; r > 0. 
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𝐾: the capital committed to the policy. 
This suggests the value added is net management fees (profits based management fees) plus 
risk premiums on shareholders’ capital for bearing the insurance risk. 
In literature, there is an intense debate as to whether premiums or claims are an appropriate 
proxy for output. More than half87 of the existing studies (see Eling and Luhnen, 2010a) 
followed Cummins and Weiss (2000) and specified output as claims compared to 1 in 3 studies 
utilised premiums as output. Although more studies utilised claims as a proxy for output 
compared to premiums, Eling and Luhnen (2010a) stated that there is no recognisable trend 
over time as to whether either of the two main proxies is gaining more of a following among 
researchers. 
5.2.2.1. Claims as an Output 
Cummins and Weiss (2013; p.818) argued that the quantity of insurer output should be proxied 
by the present value of claims8889; however, the theoretical illustration (see Equation 16) does 
not support this proxy concerning life insurance contracts. In terms of accounting variables to 
proxy output, following Yuengert (1993), Berger et. al. (2000) and Cummins and Weiss (2000, 
2013) the sum of incurred claims and additions to reserves is suggested to be used to measure 
insurance output, suggesting the incurred claims during a particular period are an appropriate 
proxy for the risk-pooling and risk-bearing function as they measure the amount of funds 
distributed to policyholders for insured events. Given the fact that insurers may not be willing 
to maximise the value of insurance claims, this output proxy violates the principle output 
                                                          
87 95 studies were included in Eling’s and Luhnen’s (2010a) survey, from which 80 studies applied the value-
added approach. Out of the 80 articles that applied the value-added approach, 46 specified claims as output 
compared to 32 studies used premiums as output. 
88 Cummins and Weiss (2013; p.818) derived the value added for a protection based insurance contact as the 
insurer’s expenses plus the owners’ profit for bearing insurance risk following Pratt-Arrow concept of the 
insurance premium (Arrow, 1971); for more details see Cummins and Weiss (2013; pp.817-819).  
89 They suggest output to be measured as Q =
C
1+r
          where C: the claims; C ≥ 0; Q: the output; C > 0 and r: 
the return on invested assets; r > 0. 
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characteristics90 (see Diacon, 2001; Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002). Furthermore, the time 
lag between the date when the premiums are received and date of the payment of the claims 
means the estimated claims need to be adjusted on a yearly basis (see Diacon, 2001). 
Furthermore, it was stated that claims distort efficiency because when claims unexpectedly and 
dramatically increase due to unforeseen catastrophic events or other adverse fluctuations with 
no change in inputs, the effect on the firm would appear to be efficiency enhancing (Diacon, 
Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Brockett et. al., 2004a; 2005; Leverty and Grace, 2010). Moreover, 
Leverty and Grace (2010) raised a theoretical concern regarding using claims as an output 
measure, as this measure is not validated empirically. 
5.2.2.2. Revenue as an Output 
As it has been defined in Equation 14, insurance revenue is argued to be a proxy for life insurers 
output. It is questionable whether premiums meet the definition of revenues under the IFRSs, 
and under developments insurance contracts project by the IASB for most life insurance 
contract as these contracts are considered to be investment contracts such as unit-linked 
contracts and the accounting treatment for such contracts is proposed to be as deposit received 
from policyholders rather than revenues (IASB, 2010a;b; IASB, 2013a; b; c; d; e) as risks of 
these contracts are transferred to policyholders (see Brennan and Schwartz, 1976; Knights and 
Willmott, 1993; Hardy, 2003; Swiss Re, 2003, Richards, 2004; O’Brien, 2006a,b; Carter and 
Falush, 2009; Cipra, 2010; OECD, 2011; Aviva Plc, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 2013). 
                                                          
90 The production function of a life insurer uses N inputs (labour and capital etc.) to produce a single output is 
given as 𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑋), where Q represents output and X = (X1, X2,..., Xn) is an n X vector of inputs. There are several 
properties for this function among these are: (1) Non-negativity: the value of 𝑓(𝑥) is a finite, non-negative and 
real number. (2) Weak essentiality: the production of positive output is impossible without the use of at least one 
input. (3) Non-decreasing in x: (or monotonicity) additional units of an input will not decrease output. (4) Concave 
in x: any linear combination of the vectors x0 and x1 will produce an output that is no less than the same linear 
combination of F(x0) and F(x1) (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000; 2006). 
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Furthermore, premiums are not output as premiums measure price times output quantity, not 
output (see Yuengert, 1993, p. 489), and systematic differences in price across large and small 
firms may lead to misleading inferences about average costs if premiums are used as an output 
proxy (see Yuengert, 1993, p. 489). Indeed, it is argued that premiums are a valid measure of 
insurer output if insurance products are homogeneous and competitive pressures compel 
existing players to charge the same price (Allen, 1974; Blair, Jackson and Vogel, 1975). 
However, the existence of market imperfection could led to misleading result (Doherty, 1981), 
whereas the homogeneity assumption of life assurance products is questionable since life 
insurers offer products range from pure protections (health insurance) to investment policies 
(unit-linked). Moreover, it was argued that using premiums as a proxy for output could be 
misleading as it is simply a transfer of wealth between policyholders (O’Brien, 1991). As for 
adding investment income to premiums, it was suggested that the return on invested premiums 
should be added to premiums to measure output as investment income is the only source to 
cover underwriting losses (Diewert, 1995; Sherwood, 1999) and the prices paid by individuals 
and businesses for insurance claims would equal premiums plus investment income 
(Sherwood, 1999). Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013) stated that premiums can be used as a 
proxy for expected payouts for policyholders (claims); however, premiums do not include the 
expect returns on invested premiums as well as changes in the value of invested premiums over 
relatively long period of time. This is an important variable given the long-term nature of life 
insurance products and the facts that many of these products can be considered to be purely 
investment products. Furthermore, systematic differences in price across large and small firms 
may lead to misleading inferences about average costs if premiums are used as an output proxy 
(Yuengert, 1993; Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013). 
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5.2.2.3. Funds as an Output 
As it has been defined in Equation 16, the value added is argued to be used as a proxy for 
output. The main problem of using V as an output proxy is that r can be negative (see Table 
12), in particular, during the periods of financial turmoil such as 2008 (see Table 12). This 
suggests that proxy violates the non-negativity property of output and the production function91 
(Coelli et. al., 2005). It argued that accumulated funds92 M can be used to proxy output of life 
insurers. 
Cummins and Weiss (2013) argued that as life insurance products involve accumulation of 
assets, additions to reserves are expected to be highly correlated to the intermediation function 
based output. Furthermore, they argued that to capture the element of the intermediation 
function that is related to services provided in connection with funds contributed by 
policyholders in previous years, such as asset management etc. they suggest average invested 
assets for life insurers to be usually included as an output variable. They stated this approach 
that has not been utilized in the existing literature would be to separate incurred benefits from 
additions to reserves, giving rise to a total of ten insurance outputs if by line disaggregation is 
used. It would be interesting to test whether this might raise the average estimated efficiency 
scores (Cummins and Weiss, 2013, p. 820). Fenn et. al. (2008) and Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon 
(2013) argued that the products provided by insurers to their policyholders, namely, present 
value of the future claims payments are considered to be an output for these products. 
                                                          
91 The production function of a life insurer uses N inputs (labour and capital etc. ) to produce a single output is 
given as 𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑋), where Q represents output and X = (X1, X2,..., Xn) is an n X vector of inputs. There are several 
are several properties for this function among these are: (1) Non-negativity: the value of 𝑓(𝑥) is a finite, non-
negative and real number. (2) Weak essentiality: the production of positive output is impossible without the use 
of at least one input. (3) Non-decreasing in x: (or monotonicity) additional units of an input will not decrease 
output. (4) Concave in x: any linear combination of the vectors x0 and x1 will produce an output that is no less 
than the same linear combination of F(x0) and F(x1) (Coelli et. al., 2005). 
92 The author tried to use the change in accumulated funds 𝛥𝑀𝑡 = Mt −𝑀𝑡−1; however, this proxy violates the 
non-negativity property of output for downsizing firms and during the periods of financial turmoil such as 2008 
due to significant decline in the value assets under-management (see Table 12). 
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Surprisingly, the authors declared this variable is unmeasurable despite the fact that the 
estimated value of future claims or the value of assets held to back up these claims can be used 
to proxy this variable. Although the present value of future claims is an estimate and it is subject 
to random fluctuations and estimation errors (Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013); the value of 
assets are produced using accounting rules and mainly using fair value valuation of backed 
assets (Ernst and Young, 2011, p.7). 
Regarding wealth maximising with respect to policyholders, maximising returns on 
policyholders’ assets can be achieved by maximising the value of M. This will maximise their 
future benefits (claims) and reduce the probability that the life insurer becomes insolvent. 
Indeed, shareholders’ funds M are not held to protect policyholders in adverse circumstances 
(O’Brien, 1991) but also to enable life insurers to benefit from economies of scale, generate 
higher return, manage risk effectively and minimise solvency risk. For instance, there is 
substantial body of insurance-based literature supports the view that larger insurers are less 
likely to become insolvent and more likely to be rated by rating agencies (BarNiv and 
Hershbarger, 1990; Cummins, Harrington and Klein, 1995; Pottier, 1997; Bouzouita and 
Young, 1998; Chen and Wong, 2004). Similarly, insurance-based literature tends to support 
the view that there is positive relationship between size and performance, such as investment 
yield (Boose, 1993; Adams, 1996b; Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001), efficiency (Fecher, 
Perelman and Pestieau, 1991; Yuengert, 1993; Hardwick, 1997; Hirao and Inoue, 2004; 
Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013), etc. Furthermore, in the UK, most life assurance policies 
are written in the linked form (80% of new premiums in 2010). For these linked life assurance 
products, the value of policyholders’ benefits is linked to the value of policyholders’ assets 
suggesting that maximising the value of policyholders’ assets would maximise their benefits. 
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With regard to maximising shareholders’ wealth, a life insurer charges a percentage a of the 
market value of asset under management Mt as management fees. Indeed, the main source of 
revenue from unit-linked business (60% of the value of policyholders’ assets in 2010) are 
streams from management fees charged as a percentage a of the market value of underlying 
assets (Swiss Re, 2003). However, the regulatory authority93 and competitive pressure may 
prevent the life insurer from increasing a more than a certain level, usually 1% (see Swiss Re, 
2003). Therefore, the life insurer can only maximise its revenues by maximising the market 
value of underlying assets Mt. 
5.2.2.4. Financial Ratios as an Output  
Some existing studies, such as Jeng and Lai (2005), Jeng, Lai and McNamara (2007) and 
Leverty and Grace (2010) employed financial ratios such as liquidity ratio, solvency ratio and 
return on assets to proxy insurer output based on the intermediation approach. However, 
Cummins and Weiss (2013) argued that these ratios do not measure output as they cannot 
measure output volume (Cummins and Weiss, 2013, p.846). 
5.2.3. Existing Evidence 
Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013) utilised three measures of output, namely, premiums, 
claims and claims plus additions to reserves, using sample of European insurers (life and non-
life) from 14 major European countries over the period 1995-2008 to estimate productivity 
growth. They found that result is sensitive to utilised output proxy. 
Leverty and Grace (2010) used claims plus addition to reserves to proxy value added based 
output, and ratios such as the liquidity ratio, solvency ratio, and return on assets to proxy the 
                                                          
93 In the UK, Sandler (2002) proposed assets management fees could be converged in the long-term towards a 
1% charge; whereas, a similar charging structure may force its way into continental Europe (Swiss Re, 2003). 
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intermediation function. They found that the two proxies were not mutually consistent and thus 
potentially yielded different answers to tested hypotheses using data on US general insurers. It 
was also found that the claims based efficiency was more closely related to traditional measures 
of firm performance (ratio analysis). Furthermore, highly ranked firms based on claims as an 
output proxy were found to be generally significantly less likely to fail, whereas, highly ranked 
firms based on financial ratios as an output proxy were found to be more likely to fail. 
Jeng, Lai and McNamara (2007) found mixed results depending on which efficiency output 
proxies, claims or financial ratios, they used to estimate efficiency of 11 US life insurers over 
the period to 1980–1995 pre and post demutualisation. For instance, the result using the claims 
as a proxy for output indicates that there is an improvement in efficiency post demutualisation. 
In contrast, evidence using financial ratios as proxy for output shows that efficiency of the 
demutualized life insurers relative to mutual control insurers deteriorates before 
demutualization and improves after conversion. 
Jeng and Lai (2005) used number of policies as an output measure to proxy value added based 
output and ratios such as the liquidity ratio, solvency ratio and return on assets to proxy the 
intermediation function. They found contradictory evidence depending on which efficiency 
approach being used to estimate the efficiency of Japanese life insurers. The authors concluded 
that ‘when different efficiency approaches provide different conclusions, researchers need to 
be careful about interpreting results; it may not be appropriate to use only one approach’ (Jeng 
and Lai, 2005, pp. 151). However, Cummins and Weiss (2013) argued using of financial ratios 
such as the liquidity ratio, solvency ratio, and return on assets etc. to proxy output is inadequate 
as these variables do not measure output volume. 
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5.3. Data, Sample and Variables 
The data is obtained from the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). 
The sample is based on the initial sample in Chapter 2 and Table 31 in the Appendix; it consists 
of 368 firms (5,601 observations) over the period 1985-2010. Given that the calculation of 
value creation and real capital gain have been made for all firms over the period 1985-2010 (as 
it has been explained in details in Chapter 3), it was possible to include all sample (368 firm 
and 5,601 observations; see Table 31 in the Appendix); however, all negative or nil ‘value’ of 
some variables, namely, claims, capital, premiums and assets are excluded. Furthermore, all 
firms with less than 5 observations (30 firms) are excluded, and any firm with less than £5 
million average value of assets (based on F13, L89, LTIB) over period are also excluded (20 
firms). Therefore the final sample regarding the empirical analysis includes 5,030 observations 
for 318 firms. In this chapter, to ensure inter-temporal comparability of figures and tables the 
financial data was deflated by the UK GDP deflator index (HM Treasury, 2012). This means 
all real values are in 2010 prices. 
Three output variables are defined: (1) Revenue: it is defined as premiums plus investment 
income (realised gain only) (see Diacon, 2001and Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002); this is 
net premiums (F41, L21, C4) plus investment income (F40, L12). This variable, revenue, does 
not include valuation gain and loss (unrealised gain) (F40, L13 + L14) as 198 (4%) out 5,030 
observations have the sum of premiums plus investment income plus valuation gain and loss 
negative (see Table 12), which violates the principle output characteristic, namely, non-
negativity (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000; 2006). Indeed, 47 (34%) out 140 firms have the 
sum of premiums, investment income and unrealised gain negative in 2008, suggesting 
including unrealised gain and loss means the revenue based output would violate non-
negativity principle output characteristic (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000, 2006). However, 
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excluding unrealised gain and loss would create measurement bias as it excludes key part of 
insurers’ revenues, for instance the value of linked assets fell by 23% (14% total assets) 
(unrealised gain) in 2008, whereas investment income was 5% (realised gain). (2) Claims: it is 
defined as incurred claims (see Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013); this is net claims (F42, 
L46, C4). It is interesting that net claims plus additions to reserves proposed by existing studies 
(see Yuengert, 1993 and Cummins and Weiss, 2000; 2013) violates the principle output 
characteristics, namely, non-negativity (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000, 2006). This variable 
is measured as net claims (F42, L46, C4) plus addition to net mathematical reserves (F50, L48, 
C4), which is defined as net mathematical reserves (F50, L48, C4) at time t less net 
mathematical reserves (F50, L48, C4) at t-1. Indeed, 313 out 5,030 (58 (41%) out of 140 in 
2008) firms have the sum of net claims plus additions to reserves negative (see Table 12), 
suggesting including additions to reserves means the claims based output would violate non-
negativity principle output characteristic (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000; 2006). However, 
excluding additions to reserves would create a measurement bias as it excludes key part of 
insurers’ output to proxy the intermediation function (see Cummins and Weiss, 2013). As 
addition to reserves, as a standalone variable, 1,188 out 5,030 (101 (72%) out of 140 in 2008) 
firms have the additions to reserves negative (see Table 12). (3) Funds: it is defined as net 
policyholders’ assets (F40, L59) or total policyholders’ assets (F13, L89, LTIB) less total other 
insurance and non-insurance liabilities such as unpaid claims, accrual etc. (F14, L49). 
However, change in funds (it is defined as increase / decrease in policyholders’ funds for a 
particular period (F40, L39) is not usable practically; 1,210 out 5,030 (107 (76%) out of 140 in 
2008) firms have this variable negative (see Table 12). Regarding output prices, Cummins and 
Weiss (2013) found output prices have not been used in studies that analyse only technical or 
cost efficiency, these studies utilise value based output measures as defined above rather than 
units (see also Diacon, 2001; Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002). 
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Regarding input variables, the survey by Cummins and Weiss (2013) suggests that there is high 
degree of uniformity in the inputs utilized in insurance efficiency studies as most of these 
studies utilize capital (policyholders’ assets and shareholders’ capital) and labour as input. As 
for input prices, existing studies utilize insurance industry average weekly wages to measure 
the price of labour. Following the UK based studies (see Fenn et. al., 2008; Vencappa, Fenn 
and Diacon, 2013), the average weekly wages are derived from the ONS (ONS, 2014). This 
variable is measured as nominal average weekly wages except compulsory social security, it is 
for the whole economy 1985-1989 (ONS code: MD9M); private sector 1990-1999 (ONS code: 
MD9N) and financial and insurance activities 2000-2010 (ONS code: K58I). The price of 
capital is proxied using nominal rate of interest of the 15-year-UK-government bond rate (Bank 
of England, 2014) following Fenn et. al. (2008) and Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013). 
Finally, total costs are defined as net of reinsurance total expense (F43, L46, C4). The capital 
variable is measured as sum of policyholders’ assets following Leverty and Grace (2010) (sum 
of assets held to back up long-term liabilities plus long-term debt etc.) (F13, L89, LTIB) plus 
the value of shareholders capital (see Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006) (F2, L12). The capital 
variable is assumed to be fixed inputs as it is built over time and it is very difficult to be adjusted 
quickly (see Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Berger et. al., 2000 and Fenn et. al. 2008). 
5.4. Function Form and Estimation Issues 
Efficiency analysis is based on modern microeconomic theory; assuming the objective of 
privately owned firms operating in a competitive industry is to maximise profits by minimising 
cost and maximising revenue. The basic form of efficiency analysis is the production frontier; 
assuming a firm minimises input conditional on the output level. Cost efficiency analysis 
requires the input prices to be known to estimate the cost frontier under the assumption that the 
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firm minimises cost conditional on the output level and input prices (see Cummins and Weiss, 
2013, pp. 795, 796 and 797). 
Efficiency analysis is considered to be a framework to identify firms failing to optimise their 
resources, and, hence, becoming not full efficient (Farrell, 1957). This identification is done by 
comparing the efficiency score for a particular firm to the efficiency score of the ‘best practice’ 
firm that produces the same output under the same conditions (Hardwick and Guirguis, 2007); 
this has been defined as (non-volume) measure of economic X-efficiency (Mester, 1997). The 
cost efficiency analysis is evaluated by comparing the firms to the frontier of the most efficient 
firm in the industry; it also call ‘best practice’ efficient frontier. Cost efficiency varies between 
0 and 1 with a score of 1 indicates that the firm is fully efficient (see Cummins and Weiss, 
2013, p.797).  
The deviation of from the best practice efficient frontier can be interpreted as the firm is not 
successful in optimisation, and, hence, it is not full efficient (Farrell, 1957). This variation in 
efficiency score can related to: (1) firm size (see Demsetz, 1973, p.4). (2) in-completed labour 
contacts (see Leibenstein, 1966; p.407), (3) unspecified production function (see Leibenstein, 
1966; p.407), (4) un-marketed inputs (see Leibenstein, 1966; p.407). This view is supported by 
insurance based literature; suggesting that factors such as market structure and firm size impact 
efficiency scores (see Choi and Weiss, 2005; Fenn et al., 2008). 
There are two main94 approaches in the efficient frontier analysis, namely, the econometric 
approach and the mathematical programming approach. Firstly, the econometric approach 
requires a specific form (the Translog, the Cobb-Douglas, the Fuss normalised quadratic, the 
generalised translog, the composite cost and the Fourier flexible) for production, cost, revenue 
or profit function, and makes assumptions regarding the distribution of error terms and 
                                                          
94 There is another approach, called index; it defines productivity as an index measuring outputs to inputs. 
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inefficiency (Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Eling and Lunen, 2010a). Three main types of 
econometric frontier approaches have been employed in insurance-based literature to measure 
insurer performance, namely, the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA95), the Distribution Free 
Approach (DFA96) and the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA97). The primary differences between 
these approaches are assumptions regarding error term distribution and inefficiency (Eling and 
Lunen, 2010a). Secondly, the mathematical programming, this approach does not require 
assumptions regarding functional form or error term distribution, and, hence, it avoids the 
specification error in the function that is considered to be the main drawback of the econometric 
approach (Cummins and Weiss 2000). Two principle types of mathematical programming 
approach have been used to measure efficiency in the insurance industry, namely, the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA98) and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH99). 
The DEA (see Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978; Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000; 
Ramanathan, 2003; Ray, 2004; Coelli et. al. 2005; Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007; Fried, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 2008 and Cooper, Seiford and Zhu, 2011) and the SFA (see Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt, 1977 and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; 
Coelli et. al., 2005; Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2008 and Greene, 2008) are considered to be 
most popular techniques to estimate efficiency using the non-parametric approach and the 
econometric approach, respectively (see Eling and Lunen, 2010a; Cummins and Weiss, 2013). 
However, Cummins and Zi (1998) and Eling and Luhnen (2010b) found that there is no 
                                                          
95 It requires specifying production, cost, revenue or profit function form (translog the most popular), and 
assuming inefficiency and error terms follow asymmetric distribution. 
96 It requires specifying production, cost, revenue or profit function form (translog the most popular), assuming 
efficiency is stable over time, assuming Error terms equal to zero and requiring a long time series. 
97 It requires Specific production, cost, revenue or profit function form (translog the most popular), permitting 
inefficiencies differences between quartiles, requiring no assumptions regarding inefficiency or error terms. 
98 It requires using linear programming to measure output and input interrelationship, determining efficiency score 
optimisingly, specifying either the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) or the Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) and 
specific cost inefficiency as technical efficiency (pure technical efficiency * scale efficiency)* allocative 
efficiency. 
99 It special configuration of the DEA; it requires no points on lines connecting vertices, and it relaxes frontier 
convexity assumption. 
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difference between average efficiency scores estimated using parametric and non-parametric 
approaches; suggesting a correct application of DEA and SFA would yield similar results ( see 
Cummins and Weiss, 2013, p. 814). Given the volatile100 nature of date set utilised in this study, 
The FSA is considered to be the most appropriate approach compared to the DEA as the FSA 
incorporates a random effort in the efficiency model to deal with measurement error, and, 
hence, it provides more accurate results (see Fenn et. al. 2008, p 87; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a, 
p. 226; Eling and Luhnen, 2010b; p.1501; Cummins and Weiss, 2013, p.813). Therefore 
chapter utilises the SFA originated by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977) to estimate cost efficiency of the UK life insurers over the period 1985-
2010. 
It is assumed that insurance outputs 𝑄 are produced using a vector of inputs; suggesting the 
associated production function can be written as follows: 
𝑌(𝑄, 𝑋, 𝑍, 𝑇) = 0                                                                                                                                 (17) 
Where: 
Z: a vetor of quasi-fixed inputs. 
T: represents time. 
𝑄: Output. 
𝑋: a vector of inputs. 
Under the assumption that insurance firms are cost minimizers (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000), the associated cost function that assumed to be shared among all firms can be written as 
follows: 
𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑄,𝑊, 𝑍, 𝑇)                                                                                                                                (18) 
Where: 
𝑄: the output. 
𝐶: the total costs 𝐶𝑖 =  𝑊𝑛𝑖𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑛 . 
𝑊: a vector of price input (W1,…, Wn); where W is input price and n=1,2. 
                                                          
100 The number of the UK life insurers has declined considerably over the period since 1980s due to the M&A 
(Swiss Re, 2006; Carter and Falush, 2009); it went down from 229 (1985) to 143 (2010). Furthermore, most 
parents (groups) used to transfer funds (assets) between subsidiaries due to consolidations. 
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𝑍: the capital variable is assumed to be quasi-fixed input following (Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Berger 
et. al., 2000; Fenn et. al., 2008; Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 2013); it is stock and it built over time so 
it is less likely to changed quickly. 
𝑇: is included to take into account of unobserved effects related to time such as technical change or 
macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The exact functional forms of the production function defined by (17) and the cost function 
defined by (18) are unknown so the well-known translog function form is used (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Cummins et. al., 2009; Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2013) which is given by: 
𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝑖𝑡 = [𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑄𝑗
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Where: 
𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑛}; n = 318 firms. 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡: the price for firm i at time t,  𝑙 𝑜𝑟 𝑓 = {1, … , 𝑆}. 
𝑄𝑖𝑡: the amount of output and quasi-fixed inputs produced by firm i in year t; 𝑗 𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = {1, … ,𝑀}. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡: an inefficiency error term; this error is captured the inefficiency. This is one-sided error term as inefficiency 
can only increase (not reduce) costs; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0 ; 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝜆) (see Greene, 2003; 2005). 
vit: a two-sided random error term; this measurement error differs across firms and it is assumed to be 
independent, identically distributed, and beyond the control of individual firms; it does not indicate 
inefficiency; vit ~ (0, σ𝑣it
2   ). 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = the observed total costs for firm i at time t. 
𝑎𝑖 = the intercept; it can be used for the analysis of insurance-pooling efficiency. 
Given that the translog form does not allow any of the independent variables to be equal to 
zero (see Berger et. al. 2000 and Cummins and Weiss, 2013), any non-positive value is 
excluded as explained in the sample section (see Section 5.3). 
Following Fenn et.al. (2008), the potential endogeneity problem regarding output and quasi-
fixed inputs is addressed by lagging these variables one period. Furthermore, the linear 
homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed prior to estimation by dividing total costs 
and all input prices but one by this last price (Cummins et. al., 2009); therefore (3) can be 
rewritten as follows:  
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𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
=  ℵ𝑐 (𝑄𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1,
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
, 𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡)                                                                                        (20) 
Where 
ℵ𝑐 : Stochastic frontier functional form. 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) argued that the longer the panel, the less tenable the time 
invariant assumption becomes. This chapter is based on 26-year-sample-period; the assumption 
of the time varying decay is adopted (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990 
and Battese and Coelli, 1992). Equation (19) is then estimated by Maximum Likelihood 
Dummy Variable (MLDV) as implemented in the ‘true fixed effect model’ (see Greene, 2005) 
and using ‘sfpanel’ in Stata (see Belotti et. al., 2013). Following Battese and Coelli (1988), the 
cost efficiency scores are estimated as follows: 
Cost efficiency =  E[exp( u|v)]                                                                                                     (21) 
It is argued that heteroskedasticity in the error term may lead to significant estimation bias that 
significantly affect ranking of inefficient firms (Caudill, Ford and Gropper, 1995). To address 
this issue, the chapter follows the procedure suggested by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000); the 
variances of one-sided and two-sided errors are explicitly modelled when the cost functions is 
fitted. The variances of one-sided and two-sided errors are modelled as follows  
𝜎𝑢𝑖
2 = 𝑔𝑢(𝑝𝑖, 𝛿𝑢𝑖)                                                                                                                              (22.1) 
𝜎𝑣𝑖
2 = 𝑔𝑣(𝑝𝑖, 𝛿𝑣𝑖)                                                                                                                               (22.2) 
Where: 
𝑝𝑖  : a vector of valuables that systematically influence the variances. 
𝛿𝑢𝑖 : the coefficient to be estimated to one-sided error. 
𝛿𝑣𝑖 : the coefficient to be estimated to two-sided error. 
It is argued that the above approach will address the effect of heteroskedasticity as well as 
incorporating exogenous influences on cost efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Following Fenn et. al.(2008) the impact of firm size on error structure in also tested. 
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5.5. Result and Robust Tests 
5.5.1. The Univariate Analysis  
Table 12 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the chapter. Panel 
(B) illustrates why using some accounting variables as an output is challenging as most of these 
variables can be negative such as change in funds, revenue including valuation gain and loss, 
claims plus addition to reserves and addition to reserves (as a standalone variable). Indeed, 
substantial proportion of existing sample firms have these variables negative in 1990, 1994, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2008. Therefore, it is less likely that these variables to be usable 
practically as they require the researcher to drop about 50% of sample firms; these could reach 
70% such as in 2008. Furthermore, these variables are sensitive to changes in the economic 
conditions, suggesting this volatility may distort efficiency. 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis 
Variable (£m) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue 5030 736 2385 0.0250 81500 
Claims 5030 466 1581 0.0030 35600 
Funds 5030 4072 11400 0.1127 225000 
Wages (£) 5030 535 251 303 1010 
Rate of Capital 5030 0.0699 0.0221 0.0423 0.1054 
Costs 5030 70 154 0.001 1902 
Capital 5030 4723 12700 0.0640 225000 
Source: the author. 
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Panel B: Negativity Issues Regarding some Possible Output Variables 
Year Obs. Number of firms that have these Variables negative 
Change 
In Funds 
(% of Total) 
Revenue Including 
Valuation Gain 
(% of Total) 
Claims Plus 
Addition 
To Reserves 
(% of Total) 
Addition 
To Reserves 
(% of Total) 
1985 201 15 (7%) 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
1986 206 16 (8%) 0 (0%) 3 (1%) 17 (8%) 
1987 206 33 (16%) 2 (1%) 1 (0%) 34 (17%) 
1988 225 31 (14%) 4 (2%) 7 (3%) 28 (12%) 
1989 225 13 (6%) 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 15 (7%) 
1990 223 99 (44%) 33 (15%) 36 (16%) 101 (45%) 
1991 223 29 (13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1%) 27 (12%) 
1992 216 22 (10%) 0 (0%) 5 (2%) 23 (11%) 
1993 219 27 (12%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 27 (12%) 
1994 205 99 (48%) 12 (6%) 12 (6%) 90 (44%) 
1995 200 17 (9%) 1 (1%) 3 (2%) 20 (10%) 
1996 223 39 (17%) 0 (0%) 8 (4%) 34 (15%) 
1997 217 18 (8%) 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 21 (10%) 
1998 217 19 (9%) 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 15 (7%) 
1999 208 25 (12%) 2 (1%) 5 (2%) 22 (11%) 
2000 203 66 (33%) 13 (6%) 13 (6%) 57 (28%) 
2001 192 100 (52%) 32 (17%) 39 (20%) 93 (48%) 
2002 191 120 (63%) 43 (23%) 52 (27%) 116 (61%) 
2003 184 49 (27%) 0 (0%) 6 (3%) 55 (30%) 
2004 178 55 (31%) 2 (1%) 10 (6%) 60 (34%) 
2005 164 31 (19%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 30 (18%) 
2006 156 57 (37%) 0 (0%) 12 (8%) 61 (39%) 
2007 144 59 (41%) 1 (1%) 9 (6%) 65 (45%) 
2008 140 107 (76%) 47 (34%) 58 (41%) 101 (72%) 
2009 133 34 (26%) 2 (2%) 10 (8%) 46 (35%) 
2010 131 30 (23%) 1 (1%) 8 (6%) 30 (23%) 
Total 5030 1210 (24%) 198 (4%) 313 (6%) 1188 (24%) 
Source: the author. 
Where:  
Number of observations is 5,030 for 318 firms over the period 1985-2010. 
Revenue: the sum of net premiums (F41, L21, C4) plus investment income (F40, L12) for firm i at time t. 
Claims: net claims (F42, L46, C4) for firm i at time t. 
Funds: net policyholders’ assets (F40, L59) for firm i at time t. 
Wages: the average weekly wages are derived from the ONS (ONS, 2014). This variable is measured as nominal 
average weekly wages except compulsory social security, it for the whole economy 1985-1989 (ONS code: 
MD9M); private sector 1990-1999 (ONS code: MD9N) and financial and insurance activities 2000-2010 
(ONS code: K58I). 
Rate of capital: it is price of capital proxied using nominal rate of interest of the 15-year-UK-government bond 
rate (Bank of England, 2014). 
Costs: total incurred expense net of reinsurance (F43, L46, C4) for firm i at time t. 
Capital: it is the sum of policyholders’ assets (sum of assets held to back up long-terms liabilities plus long-term 
debt etc.) (F13, L89, LTIB) plus the value of shareholders capital (F2, L12). 
Change in funds: change in net policyholders’ assets (F40, L39) for firm i at time t. 
Revenue including valuation gain: the sum of net premiums (F41, L21, C4) plus investment income (F40, L12) 
plus valuation gain and loss (F40, L13+L14) for firm i at time t. 
Claims plus addition to reserves: net claims (F42, L46, C4) plus addition to reserves ((F50, L48, C4)t - (F50, L48, 
C4)t-1) for firm i at time t. 
Addition to reserves: change in net reserves ((F50, L48, C4)t - (F50, L48, C4)t-1) for firm i at time t. 
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5.5.2. The Multivariate Analysis 
The full parameter estimates for the stochastic frontier cost function for three output proxies 
are presented in the Table 13. The estimated result is corrected for heteroskedasticity in both 
error terms. Relevant diagnose tests are reported to ensure the result is robust. It is argued that 
the parameter estimates regarding the stochastic frontier cost functions have little informative 
value as they are simple the end of producing a frontier (Fenn et. al., 2008). 
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Table 13: Parameter Estimates for the Stochastic Fourier Cost Function 
 Revenue as Output Claims as Output  Funds as Output 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Output  0.5036*** 0.1152 -0.0484 0.1096 0.4116** 0.1792 
Rate of Capital -0.0614 0.099 0.161 0.106 0.1822* 0.1046 
Capital -0.4838*** 0.13 0.0898 0.1341 -0.4029** 0.2001 
Squared Capital 0.1354*** 0.0117 0.0266** 0.0107 0.0472* 0.0243 
Squared Output 0.0406*** 0.0089 -0.0012 0.0065 -0.0263 0.0221 
Capital*Output -0.1108*** 0.0135 0.0338*** 0.012 0.0351 0.0274 
Rate of Capital*Output -0.0263 0.0231 0.0475** 0.0241 0.1035** 0.0471 
Rate of Capital*Capital 0.1193*** 0.0243 0.0334 0.028 -0.0323 0.0498 
1987 0.0617 0.0425 0.052 0.0406 0.049 0.0409 
1988 0.1041** 0.042 0.0786* 0.0404 0.0688* 0.0404 
1989 0.1334*** 0.0414 0.0739* 0.0401 0.0685* 0.0402 
1990 0.0547 0.0469 -0.0345 0.0461 -0.0399 0.0462 
1991 -0.0429 0.0414 -0.024 0.0406 -0.0273 0.0408 
1992 -0.0285 0.0406 -0.0338 0.0398 -0.0306 0.0401 
1993 -0.0046 0.0401 -0.0084 0.0393 -0.0042 0.0396 
1994 -0.0144 0.0407 -0.0504 0.0403 -0.0514 0.0403 
1995 -0.0428 0.0417 -0.1057*** 0.0407 -0.0945** 0.0413 
1996 -0.0886** 0.0418 -0.1705*** 0.041 -0.1649*** 0.0412 
1997 -0.1075*** 0.0415 -0.1359*** 0.0407 -0.1221*** 0.041 
1998 -0.0018 0.0469 -0.0138 0.0467 -0.0051 0.0471 
1999 0.2331*** 0.0407 0.1872*** 0.0398 0.199*** 0.0402 
2000 -0.3685*** 0.0723 -0.305*** 0.074 -0.2869*** 0.0746 
2001 0.0392 0.0451 0.0041 0.0457 0.0199 0.0454 
2002 0.0697 0.0451 0.0472 0.0455 0.0531 0.0453 
2003 0.0693 0.0444 0.0674 0.0436 0.0742* 0.044 
2004 -0.0752* 0.0448 -0.0746* 0.0434 -0.0586 0.0438 
2005 -0.0857* 0.0487 -0.0668 0.0476 -0.0501 0.0482 
2006 -0.0018 0.0492 -0.0108 0.0477 0.0026 0.048 
2007 -0.0199 0.0499 -0.0286 0.0491 -0.0197 0.0492 
2008 -0.0985** 0.0491 -0.0774 0.0473 -0.0805* 0.0478 
2009 0.0266 0.0502 0.0678 0.0484 0.0638 0.0489 
2010       
Log Likelihood -3223.01  -3415.39  -3422.4  
Wald Test 2540.46***  2039.08***  2005.68***  
Number of Obs. 4712  4712  4712  
Number of Firm 318  318  318  
𝛔𝐮𝐢
𝟐  (Assets) -0.1901***   -.2158***   -0.206***   
𝛔𝐯𝐢
𝟐  (Assets) -0.1091***   -0.0349  -0.0448  
𝛔𝐮𝐢
𝟐  (One-Sided Error) 0.4432***  0.5438***  0.5396***  
𝛔𝐯𝐢
𝟐  (Two-Sided Error) 0.2862***  0.2279***  0.2322***  
Source: the author. 
Where:  
Number of observations is 5,030 for 318 firms over the period 1985-2010. 
Assets: the natural logarithms of total admissible assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Output: it is either Revenue: the sum of net premiums (F41, L21, C4) plus investment income (F40, L12) for firm 
i at time t, Claims: net claims (F42, L46, C4) for firm i at time t or Funds: net policyholders’ assets (F40, 
L59) for firm i at time t. 
Rate of Capital: it is the price of capital proxied using nominal rate of interest of the 15-year-UK-government 
bond rate (Bank of England, 2014). 
Capital: it is the sum of policyholders’ assets (sum of assets held to back up long-terms liabilities plus long-term 
debt etc.) (F13, L89, LTIB) plus the value of shareholders capital (F2, L12). 
Squared Capital: it is squared Capital for firm i time t. 
Squared Output: it is squared Output for firm i time t. 
Capital*Output: it is Capital multiplied by Output for firm i time t. 
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Rate of Capital*Output: it is Rate of Capital multiplied by Output for firm i time t. 
Rate of Capital*Capital: it is Rate of Capital multiplied by Capital for firm i time t. 
Table 13 presents also the result for modelled Heteroskedasticity for both error terms (one-
sided and two-sided error term). It shows that the coefficients estimated on firm size (lagged 
one period to control for any potential endogeneity issue) on both error terms. The effect of 
firm size on cost efficiency is negative and significant for the one-sided error term for three 
output proxies, and negative but only significant for revenue based output proxy concerning 
the two-sided error term. This suggests size decreases the cost efficiency, this result contradicts 
existing evidence based on the European insurance market reported by Fenn et. al. (2008) 
regarding the effect of size on cost efficiency. However, the cost efficiency fluctuates more for 
small firms compared to large firms, which is consistent with previous findings (see Fenn et. 
al., 2008). 
The mean of the cost efficiency and yearly changes for three output measures, namely, revenue, 
claims and funds are reported in Table 14 and Figure 49 and Figure 50, whereas Kernel Density 
estimate of cost efficiency for three output proxies is reported in Figure 51. The result shows 
that, on average, revenue based output proxy reports high level of cost efficiency compared to 
claims and funds based proxies. Figure 50 shows that revenue based efficiency is more stable 
compared to funds and claims based efficiency scores. This is consistent with previous findings 
of Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013); they found claims based efficiency fluctuated over time 
for European life insurers. One interpretation of the current result is that most life insurance 
premiums are written in linked form for which payouts are linked to the value of assets, and 
policyholders do bear investment risks; suggesting fluctuation in the value of assets, and, 
hence, their benefits (claims) would distort efficiency. 
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Table 14: Cost Efficiency for all the UK Life Insurers over the Period 1986-2010 
Year Revenue  Claims  Funds 
Revenue 
(Yearly Change) 
Claims 
(Yearly Change) 
Funds 
(Yearly Change) 
1986 67.7% 63.5% 63.7%    
1987 69.8% 66.0% 66.2% 3.1% 3.9% 3.9% 
1988 70.2% 67.3% 67.6% 0.5% 1.9% 2.2% 
1989 71.1% 67.6% 67.9% 1.2% 0.6% 0.4% 
1990 71.0% 68.0% 68.2% -0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 
1991 71.2% 67.1% 67.3% 0.3% -1.4% -1.2% 
1992 71.6% 67.2% 67.3% 0.5% 0.1% -0.1% 
1993 70.6% 65.8% 66.1% -1.4% -2.0% -1.8% 
1994 69.6% 65.0% 65.3% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% 
1995 70.1% 65.9% 65.9% 0.6% 1.3% 1.0% 
1996 69.9% 64.8% 65.0% -0.2% -1.7% -1.3% 
1997 70.2% 65.2% 65.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 
1998 69.5% 64.9% 65.3% -1.0% -0.4% -0.01% 
1999 69.4% 65.4% 65.5% -0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 
2000 69.5% 65.1% 65.1% 0.2% -0.5% -0.6% 
2001 69.5% 65.1% 65.4% 0.002% -0.01% 0.4% 
2002 70.3% 65.6% 65.6% 1.2% 0.9% 0.4% 
2003 70.4% 66.5% 66.5% 0.2% 1.3% 1.4% 
2004 70.3% 66.6% 66.7% -0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
2005 70.3% 65.4% 65.3% -0.03% -1.7% -2.0% 
2006 70.4% 66.7% 66.7% 0.1% 2.0% 2.1% 
2007 70.2% 66.4% 65.9% -0.2% -0.5% -1.2% 
2008 70.4% 66.5% 66.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.9% 
2009 70.2% 66.2% 65.8% -0.3% -0.5% -1.0% 
2010 68.2% 63.5% 63.2% -2.8% -4.0% -4.0% 
Source: the author. 
Where:  
Yearly Change: it is efficiency score time t less efficiency score at time t-1 divided by efficiency score at time t-1 
at the aggregated level. 
Figure 49: Cost Efficiency for all the UK Life Insurers over the Period 1986-2010 
 
Source: the author. 
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Figure 50: Yearly Changes in the Cost Efficiency for all the UK Life Insurers over the Period 1986-2010 
 
Source: the author. 
Figure 51: Kernel Density Estimates of Cost Efficiency 
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Source: the author. 
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5.5.3. Robust Tests 
Bauer et. al. (1998) argued that efficiency scores estimated using different approaches / 
estimates should meet certain consistency conditions to be useful for decision making. These 
conditions are: efficiency scores estimated using different approaches should have comparable 
descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviations etc. Firms should be ranked according 
to estimated efficiency scores from different approaches roughly similarly. Finally, the 
efficiency scores estimated using different approaches should be consistent with conventional 
measures of performance such as financial ratios. 
Table 15: Comparison of Estimated Cost Efficiency 
Panel A: Cost Efficiency Scores 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Revenue  4712 0.7010 0.1856 0.0076 0.9693 0.0344 -1.4691 4.8026 
Claims  4712 0.6593 0.2213 0.0041 0.9737 0.0490 -1.0845 3.2795 
Funds 4712 0.6604 0.2196 0.0057 0.9733 0.0482 -1.0954 3.3137 
Source: the author. 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix between Efficiency Ranking and Value Creation 
 Value Creation Real Capital Gain  Revenue  Claims  Funds 
Value Creation 1     
Real Capital Gain  0.4666*** 1    
Revenue  0.3057*** 0.0964*** 1   
Claims  0.2813*** 0.0782*** 0.9374*** 1  
Funds 0.2809*** 0.0783*** 0.9372*** 0.9945*** 1 
Source: the author. 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix between Efficiency Scores 
 Premiums Claims Assets 
Premiums 1   
Claims 0.9375*** 1  
Assets 0.9375*** 0.9949*** 1 
Source: the author. 
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Panel D: Cost Efficiency and Conventional Measures of Performance 
Variables 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Efficiency  
Revenue 
Efficiency  
Claims 
Efficiency  
Funds 
Efficiency  
Score 
Revenue  4712 0.7010 0.1856 0.0076 0.9693    
Claims 4712 0.6593 0.2213 0.0041 0.9737    
Funds 4712 0.6604 0.2196 0.0057 0.9733    
 
Growth Assets 4712 0.1334 0.2687 -0.9997 0.9965 0.08*** 0.1129*** 0.1261*** 
Premiums 4712 0.1514 0.5223 -0.9998 1.9918 0.1855*** 0.1318*** 0.139*** 
  
Size Reserves 4712 13.4044 2.3591 3.9886 19.2308 0.2286*** 0.2322*** 0.2271*** 
Assets 4712 13.5018 2.2330 4.1663 19.2317 0.2342*** 0.2388*** 0.2338*** 
Premiums 4712 11.4477 2.3751 0.7459 18.1441 0.2732*** 0.2969*** 0.2953*** 
Market Share 4712 0.0028 0.0082 0.0001 0.1632 0.1355*** 0.1443*** 0.1432*** 
 
Expense Expense 4712 0.0589 0.1319 0.0001 0.9892 0.0417*** 0.0185 0.0255* 
 
Investment  
Performance  
Valuation 
Gain 
4712 0.0255 0.0939 -0.8567 1 0.0085 0.0079 0.0058 
Investment 
Income 
4712 0.0474 0.0218 0.0001 0.1497 -0.0709*** -0.0684*** -0.0682*** 
Value Creation 4712 0.2477 0.1697 -0.4995 0.6961 0.0927*** 0.0963*** 0.1029*** 
Capital Gain 4712 0.0191 0.1609 -0.4996 0.4996 0.0198 -0.0026 -0.0013 
Tobin’s Q 4712 1.0551 0.2256 0.0035 1.9925 0.0016 -0.0216 -0.0216 
 
Risk Free Asset 4712 0.0936 0.1457 0.0001 0.9875 -0.0984*** -0.1179*** -0.1211*** 
Liquidity 4712 0.0736 0.1433 0.0001 0.9986 -0.1121*** -0.1182*** -0.1163*** 
Capitalization 4712 0.0441 0.0713 0.0001 0.9870 -0.1305*** -0.1204*** -0.1203*** 
Derivatives 4712 0.2381 0.4260 0 1 0.1142*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 
Reinsurance 4712 0.1212 0.2147 0.0001 0.9989 -0.0415*** -0.063*** -0.0661*** 
Surrender 4712 0.4607 0.3284 0.0001 1 -0.0231 -0.0088 -0.0101 
Volatility 4712 0.0692 0.0631 0.0001 1 -0.0463*** -0.0571*** -0.0561*** 
Instability 4712 0.0006 0.0325 -0.3585 0.5750 -0.0014 0.0025 0.0034 
 
Products Linked 4712 0.4414 0.4093 0 1 -0.0562*** -0.0585*** -0.0575*** 
Non-linked 4712 0.5586 0.4093 0 1 0.0562*** 0.0585*** 0.0575*** 
With-Profits 4712 0.1882 0.2848 0 1 0.1354*** 0.1493*** 0.1475*** 
Non-Profit 4712 0.2725 0.3276 0 1 -0.09*** -0.1078*** -0.1036*** 
Unitised  
With-Profits 
2603 0.0783 0.1645 0 0.9817 0.1318*** 0.1643*** 0.1572*** 
Property Linked 4712 0.4763 0.4134 0 1 -0.045*** -0.0459*** -0.0451*** 
Index Linked 2603 0.0316 0.1019 0 1 0.0071 -0.0072 -0.0135 
 
Diversification Product line 4712 0.5919 0.4915 0 1 0.1842*** 0.1767*** 0.1754*** 
HHI liability 4712 0.7204 0.2498 0.2088 1 -0.1231*** -0.1247*** -0.1202*** 
Overseas 4712 0.2912 0.4544 0 1 0.0688*** 0.065*** 0.0665*** 
Source: the author. 
Where: 
Number of observations is 5,030 for 318 firms over the period 1985-2010. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Efficiency Revenue: efficiency score based on using revenue as output for firm i at time t. 
Efficiency Claims: efficiency score based on using claims as output for firm i at time t. 
Efficiency Funds: efficiency score based on using funds as output for firm i at time t. 
Growth Assets: the growth rate of policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Growth Premiums: the growth rate of gross premiums for firm i at time t (F41; L19). 
Assets: the natural logarithms of total admissible assets for firm i time t (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Reserves: the natural logarithms of total gross mathematical reserves for firm i time t (F50; L18, C4). 
Premiums: the natural logarithms of total gross premiums for firm i time t (F41; L19; C4). 
Expense: the ratio of gross expense to admissible assets for firm i at time t (F43, L16, C4) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Valuation Gain: valuation gain and loss deflated by the value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, L13+L14) 
/ (F13, L89, LTIB). 
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Investment Income: investment income deflated by the value of admissible assets for firm i, time t (F40, L12) / 
(F13, L89, LTIB). 
Value Creation: it is based on Chapter 3 calculation deflated by the value of admissible assets (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Capital Gain: it based on Chapter 3 calculation deflated by the value of admissible assets (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Tobin’s Q: it based on Chapter 3 calculation. 
Free Asset: the amount of reported free assets divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L42) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Liquidity: liquid assets (the sum of the cash in hand, deposits not subject to time restriction on withdrawal, bank 
and approved credit and financial deposits <= 1 month, bank and approved credit and financial deposits > 
1 month and deposits with ceding undertakings (see classification of admissible assets in Table 17 in 
Appendix) divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F13; L54 + L55 + L57 + L81 + L82; LTIB) / 
(F13, L89, LTIB). 
Capitalization: minimum capital requirement divided by admissible assets for firm i at time t (F2, L36) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Derivatives: 1 for use of derivative in business and 0 otherwise for firm i time t (it is based on (F17; L51, C1; 
LTIB), (F17; L51, C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994). 
Reinsurance: premiums ceded to gross premiums written for firm i time t (F41; L20; C4) / (F41; L19; C4). 
Surrender: the value of gross surrender and partial surrender claims to total gross claims for firm i, time t (F42, 
L13; C4)/ (F42, L16; C4). 
Volatility: the absolute values of weighted average valuation gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets for 
firm i, time t |((F40, L14) / (F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*( (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, 
L13) / (F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB))|*((F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Overseas: 1 for an insurer that has overseas operations and 0 otherwise for firm i time t. (it is based on F50, L18, 
C3). 
Linked: the linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, 
L89, LTIB). 
Non-linked: the non-linked assets divided by total policyholders’ assets for firm i at time t. (F13, L89- (L58+L59), 
LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
HHI liability: HHI score is expressed as the sum of the squared share of each business line (Non-Profit, With-
Profits, Unitised With-Profits, Property Linked and Index Linked) in gross mathematical reserves. With-
Profits (F50; L11, C4), Non-Profit (F50; L12, C4), Unitised With-Profits (F50; L13, C4), Property Linked 
(F50; L14+L15, C4) and Index Linked (F50; L16+L17, C4). 
With-Profits: the proportion of with-profits product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, L11, C4) / 
(F50, L18, C4). 
Non-Profit: the proportion of non-profit product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, L12, C4) / 
(F50, L18, C4). 
Unitised With-Profits: the proportion of unitised with-profits product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t 
(F50, L13, C4) / (F50, L18, C4). 
Property Linked: the proportion of Property unit-linked product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, 
L14+L15, C4) / (F50, L18, C4). 
Index Linked: the proportion of index unit-linked product reserves to total reserves for firm i at time t (F50, 
L16+L17, C4) / (F50, L18, C4). 
Product line: 0 for insurer writes over 90% of new premiums from a single line, namely, non-profit, with-profits, 
unitised with-profits, property unit-linked or index unit-linked and 1 otherwise for firm i time t. With-
Profits ((F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + 
(L300-445, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and 
OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)); 
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) Table 29 
in Appendix; Property Linked ((F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, 
UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix); and Index 
Linked ((F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)); UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  
UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 in Appendix). 
Market Share: the value of policyholders’ assets for firm i time t expressed as a share of total policyholders’ assets 
for all firms at time t. (F13, L89, LTIB). 
Instability: a dummy is set 1 in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2008 (during these 
years change in real capital gain and sometimes change in value creation were negative) and 0 otherwise 
multiplied by the absolute values of weighted average capital gain and loss of linked and non-linked assets 
|((F40, L14) / (F13, L58+L59, LTIB))|*((F13, L58+L59, LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB)+ |((F40, L13) / (F13, 
L89-(L58+L59), LTIB))|*((F13, L89-(L58+L59), LTIB) / (F13, L89, LTIB). 
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The consistency conditions are tested and reported in Table 15. The result, as shown in Table 
15 Panel A, shows that the three output proxies have roughly similar mean and standard 
deviation. The revenue based efficiency has the highest mean and the lowest standard deviation 
compared to claims and funds based efficiency scores. This can be attributed partly to linking 
payouts for the holders of life assurance policies to the market value of asserts such as unit-
linked products, suggesting the value of assets, and, hence, payouts to policyholders fluctuated 
as the market value of assets fluctuated, such as changes in the economic conditions. This may 
suggest revenue based efficiency gives the most consistent estimation for efficiency scores. 
However, this measure does not take into account the effect of the changes in the market value 
of assets as valuation gain and loss needs to be dropped to avoid negativity issues (see Table 
15), and systematic differences in price across large and small firms may lead to misleading 
inferences about average costs (see Allen, 1974; Blair, Jackson and Vogel, 1975; Doherty, 
1981 and Yuengert, 1993, p.489). 
As for ranking, the result, as shown in Table 15 Panel B, shows that three output proxies rank 
firms approximately similarly. Indeed, 99% is the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
between claims based ranking and funds for all firms over the period 1986-2010. Furthermore, 
the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between revenue based efficiency ranking and 
claims or funds is almost 94%, suggesting the three proxies give roughly similar ranking for 
all firms. Similarly, the correlation between efficiency scores estimated using different proxies 
are relatively high; 99% is the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between claims based 
cost efficiency scores and funds for all firms over the period 1986-2010 see Table 15 Panel C. 
Furthermore, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between revenue based cost 
efficiency scores and claims or funds is almost 94% see Table 15 Panel C. It is interesting that 
value creation or real capital gain based ranking (see Chapter 3) is positively related to cost 
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efficiency based ranking, suggesting more efficient firms are more likely to deliver higher 
value for policyholders compared with less efficient firms. 
To test how efficiency scores estimated using different proxies are related to conventional 
measures of firm performance, such as growth, size, expense, investment performance, risk 
management, product decomposition and diversification, Pearson correlation coefficient 
matrix (pairwise correlation) is calculated between efficiency scores estimated using different 
proxies and all predetermined variables. Table 14 Panel D presents the descriptive statistics for 
variables used in this analysis and the tabulated results of the Pearson correlation coefficient 
matrix (pairwise correlation) between efficiency scores and all predetermined variables. The 
result shows the relationship between all predetermined variables and efficiency scores 
estimated using different output proxies are almost consistent, providing further evidence 
regarding the consistent between efficiency scores estimated using different proxies. The 
overall result shows that cost efficiency scores are positively related to firm size, market share, 
growth rate, value creation, expense ratio and diversified firm. In contrast, cost efficiency 
scores are negatively related to overcapitalisation, volatility of assets and linked products. 
The cost efficiency is positively related to firm size regardless how the size of business is 
measured. Similarly, the cost efficiency is positively related to financial performance measured 
by value creation; however, it is inversely related to investment income. With reference to cost 
ratio, the result shows that cost efficiency is positively related to cost ratio. The result also 
shows the cost efficiency is negatively related to proportion of assets invested in linked funds 
and concentrated firms. Therefore, the type of products on which life insurers are focused 
determines efficiency at which a firm operates. For the second issue of the discussion on 
capitalization, hedging strategies and business risk, the result suggests cost efficiency is 
inversely related to the asset-liquidity ratio, free asset ratio, amount of reinsurance purchase, 
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volatility of assets and capitalisation ratio. In short, on the basis of the discussion above, it is 
claimed that a cost efficiency scores are closely related to conventional measure of firm 
performance. A firm with more investment in linked funds are less efficient compared to non-
linked based firm. Furthermore, it seems that volatility, overcapitalisation, reinsurance 
dependency distort efficiency scores. However, efficiency scores positively related to value 
creation based measure of firm performance.  
5.6. Conclusion 
A failure in defining an output proxy for the operation processes of life insurers implies that 
efficiency scores can be biased for indicating the performance of life insurers. Given the 
intangible nature of output in the life insurance business, it is challenging to find an appropriate 
accounting proxy for output of life insurers. Theoretically, the output proxy has been defined 
based on different theoretical foundations that are not mutually consist, creating two schools 
of thought on how to proxy output: claims or premiums. 
This chapter discusses the theoretical foundation for different output proxies utilised in the 
existing studies and then verifies analytically and empirically whether each of this proxy is a 
valid proxy to estimate cost efficiency. This chapter employs the stochastic frontier cost 
function to estimate efficiency scores based on three output proxies, namely, revenue, claims 
and funds. The chapter goes further to test whether cost efficiency scores estimated using 
different proxies are consistent and related to conventional measure of firm performance and 
value creation. The result suggests revenue based efficiency scores, on average, are higher and 
less volatile compared to average cost efficiency based on funds or claims. However, funds 
and claims give relatively similar cost efficiency scores. It is also found that three output 
proxies give consistently similar ranking for competitive firms, and cost efficiency based on 
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different proxies are closely related to conventional measurers of firm performance and value 
creation.  
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6. Chapter 6: Conclusion 
There have been dramatic changes not only in the macroeconomic and regulatory environments 
of the UK life insurers but also ownership structures as well as product and segment structures. 
The main issues concerning policyholders and shareholders are transferring investment risks 
to the policyholders and changing insurer’s roles from surplus and risk sharing to managing 
policyholders’ assets for fees charged as a discretionary percentage of the value policyholders’ 
assets, suggesting that the policyholders’ payouts and shareholders’ revenues are now linked 
to the market value of policyholders’ assets. This has increased the importance of changing in 
the market value of invested assets (unrealised gain) and requires a renovation of some existing 
performance measures that are oriented towards shareholders. The main aim of the thesis is to 
understand how the UK life insurance industry performs with respect to policyholders 
compared to shareholders’ oriented conventional measures of performance such as efficiency 
frontier. 
The investigation started by reviewing changes in external and internal environments of the 
UK life insurers over the period 1985-2010, and how these changes affected the performance 
and structure of the UK life insurance industry. Chapter 2 — Data, Sample and Review of 
Latest Developments of the UK Life Insurance Industry over the Period 1985-2010: started by 
reviewing the performance of the UK economy since the 1970s concerning growth, inflation 
and the financial market performance. Using the analytical approach, it is found that the 1985-
2010 period characterised by a slow rate of economic growth, decline in the interest rates to 
their lowest levels, minimum inflation rate, and frequent financial crises that significantly 
affected the whole performance of economy in general and the financial markets in particular. 
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A detailed review of the regulatory developments of the UK Life insurance industry is also 
conducted at the EU level with respect to the single passport system and the solvency II, and 
the UK level concerning the regulatory reform since 1970s. The regulatory developments at 
the EU and UK levels seem to have significant impact on the structures of the UK life insurance 
industry: (1) Since the early 1980s, the activities of the individual financial institution have 
become more varied, making distinction between banks such building societies and non-banks 
such as asset management and insurers less sharp (Watson, 2004); whereas the developments 
of the financial intermediary in the UK during the 19th century characterised by existence of 
clear market segmentations, including banks, brokers, building societies, insurance companies 
(Thomas, 2004). The dimension of the financial service market segments on the institutional 
and functional levels has led to broaden the scope of operations which intermediaries can 
access; creating intensively competitive market and putting pressure on firms to reduce the unit 
costs of their delivery (Thomas, 2004). (2) The European directives treat foreign financial 
institutions (from non-member states) that are authorised to operate within a single member 
state as member states financial institutions (home institutions); permitting the foreign financial 
institutions operating in the UK to access the European market. This has promoted competition 
between financial institutions in Europe and increased the attraction of the London base 
(Thomas, 2004). (3) The liberalization of the European insurance market increases 
competiveness pressure leading to cost cutting, and, hence, enhance the overall efficiency and 
productivity of the European insurers (Swiss Re, 1996; Fenn et. al., 2008; Vencappa, Fenn and 
Diacon, 2013). (4) Increase in the concentration within the industry, making the whole industry 
dominated by smaller number of groups (see Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; and Davutyan 
and Klumpes, 2008). 
Chapter 2 also included a detailed analysis for all UK life insurers over the period 1985-2010 
based on annual regulatory returns submitted to the FSA (formerly the DTI) obtained from the 
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SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). A detailed review for all 
regulatory forms 1-60 is made to explain how the data used in analytical and empirical 
investigations in the thesis is derived; suggesting the source of each single variable utilised in 
the thesis is linked to the regulatory by form, line and column. Furthermore, the purpose of 
each form as well as the nature of data included in each form, namely, solvency and capital, 
assets and liabilities and income and expense is discussed. A further illustration on whether 
each form includes data concerning policyholders’ assets, liabilities, income and expense or 
shareholders’ assets, liabilities, income and expense is made to explain how the data is unlisted 
to analyse performance from policyholders’ perspective in this thesis. The chapter also 
included detailed explanations on how data concerning organisation form (mutual and 
proprietary), industry structure for parents (insurers, banks and other institutions) and 
geographic location for parents (UK and overseas) is collected. 
The chapter also included detailed descriptions of each product category, namely, with-profits, 
unitised with-profits, property unit-linked and index unit-linked with respect to definition, 
risks, payouts to policyholders, exit and persistency, guarantees and capital intensity, 
transparency and discretion, fund structures and the basis for insurers’ revenue. Furthermore, 
detailed analysis based on data derived from SynThesys life database with respect to market 
share for each product category, namely, with-profits, unitised with-profits, property unit-
linked and index unit-linked at aggregated, segmental (life, pension and overseas), organisation 
form (mutual and proprietary), industry structure (insurers, banks and other institutions) and 
parental issue (UK and overseas) levels. It is found that proprietary life insurers regarding 
ownership, the unit-linked business with respect to products and the pension concerning 
segmental issues have dominated the UK life insurance market. This change in product 
structures comes as a response to the changes in the external environment, in particular 
unparalleled fall in interest rates. The change in market conditions led to many with-profits 
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insurers, in particular mutual, to close to new business and changes in ownership structures in 
terms of demutualisation, consolidation with other mutual insurers and the acquisition of 
mutual insurers by proprietary counterparts. This leads to having predominantly proprietary 
life insurance industry compared to almost equality controlled industry by mutual and 
proprietary life insurers in 1980s. It also seems that proprietary life insurers have managed to 
deal with adverse effects of changes in economic conditions through focusing on less capital 
intensive products, such as unit-linked products. The analysis of the market trend shows that 
banks and other financial and non-financial groups as well as foreign groups enter the UK life 
assurance market through unit-linked products as well as non-profit products, suggesting that 
these firms focus on standardised and less capital intensive products. In contrast, the UK life 
insurers still write substantial part of their overseas business in terms of with-profits products. 
In Chapter 2, the fund cycle (sources, usages and distribution of life insurance funds) as well 
as capital structures of the life insurers are constructed using flow charts supported by detailed 
analyses with respect to flow of the fund account, assets, liabilities, composition of 
policyholders’ assets, released on unreleased gains and loss on policyholders’ assets, 
premiums, expense, size, reinsurance, derivative usage, surplus and net cash flow from 
premiums and claims. It is reported that the UK life insurers have experienced some common 
features during the period financial turmoil, such as sharp drop in the value of linked assets, 
increase in proportion of claims paid in terms of surrender or partial surrender claims and 
excess in the amount of claims over premiums. It is also found that the amount of valuation 
losses (unrealised gain) increased in line with the increase in the proportion of assets invested 
in linked funds. In contrast, it seems that transformation from the participation business to the 
unit-linked business has enhanced profitability of proprietary life insurers. 
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The empirical investigation started by assessing the performance of the UK life insurers from 
policyholders’ perspective over the period 1985-2010. Chapter 3 — Does Saving-Investment 
Create Value for the Savers? – a Case of the UK Life Insurance Firms: started by theoretical 
and analytical deviation the value creation from a life insurance contract with respect to 
policyholders. The value creation approach to measure investment performance is based on the 
economic and accounting valuation of life assurance funds. This valuation assumes that the 
basic expectation of saving investors is the value of their investment at maturity date should be 
high than the inflated value of the original investment (measured using current price). Value 
creation can be decomposed into two components investment incomes (realised gain) and 
capital gains (unrealised gain) in accumulative terms; however, the contribution of a particular 
period to the accumulative measure can be found by deducting the current accumulative 
balance from the proceeding period balance. The valuation also provides a new term called 
total economic value, which is the sum of basic expected value and economic value of 
investment income, to provide a benchmark of whether an insurer has managed to keep the 
value of invested assets in line with changes in purchasing power. 
The value creation approach classifies life insurers into three categories with respect to value 
creation: (1) Full value creation — life insurers that can keep the value of policyholders’ 
contributions and realised gain from investing these contributions in line with the changes in 
the purchase power of the monetary unit, and, hence, achieve positive real capital gain 
(unrealised gain); all value are in accumulative terms. (2) Semi value creation ― life insurers 
that can keep the value of policyholders’ contributions but only part realised gain from 
investing these contributions in line with the changes in the purchase power of the monetary 
unit, and, hence, achieve negative real capital gain (unrealised gain) that destroys part of 
realised gain generated from investing policyholders’ contributions; all value are in 
accumulative terms. (3) Value destroying ― life insurers that cannot keep the value of 
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policyholders’ contributions and realised gain from investing these contributions in line with 
the changes in the purchase power of the monetary unit, and, hence, achieve negative real 
capital gain (unrealised gain) that destroys all realised gain generated from investing 
policyholders’ contributions and part of their contributions; all value are in accumulative terms. 
In Chapter 3, value creation is calculated for the 369 UK life insurers over the period 1985-
2010, and all UK life insurers are ranked based on their abilities to deliver value for 
policyholders. To examine the variation in life insurers’ abilities to derive value for 
policyholders and how value creation abilities are related to legal form, ownership structure 
(industry and geographic location of the parents), business strategies, business and financial 
performance and risk-taking attitudes analytical and empirical analyses are employed. The 
basic idea was to compare value creation between top 10 and bottom 10 firms, the top firm and 
the bottom firm, mutual and proprietary, insurer and banks based parents, overseas and UK 
based parent analytically. Furthermore, empirical investigation is also carried out to examine 
the difference between top 10 and bottom 10 firms, full value creation and non-value creating 
(semi value creation and value destroying ) on five-year-interval over the period 1985-2010 
supported by full sample Pairwise Correlation between identified performance based variables 
and value creation as well as Tobin’s Q. 
It is evident that: (1) Value creation is closely related to conventional measure of firm 
performance such as Tobin’s Q; however, value creation is unique in identifying financial 
healthy of life insurers with respect to their abilities to keep the value of invested policyholders’ 
assets in line with a particular benchmark such as inflation and classify life insurers according 
to these abilities. (2) There has been a significant decrease in the UK life insurer abilities to 
deliver real wealth for policyholders in particular during the period of financial turmoil. (3) 
Value creation is closely related to firm size, growth, financial strength, efficiency, solvency 
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and risk-taking attitudes. (4) Value destroying insurers keep higher level of liquid assets and 
extensively hedge through reinsurance purchase and use of derivatives compared to full value 
creation insurers. (5) Ownership structures and legal form affect life insurers’ abilities to 
deliver value for policyholders; including significant variations between insurers based parents 
and banks and other financial institutions based parents in their abilities to create value for 
policyholders. 
The value creation approach could be employed as a Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to 
assess the performance of life insurers since the value creation approach will provide the users 
with information to rank and classify different investment funds. Another application of value 
creation could be using economic value as a benchmark to market consistent valuation of assets 
and liabilities. Indeed, assets and liabilities under the current regulatory valuation for linked 
products will move in the same direction, and, hence, a free asset ratio may not be a good 
measure of insurer solvency. In contrast, the basic expected value could be used as a warning 
sign for regulators; when the market value falls below the expected value of policyholders’ 
assets for a relatively long period, regulators may need to review the insurer investment policy. 
Further application for the value creation concept is that it could be used to examine whether 
the value of investment funds is kept at higher value than basic expected value. Furthermore, 
the current market price of traded investments funds could be used to test whether the market 
is efficient concerning value creation. 
In Chapter 4 — An Investigation into the Diversification- Performance Relationship in the UK 
Life Insurance Industry: the empirical investigation goes further to examine whether variation 
in life insurers abilities to create value can be related to composition of the product mix. To 
establish the link between product diversification and value creation; the investigation started 
by examining difference between conventional products (non-linked) based life insurers and 
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modern products (unit-linked) based life insurers with respect to business and financial 
performance, risk-taking attitude and hedging strategy. The investigation is carried out by 
comparing the difference between these two groups of firms (linked and non-linked) 
analytically and empirically on five-year-interval supported by Pairwise Correlation based on 
full sample between proportion of linked assets and pre-identified performance variables. 
To further validate the result of the investigation concerning differences between linked and 
non-linked based products with respect to value creation, panel data based econometric analysis 
is also carried out. The basic idea is to examine whether the effect of product diversification 
on the performance of the UK life insurers is homogenous across conventional ratio such as 
investment yield (realised gain), and two value creation based measures, namely, capital gain 
(unrealised gain) and value creation (realised and unrealised gains). In this investigation, 
product diversification is measured using conventional the HHI, dummy and the proportion of 
assets invested in linked funds. 
The empirical investigation started by establishing the potential effect of product 
diversification on three proposed measures of performance, namely, realised gain, unrealised 
gain and value creation (a combined measure of realised and unrealised gains) using the OLS 
estimator (see Berger and Ofek, 1995). The result of that investigation is validated by 
comparing the result to fixed effects estimator that controls unobserved firm specific effects; 
fixed effects estimator is run with and without controlling for the time invariant of some 
explanatory variables (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). The 2SLS estimator is also employed to 
control for any potential endogeneity issue concerning the linked asset based variable. The 
linked asset is instrumented by three variables, namely, Capitalisation, Surrender and 
Liquidity; this process is validated by employing Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic and the Hansen–Sargan test or Hansen J test to ensure the instruments 
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are valid, and, hence, the result of the 2SLS is reliably. Given that value creation is measured 
in accumulative term, the result is also validated by employing the difference and system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen 
(1988) for dynamic version of the estimated model. The potential effect of the economic 
conditions on the result is also controlled by employing interaction term of adverse economic 
conditions based dummy and linked assets to test whether the result would be sensitive for 
adverse changes in economic conditions such as the period of the financial turmoil. To validate 
the interaction term, the empirical model is run on a yearly basis and economic condition based 
sub-periods to examine whether the result would vary between years /periods with different 
economic conditions. 
It evident that: (1) Life insurers with a high level of assets invested in linked funds perform 
better in terms of business growth and value creation compared to non-linked insurers. 
However, linked based insurers have lower investment yield (realised gain) and higher levels 
of persistency risks and assets volatility. (2) Non-linked insurers are more capital intensive and 
less cost efficient; in addition, they purchase more reinsurance and they are more likely to use 
derivatives compared to linked-based insurers. (3) The effect of diversification between linked 
and non-linked products on financial performance is not homogeneous for investment yield 
(realised gain), capital gain (unrealised gain) and value creation (realised and unrealised gains), 
and it also depends on how diversification is measured. (4) Although unit-linked products 
outperform non-linked products with respect to value creation, unit-linked products are more 
vulnerable to adverse movements in the market value of the assets, and, hence, the 
policyholders, who bear the investment risk of linked products, may suffer from adverse 
movement in the equity market. 
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In Chapter 5 — The Robustness of Output Proxies in Life Insurance Efficiency Studies: 
Empirical Evidence from the UK: the empirical investigation goes further to examine how 
value creation is related to frontier efficiency based measure of firm performance. The 
investigation started by examining the validity of existing output proxies in the insurance based 
literature. The output is firstly derived based on a life insurance contract (investment based 
contract) compared to existing theoretical derivation of output from protection based insurance 
contract (general insurance contract) (see Arrow, 1971; Cummins and Weiss, 2013; pp.817-
819). The output is theoretically defined, using the value added approach, as net management 
fees (profits based management fees) plus risk premiums on shareholders’ capital for bearing 
the insurance risk compared to insurer’s expenses plus the owners’ profit for bearing insurance 
risk based on protection insurance contract (see Cummins and Weiss, 2013; p.819). The 
investigation went to theoretical and analytically validate the existing proxies of output based 
on exiting insurance based literature and the theoretical deviation of the output based life 
insurance based contract. The cost efficiency based on the SFA approach is estimated for three 
output proxies, namely, revenue, claims and funds, and then the relationship between cost 
efficiency scores and conventional measures of firm performance is examined as well as the 
value creation. Furthermore, the ranking of best practice firms based on efficiency scores 
compared to value reaction based ranking. 
Using data on 369 firms over the period 1985-2010, it is found that: (1) Many existing output 
proxies can violate non-negativity constraints for downsizing firms or during the period of 
financial turmoil due to the significant changes in the value of assets and other key variables. 
(2) Claims, revenue and funds give consistently similar ranking for competitive firms, and cost 
efficiency based on different proxies are closely related to conventional measurers of firm 
performance and value creation. (3) The ranking of best practice firms based on efficiency 
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scores is related to value creation based ranking. (3) Average cost efficiency based on revenue 
is higher and less volatile compared to average cost efficiency based on funds or claims. 
The main limitation of thesis is volatility and level of reporting of the SynThesys life database 
(version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). As for level of reporting, the data is only available at 
the legally operating entity level not the group level; suggesting many of the firms in the data 
set could belong to one group such as Aviva plc based subsidiaries. This mainly because the 
FSA rules required data to be filed at the legal entity level not the group level (see FSA, 2008a; 
KPMG, 2009; Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). Furthermore, the 
data availability with respect to Form 40 in the SynThesys life database (version 10.1, 15-
August 2011 released) is only at the aggregated firm level not the fund level, although the Form 
40 is filed to FSA at the fund and operating entity levels (see FSA, 2008a; KPMG, 2009; 
Philpott, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010 and KPMG, 2012). Therefore, it is only possible to 
calculate the value creation and carry out the empirical investigation at the legal entity level. 
With respect to data volatility, the number of the UK life insurers based on the SynThesys life 
database (version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released) has declined considerably over the period 
since 1980s due to the M&A (Swiss Re, 2006; Carter and Falush, 2009). It went down from 
229 (1985) to 143 (2010). The number includes the proprietary and mutual UK life insurers; 
however, the number of mutual life insurers has declined considerable due to demutualisation 
and the M&A activities (Swiss Re, 1999; Carter and Falush, 2009). This consolidation is 
usually done at the group level but it is reflected in data set by transferring funds between 
subsidiaries; many parents such as Aviva plc used to transfer funds between subsidiaries that 
crates unusual change in the size of the existing firms. 
A further limitation of value creation analysis is that it assumes that there are no guarantees for 
life assurance products; however, most life assurance products are sold with guarantees. This 
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was inherited from the nature and availability of the data in the the SynThesys life database 
(version 10.1, 15-August 2011 released). 
The scope of the potential future research lies on expanding the value creation analysis at the 
EU level, this would provide the basis for comparing performance of in the EU single passport 
market and test whether the regulatory change the EU level has affected life insurers’ abilities 
to derive value for policyholders. Furthermore, the application of the value creation analysis at 
fund level would provide more insight on how different investment funds have preformed 
compared to policyholders’ expectations. This analysis would also provide more insight on 
how the composition of assets held by fund would affect the fund abilities to deliver value for 
policyholders.  
Recent efficiency studies at the EU level (see Fenn et. al. 2008, Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon, 
2013) provide insight cornering impact of the regulatory change at the EU on efficiency and 
productivity of the EU life insurers. A further analysis at EU using output proxies suggested in 
the thesis would provide more insight on how that regulator change has affected EU life 
insurers. 
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Appendix 
Table 16: Form 2 Statement of Solvency - Long-Term Insurance Business 
Line Description Description 
11 Capital Resources Capital resources arising within the LT insurance fund 
12 Capital resources allocated towards LT business arising outside the LT fund 
13 Capital resources to cover LT business capital resources requirement (11+12) 
21 Guarantee Fund Guarantee Fund requirement 
22 Excess (deficiency) of capital resources to cover guarantee Fund requirement 
31 Minimum Capital 
Requirement (MCR) 
LT insurance capital requirement 
32 Resilience capital requirement 
33 Base capital resources requirement 
34 Individual minimum capital requirement 
35 Capital requirements of regulated related undertakings 
36 Minimum capital requirement (34+35) 
37 Excess (deficiency) of available capital resources to cover 50% of MCR 
38 Excess (deficiency) of available capital resources to cover 75% of MCR 
39 Enhanced Capital 
Requirement 
With-profits insurance capital component 
40 Enhanced capital requirement 
41 Capital Resources 
Requirement (CRR) 
Capital resources requirement (greater of 36 and 40) 
42 Excess (deficiency) of capital resources to cover LT business CRR (13-41) 
51 Contingent Liabilities Contingent liabilities re LT business shown in supplementary note to F14 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 17: Form 13 Analysis of Admissible Assets 
Line Classifications Classifications Description Description 
11 Non-linked Land and Buildings Investments in 
Group Undertakings 
and Participating 
Interests 
Land and buildings 
21 Non-linked Affiliates UK insurance dependants - shares 
22 Non-linked Affiliates UK insurance dependants - debts and loans 
23 Non-linked Affiliates Other insurance dependants - shares 
24 Non-linked Affiliates Other insurance dependants - debts and loans 
25 Non-linked Affiliates Non-insurance dependants - shares 
26 Non-linked Affiliates Non-insurance dependants - debts and loans 
27 Non-linked Affiliates Other group undertakings - shares 
28 Non-linked Affiliates Other group undertakings - debts and loans 
29 Non-linked Affiliates Participating interests - shares 
30 Non-linked Affiliates Participating interests - debts and loans 
41 Non-linked Equities Other Financial 
Investments 
Equity shares 
42 Non-linked Equities Other shares and other variable yield participations 
43 Non-linked Equities Holdings in collective investment schemes 
44 Non-linked Other Assets Rights under derivative contracts 
45 Non-linked Bonds Fixed interest securities - approved 
46 Non-linked Bonds Fixed interest securities - other 
47 Non-linked Bonds Variable interest securities - approved 
48 Non-linked Bonds Variable interest securities - other 
49 Non-linked Other Assets Participation in investment pools 
50 Non-linked Mortgages and Loans Loans secured by mortgages 
51 Non-linked Mortgages and Loans Loans to public / local authorities and nationalised industries 
52 Non-linked Mortgages and Loans Loans secured by policies of insurance issued by the company 
53 Non-linked Mortgages and Loans Other loans 
54 Non-linked Cash  Bank and approved credit and financial inst deposits <= 1 month 
55 Non-linked Cash  Bank and approved credit and financial inst deposits > 1 month 
56 Non-linked Other Assets Other financial investments 
57 Non-linked Cash  Deposits with ceding undertakings 
58 Linked Linked Assets Assets held to match linked liabilities: index linked 
59 Linked Linked Assets  Assets held to match linked liabilities: property linked 
60 Non-linked Other Assets Reinsurers' Share of 
Technical Provisions 
Provision for unearned premiums 
61 Non-linked Other Assets Claims outstanding 
62 Non-linked Other Assets Provision for unexpired risks 
63 Non-linked Other Assets Other 
71 Non-linked Debtors Debtors and Salvage Direct insurance business - policyholders 
72 Non-linked Debtors Direct insurance business - intermediaries 
73 Non-linked Debtors Salvage and subrogation recoveries 
74 Non-linked Debtors Reinsurance accepted 
75 Non-linked Debtors Reinsurance ceded 
76 Non-linked Debtors Dependants - due in 12 months or less 
77 Non-linked Debtors Dependants - due in more than 12 months 
78 Non-linked Debtors Other - due in 12 months or less 
79 Non-linked Debtors Other - due in more than 12 months 
80 Non-linked Other Assets Other Assets Tangible assets 
81 Non-linked Cash  Deposits not subject to time restriction on withdrawal 
82 Non-linked Cash  Cash in hand 
83 Non-linked Other Assets Other assets 
84 Non-linked Accrued Income Accrued interest and rent 
85 Non-linked Accrued Income Deferred acquisition costs (general business only) 
86 Non-linked Accrued Income Other prepayments and accrued income 
87 n/a n/a Deductions from the aggregate value of assets 
89 n/a Total Admissible Assets  Grand total of admissible assets (11 to 86 less 87) 
91 n/a n/a Reconciliation to 
Asset Values 
Determined in 
Accordance with 
GAAP/IFRSs 
Total admissible assets (as per line 89) 
92 n/a n/a Admissible Assets in excess of market and counterparty limits 
93 n/a n/a Inadmissible Assets directly held 
94 n/a n/a Capital resources requirement deduction of regulated related undertakings 
95 n/a n/a Ineligible surplus capital and restricted assets in regulated related ins undertakings 
96 n/a n/a Inadmissible assets of regulated related ins undertakings 
97 n/a n/a Book value of related ancillary services undertakings 
98 n/a n/a Other differences in the valuation of assets 
99 n/a n/a Deferred acquisition costs excluded from line 89 
100 n/a n/a Reinsurers' share of technical provisions excluded from line 89 
101 n/a n/a Other asset adjustments (may be negative) 
102 n/a n/a Total assets (91 to 100) 
103 n/a n/a Amount included in Line 89 attributable to debts from related insurers 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
Where: 
Form 13 is available separately for the LTIB (life) and the OLTIB (general’s and shareholders’ assets). 
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Table 18: Form 44 Long-Term Insurance Business: Linked Funds Balance Sheet 
Line Description Description 
11 Internal 
Linked 
Funds 
(Excluding 
Cross 
Investment) 
Directly held assets (excluding collective investment schemes) 
12 Directly held assets - collective investment schemes of connected cos 
13 Directly held assets - other collective investment schemes 
14 Total assets (11+12+13) 
15 Provision for tax on unrealised capital gains 
16 Secured and unsecured loans 
17 Other liabilities 
18 Total net assets (14-15-16-17) 
21 Directly 
Held 
Linked 
Assets Value of directly held linked assets 
31 Total  Value of directly held linked assets and units held (18+21) 
32 Surplus units 
33 Deficit units 
34 Net unit liability (31-32+33) 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 19: Form 17 Analysis of Derivative Contracts 
Line/Column Description Description Value as at the 
End of this 
Financial Year 
Notional Amount 
as at the End of 
this Financial 
Year 
Assets Liabilities Bought 
/Long 
Sold 
/Short 
1 2 3 4 
11 Futures 
and 
Contracts 
for 
Differences 
Fixed-interest securities     
12 Interest rates     
13 Inflation     
14 Credit index/basket     
15 Credit single name     
16 Equity Index     
17 Equity Stock     
18 Land     
19 Currencies     
20 Mortality     
21 Other     
31 In the 
Money 
Options: 
Swaptions     
32 Equity index calls     
33 Equity stock calls     
34 Equity index puts     
35 Equity stock puts     
36 Options     
41 Out of the 
Money 
Options 
Swaptions     
42 Equity index calls     
43 Equity stock calls     
44 Equity index puts     
45 Equity stock puts     
46 Other     
51  Total (11 to 46)     
52  Adjustment for variation margin    
53  Total (51+ 52)   
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
Where: 
Form 17 is available separately for the LTIB (life) and the OLTIB (general’s and shareholders’ assets). 
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Table 20: Form 14 Long-Term Insurance Business: Liabilities and Margins 
Line Description 
11 Mathematical reserves after distribution of surplus 
12 Cash bonuses not paid to policyholders prior to end of fin yr 
13 Balance of surplus / (valuation deficit) 
14 Long-term insurance business fund c/f (11 to 13) 
15 Claims outstanding - gross 
16 Claims outstanding- reinsurers' share 
17 Claims outstanding - net (15-16) 
21 Provisions - taxation 
22 Provisions - other risks and charges 
23 Deposits received from reinsurers 
31 Creditors - direct insurance business 
32 Creditors - reinsurance accepted 
33 Creditors - reinsurance ceded 
34 Debenture loans - secured 
35 Debenture loans - unsecured 
36 Amounts owed to credit institutions 
37 Creditors - taxation 
38 Creditors - other 
39 Accruals and deferred income 
41 Provision for ‘reasonably foreseeable adverse variations’ 
49 Total other insurance and non-insurance liabilities (17 to 41) 
51 Excess of the value of net admissible assets 
59 Total liabilities and margins 
61 Amounts included in Line 59 attributable to related companies 
62 Amounts included in Line 59 attributable to property linked benefits 
71 Total Liabilities (11+12+49) 
72 Increase to liabilities - DAC related 
73 Reinsurers' share of technical provisions 
74 Other adjustments to liabilities (may be negative) 
75 Capital and reserves and fund for future appropriations 
76 Total liabilities (71 to 75) 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 21: Form 50 Long-Term Insurance Business: Summary of Mathematical Reserves 
Line/Column Description Description UK 
Life 
UK 
Pension 
Overseas Total 
Financial 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 
11 Gross 
Form 51 - with-profits 
    
12 
Form 51 - non-profit 
    
13 
Form 52 
    
14 
Form 53 - linked 
    
15 
Form 53 - non-linked 
    
16 
Form 54 - linked 
    
17 
Form 54 - non-linked 
    
18 
Total 
    
21 Reinsurance - 
External Form 51 - with-profits 
    
22 
Form 51- non-profit 
    
23 
Form 52 
    
24 
Form 53 - linked 
    
25 
Form 53 - non-linked 
    
26 
Form 54 - linked 
    
27 
Form 54 - non-linked 
    
28 Total     
31 Reinsurance - Intra-
Group Form 51 - with-profits 
    
32 
Form 51 - non-profit 
    
33 
Form 52 
    
34 
Form 53 - linked 
    
35 
Form 53 - non-linked 
    
36 
Form 54 - linked 
    
37 
Form 54 - non-linked 
    
38 
Total 
    
41 Net of Reinsurance 
Form 51 - with-profits 
    
42 
Form 51 - non-profit 
    
43 
Form 52 
    
44 
Form 53 - linked 
    
45 
Form 53 - non-linked 
    
46 
Form 54 - linked 
    
47 
Form 54 - non-linked 
    
48 
Total 
    
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 22: Form 40 Long-Term Insurance Business: Revenue Account 
Line Description Description 
11 Income Earned premiums 
12 Investment income receivable before deduction of tax 
13 Increase (decrease) in value of non-linked assets brought into account 
14 Increase (decrease) in value of linked assets 
15 Other income 
19 Total income 
21 Expenditure Claims incurred 
22 Expenses payable 
23 Interest payable before deduction of tax 
24 Taxation 
25 Other expenditure 
26 Transfer to (from) non-technical account 
29 Total expenditure 
31  Business transfers-in 
32  Business transfers-out 
39  Increase (decrease) in fund in financial year (19-29+31-32) 
49  Fund brought forward 
59  Fund carried forward (39+49) 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 23: Form 41 Long-Term Insurance Business: Analysis of Premiums 
Line/Column Description Description UK 
Life  
UK 
Pension 
Overseas  Total 
Financial 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 
11 Gross Regular premiums     
12 Single premiums     
13 Reinsurance 
External 
Regular premiums     
14 Single premiums     
15 Reinsurance 
Intra-Group 
Regular premiums     
16 Single premiums     
17 Net of 
Reinsurance 
Regular premiums     
18 Single premiums     
19 Total Gross     
20 Reinsurance     
21 Net     
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 24: Form 42 Long-Term Insurance Business: Analysis of Claims 
Line/column Description Description UK 
Life 
UK 
Pension 
Overseas Total 
Financial 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 
11 Gross Death or disability lump sums     
12 Disability periodic payments     
13 Surrender or partial surrender     
14 Annuity payments     
15 Lump sums on maturity     
16 Total     
21 Reinsurance - 
External 
Death or disability lump sums     
22 Disability periodic payments     
23 Surrender or partial surrender     
24 Annuity payments     
25 Lump sums on maturity     
26 Total     
31 Reinsurance - 
Intra-Group 
Death or disability lump sums     
32 Disability periodic payments     
33 Surrender or partial surrender     
34 Annuity payments     
35 Lump sums on maturity     
36 Total     
41 Net of Reinsurance Death or disability lump sums     
42 Disability periodic payments     
43 Surrender or partial surrender     
44 Annuity payments     
45 Lump sums on maturity     
46 Total     
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 25: Form 43 Long-Term Insurance Business: Analysis of Expenses 
Line/column 
Description 
Description 
UK 
Life  
UK 
Pension 
Overseas  Total 
Financial 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 
11 Gross 
Commission - acquisition 
    
12 
Commission - other 
    
13 
Management - acquisition 
    
14 
Management - maintenance 
    
15 
Management - other 
    
16 
Total 
    
21 Reinsurance - 
External Commission - acquisition 
    
22 
Commission - other 
    
23 
Management - acquisition 
    
24 
Management - maintenance 
    
25 
Management - other 
    
26 
Total 
    
31 Reinsurance - 
Intra-Group Commission - acquisition 
    
32 
Commission - other 
    
33 
Management - acquisition 
    
34 
Management - maintenance 
    
35 
Management - other 
    
36 
Total 
    
41 Net of Reinsurance 
Commission - acquisition 
    
42 
Commission - other 
    
43 
Management - acquisition 
    
44 
Management - maintenance 
    
45 
Management - other 
    
46 
Total 
    
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 26: Form 58 Long-Term Insurance Business: Distribution of Surplus 
Line Description Description 
11 Valuation Result Fund c/f 
12 Bonus payments in anticipation of a surplus 
13 Transfer to non-technical account 
14 Transfer to other funds / parts of funds 
15 Subtotal (11 to 14) 
21 Mathematical reserves 
29 Surplus inc contingency and other reserves (15-21) 
31 Composition of 
Surplus 
Balance b/f  
32 Transfer from non-technical account 
33 Transfer from other funds / parts of fund 
34 Surplus arising since last valuation 
39 Total 
41 Distribution of 
Surplus 
Bonus paid in anticipation of a surplus 
42 Cash bonuses 
43 Reversionary bonuses 
44 Other bonuses 
45 Premium reductions 
46 Total allocated to policyholders (41 to 45) 
47 Net transfer out of fund / part of fund 
48 Total distributed surplus (46+47) 
49 Surplus carried forward 
59 Total (48+49) 
61 Percentage of 
Distributed 
Surplus 
Allocated to 
Policyholders 
Current year 
62 Current year -1 
63 Current year -2 
64 Current year -3 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 27: Form 45 Long-Term Insurance Business: Revenue Account for Internal Linked Funds 
Line Description Description 
11 Income Value of total creation of units 
12 Investment Income attributable to funds before deduction of tax 
13 Increase (decrease) in value of investments in the financial year 
14 Other income 
19 Total income 
21 Expenditure Value of total cancellation of units 
22 Charges for management 
23 Charges in respect of tax on investment income 
24 Taxation on realised capital gains 
25 Increase (decrease) in amounts set aside for tax on capital gains not yet realised 
26 Other expenditure 
29 Total expenditure 
39  Increase (decrease) in funds in financial year (19-29) 
49  Internal linked funds b/f 
59  Internal linked funds c/f (39+49) 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 28: Form 46 Long-Term Insurance Business: Summary of New Business 
Line/column Description Description UK 
Life 
UK 
Pension 
Overseas Total 
Financial 
Year 
 
1 2 3 4 
11 
Number of New 
Policyholders / 
Scheme Members for 
Direct Insurance 
Business 
Regular premium business 
    
12 Single premium business 
    
13 Total 
    
21 
Amount of New 
Regular Premiums Direct insurance business 
    
22 External reinsurance 
    
23 Intra-group reinsurance 
    
24 Total 
    
25 
Amount of New Single 
Premiums Direct insurance business 
    
26 External reinsurance 
    
27 Intra-group reinsurance 
    
28 Total 
    
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 29: Form 47 Long-Term Insurance Business: Analysis of New Business 
Product  
Code  
Number 
Product Description Classification  Regular Premium Business Single Premium Business 
Number of 
Policyholders 
/ Scheme 
Members 
Amount 
of 
Premiums 
Number of 
Policyholders 
/ Scheme 
Members 
Amount 
of 
Premiums 
3 4 5 6 
100 Conventional whole life with-profits ordinary branch Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
105 Conventional whole life with-profits industrial branch Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
110 Conventional whole life with-profits (individual savings account) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
115 Conventional whole life with-profits (tax exempt) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
120 Conventional endowment with-profits ordinary branch Savings Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
125 Conventional endowment with-profits ordinary branch target cash Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
130 Conventional endowment with-profits industrial branch Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
135 Conventional endowment with-profits (individual savings account) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
140 Conventional endowment with-profits (tax exempt) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
145 Income protection with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
150 Income protection with-profits (Holloway) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
155 Conventional pensions endowment with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
160 Conventional pensions endowment with-profits - increments Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
165 Conventional deferred annuity with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
170 Conventional deferred annuity with-profits - increments Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
175 Group conventional deferred annuity with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
180 Group conventional deferred annuity with-profits - increments Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
185 Group conventional pensions endowment with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
190 Group conventional pensions endowment with-profits - increments Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
195 Annuity with-profits (purchased life annuity) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
200 Annuity with-profits (compulsory purchase annuity) Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
205 Miscellaneous conventional with-profits Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
210 Additional reserves with-profits ordinary branch Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
215 Additional reserves with-profits industrial branch Non-linked: with-profits (participating business)     
300 Regular premium non-profit WL/EA ordinary branch Non-linked: non-profit     
305 Single premium non-profit WL/EA ordinary branch Non-linked: non-profit     
310 Non-profit industrial branch Non-linked: non-profit     
315 Individual deposit administration non-profit Non-linked: non-profit     
320 Group deposit administration non-profit Non-linked: non-profit     
325 Level term assurance Non-linked: non-profit     
330 Decreasing term assurance Non-linked: non-profit     
335 Decreasing term assurance (rider benefits) Non-linked: non-profit     
336 Mortality risk premium reinsurance Non-linked: non-profit     
340 Accelerated critical illness (guaranteed premiums)  Non-linked: non-profit     
345 Accelerated critical illness  (reviewable premiums) Non-linked: non-profit     
350 Stand-alone critical illness (guaranteed premiums)  Non-linked: non-profit     
355 Stand-alone critical illness  (reviewable premiums) Non-linked: non-profit     
360 Income protection non-profit (guaranteed premiums) Non-linked: non-profit     
365 Income protection non-profit (reviewable premiums) Non-linked: non-profit     
370 Long-term care policy Non-linked: non-profit     
375 Protection menu policy Non-linked: non-profit     
380 Miscellaneous protection rider Non-linked: non-profit     
385 Income protection claims in payment Non-linked: non-profit     
390 Deferred annuity non-profit Non-linked: non-profit     
395 Annuity non-profit (purchased life annuity) Non-linked: non-profit     
400 Annuity non-profit (compulsory purchase annuity) Non-linked: non-profit     
401 Annuity non-profit (bulk transfer) Non-linked: non-profit     
405 Annuity non-profit (compulsory purchase annuity impaired life) Non-linked: non-profit     
410 Group Life Non-linked: non-profit     
411 Group death in service dependants' annuities Non-linked: non-profit     
415 Collective Life Non-linked: non-profit     
420 Group income protection Non-linked: non-profit     
425 Group income protection claims in payment Non-linked: non-profit     
430 Group critical illness Non-linked: non-profit     
435 Miscellaneous non-profit Non-linked: non-profit     
440 Additional reserves non-profit ordinary branch Non-linked: non-profit     
445 Additional reserves non-profit industrial branch Non-linked: non-profit     
500 Life unitised with-profit single premium Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
505 Life unitised with-profit whole life regular premium Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
506 Life unitised with-profit whole life regular premium (individual savings account) Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
510 Life unitised with-profit endowment regular premium - savings Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
515 Life unitised with-profit endowment regular premium - target cash Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
516 Life unitised with-profit endowment regular premium (individual savings account) Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
520 Holloway member accounts Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
525 Individual pensions unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
530 Individual pensions unitised with-profit - increments Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
535 Group money purchase pensions unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
540 Group money purchase pensions unitised with-profit - increments Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
545 Individual deposit administration with-profits Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
550 Individual deposit administration with-profits - increments Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
555 Group deposit administration with-profits Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
560 Group deposit administration with-profits - increments Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
565 The Department for Work and Pensions National Insurance rebates unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
570 Income drawdown unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
571 Trustee investment purchased life annuity unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
574 unitised with-profit investment only reinsurance Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
575 Miscellaneous unitised with-profit Unit-linked: unitised with-profits      
580 Term assurance rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
585 Accelerated critical illness rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
590 Stand-alone critical illness rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
595 Income protection rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
605 Miscellaneous protection rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
610 Additional reserves accumulating with-profit Unit-linked: Property linked     
700 Life property linked single premium Unit-linked: Property linked     
705 Life property linked single premium quasi index linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
710 Life property linked whole life regular premium Unit-linked: Property linked     
715 Life property linked endowment regular premium - savings Unit-linked: Property linked     
720 Life property linked endowment regular premium - target cash Unit-linked: Property linked     
725 Individual pensions property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
730 Individual pensions property linked - increments Unit-linked: Property linked     
735 Group money purchase pensions property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
740 Group money purchase pensions property linked - increments Unit-linked: Property linked     
745 The Department for Work and Pensions National Insurance rebates property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
750 Income drawdown property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
755 Trustee investment purchased life annuity Unit-linked: Property linked     
760 Small self administered schemes Unit-linked: Property linked     
765 Group managed fund Unit-linked: Property linked     
770 Term assurance rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
775 Accelerated critical illness rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
780 Stand-alone critical illness rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
785 Income protection rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
790 Miscellaneous protection rider Unit-linked: Property linked     
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794 Property linked investment only reinsurance Unit-linked: Property linked     
795 Miscellaneous property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
800 Additional reserves property linked Unit-linked: Property linked     
900 Life index linked single premium Unit-linked: Index  linked     
901 Indexed linked income protection claims in payment Unit-linked: Index  linked     
902 Group indexed linked income protection claims in payment Unit-linked: Index  linked     
905 Index linked annuity Unit-linked: Index  linked     
906 Index linked annuity (bulk transfer) Unit-linked: Index  linked     
907 Index linked deferred annuity Unit-linked: Index  linked     
910 Miscellaneous Index linked Unit-linked: Index  linked     
915 Additional reserves Index Linked Unit-linked: Index  linked     
This form is available separately as follows: 
UK Life  Direct Insurance Business UKL_DB 
Reinsurance accepted external UKL_RE 
Reinsurance accepted intragroup UKL_RG 
UK Pension Direct Insurance Business UKP_DB 
Reinsurance accepted external UKP_RE 
Reinsurance accepted intragroup UKP_RG 
Overseas Direct Insurance Business OS_DB 
Reinsurance accepted external OS_RE 
Reinsurance accepted intragroup OS_RG 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 30: Form 16 Profit and Loss Account (Non-Technical Account) 
Line Description 
11 Transfer (to)/from general business technical account: From Form 20 
12 Transfer (to)/from general business technical account: Equalisation provisions 
13 Transfer from LT business revenue account 
14 Investment income: Income 
15 Investment income: Value re-adjustments on investments 
16 Investment income: Gains on the realisation of investments 
17 Investment charges: Investment management charges, including interest 
18 Investment charges: Value re-adjustments on investments 
19 Investment charges: Loss on the realisation of investments 
20 Allocated investment return transferred to general business technical account 
21 Other income and charges 
29 Profit or loss on ordinary  activities before tax (11+12+13+14+15+16-17-18-19-20+21)  
31 Tax on profit or loss on ordinary activities 
39 Profit or loss on ordinary activities after tax (29-31) 
41 Extraordinary profit or loss 
42 Tax on extraordinary profit or loss 
43 Other taxes not shown under preceding items 
49 Profit or loss for the financial year (39+41-(42+43)) 
51 Dividends (paid or foreseeable) 
59 Profit or loss retained for the financial year (49-51) 
Source: the author — based on the FSA return forms (see FSA, 2008a). 
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Table 31: The UK Life Insurers Included in the Thesis 
Full Name Average 
Size 
(£m)* 
Sample Period  Legal Form  Parent Country of Origin  Parent Main Business  
Period Number 
of  
years 
Proprietary Mutual UK Overseas Insurer Bank Other 
Financial  
Services 
Non- 
Financial  
Services 
Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd 10213 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2007 2008-2010  1985-2010   
Abbey Life Pension and Annuities Ltd 233 1985-1996 12 1985-1996  1985-1996   1985-1996   
Aberdeen Asset Management Life and Pensions Ltd 2997 1998-2010 13 1998-2010  1998 
and 2006-
2010 
1999-2005  1998-2005 2006-2010  
Aberdeen Asset Management Pooled Pensions Ltd 2602 1993-2009 17 1998-2009 1993-1997  1993-2009 1993-2001  2002-2009  
ACE Europe Life Ltd 6 2007-2010 4 2007-2010   2007-2010 2007-2010    
AEGON Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 2 1985-1997 13 1985-1997   1985-1997 1985-1997    
Aetna Life Insurance Co Ltd 300 1985-1992 8 1985-1992  1985-1992  1985-1992    
Aetna Pensions Ltd 29 1985-1990 6 1985-1990  1985-1990  1985-1990    
Ageas Protect Ltd 11 2008-2010 3 2008-2010   2008-2010 2008-2010    
ALAC (UK) Ltd 204 1985-1997 13 1985-1997   1985-1997 1985-1997    
Alba Life Ltd 3846 1985-2005 21 2000-2005 1985-1999 1985-2005  2000-2005 1985-1999   
Albany Life Assurance Co Ltd 1836 1985-1998 14 1985-1998   1985-1998 1985-1998    
All Counties Insurance Co Ltd 11 1985-2002 18 1985-2002  1985-2002     1985-2002 
Alliance and Leicester Life Assurance Co Ltd 287 1995-2002 8 1995-2002  1995-2002  1995-2002    
Allianz Insurance plc 779 1985-2004 20 1985-2004   1985-2004 1985-2004    
Allied Dunbar Assurance plc 19028 1985-2004 20 1985-2004  1985-1998 1999-2004 1985-2004    
Allied Dunbar Provident plc 10 1985-1989 5 1985-1989  1985-1989  1985-1989    
Ambassador Life Assurance Co Ltd 106 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997   1985-1997   
American Life Insurance Co UK Branch 4159 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society Ltd (The) 144 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Assicurazioni Generali 389 1985-1993 9 1985-1993   1985-1993 1985-1993    
Assurant Life Ltd 10 1998-2010 13 1998-2010   1998-2010 1998-2010    
Australian Mutual Provident Society 2489 1985-1996 12  1985-1996  1985-1996 1985-1996    
Aviva Annuity UK Ltd 16717 1997-2010 14 2000-2010 1997-1999 1997-2010  1997-2010    
Aviva Insurance Ltd 2 1985-2004 20 1998-2004 1985-1997 1985-2004  1985-2004    
Aviva Insurance UK Ltd 63 1986-1997 12  1986-1997 1986-1997  1986-1997    
Aviva International Insurance Ltd 5356 1985-1986 2  1985-1986 1985-1986  1985-1986    
Aviva Investors Pensions Ltd 3079 1985-2010 26 2000-2010 1985-1999 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Aviva Life and Pensions UK Ltd 53675 1997-2010 14 2000-2010 1997-1999 1997-2010  1997-2010    
Avon Insurance plc 194 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
AXA Annuity Co Ltd 1336 2007-2007 1 2007-2007   2007-2007 2007-2007    
AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc 10333 1985-2000 16 1985-2000   1985-2000 1985-2000    
AXA Wealth Ltd 1510 1985-2010 26 1997-2010 1985-1996  1985-2010 1985-1999 
and2007-
2010 
 2000-2006  
BandCE Insurance Ltd 48 1995-2010 16  1995-2010 1995-2010  1995-2010    
BA (GI) Ltd 6915 1985-2005 21 1985-2005  1985-2005  1985-2005    
Baillie Gifford Life Ltd 3878 1998-2010 13 1998-2010  1998-2010    1998-2010  
Barclays Life Assurance Co Ltd 2399 1985-1988 
and1991-
2010 
24 1997-2010 1985-1988  
and 1991-
1996 
1985-1988 
and1991-2008 
2009-2010 2009-2010 1985-1988 
and1991-
2008 
  
BLAC Ltd 4324 1985-2002 18 1985-2002  1985-2002   1985-2002   
Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd 6 1985-1996 12 1985-1996   1985-1996 1985-1996    
BlackRock Asset Management Pensions Ltd 50405 1995-2010 16 1995-2010  1995-2009 2010  1995-2010   
BlackRock Pensions Ltd 1931 1989-2010 22 1989-2010  1989-1994 1995-2010  1989-2010   
Bradford Insurance Co Ltd 2 1985-2004 20 1996-2004 1985-1995 1985-2004  1985-2004    
Britannia Life Association of Scotland Ltd 1064 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993   1985-1993   
Britannia Life Ltd (pre1994) 471 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993   1985-1993   
Britannia Life Managed Pension Funds Ltd 49 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993   1985-1993   
Britannic Unit Linked Assurance Ltd 906 1985-2005 21 1985-2005  1985-2005  1985-2005    
British and European Reinsurance Co Ltd 87 1985-1999 15 1998-1999 1985-1997 1985-1999  1985-1999    
British Airways Benefit Fund 4 1996-2001 6  1996-2001 1996-2001  1996-2001    
British Equitable Assurance Co Ltd 2 1985-2001 17 1985-2001  1985-1998 1999-2001 1985-2001    
British Friendly Society Ltd 104 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
British Life Office Ltd 212 1985-2003 19  1985-2003 1985-2003  1985-2003    
British National Life Assurance Co Ltd 186 1985-1993 9 1985-1993   1985-1993 1985-1993    
BUPA Health Assurance Ltd 60 1994-2010 17 1994-1994 1995-2010 1995-2010 1994-1994 1994-2010    
Caledonian Insurance Co Ltd 327 1987-1999 13 1987-1999  1987-1999  1987-1999    
Canada Life Assurance Co  1483 1985-1998 14  1985-1998  1985-1998 1985-1998    
Canada Life Irish Operations Ltd 589 1985-1995 11  1985-1995  1985-1995 1985-1995    
Canada Life Ltd 6853 1985-2010 26 1998-2010 1985-1997  1985-2010 1985-2010    
Canterbury Life Assurance Co Ltd 49 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000  1985-2000    
CCL Assurance Ltd 216 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
Century Life Assurance 189 1995-2003 9 1995-2003  1995-2003  1995-2003    
Century Life plc 1361 1985-2005 21 1985-2005  1985-2005  1985-2005    
CGNU Life Assurance Ltd 10104 1985-2008 24 1998-2008 1985-1997 1985-2008  1985-2008    
Cirencester Friendly Society Ltd 42 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
City of London Insurance Co Ltd 1 1985-2004 20 1985-2004  1985-1998 1999-2004 1985-2004    
City of Westminster Assurance Co Ltd 555 1985-2005 21 1985-2005   1985-2005 1985-2005    
City of Westminster Assurance Society Ltd 35 1985-1993 9 1985-1993   1985-1993 1985-1993    
Civil Servants Annuities Assurance Society 18 1997-2000 4  1997-2000 1997-2000  1997-2000    
Clerical Medical and General Life Assurance Society 7606 1985-1995 11  1985-1995 1985-1995  1985-1995    
Clerical Medical Investment Group Ltd 22047 1996-2010 15 1996-2010  1996-2010   1996-2010   
Clerical Medical Managed Fund Ltd 6023 1985-2010 26 1997-2010 1985-1996 1985-2010  1985-1996 1997-2010   
Colonial Mutual Life (Unit Assurances) Ltd 109 1985-1996 12  1985-1996  1985-1996 1985-1996    
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 2630 1985-1996 12  1985-1996  1985-1996 1985-1996    
Combined Insurance Co of America (UK Branch) 87 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Commercial Union Assurance (Unit Trusts) Ltd  32 1985-1986 2  1985-1986 1985-1986  1985-1986    
Commercial Union Life Assurance Co Ltd 11332 1985-2008 24 1998-2008 1985-1997 1985-2008  1985-2008    
Communication Workers Friendly Society Ltd 93 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Compass Friendly Society Ltd 0.3 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Confederation Life Insurance Co 2592 1985-1993 9  1985-1993  1985-1993 1985-1993    
Confederation Life Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 906 1985-1999 15 1985-1994  
and1998-1999 
1995-1997  1985-1999 1985-1999    
Consolidated Life Assurance Co Ltd 332 1985-1996 12 1985-1996  1985-1994 1995-1996 1985-1994   1995-1996 
252 
 
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd 17901 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010   1985-2010   
Countrywide Assured plc 725 1988-2010 23 1988-2010  1988-2010  2004-2010 1988-2003   
Criterion Insurance Co Ltd 1 1985-1989 5 1985-1989  1985-1989  1985-1989    
Crown Life Assurance Co Ltd 427 1985-1994 10 1985-1994  1985-1994  1985-1994    
Crown Life Insurance Co 70 1985-1999 15 1985-1999   1985-1999 1985-1999    
Crown Life Pensions Ltd 644 1985-1994 10 1985-1994  1985-1994  1985-1994    
Cuna Mutual Insurance Society 4 1985-2005 21  1985-2005 1985-2005  1985-2005    
Customs Annuity and Benevolent Fund Inc 26 1985-2003 19  1985-2003 1985-2003  1985-2003    
Dentists and General Mutual Benefit Society Ltd 33 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Dentists Provident Society Ltd 146 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Direct Line Life Insurance Co Ltd 73 1995-2010 16 1995-2010  1995-2010   1995-2010   
Domestic and General Life Assurance Co Ltd 5 1994-2007 14 1994-2007  1994-2007     1994-2007 
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd 1981 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-1996 1997-2010 1985-2010    
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc 236 1985-2002 18  1985-2002 1985-2002     1985-2002 
Ecclesiastical Life Ltd 181 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010     1985-2010 
Edinburgh Assurance Co Ltd 303 1985-1996 12  1985-1996 1985-1996  1985-1996    
Equitable Life Assurance Society (The) 18383 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Equity and Law (Managed Funds) Ltd 1032 1985-1991 7 1985-1991   1985-1991 1985-1991    
Esano London Friendly Society 7 2001-2003 3  2001-2003 2001-2003  2001-2003    
Eurolife Assurance Co Ltd 249 1985-2004 20 1985-2004  1985-2004  1985-2004    
Exeter Friendly Society Ltd 37 2008-2010 3  2008-2010 2008-2010  2008-2010    
FandC Managed Pension Funds Ltd 874 1985-2010 26 1985-1997  
and2009-2010 
1998-2008 1985-2010  1985-2008  2009-2010  
Family Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 1403 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Fidelity Life Assurance Ltd 6 1985-2004 20 2000-2004 1985-1999 1985-2004  1985-2004    
FIL Life Insurance Ltd 1296 1998-2010 13 1998-2010   1998-2010 1998-2010    
Financial Assurance Co Ltd 740 2004-2010 7 2004-2010   2004-2010 2004 
and2007-
2010 
  2005-2006 
First National Assurance Ltd 1 1985-1998 14 1989-1998 1985-1988 1985-1998   1985-1998   
Fleming Life Ltd 73 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000   1985-2000   
Forester Life Ltd 435 1995-2010 16  1995-2010 1995-2010  1995-2010    
Friends Life Assurance Society Ltd 11885 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Friends Life Co Ltd 17200 1997-2010 14 1997-2010   1997-2010 1997-2010    
Friends Provident (London and Manchester)  
Assurance Ltd 
2381 1985-1999 15 1985-1998 1999-1999 1985-1999  1985-1999    
Friends Provident Life and Pensions Ltd 22202 2001-2010 10 2009-2010 2001-2008 2001-2010  2001-2010    
Friends Provident Life Assurance Ltd 2646 1985-2010 26 2009-2010 1985-2008 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Friends Provident Life Office 14704 1985-2000 16  1985-2000 1985-2000  1985-2000    
Friends Provident Linked Life Assurance Ltd 578 1985-1998 14  1985-1998 1985-1998  1985-1998    
Friends Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd 1189 1985-1998 14  1985-1998 1985-1998  1985-1998    
Friends Provident Pensions Ltd 4987 1985-2010 26 1985-1999 
and 2009-
2010 
1999-2008 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Friends Provident Reinsurance Services Ltd 313 2004-2009 6 2008-2009 2004-2007 2004-2009  2004-2009    
GE Frankona Reassurance Ltd 1009 1991-2005 15 1991-2005  1991-2005  1991-2005    
GE Keynes Holdings Ltd 1093 1985-2003 19 1985-2003   1985-2003 1985-1991   1992-2003 
General Accident Pensions Management 192 1985-1996 12  1985-1996 1985-1996  1985-1996    
General Reinsurance Life UK Ltd 125 1995-2007 13 1995-2007   1995-2007 1995-1998  1999-2007  
General Reinsurance UK Ltd 20 1994-1995 2 1994-1995   1994-1995 1994-1995    
Gisborne Life Assurance Co Ltd 750 1985-1999 15 1985-1999  1985-1999   1985-1999   
GL and P plc 1417 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997    
Global General and Reinsurance Co Ltd 14 1985-2004 20 1985-2004   1985-2004 1985-2004    
Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd 578 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
Gresham Unit Assurance Ltd 170 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
Growth and Secured Life Assurance Society Ltd 3 1985-1999 15  1985-1999 1985-1999  1985-1999    
Guardian Assurance plc 7595 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-1997 1998-2010 1985-2010    
Guardian Eastern Insurance Co Ltd 1 1985-1999 15 1985-1999  1985-1999  1985-1999    
Guardian Linked Life Assurance Ltd 1234 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-1998 1999-2010 1985-2010    
Guardian Pensions Management Ltd 646 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-1998 1999-2010 1985-2010    
Halifax Life Ltd 5761 1995-2010 16 1995-2010  1995-2010   1995-2010   
Hamilton Life Assurance Co Ltd 143 1985-2008 24 1985-2008  1985-2008  2008-2008 1985-2007   
Hannover Life Reassurance (UK) Ltd 170 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Hannover Standard Life 19 2000-2003 4  2000-2003 2000-2003  2000-2003    
Health Shield Friendly Society Ltd 45 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Hearts of Oak Insurance Co Ltd 405 1996-2006 11  1996-2006 1996-2006  1996-2006    
Hermes Assured Ltd 8489 1997-2006 10 2000-2006 1997-1999 2000-2006 1997-1999 1997-2006    
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (from1995) 1576 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997   1985-1997   
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (pre 1995) 1598 1985-1994 10 1985-1994  1985-1994   1985-1994   
Hiscox Insurance Co Ltd 30 1985-1999 15 1985-1999   1985-1999 1985-1999    
Hodge Life Assurance Co Ltd 99 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Homeowners Friendly Society Ltd 699 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
HSBC Life (UK) Ltd 3024 1988-2010 23 1988-2010  1988-2010   1988-2010   
Ideal Benefit Society (The) 64 1996-2003 8  1996-2003 1996-2003  1996-2003    
Imperial Life (UK) Ltd 58 1985-1988 4 1985-1988   1985-1988 1985-1988    
Independent Order of Foresters 259 1985-1994 10  1985-1994 1985-1994  1985-1994    
Independent Order of Odd Fellows 
 Manchester Unity Friendly Society 
214 1996-2003 8  1996-2003 1996-2003  1996-2003    
IntegraLife UK Ltd 553 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Invesco Life Ltd 2 2000-2000 1 2000-2000   2000-2000 2000-2000    
Invesco Perpetual Life Ltd 457 1999-2010 12 1999-2010   1999-2010 1999-2010    
Investment Solutions Ltd 151 1997-2010 14 2001-2010 1997-2000 2001-2003 1997-2000 
and2004-2010 
1997-2010    
Irish Life Assurance plc 502 1985-1993 9 1985-1993   1985-1993 1985-1993    
Irish Progressive Life Assurance Co Ltd 663 1986-1998 13 1986-1998  1986-1992 1993-1998 1986-1998    
JPMorgan Life Ltd 2473 1997-2010 14 1997-2010   1997-2010  1997-2010   
Just Retirement Ltd 1307 2005-2010 6 2005-2010  2005-2010    2005-2010  
Kensington Friendly Collecting Society Ltd 7 1997-2010 14  1997-2010 1997-2010  1997-2010    
Kingston Unity Friendly Society 19 2000-2003 4  2000-2003 2000-2003  2000-2003    
Lancashire and Yorkshire Assurance Society 130 1988-1994 7  1988-1994 1988-1994  1988-1994    
LAS Investment Assurance Ltd 286 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993   1985-1993   
LAS Pensions Management Ltd 174 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993   1985-1993   
Leeds Life Assurance Ltd 37 1994-1994 1 1994-1994  1994-1994   1994-1994   
Legal and General (Unit Assurance) Ltd 1528 1985-1990 6 1985-1990  1985-1990  1985-1990    
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Legal and General (Unit Pensions) Ltd 561 1985-1990 6 1985-1990  1985-1990  1985-1990    
Legal and General Assurance  
(Pensions Management) Ltd 
70125 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 36425 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Liberty Life Assurance Co Ltd 548 1985-1994 10 1985-1994   1985-1994 1985-1994    
Liberty Re Ltd 66 1997-2000 4  1997-2000  1997-2000 1997-2000    
Life Insurance Corporation of India 60 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Lincoln Assurance Ltd (pre 1996) 981 1985-1996 12 1985-1996   1985-1996 1985-1996    
Lindsey House Friendly Society 11 2001-2003 3  2001-2003 2001-2003  2001-2003    
Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society Ltd 4885 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Liverpool Victoria Life Co Ltd 866 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Lloyds Bowmaker Assurance Ltd 11 1985-1994 10 1985-1994  1985-1994   1985-1994   
London and Edinburgh Life Assurance Co Ltd 96 1987-1999 13 1987-1999  1987-1999  1987-1999    
London Aberdeen and Northern Mutual  
Assurance Society Ltd 
57 1985-2006 22  1985-2006 1985-2006  1985-2006    
London General Life Co Ltd 48 1991-2010 20 1991-2010   1991-2010 1991-2006  2007-2010  
London Life Association Ltd 2479 1985-1988 4  1985-1988 1985-1988  1985-1988    
London Life Linked Assurances Ltd 292 1985-2005 21 1998-2005 1985-1997 2004-2005 1985-2003 1985-2003  2004-2005  
London Life Ltd 2033 1985-2010 26 1998-2010 1985-1997 2004-2010 1985-2003 1985-2003 
and2005-
2010 
 2004  
Lucida plc 894 2008-2010 3 2008-2010   2008-2010   2008-2010  
M and G Life Assurance Co Ltd 1597 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000    1985-2000  
M and G Pensions and Annuity Co Ltd 1713 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000    1985-2000  
Managed Pension Funds Ltd 25150 2003-2010 8 2003-2010   2003-2010   2003-2010  
Manchester Unity Life Insurance Collecting Society 23 1988-1998 11  1988-1998 1988-1998  1988-1998    
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co Ltd 738 1985-1994 10  1985-1994  1985-1994 1985-1994    
Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance Society 1432 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Markel International Insurance Co Ltd 1 1985 
and1988-
2007 
21 1985 
and 1988-
2007 
  1985 
 1988-2007 
1985 
and1988-
2007 
   
Marks and Spencer Life Assurance Ltd 202 1995-2010 16 1995-2010  1995-2010   2006-2010  1995-2005 
Medical Sickness Annuity and Life 
 Assurance Society Ltd 
658 1985-1996 12  1985-1996 1985-1996  1985-1996    
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Ltd (The) 2424 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1996 1997-1997 1985-1997    
Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd 1298 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2003  2004-2010  
MetLife Assurance Ltd 736 2007-2010 4 2007-2010   2007-2010 2007-2010    
MetLife Ltd 25 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Metropolitan Police Friendly Society Ltd 86 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Monarch Assurance plc 125 1996-2010 15 1996-2010  1996-2010  1996-2010    
Munich Reinsurance Co United Kingdom Life Branch 459 1985-2003 19 1985-2003   1985-2003 1985-2003    
National Deposit Friendly Society Ltd 174 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
National Employers' Life Assurance Co Ltd 375 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 4543 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
National Financial Management Corporation plc 520 1985-1990 6 1985-1990  1985-1990   1985-1990   
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd 831 1985-1987 3  1985-1987 1985-1987  1985-1987    
National Mutual Life Assurance Society 3011 1985-2002 18  1985-2002 1985-2002  1985-2002    
National Mutual Pensions Ltd 143 1985-1995 11  1985-1995 1985-1995  1985-1995    
National Provident Institution 9623 1985-1999 15  1985-1999 1985-1999  1985-1999    
National Provident Life Ltd 7893 2000-2010 11 2000-2010  2004-2010 2000-2003 2000-2003 
and2005-
2010 
 2004  
National Westminster Life Assurance Ltd 4873 1993-2010 18 1993-2010  1993-2010   1993-2010   
Nationwide Life Ltd 1434 1995-2010 16 2008-2010 1995-2007 1995-2010  2008-2010 1995-2007   
NEL Britannia Assurance Co Ltd 122 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
NEL Pensions Ltd 576 1985-1991 7 1985-1991  1985-1991  1985-1991    
NM Life Ltd 817 1985-2006 22 1985-2006  1985-1999 2000-2006 1985-1999   2000-2006 
NM Pensions Ltd 6066 2002-2006 5 2002-2006   2002-2006    2002-2006 
Northern Assurance Co Ltd 1608 1985-1998 14 1998-1998 1985-1997 1985-1998  1985-1998    
Norwich Union Asset Management Ltd 970 1985-1992 8  1985-1992 1985-1992  1985-1992    
Norwich Union Life (RBS) Ltd 2706 1985-2000 16 1998-2000 1985-1997 1985-2000  1985-2000    
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society  30668 1985-1996 12  1985-1996 1985-1996  1985-1996    
Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Ltd 8907 1985-2004 20 1998-2004 1985-1997 1985-2004  1985-2004    
Nottingham Oddfellows Assurance  
Friendly Society Ltd 
13 1996-2008 13  1996-2008 1996-2008  1996-2008    
NPI Annuities Ltd 588 1985-1998 14  1985-1998 1985-1998  1985-1998    
NPI Ltd 4451 2000-2010 11 2000-2010  2004-2010 2000-2003 2000-2003 
and2005-
2010 
 2004  
NRG London Reinsurance Co Ltd 32 1985-1998 14 1985-1998  1985-1998  1985-1998    
NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd 473 1985-1993 9 1985-1993  1985-1993  1985-1993    
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Ltd 972 1985-1993 
and1995-
1999 
14  1985-1993 
and 1995-
1999 
1985-1993 
and1994-1999 
 1985-1993 
and1995-
1999 
   
Omnilife Insurance Co Ltd 7 1993-2010 18 1993-2010   1993-2010 1993-2010    
Original Holloway Friendly Society Ltd (The) 43 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
PA (GI) Ltd 2125 1985-2004 20 1996-2004 1985-1995 1985-2004  1985-2004    
Pacific Life Re Ltd 179 1985-2010 26 2002-2007 1985-2001 
and2008-2010 
2002-2007 1985-2001 
and2008-2010 
1985-2010    
Partnership Life Assurance Co Ltd 497 2005-2010 6 2005-2010  2005-2010    2005-2010  
Paternoster UK Ltd 2178 2006-2010 5 2006-2010  2006-2010  2006-2010    
Pearl Assurance (Unit Funds) Ltd 853 1985-2005 21 1998-2005 1985-1997 2004-2005 1985-2003 1985-2003  2004-2005  
Pearl Assurance (Unit Linked Pensions) Ltd 288 1985-2005 21 1998-2005 1985-1997 2004-2005 1985-2003 1985-2003  2004-2005  
Pearl Assurance Ltd 16007 1985-2010 26 1998-2010 1985-1997 2004-2010 1985-2003 1985-2003 
and2006-
2010 
 2004-2005  
Pegasus Assurance Ltd 11 1989-1998 10 1989-1998  1989-1998  1989-1995 1996-1998   
Pension Annuity Friendly Society Ltd (The) 190 1995-2005 11  1995-2005 1995-2005  1995-2005    
Pension Insurance Corporation Ltd 3097 2008-2010 3 2008-2010  2008-2010  2008-2010    
Pensions Management (SWF) Ltd 4675 1985-2010 26 2000-2010 1985-1999 1985-2010  1985-1999 2000-2010   
PFM Assurance Ltd 17 1985-1994 10  1985-1994 1985-1994  1985-1994    
Pharmaceutical and General Provident Society Ltd 33 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Phoenix and London Assurance Ltd 8713 1985-2010 26 1996-2010 1985-1995 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Phoenix Life and Pensions Ltd 10386 1985-2005 21 1985-2005  1985-2005  1985-2005    
Phoenix Life Assurance Ltd 2381 1993-2007 15 1993-2007  1993-2007   1993-2007   
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Phoenix Life Ltd 7971 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Phoenix Pensions Ltd 2368 2000-2005 
and2007-
2010 
10 2000-2005  
and 2007-
2010 
 2000-2005 
and2007-2010 
 2000-2005 
and2006-
2010 
   
Pinnacle Insurance plc 297 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010  1985-2010   
Pioneer Friendly Society Ltd 18 1996-2007 12  1996-2007 1996-2007  1996-2007    
POIS Assurance Ltd 199 1988-2001 14  1988-2001 1988-2001  1988-2001    
Police Mutual Assurance Society Ltd 1118 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
PPP Lifetime Care plc 185 1992-2006 15 1992-2006  1992-1999 2000-2006 1992-2006    
Premium Life Assurance Co Ltd 103 1985-1996 12 1985-1996  1985-1996  1985-1996    
Professional Life Assurance Co Ltd 113 1985-1999 15 1985-1999   1985-1999 1985-1999    
Property Growth Assurance Co Ltd 199 1985-1988 4  1985-1988 1985-1988  1985-1988    
Prosperity Life Assurance Ltd 214 1985-1993 9 1985-1993  1985-1993  1985-1993    
Proteus Insurance Co Ltd 0.02 1985-1998 14 1985-1998  1985-1998  1985-1998    
Provident Mutual Life Assurance Ltd 5676 1985-1995 11  1985-1995 1985-1995  1985-1995    
Prudential (AN) Ltd 412 1985-2009 25 1985-2009  1985-2009  1985-2009    
Prudential Annuities Ltd 12120 1992-2010 19 1992-2010  1992-2010  1992-2010    
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The) 76213 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Prudential Holborn Life Ltd 1174 1985-2009 25 1985-2009  1985-2009  1985-2009    
Prudential Pensions Ltd 4607 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Prudential Retirement Income Ltd 5770 1985-1998 
and2000-
2010 
25 2000-2010 1985-1998 1985-1998 
and2000-2010 
 1985-1998 
and2000-
2010 
   
Railway Enginemens Assurance Society Ltd 22 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Rational Shelley Friendly Society Ltd 23 1998-2004 7  1998-2004 1998-2004  1998-2004    
Reassure UK Life Assurance Co Ltd 543 1985-2004 20 1985-2004   1985-2004 1985-2004    
Rechabite Friendly Society Ltd 21 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Red Rose Friendly Society Ltd 9 1999-2010 12  1999-2010 1999-2010  1999-2010    
Refuge Assurance Ltd 4029 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000  1985-2000    
Refuge Investments Ltd 489 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000  1985-2000    
Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 595 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
RGA Reinsurance UK Ltd 44 2000-2010 11 2000-2010   2000-2010 2000-2010    
RM Life Assurance Ltd 430 1987-2006 20 1987-2006   1987-2006  1987-2006   
Rothesay Life Ltd 823 2008-2010 3 2008-2010   2008-2010  2008-2010   
Royal and Sun Alliance Life Holdings 779 1985-1988 4 1985-1988  1985-1988  1985-1988    
Royal Artillery Widows Insurance Society 5 1997-2010 14  1997-2010 1997-2010  1997-2010    
Royal Life (Unit Linked Assurance) 526 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997    
Royal Life (Unit Linked Pension Fund) 745 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997    
Royal Liver Assurance Ltd 2706 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd (The) 13496 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Royal London Pooled Pensions Co Ltd 582 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses 1339 1985-2000 16  1985-2000 1985-2000  1985-2000    
Royal Scottish Assurance plc 1462 1991-2010 20 1991-2010  1991-2010   1991-2010   
Save and Prosper Insurance Ltd 830 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010   1985-2010   
Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd 1353 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2002 2003-2010  1985-2010   
Schoolteachers Friendly Society 19 1996-2003 8  1996-2003 1996-2003  1996-2003    
Schroder Pension Management Ltd 4141 2006-2010 5 2006-2010  2006-2010  2006-2010    
SCOR Global Life Reinsurance UK Ltd 49 1995-2008 14 1995-2003 
and2006-2008 
2004-2005 2004-2005 1995-2003 
and2006-2008 
1995-2008    
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society 11056 1985-1996 12 1985-1996  1985-1996  1985-1996    
Scottish Amicable Life plc 5624 1997-2001 5 1997-2001  1997-2001  1997-2001    
Scottish Equitable (Managed Funds) Ltd 6085 1985-2009 25 1985-2009   1985-2009 1985-2009    
Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society 4857 1985-1992 8 1985-1992   1985-1992 1985-1992    
Scottish Equitable plc 21942 1993-2010 18 1993-2010   1993-2010 1993-2010    
Scottish Friendly Assurance Society Ltd 388 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Scottish Legal Life Assurance Society Ltd 231 1988-2006 19  1988-2006 1988-2006  1988-2006    
Scottish Life Assurance Co 5865 1985-2000 16  1985-2000 1985-2000  1985-2000    
Scottish Life Investment Assurance Co Ltd 184 1985-1990 6  1985-1990 1985-1990  1985-1990    
Scottish Mutual Assurance Ltd 9061 1985-2008 24 1993-2008 1985-1992 1985-2004 
and2007-2008 
2005-2006 1985-1992 
and2007-
2008 
1993-2006   
Scottish Mutual Pension Funds Investment Ltd 154 1985-1994 10 1989-1994 1985-1988 1985-1994   1985-1994   
Scottish Mutual Pensions Ltd 154 1985-1988 
and1990-
1996 
and1999-
2005 
18 1999-2005 1985-1988 
and1990-1996 
1985-1988 
and 1990-
1996 
and1999-2004 
2005  1985-1988 
and1990-
1996 
and1999-
2005 
  
Scottish Provident Assurance Ltd 1192 1985-1994 10  1985-1994 1985-1994  1985-1994    
Scottish Provident Institution 6888 1985-2001 17  1985-2001 1985-2001  1985-2001    
Scottish Provident Ltd 8191 2001-2008 8 2001-2008  2001-2004 
and2007-2008 
2005-2006 2007-2008 2001-2006   
Scottish Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd 229 1985-1994 10  1985-1994 1985-1994  1985-1994    
Scottish Widows Administration Services Ltd 5544 1985-2003 19 1985-2003  1985-2003   1985-2003   
Scottish Widows Annuities Ltd 5261 2000-2010 11 2000-2010  2000-2010   2000-2010   
Scottish Widows' Fund and Life Assurance Society 15033 1985-2002 18 2000-2002 1985-1999 1985-2002  1985-1999 2000-2002   
Scottish Widows plc 27134 2000-2010 11 2000-2010  2000-2010   2000-2010   
Scottish Widows Unit Funds Ltd 7896 1985-2010 26 2000-2010 1985-1999 1985-2010  1985-1999 2000-2010   
Security Assurance Ltd 3 1986-1997 12  1986-1997 1986-1997  1986-1997    
Shepherds Friendly Society Ltd (The) 63 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Skandia Life Assurance Co Ltd 7520 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  2006-2010 1985-2005 1985-2010    
Skandia MultiFUNDS Assurance Ltd 1220 2002-2010 9 2002-2010  2002-2010  2002-2010    
SL Liverpool plc 1088 1985-1989 
and1991-
2004 
19 1997-2004 1985-1989 
and1991-1996 
 1985-1989 
and1991-2004 
1985-1989 
and1991-
2004 
   
SLFC Assurance (UK) Ltd 4289 1987-2010 24 1987-2010   1987-2010 1987-2010    
St Andrews Life Assurance plc 4477 1996-2010 15 1996-2010  1996-2010   1996-2010   
St George Assurance 70 1985-1993 9  1985-1993 1985-1993  1985-1993    
St James Place UK plc 6219 1992-2010 19 1992-2010  1992-2010  1997-2001 1992-1996 
and2002-
2010 
  
Standard Life Assurance Co 2006 (The) 54776 1985-2005 21  1985-2005 1985-2005  1985-2005    
Standard Life Assurance Ltd 51221 2006-2010 5 2006-2010  2006-2010  2006-2010    
Standard Life Investment Funds Ltd 16289 1985-2010 26 2006-2010 1985-2005 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Standard Life Pension Funds Ltd 88 1985-1986 23 2006-2010 1985-1986 
and1990-2005 
1985-1986 
and1990-2010 
 1985-1986    
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and1990-
2010 
and1990-
2010 
State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan 4 1985-2001 17 1985-2001   1985-2001 1985-2001    
Sterling Life Ltd 23 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Strand Friendly Society 41 1988-2002 15  1988-2002 1988-2002  1988-2002    
Suffolk Life Annuities Ltd 757 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Sun Alliance Linked Life Insurance Ltd 667 1985-1997 13 1996-1997 1985-1995 1985-1997  1985-1997    
Sun Alliance Pensions Ltd 1330 1985-1997 13 1996-1997 1985-1995 1985-1997  1985-1997    
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada 3291 1985-1999 15 1998-1999 1985-1997  1985-1999 1985-1999    
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada - Irish Business 122 1986-1999 14 1998-1999 1986-1997  1986-1999 1986-1999    
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd 4718 1985-2010 26 1998-2010 1985-1997  1985-2010 1985-2010    
Sun Life Pensions Management Ltd 7838 1985-2006 22 1985-2006   1985-2006 1985-2006    
Sun Life Unit Assurance Ltd 7280 1985-2006 22 1985-2006   1985-2006 1985-2006    
Swiss Life (UK) Group plc 204 1985-1991 7  1985-1991  1985-1991 1985-1991    
Swiss Life Insurance and Pension Co 251 1985-1989 5  1985-1989  1985-1989 1985-1989    
Swiss Re Life and Health Ltd 3387 1998-2007 10 1998-2007   1998-2007 1998-2007    
Swiss Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd 352 1985-1997 13 1985-1997   1985-1997 1985-1997    
Teachers Assurance Co Ltd 469 1985-1998 14  1985-1998 1985-1998  1985-1998    
Teachers Provident Society Ltd 528 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Threadneedle Pensions Ltd 1388 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-1998 1999-2010 1985-2010    
TPFL Ltd 12 1998-2004 7 2001-2004 1998-2000 1998-2004  1998-2001   2002-2004 
Transatlantic Life Assurance Co Ltd 3 1985-2010 26 1985-2010  1985-2010  1985-2010    
Transport Friendly Society Ltd 47 1991-2010 20  1991-2010 1991-2010  1991-2010    
TSB Life Ltd 3197 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997   1985-1997   
TSB Pensions Ltd 1277 1985-1997 13 1985-1997  1985-1997   1985-1997   
Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society Ltd 568 1988-2010 23  1988-2010 1988-2010  1988-2010    
Tunstall Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 18 1997-2002 6  1997-2002 1997-2002  1997-2002    
UBS Global Asset Management Life Ltd 8681 1998-2010 13 1998-2010   1998-2010  1998-2010   
UIA (Insurance) Ltd 54 1985-2004 20  1985-2004 1985-2004  1985-2004    
UK Life Assurance Co Ltd 54 1985-1989 5 1985-1989  1985-1989  1985-1989    
UK Provident Pensions Ltd 53 1985-1989 5  1985-1989 1985-1989  1985-1989    
United Friendly Insurance plc 3540 1985-2000 16 1985-2000  1985-2000  1985-2000    
United Friendly Life Assurance Ltd 181 1986-2000 15 1986-2000  1986-2000  1986-2000    
United Kingdom Civil Service Benefit Society Ltd 221 1988-2002 15  1988-2002 1988-2002  1988-2002    
United Kingdom Temperance and General  
Provident Institution 
3629 1985-1987 3  1985-1987 1985-1987  1985-1987    
University Life Assurance Society 185 1985-2006 22  1985-2006 1985-2006  1985-2006    
UNUM Ltd 899 1985-2010 26 1985-2010   1985-2010 1985-2010    
Wesleyan Assurance Society 2840 1985-2010 26  1985-2010 1985-2010  1985-2010    
Wessex Life Assurance Co Ltd 2 1985-1997 13 1985-1997   1985-1997 1985-1997    
Wiltshire Friendly Society Ltd 18 1996-2010 15  1996-2010 1996-2010  1996-2010    
Windsor Life Assurance Co Ltd 5751 1985-2010 26 1995-2010 1985-1994 1995-2004 1985-1994 
and2005-2010 
1985-2010    
Winterthur Life UK Ltd 5344 1997-2010 14 1997-2010   1997-2010 1997-2000 
and2007-
2010 
 2001-2006  
WLUK Ltd 1267 1985-2000 16 1985-2000   1985-2000 1985-1996  1997-2000  
XL RE Ltd 2680 1999-2010 12 1999-2010   1999-2010   1999-2010  
XSMA Ltd 16 1996-2004 9 1996-2004  1996-2004     1996-2004 
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd 1 1985-2004 20 1998-2004 1985-1997 1985-2004  1985-2004    
Zurich Assurance (2004) plc 576 1998-2004 7 1998-2004   1998-2004 1998-2004    
Zurich Assurance Ltd 21516 1991-2010 20 1991-2010  1991-2004 2005-2010 1991-2010    
Source: the author. 
Where: 
Average size: it is based on (F13, L89, LTIB). 
The classification is based on the parent status. 
Legal and General Pensions Ltd is included in the Synthesys life but there no data provided. 
Barclays Life Assurance Co Ltd terminated its operations in 1989 and did not provide returns in 1990. 
Markel International Insurance Co Ltd terminated its operations in 1986 and did not provide returns in 1987. 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Ltd did not provide returns in 1994. 
Phoenix Pensions Ltd terminated its operations in 2006. 
Prudential Retirement Income Ltd terminated its operations in 1999. 
Prudential Retirement Income Ltd terminated its operations in 1999. 
Scottish Mutual Pensions Ltd terminated its operations in 1989 and 1997 and did not provide returns in 1998. 
SL Liverpool plc did not provide returns in 1990. 
Standard Life Pension Funds Ltd terminated its operations in 1987 and did not provide returns in 1988 and 1989. 
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Table 32: Flow of Funds, Assets and Liabilities in the UK Life Insurance Business over the Period 1985-2010 
Year 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
 
1. Number of Firms and Ownership  
1.1 Total 
Total Number of Firms (see Table 31) 143 148 155 157 164 176 192 203 211 215 228 233 243 250 251 232 232 242 240 246 244 248 252 234 233 229 
1.2 Legal Form 
Mutual % Total (see Table 31) 30% 29% 31% 31% 32% 34% 32% 33% 35% 36% 36% 39% 40% 46% 47% 46% 46% 47% 48% 47% 47% 46% 48% 45% 47% 46% 
Proprietary % Total (see Table 31) 70% 71% 69% 69% 68% 66% 68% 67% 65% 64% 64% 61% 60% 54% 53% 54% 54% 53% 52% 53% 53% 54% 52% 55% 53% 54% 
1.3 Banks and Insurers Ownership 
Bank Parents % Total (see Table 31) 17% 16% 16% 17% 18% 18% 16% 16% 17% 16% 15% 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 15% 14% 13% 13% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
Insurers Parents % Total (see Table 31) 76% 76% 76% 75% 72% 70% 72% 76% 75% 78% 79% 81% 82% 82% 80% 83% 83% 82% 84% 85% 85% 86% 86% 85% 86% 86% 
Other Parents % Total (see Table 31) 8% 8% 8% 8% 10% 12% 11% 7% 8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 6% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
1.4 The UK and International Ownership  
The UK Parents % Total (see Table 31) 68% 68% 70% 71% 69% 69% 71% 68% 70% 70% 70% 70% 74% 75% 75% 72% 73% 73% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 72% 73% 72% 
International Parents % Total (see Table 31) 32% 32% 30% 29% 31% 31% 29% 32% 30% 30% 30% 30% 26% 25% 25% 28% 27% 27% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 28% 27% 28% 
 
2. Size 
Admissible Assets (£m) (F13; L89; LTIB) 9640 8898 8019 9509 8907 8149 6443 5723 5039 5493 5576 5267 4314 3635 3124 3130 2755 2762 2235 1925 1756 1988 1668 1657 1598 1378 
Gross Premiums (£m) (F41; L19; C4) 1122 1170 1309 1866 1524 1077 882 807 767 769 799 650 520 403 347 340 368 408 352 307 283 267 207 230 209 179 
 
3. Assets and Liabilities 
3.1 Assets 
Land and Buildings (F13; L11; LTIB) 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 6% 7% 9% 12% 13% 14% 12% 11% 12% 
Cash (F13; L54 + L55 + L57 + L81 + L82; LTIB) 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Bonds (F13; L45 + L46 + L47 + L48; LTIB) 20% 21% 21% 18% 19% 23% 28% 29% 30% 23% 20% 19% 22% 21% 21% 22% 22% 24% 23% 20% 19% 18% 21% 22% 22% 25% 
Equities and Other Shares and Affiliates (F13; L21 + L22 + L23 + L24 + L25 + L26 + L27 + L28 + L29 + L30 + L41 + L42 + L43; LTIB) 12% 12% 13% 16% 17% 18% 16% 18% 20% 27% 31% 34% 33% 36% 36% 36% 35% 36% 35% 35% 33% 36% 33% 32% 35% 33% 
Assets Held to Cover Linked Liabilities (F13; L58 + L59; LTIB) 61% 60% 57% 59% 55% 52% 47% 44% 39% 40% 40% 39% 35% 32% 32% 31% 30% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 25% 25% 25% 23% 
Mortgages and Loans and Debtors (F13; L50 + L51 + L52 + L53; LTIB) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Other Assets (F13; L44 + L49 + L56 + L60 + L61 + L62 + L63 + L80 + L83; LTIB) 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.05% 
Total Assets (£m) (F13; L89; LTIB) 1378547 1316858 1242998 1492914 1460741 1434243 1236981 1161848 1063148 1180891 1271278 1227118 1048226 908695 784059 726238 639176 668445 536417 473481 428405 492991 420343 387686 372360 315641 
3.2 Assets, Ownership and Legal Form  
3.2.1 Legal Form 
Proprietary % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 94% 94% 91% 91% 90% 82% 82% 80% 80% 79% 78% 66% 64% 55% 52% 48% 48% 48% 45% 45% 46% 46% 47% 48% 48% 48% 
Mutual % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 6% 6% 9% 9% 10% 18% 18% 20% 20% 21% 22% 34% 36% 45% 48% 52% 52% 52% 55% 55% 54% 54% 53% 52% 52% 52% 
3.2.2 Banks and Insurers Ownership 
Bank Parents % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 18% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 23% 22% 21% 16% 14% 13% 12% 10% 10% 9% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Insurers Parents % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 78% 78% 77% 76% 73% 72% 71% 74% 75% 76% 78% 83% 85% 86% 87% 89% 90% 89% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 
Other Parents* % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 6% 6% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.5% 
3.2.3 The UK and International Ownership  
The UK Parents % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 74% 80% 80% 79% 78% 76% 80% 77% 78% 79% 79% 80% 82% 83% 84% 83% 83% 84% 83% 84% 84% 84% 85% 85% 85% 85% 
International Parents % Total Assets (F13; L89; LTIB) 26% 20% 20% 21% 22% 24% 20% 23% 22% 21% 21% 20% 18% 17% 16% 17% 17% 16% 17% 16% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
3.3 Liabilities  
Mathematical Reserves (F14; L11) 90% 90% 90% 89% 89% 90% 91% 92% 93% 91% 88% 84% 85% 83% 83% 83% 85% 81% 83% 83% 82% 74% 75% 75% 72% 74% 
Other Insurance and Non-Insurance Liabilities (F14; L12 + L49) 5% 5% 6% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Margin (F14; L13 + L51) 5% 5% 4% 7% 8% 7% 6% 5% 3% 6% 9% 13% 11% 13% 13% 13% 11% 16% 13% 13% 14% 22% 20% 20% 23% 21% 
3.4 Shareholders’ Capital 
Capital Resources Allocated Towards Long-Term (F2; L12) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1.7% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
3.5 Capital Requirements (Minimum Capital Requirements) 
Capital Requirements (F2; L40) 4% 4% 3% 5% 6% 6% 5% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
3.5.1 Legal Form 
Proprietary % Proprietary Total Assets (F2; L40) 4% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Mutual % Mutual Total Assets (F2; L40) 8% 8% 6% 9% 9% 6% 5% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
3.6 Free Assets 
Free Assets % Total Assets (F14; L13 + L51) + (F2; L12) – (F2; L40) 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 4% 6% 10% 8% 10% 10% 11% 9% 14% 11% 10% 11% 19% 18% 17% 20% 18% 
3.6.1 Legal Form 
Proprietary % Proprietary Total Assets (F14; L13 + L51) + (F2; L12) – (F2; L40) 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 6% 8% 7% 8% 9% 10% 8% 12% 10% 9% 10% 17% 16% 16% 18% 16% 
Mutual % Mutual Total Assets (F14; L13 + L51) + (F2; L12) – (F2; L40) 6% 6% 4% 6% 6% 4% 3% 3% 2% 5% 8% 12% 9% 12% 12% 12% 10% 15% 12% 11% 12% 21% 19% 19% 22% 20% 
 
4. Investment  Performance 
4.1 Total Assets 
Investment Income % Total Assets (F40; L12)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 
Valuation Gain and Loss % Total Assets (F40; L13+L14)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 6% 7% -14% 1% 3% 8% 4% 5% -10% -6% 1% 6% 8% 7% 3% 5% -3% 9% 4% 5% -4% 6% 3% 2% 5% 3% 
4.2 Linked Assets 
Investment Income % Linked Assets (F45; L12) / (F13; L58+L59; LTIB) 3% 3% 4% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Valuation Gain and Loss % linked Assets (F45; L13) or (F40; L14) / (F13; L58+L59; LTIB) 8% 11% -23% 2% 6% 12% 6% 10% -19% -13% -4% 13% 8% 9% 5% 10% -7% 17% 8% 8% -17% 15% 5% 1% 13% 7% 
4.3 Non-linked Assets 
Investment Income % Non-Linked Assets ((F40; L12) - (F45; L12))/ (F13; L89-( L58+L59); LTIB) 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 
Valuation Gain and Loss % Non-linked Assets (F40; L13) / (F13; L89-( L58+L59); LTIB) 3% 1% -2% 0.1% -1% 4% 1% 1% -4% -1% 4% 2% 8% 7% 3% 3% -1% 6% 3% 3% 0.1% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
 
5. Cash Flow 
Premiums Less Claims (£m) (F41; L19, C4)- (F42; L16, C4) -25415 -20214 -21796 64699 56174 4423 30025 20669 30460 30885 61216 56232 40788 24186 21391 20588 29271 42319 34308 30833 27098 27103 16771 18668 16186 14116 
Premiums Less Claims % Total Assets((F41; L19, C4)- (F42; L16, C4))/ (F13; L89; LTIB) -2% -2% -2% 4% 4% 0.3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
 
6. Gross Premiums 
6.1 Segments 
Life (F41; L19, C1) 15% 15% 22% 22% 24% 31% 35% 34% 40% 43% 38% 43% 44% 47% 52% 52% 57% 49% 50% 50% 49% 50% 58% 64% 64% 60% 
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Pension (F41; L19, C2) 81% 82% 75% 76% 74% 67% 65% 66% 60% 57% 62% 57% 56% 53% 48% 48% 43% 51% 50% 50% 51% 50% 42% 36% 36% 40% 
Overseas (F41; L19, C3) 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2%                     
6.2 Regular and Single Premiums  
Regular Premiums (F41; L11, C4) 22% 21% 20% 14% 15% 21% 25% 27% 27% 26% 25% 28% 33% 40% 46% 52% 48% 41% 47% 50% 56% 56% 62% 51% 55% 61% 
Single Premiums (F41; L12, C4) 78% 79% 80% 86% 85% 79% 75% 73% 73% 74% 75% 72% 67% 60% 54% 48% 52% 59% 53% 50% 44% 44% 38% 49% 45% 39% 
6.3 Total 
Total (£m) (F41; L19, C4) 160475 173131 202852 292938 249862 189536 169347 163870 161830 165394 182079 151500 126448 100719 87156 78922 85373 98808 84425 75554 69025 66256 52165 53882 48813 41035 
Total % Total Assets (F41; L19, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 12% 13% 16% 20% 17% 13% 14% 14% 15% 14% 14% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 13% 15% 16% 16% 16% 13% 12% 14% 13% 13% 
6.4 New Premiums vs. Recurring  
Gross New Premiums % Total Premiums (F46; L28, C4)/ (F41; L19, C4) 81% 81% 66% 62% 61% 78% 76% 76% 76% 75% 75% 73% 71% 66% 59% 49% 52% 50% 55% 51% 50% 50% 50% 54% 53% 44% 
Gross Recurring Premiums % Total Premiums ((F41; L19, C4) - (F46; L28, C4)) / (F41; L19, C4) 19% 19% 34% 38% 39% 22% 24% 24% 24% 25% 25% 27% 29% 34% 41% 51% 48% 50% 45% 49% 50% 50% 50% 46% 47% 56% 
6.5 Legal Form 
Proprietary % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 96% 96% 95% 96% 95% 88% 86% 85% 83% 84% 85% 71% 71% 57% 58% 53% 56% 56% 52% 50% 51% 50% 50% 51% 51% 50% 
Mutual % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 4% 4% 5% 4% 5% 12% 14% 15% 17% 16% 15% 29% 29% 43% 42% 47% 44% 44% 48% 50% 49% 50% 50% 49% 49% 50% 
6.6 Banks and Insurers Ownership 
Bank Parents % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 21% 24% 22% 23% 23% 31% 31% 31% 33% 33% 39% 27% 23% 18% 15% 14% 13% 11% 10% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 10% 9% 
Insurers Parents % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 73% 71% 75% 74% 72% 60% 62% 62% 64% 65% 60% 71% 74% 79% 83% 84% 86% 82% 89% 91% 89% 90% 90% 91% 90% 90% 
Other Parents % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 5% 5% 3% 3% 5% 9% 8% 7% 3% 2% 1% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 7% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
6.7 The UK and International Ownership  
The UK Parents % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 70% 80% 78% 80% 77% 67% 69% 69% 71% 73% 73% 73% 72% 75% 78% 78% 77% 78% 80% 80% 81% 81% 82% 79% 82% 83% 
International Parents % Total Premiums (F41; L19, C4; see Table 31) 30% 20% 22% 20% 23% 33% 31% 31% 29% 27% 27% 27% 28% 25% 22% 22% 23% 22% 20% 20% 19% 19% 18% 21% 18% 17% 
 
7. Gross Claims 
7.1 Segments 
Life (F42; L16, C1) 22% 23% 32% 28% 29% 31% 40% 39% 43% 43% 42% 46% 49% 50% 53% 55% 57% 57% 57% 59% 62% 64% 64% 60% 60% 58% 
Pension (F42; L16, C2) 75% 75% 66% 70% 68% 67% 60% 61% 57% 57% 58% 54% 51% 50% 47% 45% 43% 43% 43% 41% 38% 36% 36% 40% 40% 42% 
Overseas (F42; L16, C3) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%                     
7.2 Claim Categories 
Surrender or Partial Surrender (F42; L13, C4) 73% 73% 71% 74% 74% 74% 64% 62% 56% 58% 56% 50% 46% 48% 45% 44% 46% 45% 48% 47% 48% 51% 52% 56% 55% 53% 
Death or Disability Lump Sums (F42; L11, C4) 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 8% 9% 11% 10% 11% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 12% 11% 11% 12% 
Disability Periodic Payments (F42; L12, C4) 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Annuity Payments (F42; L14, C4) 9% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 9% 9% 8% 9% 10% 11% 11% 12% 13% 13% 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 10% 11% 12% 
Lump Sums On Maturity (F42; L15, C4) 13% 14% 17% 14% 14% 13% 20% 22% 27% 26% 27% 30% 34% 31% 31% 31% 30% 31% 29% 29% 29% 25% 24% 22% 22% 22% 
7.3 Total 
Total (£m) (F42; L16, C4) 185890 193345 224648 228239 193688 185113 139322 143201 131370 134509 120862 95268 85659 76533 65765 58334 56102 56489 50116 44721 41927 39154 35394 35214 32628 26918 
Total % Total Assets (F42; L16, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 13% 15% 18% 15% 13% 13% 11% 12% 12% 11% 10% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 9% 9% 10% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 
 
8. Gross Expense 
8.1 Segments  
Life (F43; L16, C1) 43% 44% 47% 51% 54% 56%                     
Pension (F43; L16, C2) 50% 48% 47% 43% 41% 37%                     
Overseas (F43; L16, C3) 7% 8% 7% 6% 5% 7%                     
8.2 Acquisition vs. Maintenance 
Acquisition (F43; L11+L13, C4) 45% 46% 53% 56% 54% 54% 58% 59% 58% 59% 57% 58% 57% 58% 58% 57% 61% 64% 63% 63% 64% 65% 67% 66% 65% 62% 
Maintenance (F43; L12+L14+L15, C4) 55% 54% 47% 44% 46% 46% 42% 41% 42% 41% 43% 42% 43% 42% 42% 42% 38% 36% 37% 37% 36% 35% 33% 34% 35% 38% 
8.3 Commission vs. Management 
Commission (F43; L11+L12, C4) 33% 32% 39% 42% 41% 42% 43% 42% 39% 40% 34% 33% 31% 32% 32% 29% 33% 34% 33% 32% 32% 32% 34% 35% 35% 32% 
Management (F43; L13+L14+L15, C4) 67% 68% 61% 58% 59% 58% 57% 58% 61% 60% 66% 67% 69% 68% 68% 71% 67% 66% 67% 68% 68% 68% 66% 65% 65% 68% 
8.4 Total 
Total (£m) (F43; L16, C4) 12462 12509 14969 15763 16130 16159 16979 17513 18800 19901 18359 17506 15567 13880 13197 13102 14030 14731 14516 14427 13882 13459 12543 10621 9672 8386 
Total % Total Assets (F43; L16, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 1.5% 1.8% 1.7% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Expense % Total Premiums (F43; L16, C4)/ (F41; L19, C4) 8% 7% 7% 5% 6% 9% 10% 11% 12% 12% 10% 12% 12% 14% 15% 17% 16% 15% 17% 19% 20% 20% 24% 20% 20% 20% 
Life Expense % Life Premiums (F43; L16, C1)/ (F41; L19, C1)  22% 21% 16% 12% 15% 16%                     
Pension Expense % Pension Premiums (F43; L16, C2)/ (F41; L19, C2) 5% 4% 5% 3% 4% 5%                     
 
9. Net Mathematical Reserves  
9.1 Segments 
Life (F50; L48, C1) 19% 21% 22% 23% 24% 25% 27% 28% 31% 32% 32% 33% 34% 37% 38% 39% 39% 39% 41% 42% 43% 45% 47% 48% 49% 49% 
Pension (F50; L48, C2) 78% 77% 75% 75% 74% 73% 71% 68% 66% 65% 66% 65% 63% 61% 59% 58% 57% 57% 55% 54% 52% 50% 47% 47% 45% 45% 
Overseas (F50; L48, C3) 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 
9.2 Business Lines 
With-Profits (F50; L41, C4) 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 12% 14% 15% 18% 19% 19% 20% 24% 25% 27% 43% 44% 42% 45% 45% 46% 43% 45% 44% 43% 45% 
Non-Profit (F50; L42, C4) 12% 11% 12% 11% 11% 13% 14% 14% 15% 13% 13% 13% 15% 15% 15% 18% 18% 19% 20% 20% 21% 20% 21% 21% 22% 23% 
Accumulative With-Profits (F50; L43, C4) 12% 14% 15% 13% 15% 17% 20% 22% 24% 23% 21% 20% 19% 19% 19%            
Property Linked (F50; L44+L45, C4) 66% 65% 61% 64% 61% 56% 50% 46% 41% 43% 45% 44% 40% 38% 37% 40% 38% 38% 35% 34% 33% 37% 34% 35% 35% 32% 
Index Linked (F50; L46+L47, C4) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%            
9.3 Total 
Total (£m) (F50; L48, C4) 1233496 1189229 1119687 1329053 1295398 1286493 1129716 1066858 988627 1062507 1102238 1018346 880802 743817 641576 593088 533148 526793 433610 379164 336099 349864 302334 277677 258528 224297 
Total % of Total Assets (F50; L48, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 89% 90% 90% 89% 89% 90% 91% 92% 93% 90% 87% 83% 84% 82% 82% 82% 83% 79% 81% 80% 78% 71% 72% 72% 69% 71% 
 
10. Reinsurance 
10.1 Premiums 
10.1.1 Intra-Group vs. External 
Intra-Group (F41; L15+L16, C4) 65% 71% 71% 69% 81% 72%                     
External (F41; L13+L14, C4) 35% 29% 29% 31% 19% 28% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10.1.2 Total 
Total (£m) (F41; L20, C4) 32687 38163 51631 62412 65279 44091 47724 31958 31657 32126 23688 22785 20611 15366 8689 9090 14611 14013 10766 6196 6568 4993 3600 4781 3852 3052 
Total % Total Assets (F41; L20, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 2.4% 2.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.5% 3.1% 3.9% 2.8% 3.0% 2.7% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7% 1.1% 1.3% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 
Total % Total Gross Premiums (F41; L20, C4)/ (F41; L19, C4) 20% 22% 25% 21% 26% 23% 28% 20% 20% 19% 13% 15% 16% 15% 10% 12% 17% 14% 13% 8% 10% 8% 7% 9% 8% 7% 
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10.2 Claims 
10.2.1 Intra-Group vs. External 
Intra-Group (F42; L36, C4) 78% 78% 81% 89% 86% 82%                     
External (F42; L26, C4) 22% 22% 19% 11% 14% 18% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10.2.2 Total 
Total (£m) (F42; L26 +L36, C4) 26978 23911 28489 36675 25332 46636 16775 14831 12987 11920 10160 10919 8543 8746 6636 5872 4613 4214 2807 2636 2563 2238 1972 2032 1802 1278 
Total % Total Assets (F42; L26 +L36, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 2.0% 1.8% 2.3% 2.5% 1.7% 3.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 
Total % Total Claims (F42; L26 +L36, C4)/ (F42; L16, C4) 15% 12% 13% 16% 13% 25% 12% 10% 10% 9% 8% 11% 10% 11% 10% 10% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 
10.3 Expense 
10.3.1 Intra-Group vs. External 
Intra-Group (F43; L36, C4) 91% 93% 97% 96% 94% 89%                     
External (F43; L26, C4) 9% 7% 3% 4% 6% 11% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10.3.2 Total 
Total (£m) (F43; L26 +L36, C4) 480 511 985 1238 1320 1712 1922 2215 2118 2376 1774 1236 819 499 452 468 557 581 510 471 571 402 390 285 279 173 
Total % Total Assets (F43; L26 +L36, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.03% 0.04% 0.08% 0.08% 0.09% 0.12% 0.16% 0.19% 0.20% 0.20% 0.14% 0.10% 0.08% 0.05% 0.06% 0.06% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.10% 0.13% 0.08% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 0.05% 
Total % Total Expense (F43; L26 +L36, C4)/ (F43; L16, C4) 4% 4% 7% 8% 8% 11% 11% 13% 11% 12% 10% 7% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 
10.4 Mathematical Reserves 
10.4.1 Intra-Group vs. External 
Intra-Group (F50; L38, C4) 77% 78% 81% 83% 88% 84%                     
External (F50; L28, C4) 23% 22% 19% 17% 12% 16% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10.4.2 Total 
Total (£m) (F50; L28 +L38, C4) 258005 239089 236073 256525 271633 199700 209107 173348 146785 142049 143424 123856 101825 79152 62298 60113 52433 46949 31449 21688 19059 18799 15430 14019 12130 8667 
Total % Total Assets (F50; L28 +L38, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 19% 18% 19% 17% 19% 14% 17% 15% 14% 12% 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 
Total % Total Mathematical Reserves (F50; L28 +L38, C4)/ (F50; L18, C4) 17% 17% 17% 16% 17% 13% 16% 14% 13% 12% 12% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 8% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 
 
11. New Premiums (APE) 
11.1 Segments 
11.1.1 Segments - All Business Lines 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1) 14% 14% 21% 25% 27% 27% 28% 28% 31% 31% 32% 38% 36% 37% 41% 41% 46% 45% 43% 45% 44% 41% 48% 58% 61% 52% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2) 82% 83% 76% 72% 71% 70% 67% 68% 63% 64% 64% 58% 60% 58% 53% 52% 45% 46% 49% 47% 49% 52% 45% 35% 32% 41% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3) 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 3% 6% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 9% 9% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 
11.1.2 Segments - Non-Profit 
Life (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29 10% 14% 19% 20% 20% 27% 33% 40% 39% 41% 51% 64% 64% 68% 64% 40% 42% 46% 48% 50% 49% 47% 57% 64% 68% 57% 
Pension (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29  27% 25% 37% 43% 41% 27% 21% 27% 38% 43% 40% 29% 27% 23% 23% 52% 50% 48% 47% 44% 45% 46% 37% 30% 27% 38% 
Overseas (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  63% 61% 44% 37% 40% 46% 45% 33% 22% 16% 9% 7% 9% 10% 13% 8% 8% 6% 6% 5% 6% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
11.1.3 Segments - With-Profits 
Life (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29  43% 39% 41% 44% 46% 48% 51% 58% 56% 54% 55% 49% 47% 50% 49% 49% 51% 41% 45% 52% 53% 47% 47% 49% 50% 48% 
Pension (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 100-215, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29  53% 58% 55% 54% 51% 48% 40% 34% 36% 34% 34% 40% 42% 34% 31% 33% 25% 31% 35% 25% 26% 32% 31% 35% 27% 26% 
Overseas (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 100-215, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 9% 8% 8% 11% 11% 11% 11% 16% 20% 19% 24% 28% 20% 23% 21% 21% 21% 16% 22% 26% 
11.1.4 Segments - Unitised With-Profits 
Life (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29 49% 43% 47% 35% 30% 29% 16% 28% 45% 52% 53% 54% 43% 33% 34%            
Pension (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 44% 41% 36% 44% 51% 46% 45% 54% 40% 37% 39% 39% 54% 64% 63%            
Overseas (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  7% 16% 18% 21% 19% 25% 39% 18% 15% 12% 8% 7% 3% 2% 3%            
11.1.5 Segments - Property Linked 
Life (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29  7% 8% 15% 20% 23% 21% 21% 17% 16% 16% 19% 26% 27% 27% 33% 38% 47% 46% 39% 38% 38% 35% 41% 57% 58% 48% 
Pension (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 90% 90% 83% 79% 76% 78% 78% 82% 83% 83% 80% 72% 71% 71% 65% 60% 49% 51% 58% 58% 60% 62% 56% 39% 38% 50% 
Overseas (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 2% 
11.1.6 Segments - Index Linked 
Life (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L 900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29  2% 3% 6% 17% 48% 50% 59% 58% 62% 39% 54% 43% 66% 77% 74%            
Pension (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L 900-915, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29  98% 97% 94% 83% 52% 50% 37% 34% 31% 53% 35% 55% 31% 22% 26%            
Overseas (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L 900-915, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  0.04% 0.1% 0.3% 0.03% 0.1% 0.03% 5% 8% 7% 8% 11% 3% 3% 1% 0.3%            
11.2 Business Lines 
11.2.1 Business Lines- All Segments 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L 100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 6% 7% 8% 32% 29% 30% 35% 35% 33% 35% 40% 38% 40% 41% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L 300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  
15% 16% 18% 20% 16% 19% 21% 22% 23% 18% 16% 15% 16% 19% 19% 21% 18% 19% 20% 19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 16% 18% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 
3% 3% 5% 3% 3% 5% 7% 8% 16% 19% 18% 23% 20% 24% 26%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG,  OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 
78% 78% 73% 75% 79% 74% 70% 67% 58% 59% 62% 56% 55% 48% 43% 48% 53% 51% 45% 46% 50% 49% 46% 48% 44% 41% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L 900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 
2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4%            
11.2.2 Business Lines - Life Segment 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 4% 7% 10% 12% 13% 31% 26% 31% 39% 39% 36% 40% 47% 42% 45% 45% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29  47% 45% 36% 35% 27% 34% 39% 46% 41% 32% 27% 19% 21% 25% 22% 25% 20% 18% 20% 21% 21% 18% 14% 12% 13% 17% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29 12% 10% 11% 5% 4% 5% 4% 8% 23% 32% 30% 33% 24% 22% 22%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29 40% 44% 52% 59% 67% 58% 53% 41% 30% 31% 36% 39% 41% 35% 35% 45% 54% 51% 40% 40% 43% 41% 39% 46% 42% 38% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKL_DB, UKL_RE and UKL_RG) see Table 29 0.4% 0.4% 0.9% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 4% 6% 7%            
11.2.3 Business lines - Pension Segment 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 32% 32% 31% 33% 33% 30% 31% 33% 33% 34% 38% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29  10% 11% 13% 15% 11% 13% 13% 11% 13% 10% 8% 10% 11% 11% 11% 13% 10% 13% 14% 10% 9% 10% 10% 14% 14% 11% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L 500-575, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 5% 6% 10% 11% 11% 15% 19% 26% 30%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 85% 84% 80% 81% 85% 83% 82% 81% 75% 77% 78% 70% 66% 59% 53% 55% 58% 56% 53% 57% 61% 59% 57% 53% 53% 51% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); UKP_DB, UKP_RE and UKP_RG) see Table 29 3% 3% 4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2%            
11.2.3 Business Lines - Overseas Segment 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  23% 21% 10% 10% 13% 11% 8% 11% 7% 5% 6% 7% 14% 12% 17% 34% 26% 21% 27% 24% 27% 35% 34% 33% 26% 27% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29  16% 16% 17% 19% 25% 22% 34% 43% 35% 38% 39% 36% 45% 57% 58% 54% 49% 61% 53% 55% 53% 48% 48% 36% 50% 62% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 7% 16% 24% 26% 27% 40% 47% 33% 45% 42% 33% 39% 15% 10% 11%            
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Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 54% 47% 49% 46% 35% 27% 10% 11% 11% 12% 20% 16% 25% 20% 14% 12% 25% 18% 20% 21% 20% 18% 18% 31% 23% 12% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%); OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Table 29 0.03% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.03% 0.01% 1% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 1% 0% 0%            
11.3 Total APE 
Total (£m) (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4) 18787 19933 20911 25087 21715 20390 19642 19598 20020 20643 20235 17795 15571 13008 10932 8703 10137 11124 11184 10671 10754 11092 10424 8788 8010 6668 
Total % Total Assets (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4)/ (F13; L89; LTIB) 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 1.6% 1.7% 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 2.2% 2.5% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 
11.4 Legal Form 
11.4.1 Legal Form-Total 
Proprietary % Total APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4 see Table 31) 95% 96% 94% 94% 93% 88% 86% 84% 84% 83% 83% 71% 70% 57% 59% 54% 56% 53% 53% 53% 55% 54% 53% 53% 54% 54% 
Mutual % Total APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4 see Table 31) 5% 4% 6% 6% 7% 12% 14% 16% 16% 17% 17% 29% 30% 43% 41% 46% 44% 47% 47% 47% 45% 46% 47% 47% 46% 46% 
11.4.2 Legal Form- Segment 
11.4.2.1 Proprietary- Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 13% 13% 21% 25% 27% 27% 28% 28% 32% 31% 33% 40% 40% 41% 47% 45% 50% 49% 45% 46% 46% 44% 50% 60% 61% 55% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 84% 84% 76% 72% 71% 71% 68% 68% 64% 64% 64% 56% 57% 53% 47% 48% 41% 42% 48% 46% 46% 48% 42% 32% 30% 37% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 6% 6% 6% 10% 9% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 
11.4.2.2 Mutual- Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 41% 41% 23% 26% 28% 27% 26% 26% 29% 27% 29% 32% 29% 31% 32% 36% 42% 40% 42% 44% 41% 38% 47% 57% 61% 48% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 58% 58% 74% 72% 70% 66% 57% 63% 61% 64% 61% 61% 65% 65% 61% 56% 50% 52% 51% 48% 53% 56% 48% 38% 34% 46% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 7% 18% 11% 10% 9% 10% 7% 6% 5% 6% 8% 7% 8% 8% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 6% 
11.4.3 Legal Form- Products  
11.4.3.1 Proprietary- Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 20% 18% 21% 24% 24% 22% 24% 28% 28% 31% 34% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
14% 15% 18% 20% 16% 20% 22% 23% 24% 18% 16% 15% 17% 21% 21% 21% 19% 18% 22% 19% 18% 17% 15% 14% 15% 17% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
3% 3% 5% 3% 3% 4% 5% 6% 12% 17% 16% 19% 15% 18% 18%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
79% 79% 73% 75% 80% 74% 72% 69% 61% 63% 65% 61% 63% 54% 51% 59% 63% 60% 54% 56% 60% 60% 57% 58% 54% 49% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 4% 6%            
11.4.3.2 Mutual - Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 7% 8% 11% 11% 14% 45% 42% 40% 47% 47% 46% 48% 53% 50% 51% 49% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
35% 35% 21% 18% 20% 13% 17% 18% 14% 16% 14% 13% 16% 16% 15% 20% 16% 20% 17% 18% 16% 16% 14% 14% 17% 18% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
12% 13% 7% 7% 7% 11% 21% 20% 37% 32% 31% 34% 32% 32% 36%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
49% 44% 68% 71% 68% 73% 57% 56% 42% 45% 46% 43% 39% 40% 33% 35% 41% 39% 35% 35% 38% 36% 33% 36% 33% 33% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
1% 2% 0% 1% 3% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2%            
11.5 Industry Parents  
11.5.1 Industry Parents - Total 
Bank Parents % Total APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4 see Table 31) 23% 25% 26% 31% 31% 32% 30% 29% 31% 31% 35% 24% 21% 17% 15% 15% 15% 15% 12% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 11% 11% 
Insurers Parents % Total APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4 see Table 31) 73% 71% 71% 66% 63% 59% 63% 65% 66% 68% 63% 74% 77% 80% 84% 84% 84% 85% 88% 88% 88% 88% 89% 89% 88% 88% 
Other Parents % Total APE (F46; L24+L28*10%, C4 see Table 31) 4% 4% 3% 3% 6% 9% 7% 6% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
11.5.2 Industry Parent- Segment 
11.5.2.1 Bank parent - Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 2% 3% 6% 7% 6% 3% 2% 11% 32% 25% 44% 40% 45% 64% 91% 90% 79% 77% 83% 65% 64% 52% 63% 55% 45% 33% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 97% 95% 90% 91% 91% 95% 97% 87% 61% 48% 53% 56% 54% 36% 7% 8% 21% 23% 17% 35% 36% 48% 37% 45% 55% 67% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 1% 2% 4% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 7% 27% 3% 3% 1% 0.1% 2% 1% 0.0002% 0.2% 0.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
11.5.2.2 Insurer Parent- Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 15% 14% 22% 27% 32% 33% 33% 32% 34% 34% 40% 41% 39% 35% 37% 37% 42% 41% 41% 43% 42% 39% 47% 57% 60% 50% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 81% 82% 74% 69% 65% 63% 60% 63% 60% 61% 55% 54% 57% 59% 56% 54% 48% 48% 51% 48% 50% 52% 46% 36% 32% 41% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% 5% 4% 6% 7% 8% 10% 10% 8% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
11.5.2.3 Other Parent- Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 14% 15% 20% 22% 21% 22% 22% 23% 24% 23% 17% 27% 27% 44% 58% 60% 68% 63% 62% 58% 58% 54% 59% 71% 69% 63% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 85% 84% 79% 77% 78% 76% 75% 75% 72% 72% 80% 70% 69% 54% 42% 40% 32% 37% 38% 41% 42% 46% 41% 28% 30% 36% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 0.4% 0.4% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 4% 4% 2% 3% 3% 2% 0.02% 0.04% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1% 1% 
11.5.3 Industry Parent- Products  
11.5.3.1 Bank Parent- Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
0.001% 0.0003% 0.0002% 0.001% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 1% 1% 1% 3% 2% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
19% 22% 25% 18% 12% 14% 13% 18% 62% 54% 59% 47% 34% 36% 29% 40% 15% 18% 52% 24% 14% 10% 8% 6% 5% 7% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
81% 78% 72% 82% 87% 86% 86% 82% 36% 41% 40% 52% 65% 48% 21% 59% 83% 79% 46% 71% 84% 88% 90% 92% 91% 91% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
1% 0.4% 3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1% 0.002% 16% 49%            
11.5.3.2 Insurer Parent - Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 4% 5% 7% 7% 8% 35% 32% 33% 38% 37% 35% 37% 42% 40% 42% 43% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
16% 17% 20% 24% 19% 23% 26% 26% 24% 21% 20% 16% 17% 20% 19% 21% 18% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 15% 17% 19% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
4% 4% 6% 5% 5% 7% 9% 10% 19% 21% 23% 27% 25% 28% 30%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L 580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
75% 75% 68% 68% 74% 67% 63% 61% 52% 54% 53% 49% 49% 44% 40% 44% 50% 46% 42% 43% 47% 46% 42% 45% 41% 38% 
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Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 2% 4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3%            
11.5.3.3 Other Parent - Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 6% 10% 13% 12% 15% 20% 18% 17% 18% 21% 23% 23% 24% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
10% 11% 11% 11% 10% 12% 14% 15% 16% 10% 6% 6% 10% 12% 13% 20% 18% 10% 13% 12% 14% 10% 7% 6% 7% 9% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 4% 5% 10% 16% 12% 14% 6% 10% 5%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
86% 85% 86% 87% 87% 84% 80% 77% 71% 72% 80% 76% 78% 65% 65% 67% 70% 75% 67% 70% 69% 73% 72% 71% 70% 67% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 7% 7%            
11.6 Overseas Ownership 
11.6.1 Overseas Ownership-total 
The UK % Total APE (F47; see Table 31) 71% 78% 73% 73% 72% 68% 69% 69% 69% 71% 70% 71% 70% 74% 77% 78% 78% 81% 81% 81% 82% 82% 83% 81% 83% 82% 
Overseas % Total APE (F47; see Table 31) 29% 22% 27% 27% 28% 32% 31% 31% 31% 29% 30% 29% 30% 26% 23% 22% 22% 19% 19% 19% 18% 18% 17% 19% 17% 18% 
11.6.2 Overseas Ownership- Segment 
11.6.2.1 The UK- Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 14% 13% 18% 22% 23% 25% 27% 27% 28% 29% 29% 36% 34% 38% 41% 41% 46% 44% 43% 45% 44% 40% 48% 58% 60% 51% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 82% 83% 78% 75% 74% 71% 66% 68% 65% 65% 66% 59% 61% 58% 52% 51% 44% 46% 49% 46% 48% 52% 45% 35% 33% 42% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 8% 6% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 7% 8% 10% 10% 8% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
11.6.2.2 Overseas - Segment 
Life (F46; L24+L28*10%, C1 see Table 31) 14% 17% 29% 34% 36% 30% 30% 31% 37% 33% 39% 43% 41% 35% 39% 40% 48% 49% 45% 48% 45% 46% 48% 61% 66% 56% 
Pension (F46; L24+L28*10%, C2 see Table 31) 85% 83% 70% 65% 62% 68% 69% 67% 60% 63% 59% 55% 57% 59% 57% 54% 47% 47% 52% 50% 52% 51% 46% 36% 30% 37% 
Overseas (F46; L24+L28*10%, C3 see Table 31) 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 7% 4% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 6% 3% 4% 7% 
11.6.3 Overseas Ownership- Products  
11.6.3.1 The UK- Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 5% 7% 8% 10% 36% 33% 33% 38% 37% 36% 38% 43% 42% 43% 44% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
16% 14% 16% 16% 15% 19% 23% 23% 21% 17% 13% 14% 15% 18% 19% 21% 18% 20% 20% 18% 17% 16% 14% 14% 16% 17% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
4% 4% 6% 4% 4% 6% 9% 11% 20% 24% 23% 28% 26% 29% 30%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
75% 80% 72% 77% 78% 72% 65% 63% 55% 55% 59% 50% 50% 43% 38% 43% 49% 47% 43% 45% 48% 46% 43% 44% 41% 39% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 1% 4% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3% 4%            
11.6.3.2 Overseas - Products 
With-Profits (F47; L100-215, C4 + (L100-215, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 15% 15% 18% 25% 26% 21% 20% 24% 21% 25% 29% 
Non-Profit (F47; L300-445, C4 + (L300-445, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE,  UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
13% 24% 22% 32% 19% 17% 18% 21% 27% 21% 21% 16% 20% 22% 18% 21% 18% 17% 21% 20% 19% 18% 16% 14% 16% 20% 
Unitised With-Profits (F47; L500-575, C4 + (L500-575, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 2% 7% 8% 8% 11% 8% 10% 12%            
Property Linked (F47; L580-800, C4 + (L580-800, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
84% 70% 75% 67% 80% 79% 81% 76% 63% 70% 69% 70% 68% 62% 62% 64% 67% 65% 54% 54% 61% 63% 60% 65% 59% 52% 
Index Linked (F47; L900-915, C4 + (L900-915, C6)*10%);  
UKL_DB, UKL_RE, UKL_RG, UKP_DB, UKP_RE, UKP_RG, OS_DB, OS_RE and OS_RG) see Tables 29 and 31 
2% 6% 1% 1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 4%            
 
12. Derivatives 
12.1 Assets and Liabilities 
Assets (F17; L51, C1; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994) 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.14% 0.10% 0.08% 0.08% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.06% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 
Liabilities (F17; L51, C2; LTIB) 0.4% 0.5% 0.8% 0.2% 0.08% 0.10% 0.08% 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01%          
12.2 Number of Firms 
Firm Using Derivatives % Total Firms (F17; L51, C1 or C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994 see Table 31) 36% 35% 36% 34% 34% 32% 30% 29% 29% 30% 29% 29% 28% 25% 26% 27% 25% 10% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 
Proprietary Using Derivatives % Proprietary (F17; L51, C1 or C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994 see Table 31) 43% 39% 39% 34% 35% 36% 32% 31% 34% 33% 30% 30% 31% 27% 28% 25% 25% 8% 6% 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 3% 3% 
Mutual Using Derivatives % Mutual (F17; L51, C1 or C2; LTIB) and (F13; L44; LTIB; prior to 1994 see Table 31) 21% 26% 29% 35% 30% 24% 26% 24% 19% 23% 26% 28% 24% 23% 25% 30% 26% 12% 9% 9% 8% 9% 7% 9% 8% 7% 
 
13. Management Charges to Property Linked Funds  
Proprietary (£m) (F45; L22, see Table 31)  3451 3281 3472 3688 2633 2547 2092 1920 1888 2090 2269 1686 1324 1193 1001 978 925 760 591 523 484 472 590 412 322 245 
Mutual (£m) (F45; L22, see Table 31) 92 86 222 203 227 534 519 668 657 607 623 686 611 628 585 388 377 348 290 256 247 243 210 189 152 108 
Total (£m) (F45; L22) 3543 3367 3694 3892 2860 3081 2611 2587 2544 2698 2892 2372 1934 1821 1585 1366 1303 1108 881 779 731 716 800 601 474 353 
Total % Property Linked Assets (F45; L22) /(F13; L59; LTIB) 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005 
14. Surpluses 
14.1 Total 
Reported % Total Assets (F58; L34) / (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.7% 1.5% 1.5% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Allocated to Policyholders % Total Assets (F58; L46) / (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.5% 0.5% 1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 1.0% 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
Transferred to (from) Non-Technical Account % Total Assets (F58; L47) or (F40, L26) / (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.01% -0.1% -0.05% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Undistributed % Total Assets (F58; L49) / (F13; L89; LTIB) 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
14.2 Proprietary 
 Transferred to Non-Technical Account (£m) (F58, L13) 3593 4289 3782 5736 5571 4434 2361 1622 2228 3965 3088 2309 2313 1416 1789 1655 1601 1567 1444 1425 1293 1160 918 807 838 677 
Transferred from Non-Technical Account (£m) (F58, L32) 767 877 2568 610 416 1578 2363 2458 2799 1381 1208 1712 1721 596 1223 331 47 411 485 235 239 256 202 125 88 63 
Net Transferred to Non-Technical Account (£m) (F40, L26) or (F58, L47) 2826 3412 1214 5126 5155 2856 -2 -836 -571 2584 1880 597 592 821 566 1323 1553 1156 959 1189 1054 904 716 682 749 613 
15. New Premiums 
Regular Premiums (F46, L24, C4) 5% 5% 6% 4% 5% 4% 6% 6% 7% 7% 5% 7% 8% 11% 12% 14% 14% 14% 16% 20% 23% 26% 33% 22% 23% 30% 
Single Premiums (F46, L28, C4) 95% 95% 94% 96% 95% 96% 94% 94% 93% 93% 95% 93% 92% 89% 88% 86% 86% 86% 84% 80% 77% 74% 67% 78% 77% 70% 
Source: the author. 
Where: *other parents are other financial services and non-financial services as shown in Table 31. 
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Table 33: The Value Creation of the UK Life Insurers over the Period 1985-2010 
Time 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
 
1. Full Sample 
1.1. Number of Firms 
Total 143 148 155 157 164 176 192 203 211 215 228 233 243 250 251 232 232 242 240 246 244 248 252 234 233 229 
Full Value Creation as % Total 46% 33% 24% 57% 61% 65% 53% 45% 37% 60% 77% 76% 77% 70% 56% 55% 47% 58% 36% 23% 22% 59% 53% 53% 63% 47% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 36% 53% 51% 34% 30% 27% 37% 43% 44% 29% 16% 15% 15% 20% 33% 32% 39% 30% 53% 67% 70% 38% 43% 44% 35% 52% 
Value Destroying as % Total  17% 14% 25% 9% 9% 7% 10% 12% 19% 11% 7% 9% 8% 10% 11% 13% 14% 12% 11% 10% 8% 3% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
1.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 1246269 1200254 1131358 1340007 1307690 1300601 1145266 1084041 1005932 1090159 1121876 1038858 900184 763343 662486 609689 549042 543474 449333 395915 352520 367737 318594 292013 271934 236677 
Tobin’s Q 101% 97% 91% 109% 111% 112% 105% 102% 98% 111% 123% 127% 122% 115% 107% 106% 102% 107% 97% 95% 95% 106% 102% 102% 103% 99% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 141% 136% 128% 154% 158% 159% 149% 146% 142% 160% 177% 186% 180% 170% 159% 158% 152% 162% 145% 143% 143% 162% 156% 156% 159% 154% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 28% 29% 31% 27% 27% 26% 28% 29% 31% 28% 25% 25% 26% 29% 31% 31% 33% 31% 35% 36% 36% 32% 34% 34% 34% 36% 
Value Creation % Market Value 29% 27% 22% 35% 37% 37% 33% 32% 29% 38% 44% 46% 44% 41% 37% 37% 34% 38% 31% 30% 30% 38% 36% 36% 37% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 1% -3% -10% 8% 10% 11% 5% 2% -2% 10% 18% 22% 18% 13% 6% 5% 2% 7% -3% -6% -6% 6% 2% 2% 3% -1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 7% 8% -15% 1% 3% 9% 4% 5% -10% -6% 1% 7% 10% 9% 4% 6% -3% 11% 5% 5% -5% 9% 5% 3% 7% 4% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 4% 7% -18% 2% 4% 10% 4% 5% -9% -4% 3% 9% 11% 13% 6% 7% -2% 13% 6% 5% -7% 10% 5% 4% 7% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow ) % Market Value 0.2% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 1% 1% 2% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 36% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 6% -19% -1% 1% 7% 3% 4% -12% -8% -0.3% 6% 8% 7% 2% 4% -5% 10% 1% -1% -12% 5% 0% -1% 4% -1% 
 
2. Top vs. Bottom  
2.1. Top 10 
2.1.1 Number of Firms 
Total 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Full Value Creation as % Total 100% 80% 60% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 70% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 80% 50% 40% 40% 70% 80% 70% 70% 30% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 0% 20% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 50% 60% 60% 30% 20% 30% 30% 70% 
Value Destroying as % Total  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2.1.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 416433 399608 365968 418032 362236 361380 317932 286113 267374 276913 279497 265021 225880 184994 143934 128533 121236 114261 95831 86754 74662 72178 63744 59461 57437 52939 
Tobin’s Q 110% 106% 100% 119% 122% 123% 115% 113% 109% 123% 133% 135% 129% 121% 114% 113% 110% 112% 104% 102% 102% 107% 103% 102% 102% 99% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 167% 161% 151% 180% 186% 190% 180% 178% 172% 195% 210% 215% 205% 195% 182% 181% 178% 182% 168% 165% 167% 175% 169% 168% 169% 165% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 31% 32% 34% 29% 28% 29% 31% 32% 34% 30% 28% 27% 29% 31% 33% 33% 35% 34% 37% 38% 38% 36% 38% 38% 39% 40% 
Value Creation % Market Value 40% 38% 34% 44% 46% 47% 44% 44% 42% 49% 52% 53% 51% 49% 45% 45% 44% 45% 41% 40% 40% 43% 41% 40% 41% 39% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 9% 6% -0.4% 16% 18% 19% 13% 12% 8% 19% 25% 26% 23% 18% 12% 12% 9% 11% 3% 2% 2% 7% 3% 2% 2% -1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 7% 8% -15% 2% 3% 9% 4% 6% -10% -5% 1% 8% 10% 10% 4% 6% 0% 10% 6% 6% 2% 8% 5% 4% 6% 4% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 5% 7% -16% 6% 0.4% 9% 6% 6% -7% -3% 2% 11% 12% 14% 6% 5% 2% 12% 6% 7% 2% 9% 6% 3% 6% 39% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 1% 1% 2% 5% 0.2% 2% 3% 2% 4% 3% 2% 3% 4% 6% 4% 1% 3% 4% 4% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 3% 40% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 6% -18% 1% 0.2% 7% 3% 4% -11% -6% 0.3% 7% 8% 8% 2% 4% -1% 8% 2% 0% -4% 4% 1% 0% 3% -1% 
2.2. Bottom 10 
2.2.1. Number of Firms 
Total 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Full Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 20% 30% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 50% 50% 50% 30% 10% 10% 10% 20% 10% 0% 10% 40% 40% 30% 60% 40% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 70% 70% 70% 70% 60% 50% 70% 90% 90% 70% 40% 40% 40% 60% 70% 60% 50% 50% 70% 80% 80% 50% 50% 60% 40% 60% 
Value Destroying as % Total  30% 30% 30% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 30% 40% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 
2.2.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 19888 20346 20963 30222 26878 23134 20949 20102 20154 20293 19031 17635 16330 13259 9160 8302 7134 7387 6579 6028 5214 5153 4293 3609 3196 3051 
Tobin’s Q 83% 81% 78% 93% 95% 97% 93% 92% 92% 98% 104% 106% 104% 98% 93% 93% 89% 96% 86% 88% 88% 100% 98% 101% 95% 103% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 105% 102% 97% 118% 125% 130% 128% 132% 133% 145% 156% 163% 163% 160% 145% 148% 145% 156% 138% 142% 142% 165% 165% 175% 167% 182% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 26% 26% 25% 22% 25% 27% 29% 33% 34% 33% 32% 33% 34% 39% 39% 40% 44% 40% 44% 43% 43% 39% 41% 42% 45% 42% 
Value Creation % Market Value 5% 2% -3% 15% 20% 23% 22% 24% 25% 31% 36% 39% 39% 37% 31% 32% 31% 36% 28% 30% 30% 39% 39% 43% 40% 45% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value -21% -24% -29% -7% -5% -3% -7% -9% -9% -2% 4% 6% 4% -2% -8% -8% -12% -4% -16% -13% -14% 0.1% -2% 1% -5% 3% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 5% 4% -15% -1% 0.1% 5% 3% 1% -6% -4% -0.4% 3% 7% 5% 2% 5% -6% 12% 1% 6% -7% 6% 1% 9% -4% 8% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 7% 5% 6% 6% 7% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 7% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 3% 5% -25% -3% 0% 3% -1% -1% -7% -3% 0.1% 3% 8% 16% 2% 6% -6% 11% 1% 4% -9% 6% 3% 7% -3% 45% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value -0.4% -1% -7% 0.1% 2% 0% -3% -1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 3% 12% 3% 3% 2% 1% 4% 6% 5% 5% 6% 2% 5% 42% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 6% -19% -3% -2% 3% 2% 0% -7% -5% -1% 2% 6% 4% -1% 3% -8% 10% -4% -1% -14% 2% -3% 5% -8% 3% 
2.3. Top Firm 
2.3.1. Number of Firms 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Full Value Creation as % Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Value Destroying as % Total  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2.3.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 80938 79396 80121 80832 80214 84143 81890 82589 81899 80500 78121 73849 67519 61930 43344 39563 42719 39438 34950 33419 29983 29218 25597 23676 22847 20990 
Tobin’s Q 127% 127% 127% 137% 137% 138% 133% 131% 128% 138% 136% 131% 126% 121% 118% 118% 117% 116% 111% 110% 110% 112% 106% 105% 103% 100% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 203% 203% 204% 221% 220% 224% 217% 215% 210% 227% 222% 215% 206% 197% 191% 191% 195% 194% 186% 184% 183% 187% 177% 175% 172% 168% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 30% 29% 30% 27% 27% 28% 29% 30% 31% 28% 29% 30% 31% 32% 32% 32% 34% 35% 36% 37% 37% 36% 38% 38% 39% 40% 
Value Creation % Market Value 51% 51% 51% 55% 55% 55% 54% 53% 52% 56% 55% 53% 52% 49% 48% 48% 49% 48% 46% 46% 45% 46% 43% 43% 42% 40% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 21% 21% 21% 27% 27% 28% 25% 24% 22% 28% 26% 24% 21% 17% 15% 15% 14% 14% 10% 9% 9% 10% 5% 5% 3% 0.3% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 3% 3% -3% 3% 2% 6% 3% 4% -4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 3% 4% 3% 7% 5% 7% 5% 10% 5% 6% 6% 6% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 2% 0.2% -3% 2% -2% 4% 2% 3% -1% 4% 5% 7% 7% 17% 6% -4% 5% 8% 4% 7% 4% 11% 6% 5% 6% 40% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 2% -0.3% 3% 1% -1% 0.04% -0.1% 0.2% 4% 1% 1% 2% 2% 10% 4% -4% 3% 4% 2% 6% 4% 5% 5% 3% 3% 40% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 1% 1% -6% 1% -1% 4% 2% 3% -5% 3% 4% 5% 5% 7% 2% 0.4% 2% 5% 2% 2% -1% 6% 1% 2% 3% 0.3% 
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2.4. Bottom  Firm 
2.4.1. Number of Firms 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Full Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 
Value Destroying as % Total  100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 
2.4.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 4088 4187 2399 2855 3275 3090 2547 2208 1989 2538 2983 3128 2776 2585 2345 2388 2388 2744 2342 2359 1973 2237 1914 1382 1081 740 
Tobin’s Q 89% 88% 77% 97% 105% 101% 92% 87% 81% 97% 111% 117% 103% 91% 84% 84% 81% 88% 80% 88% 83% 108% 103% 136% 113% 99% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 121% 121% 104% 131% 144% 139% 126% 118% 109% 133% 153% 161% 141% 128% 117% 118% 114% 127% 115% 126% 120% 155% 148% 196% 162% 143% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 30% 31% 34% 27% 26% 27% 29% 30% 32% 28% 25% 24% 27% 31% 34% 34% 36% 35% 38% 35% 37% 28% 30% 22% 27% 31% 
Value Creation % Market Value 18% 18% 4% 24% 31% 28% 20% 15% 9% 25% 35% 38% 29% 22% 14% 15% 12% 21% 13% 21% 17% 36% 32% 49% 38% 30% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value -13% -14% -30% -3% 5% 1% -9% -15% -24% -3% 10% 14% 2% -10% -20% -19% -24% -13% -25% -14% -20% 7% 2% 27% 11% -1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 4% 4% -22% -5% 6% 10% 5% 8% -18% -13% -4% 13% 12% 10% 2% 7% -7% 10% -6% 9% -21% 9% -13% 21% 14% 4% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 3% 3% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 6% 7% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value -0.01% 15% -23% -10% 5% 12% 7% 8% -22% -15% -4% 12% 10% 9% 0% 3% -12% 10% -7% 8% -21% 10% -1% 21% 19% 30% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value -1% 12% 3% -2% 2% 3% 4% 2% -2% 0% 0% 0% -2% 1% 1% -2% -3% 3% 4% 6% 7% 5% 15% 2% 7% 31% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 1% 3% -26% -8% 4% 8% 4% 6% -19% -15% -5% 12% 11% 8% -1% 5% -9% 7% -11% 2% -28% 5% -16% 18% 12% -1% 
 
3. Parental Issues 
3.1. Insurer Parents 
3.1.1 Number of Firms 
Total 108 112 119 118 118 125 139 155 160 168 179 189 200 206 206 191 193 200 201 209 208 213 216 200 200 196 
Full Value Creation as % Total 39% 30% 21% 52% 58% 61% 51% 46% 38% 61% 75% 74% 77% 68% 54% 53% 47% 57% 35% 22% 22% 59% 54% 54% 64% 47% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 44% 56% 55% 38% 32% 34% 39% 43% 44% 26% 17% 16% 15% 23% 35% 34% 40% 32% 55% 69% 71% 38% 42% 43% 35% 52% 
Value Destroying as % Total  18% 13% 24% 10% 9% 6% 10% 12% 18% 13% 8% 11% 9% 9% 11% 13% 13% 11% 10% 9% 7% 3% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
3.1.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 968365 932741 865435 1007305 947016 922373 805757 796179 756269 829328 866005 849127 753821 649169 571216 540066 490681 489074 411021 363409 324101 337210 291980 265618 248361 216699 
Tobin’s Q 101% 97% 91% 108% 112% 114% 108% 105% 102% 113% 125% 128% 123% 114% 106% 105% 101% 107% 97% 95% 95% 106% 102% 101% 102% 99% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 148% 144% 136% 163% 169% 171% 160% 158% 155% 172% 188% 193% 186% 172% 160% 159% 153% 163% 146% 144% 144% 162% 156% 155% 158% 154% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 32% 34% 36% 31% 30% 29% 30% 32% 33% 30% 27% 26% 27% 30% 32% 32% 34% 32% 35% 36% 36% 33% 34% 35% 35% 37% 
Value Creation % Market Value 32% 30% 26% 38% 41% 41% 38% 37% 35% 42% 47% 48% 46% 42% 38% 37% 35% 39% 32% 30% 31% 38% 36% 35% 37% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 1% -3% -10% 7% 11% 12% 8% 5% 2% 12% 20% 22% 19% 12% 6% 5% 1% 7% -3% -6% -6% 6% 2% 1% 2% -1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 7% 7% -14% 1% 3% 8% 4% 4% -9% -5% 1% 7% 10% 9% 4% 6% -3% 11% 5% 5% -5% 9% 5% 3% 6% 4% 
Investment yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 4% 7% -17% 3% 6% 11% 4% 4% -8% -3% 3% 9% 11% 13% 5% 6% -3% 13% 6% 5% -6% 10% 6% 3% 7% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income  (Flow) % Market Value 0.4% 2% 1% 3% 5% 4% 1% 1% 2% 4% 3% 3% 3% 6% 3% 3% 2% 4% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 37% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 5% -18% -1% 1% 7% 3% 3% -10% -7% 0% 6% 9% 7% 2% 4% -5% 9% 1% -1% -11% 5% 1% -1% 3% -1% 
3.2. Bank (and other) Parents 
3.2.1. Number of Firms 
Total 35 36 36 39 46 51 53 48 51 47 49 44 43 44 45 41 39 42 39 37 36 35 36 34 33 33 
Full Value Creation as % Total 69% 42% 33% 72% 67% 76% 58% 42% 33% 55% 82% 84% 81% 82% 62% 61% 49% 62% 38% 24% 22% 57% 47% 44% 61% 45% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 14% 42% 39% 23% 26% 12% 32% 46% 43% 38% 12% 14% 14% 7% 24% 24% 31% 21% 44% 57% 64% 37% 50% 53% 36% 55% 
Value Destroying as % Total  17% 17% 28% 5% 7% 12% 9% 13% 24% 6% 6% 2% 5% 11% 13% 15% 21% 17% 18% 19% 14% 6% 3% 3% 3% 0% 
3.2.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 277904 267512 265923 332701 360674 378229 339509 287861 249663 260831 255872 189731 146362 114174 91270 69624 58361 54400 38312 32506 28419 30526 26614 26395 23573 19979 
Tobin’s Q 104% 98% 91% 111% 109% 109% 99% 95% 88% 103% 117% 126% 119% 118% 111% 110% 105% 110% 97% 95% 93% 109% 104% 112% 108% 101% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 120% 115% 107% 132% 134% 136% 128% 121% 113% 132% 148% 161% 155% 158% 150% 150% 145% 151% 135% 135% 134% 159% 154% 165% 162% 153% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 14% 15% 17% 14% 17% 20% 23% 22% 25% 22% 18% 17% 20% 22% 24% 24% 26% 25% 29% 31% 33% 29% 31% 29% 31% 34% 
Value Creation % Market Value 17% 13% 7% 24% 25% 27% 22% 17% 11% 24% 32% 38% 36% 37% 33% 33% 31% 34% 26% 26% 25% 37% 35% 40% 38% 34% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 3% -2% -10% 10% 8% 8% -1% -5% -13% 3% 14% 21% 16% 15% 10% 9% 5% 9% -3% -5% -8% 9% 4% 11% 7% 1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 8% 9% -17% 2% 4% 10% 3% 7% -15% -9% -1% 9% 8% 9% 4% 8% -2% 13% 5% 7% -10% 9% -1% 8% 10% 6% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 5% 7% -22% -0.3% 1% 8% 4% 8% -14% -6% 0.2% 11% 11% 10% 9% 9% 1% 14% 5% 5% -12% 9% -2% 7% 10% 34% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value -0.5% -1% -0.4% -0.3% -2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 5% 3% 3% 4% 3% 6% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 34% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 5% 8% -22% 0% 1% 8% 2% 6% -16% -10% -3% 8% 7% 7% 3% 6% -3% 11% 1% 1% -16% 5% -5% 4% 7% 1% 
3.3.The UK Parents 
3.3.1. Number of Firms 
Total 97 101 108 111 113 122 136 139 149 151 159 163 179 187 190 169 169 176 177 181 181 183 186 169 170 166 
Full Value Creation as % Total 44% 33% 23% 60% 63% 66% 51% 43% 39% 60% 81% 79% 80% 72% 57% 55% 47% 57% 33% 22% 22% 57% 52% 53% 61% 43% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 41% 55% 52% 35% 33% 30% 43% 47% 44% 30% 14% 15% 14% 20% 34% 33% 39% 31% 56% 67% 71% 41% 46% 46% 37% 57% 
Value Destroying as % Total  14% 12% 25% 5% 4% 4% 7% 10% 17% 9% 5% 7% 6% 7% 9% 12% 14% 13% 11% 10% 8% 2% 3% 1% 2% 0% 
3.3.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 909450 949249 894885 1055146 1008283 988734 911555 833760 785882 853745 875216 816922 736637 630132 550780 503771 455142 449342 373977 332268 296927 306130 268419 245442 229986 201226 
Tobin’s Q 101% 98% 92% 109% 111% 113% 105% 102% 98% 110% 122% 126% 122% 114% 106% 105% 101% 107% 97% 95% 95% 106% 102% 102% 102% 98% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 145% 138% 130% 155% 160% 162% 152% 148% 143% 161% 178% 187% 182% 172% 159% 158% 152% 162% 147% 145% 145% 163% 156% 157% 159% 154% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 30% 30% 32% 27% 27% 27% 30% 30% 32% 29% 26% 26% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 32% 35% 36% 37% 33% 34% 35% 35% 37% 
Value Creation % Market Value 31% 27% 23% 35% 37% 38% 34% 32% 30% 38% 44% 46% 45% 42% 37% 37% 34% 38% 32% 31% 31% 39% 36% 36% 37% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 1% -2% -9% 8% 10% 12% 5% 2% -2% 9% 18% 20% 18% 12% 6% 5% 1% 6% -4% -5% -5% 5% 2% 2% 2% -2% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 6% 7% -14% 1% 3% 9% 4% 5% -10% -6% 1% 7% 10% 9% 4% 6% -3% 11% 5% 5% -4% 8% 4% 4% 6% 4% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 4% 7% -17% 1% 5% 9% 4% 5% -9% -3% 2% 9% 12% 13% 6% 7% -2% 12% 5% 5% -6% 9% 5% 4% 7% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 0.3% 2% 1% 2% 4% 3% 1% 1% 2% 5% 2% 3% 3% 6% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 37% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 5% -18% -0.5% 1% 7% 3% 4% -11% -8% 0% 6% 8% 7% 2% 4% -5% 9% 1% -1% -11% 4% 0.1% -0.1% 3% -2% 
3.4. Overseas Parents 
3.4.1. Number of Firms 
Total 46 47 47 46 51 54 56 64 62 64 69 70 64 63 61 63 63 66 63 65 63 65 66 65 63 63 
Full Value Creation as % Total 50% 34% 26% 48% 57% 65% 59% 48% 32% 59% 68% 69% 70% 65% 52% 54% 48% 61% 44% 25% 22% 63% 56% 51% 68% 56% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 26% 47% 49% 33% 25% 20% 23% 36% 45% 25% 19% 17% 17% 19% 31% 30% 38% 29% 44% 66% 68% 29% 36% 42% 29% 41% 
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Value Destroying as % Total  24% 19% 26% 20% 18% 15% 18% 16% 23% 16% 13% 14% 13% 16% 16% 16% 14% 11% 11% 9% 10% 8% 8% 8% 3% 3% 
3.4.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 336819 251005 236474 284861 299407 311867 233711 250281 220050 236414 246661 221936 163546 133211 111706 105918 93900 94133 75355 63648 55593 61607 50175 46571 41948 35452 
Tobin’s Q 101% 95% 88% 108% 110% 110% 106% 103% 98% 113% 125% 134% 124% 116% 110% 110% 105% 111% 97% 94% 93% 110% 104% 102% 106% 100% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 129% 130% 121% 150% 152% 151% 138% 141% 137% 158% 176% 184% 172% 162% 157% 159% 153% 162% 138% 134% 134% 159% 151% 149% 157% 150% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 22% 28% 31% 26% 25% 25% 22% 26% 29% 25% 23% 20% 23% 25% 27% 28% 30% 29% 31% 32% 33% 28% 30% 32% 31% 33% 
Value Creation % Market Value 23% 23% 17% 33% 34% 34% 27% 29% 27% 37% 43% 46% 42% 38% 36% 37% 35% 38% 28% 25% 25% 37% 34% 33% 36% 33% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 1% -5% -14% 7% 9% 9% 6% 3% -2% 12% 20% 25% 19% 14% 9% 9% 4% 10% -3% -7% -7% 9% 4% 1% 5% -0.02% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 8% 9% -19% 2% 3% 10% 4% 6% -13% -7% 0% 9% 9% 9% 3% 7% -3% 12% 7% 6% -10% 10% 7% 1% 8% 5% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 5% 7% -23% 4% 2% 14% 4% 6% -12% -5% 5% 10% 9% 12% 3% 8% -3% 18% 7% 4% -13% 11% 5% 2% 9% 33% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 0.03% -1% 0.2% 5% 0.2% 6% 1% 1% 2% 3% 5% 2% 1% 4% 1% 2% 2% 7% 5% 5% 4% 5% 3% 5% 4% 33% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 5% 8% -23% -1% 1% 8% 4% 5% -14% -8% -1% 8% 8% 8% 1% 5% -5% 11% 3% -1% -17% 6% 2% -3% 5% 0% 
 
4. Mutual vs. Proprietary  
4.1. Mutual 
4.1.1 Number of Firms 
Total 43 43 48 49 53 59 61 68 73 77 81 92 96 114 117 106 106 114 115 116 114 115 121 106 109 106 
Full Value Creation as % Total 40% 23% 17% 49% 49% 51% 38% 35% 32% 56% 74% 75% 79% 73% 59% 58% 48% 60% 40% 27% 26% 62% 55% 61% 61% 45% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 44% 63% 63% 47% 47% 46% 57% 54% 51% 32% 21% 17% 15% 22% 36% 34% 46% 35% 53% 67% 68% 36% 40% 36% 35% 54% 
Value Destroying as % Total  16% 14% 21% 4% 4% 3% 5% 10% 18% 12% 5% 8% 6% 5% 5% 8% 6% 5% 7% 6% 5% 3% 4% 3% 4% 1% 
4.1.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 67491 65328 93585 105710 114218 223019 206705 207954 204251 231697 242583 346314 316542 337151 307110 311449 281622 281891 242345 213424 190265 195524 168387 148883 137694 119848 
Tobin’s Q 94% 91% 88% 101% 104% 112% 106% 103% 100% 109% 123% 123% 121% 112% 105% 104% 100% 106% 96% 95% 95% 106% 102% 101% 101% 98% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 140% 135% 129% 149% 154% 166% 158% 155% 152% 168% 186% 188% 183% 171% 160% 160% 154% 163% 146% 145% 146% 162% 157% 156% 157% 153% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 35% 36% 37% 32% 31% 29% 31% 33% 34% 32% 27% 28% 28% 31% 33% 33% 35% 33% 35% 36% 36% 33% 34% 34% 35% 37% 
Value Creation % Market Value 28% 26% 22% 33% 35% 40% 37% 36% 34% 40% 46% 47% 45% 41% 38% 38% 35% 39% 32% 31% 31% 38% 36% 36% 36% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value -6% -10% -14% 1% 4% 11% 6% 2% 0% 8% 19% 19% 17% 10% 4% 4% 0.5% 6% -4% -5% -5% 6% 2% 1% 1% -2% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 6% 1% -12% 0.4% -0.04% 8% 5% 4% -6% -5% 4% 5% 11% 9% 4% 6% -3% 11% 5% 5% -4% 8% 5% 3% 6% 3% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 4% -0.1% -13% -3% -5% 6% 2% 4% -7% -0.1% 5% 6% 11% 14% 5% 7% -3% 12% 5% 4% -5% 10% 7% 5% 7% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 1% 1% 2% -1% -2% 0% -1% 1% 0% 9% 2% 2% 2% 7% 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 5% 4% 37% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 3% -1% -15% -2% -3% 6% 3% 3% -8% -9% 4% 4% 9% 7% 1% 4% -5% 9% 1% -1% -10% 4% 1% -0.2% 3% -2% 
4.2. Proprietary  
4.2.1. Number of Firms 
Total 100 105 107 108 111 117 131 135 138 138 147 141 147 136 134 126 126 128 125 130 130 133 131 128 124 123 
Full Value Creation as % Total 49% 37% 27% 60% 67% 73% 60% 50% 40% 62% 78% 76% 76% 68% 53% 52% 46% 56% 32% 19% 18% 56% 50% 45% 65% 48% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 33% 49% 46% 29% 23% 18% 27% 38% 41% 27% 13% 14% 15% 18% 31% 30% 33% 26% 53% 67% 72% 40% 46% 52% 35% 51% 
Value Destroying as % Total  18% 14% 27% 11% 11% 9% 12% 13% 20% 11% 9% 10% 9% 13% 16% 18% 21% 18% 15% 14% 11% 4% 4% 3% 1% 1% 
4.2.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 1178778 1134926 1037774 1234297 1193472 1077582 938562 876087 801681 858462 879293 692544 583642 426192 355376 298241 267420 261583 206988 182492 162255 172212 150207 143131 134240 116830 
Tobin’s Q 102% 98% 91% 109% 112% 112% 105% 102% 98% 111% 123% 130% 123% 117% 109% 107% 103% 109% 97% 95% 93% 107% 102% 102% 104% 99% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 141% 136% 128% 154% 158% 158% 147% 144% 139% 159% 175% 185% 178% 170% 158% 156% 151% 161% 144% 141% 141% 162% 154% 156% 160% 154% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 27% 29% 31% 26% 26% 26% 27% 28% 31% 27% 25% 23% 25% 27% 29% 29% 31% 29% 34% 35% 36% 32% 34% 34% 34% 36% 
Value Creation % Market Value 29% 27% 22% 35% 37% 37% 32% 31% 28% 37% 43% 46% 44% 41% 37% 36% 34% 38% 31% 29% 29% 38% 35% 36% 37% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 2% -3% -9% 9% 11% 11% 5% 2% -2% 10% 18% 23% 19% 14% 8% 7% 3% 8% -3% -6% -7% 6% 2% 2% 4% -1% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 7% 8% -15% 2% 3% 9% 4% 5% -11% -7% -0.1% 8% 9% 9% 4% 7% -3% 12% 6% 6% -7% 9% 4% 3% 7% 5% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6% 5% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 4% 7% -19% 2% 5% 11% 4% 6% -10% -5% 2% 10% 11% 12% 6% 7% -2% 14% 6% 5% -9% 10% 3% 3% 8% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 0.2% 1% 0.4% 3% 4% 4% 2% 1% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 36% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 4% 6% -19% -0.4% 1% 7% 3% 4% -13% -8% -1% 7% 8% 8% 2% 4% -5% 10% 2% 0.03% -13% 5% -0.4% -1% 4% -1% 
 
5. Value Creating  vs. Non-value Creating 
5.1. Value Creating 
5.1.1 Number of Firms 
Total 66 49 37 89 100 115 102 91 78 129 175 176 188 176 140 127 109 140 86 56 53 146 133 123 147 107 
Full Value Creation as % Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Value Destroying as % Total  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
5.1.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 763208 478931 193604 1050462 1087721 1169615 790611 590837 516240 892048 1094015 1018269 878277 693752 440095 397139 329304 379608 187788 144158 104602 246420 205188 170316 160871 103411 
Tobin’s Q 109% 108% 114% 114% 116% 115% 113% 113% 112% 116% 124% 129% 124% 117% 115% 114% 110% 116% 108% 106% 107% 115% 108% 109% 109% 103% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 148% 154% 160% 156% 158% 162% 163% 167% 171% 172% 180% 188% 182% 174% 168% 167% 162% 172% 161% 161% 166% 172% 162% 163% 161% 153% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 24% 28% 25% 23% 23% 25% 28% 28% 31% 28% 25% 25% 26% 28% 27% 27% 29% 28% 30% 32% 33% 28% 31% 31% 29% 32% 
Value Creation % Market Value 33% 35% 37% 36% 37% 38% 39% 40% 42% 42% 44% 47% 45% 42% 40% 40% 38% 42% 38% 38% 40% 42% 38% 39% 38% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value 8% 7% 13% 13% 14% 13% 11% 12% 11% 14% 19% 22% 19% 15% 13% 13% 9.2% 14% 8% 6% 7% 13% 8% 8% 9% 3% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 8% 9% -9% 2.2% 3.76% 9% 5% 5% -6% -6% 1% 7% 10% 9% 4% 8% -3% 14% 7% 7% -3% 11% 6% 5% 10% 8% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 3% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 6% 7% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 5% 7.9% -11% 3% 3% 11% 5% 5% -6% -4.6% 4% 9% 11% 13% 6% 8% -2% 15% 7% 9% -4% 12% 5% 4% 11% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value 1% 1% 2% 3% 1% 4% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 6% 4% 2% 2% 3% 4% 7% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 32% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 5% 7% -12% 0% 1% 8% 3% 3% -8% -7% 0% 6% 8% 8% 2% 5% -5% 12% 4% 2% -8% 7% 2% 0.9% 8% 3% 
5.2. Non-value Creating 
5.2.1. Number of Firms 
Total 77 99 118 68 64 61 90 112 133 86 53 57 55 74 111 105 123 102 154 190 191 102 119 111 86 122 
Full Value Creation as % Total 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Semi Value Creation as % Total 68% 79% 67% 79% 78% 79% 79% 79% 70% 72% 68% 63% 65% 68% 75% 70% 73% 72% 82% 87% 90% 92% 92% 94% 94% 98% 
Value Destroying as % Total  32% 21% 33% 21% 22% 21% 21% 21% 30% 28% 32% 37% 35% 32% 25% 30% 27% 28% 18% 13% 10% 8% 8% 6% 6% 2% 
5.2.2. Values 
Market Value (£m) (F40; L59) 483061 721323 937754 289545 219969 130986 354656 493204 489691 198111 27862 20589 21907 69590 222391 212550 219738 163866 261545 251758 247918 121316 113406 121697 111063 133267 
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Tobin’s Q 91% 91% 87% 92% 93% 90% 92% 92% 87% 92% 88% 88% 88% 92% 94% 93% 91% 92% 90% 89% 90% 92% 92% 93% 94% 96% 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 130% 127% 123% 147% 157% 136% 125% 128% 120% 124% 119% 120% 120% 141% 144% 144% 140% 142% 136% 134% 136% 145% 145% 147% 155% 154% 
Economic Value Investment Income % Market Value 33% 31% 33% 40% 44% 40% 29% 31% 32% 28% 30% 31% 31% 37% 37% 38% 39% 39% 38% 38% 37% 40% 40% 39% 42% 40% 
Value Creation % Market Value 23% 21% 18% 32% 36% 27% 20% 22% 17% 19% 16% 17% 17% 29% 31% 30% 29% 29% 26% 26% 26% 31% 31% 32% 35% 35% 
Real Capital Gain % Market Value -10% -10% -14% -8% -8% -11% -9% -9% -15% -9% -14% -14% -14% -8% -7% -8% -10% -9% -11% -12% -11% -9% -9% -7% -6% -4% 
Valuation Gain % Market Value (F40, L13+L14) 6% 7% -16% -1% -1% 5% 3% 6% -14% -9% -3.8% 0% 2% 6% 3% 4% -4% 6% 4% 4% -6% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Investment Yield % Market Value (F40, L12) 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 
Value Creation (Flow) % Market Value 2% 6% -20% -2% 12% 2% 2% 6% -13% 0% -38% 3% 5% 6% 5% 5% -3% 10% 5% 2% -8% 5% 6% 4% 3% 35% 
Economic Value Investment Income (Flow) % Market Value -0.2% 1% 0.4% 1% 14% 1% 0% 1% 3% 10% -20% 3% 4% 2% 4% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 8% 6% 5% 40% 
Real Capital Gain (Flow) % Market Value 2% 5% -20% -3.2% -2% 3% 2% 5% -16% -10% -18% 0% 1% 4% 1% 1% -6% 5% 0% -2.22% -13% -1% -2.1% -3% -2% -4% 
Source: the author. 
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Table 34: Ranking of the UK Life Insurers with Respect to Value Creation (Capital Gain in Parenthesis) Over the Period 1985-2010 
Year (Number of Firm)/Firm Name 2010(143) 2009(148) 2008(155) 2007(157) 2006(164) 2005(176) 2004(192) 2003(203) 2002(211) 2001(215) 2000(228) 1999(233) 1998(243) 1997(250) 1996(251) 1995(232) 1994(232) 1993(242) 1992(240) 1991(246) 1990(244) 1989(248) 1988(252) 1987(234) 1986(233) 1985(229) 
Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd 28(12) 31(12) 38(108) 32(14) 35(17) 32(21) 46(35) 46(144) 61(192) 36(22) 29(13) 20(11) 26(16) 27(17) 27(12) 27(10) 27(12) 23(10) 28(184) 31(225) 33(232) 26(18) 28(132) 29(218) 25(66) 24(217) 
Abbey Life Pension and Annuities Ltd               247(208) 228(186) 226(162) 237(196) 236(177) 241(167) 79(205) 100(224) 84(229) 85(210) 84(210) 67(199) 
Aberdeen Asset Management Life and Pensions Ltd 142(117) 146(117) 144(107) 153(133) 162(145) 175(168) 189(178) 200(192) 210(205) 87(205) 81(83) 114(105) 143(122)              
Aberdeen Asset Management Pooled Pensions Ltd  140(93) 149(113) 157(143) 164(158) 176(171) 192(181) 202(187) 209(191) 214(212) 89(227) 75(230) 74(241) 79(247) 61(246) 31(220) 28(221) 24         
ACE Europe Life Ltd 119(67) 126(49) 118(44) 143                       
AEGON Insurance Co (UK) Ltd              231(184) 227(155) 207(143) 204(117) 218(149) 219(93) 225(63) 227(58) 242(151) 245(139) 228(127) 190(127) 191(86) 
Aetna Life Insurance Co Ltd                   164(164) 208(169) 191(167) 130(113) 138(194) 128(174) 132(130) 200(98) 
Aetna Pensions Ltd                     197(75) 202(128) 197(131) 180(116) 168(121) 159(87) 
Ageas Protect Ltd 121(70) 129(54) 115                        
ALAC (UK) Ltd              147(119) 145(99) 142(97) 151(105) 154(116) 156(152) 190(143) 186(135) 166(115) 173(165) 169(158) 164(110) 160(143) 
Alba Life Ltd      77(57) 76(46) 61(36) 47(23) 46(37) 52(49) 31(29) 30(29) 31(38) 35(73) 36(125) 38(216) 77(224) 72(218) 72(223) 58(222) 76(233) 65(238) 64(219) 58(211) 48(197) 
Albany Life Assurance Co Ltd             66(53) 67(42) 65(32) 65(33) 61(28) 55(29) 55(18) 60(18) 54(12) 45(21) 53(22) 59(20) 52(14) 63(11) 
All Counties Insurance Co Ltd         185(109) 204(156) 220(195) 225(201) 239(221) 242(212) 238(192) 218(166) 217(144) 229(173) 212(123) 216(92) 210(84) 223(176) 217(163) 204(153) 206(166) 204(133) 
Alliance and Leicester Life Assurance Co Ltd         112(132) 118(93) 120(112) 129(125) 132(131) 155(142) 157(185) 167           
Allianz Insurance plc       89(54) 91(52) 88(135) 97(74) 106(97) 102(98) 112(103) 116(109) 114(104) 117(165) 120(190) 122(122) 115(189) 118(193) 112(173) 108(82) 104(77) 113(60) 102(52) 106(54) 
Allied Dunbar Assurance plc       5(4) 6(5) 9(6) 7(4) 7(4) 7(3) 7(3) 7(3) 7(2) 6(2) 7(2) 5(2) 8(4) 9(16) 11(224) 4(2) 6(4) 7(5) 5(1) 11(8) 
Allied Dunbar Provident plc                      212(175) 210(161) 195(144) 197(167) 194(136) 
Ambassador Life Assurance Co Ltd              244(216) 241(199) 190(182) 179(170) 191(192) 181(156) 180(134) 164(124) 162(181) 160(190) 144(162) 140(172) 134(144) 
American Life Insurance Co UK Branch 143(130) 148(133) 154(138) 60(150) 73(159) 92(170) 99(179) 114(184) 72(184) 86(203) 94(223) 107(229) 111(239) 135(238) 140(229) 161(203) 230(200) 239(216) 186(203) 203(201) 161(187) 156(209) 249(222) 232(205) 187(201) 181(179) 
Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society Ltd (The) 126(89) 133(78) 125(70) 126(109) 132(124) 147(148) 150(140) 152(128) 146(125) 150(171) 166(207) 171(211) 175(223) 178(210) 173(186)            
Assicurazioni Generali                  116(203) 112(182) 122(174) 137(165) 177(208) 198(203) 197(187) 199(190) 190(158) 
Assurant Life Ltd 123(77) 121(62) 102(43) 139(98) 152(107) 161(124) 174(113) 177(96) 169(85) 188(136) 207(178) 210(180) 223(191)              
Australian Mutual Provident Society               38(40) 33(37) 31(35) 33(36) 26(50) 22(163) 23(168) 27(45) 81(78) 81(77) 83(78) 74(161) 
Aviva Annuity UK Ltd 9(138) 10(139) 9(136) 17(151) 19(141) 18(29) 17(32) 17(21) 17(12) 25(28) 21(37) 18(39) 14(22) 13(35)             
Aviva Insurance Ltd       169(97) 172(85) 163(74) 182(118) 200(183) 207(186) 217(196) 215(182) 210(150) 209(148) 203(124) 221(155) 218(100) 221(70) 219(64) 233(164) 230(151) 212(146) 216(164) 211(125) 
Aviva Insurance UK Ltd              160(225) 155(209) 172(183) 175(165) 183(182) 175(142) 176(121) 183(119) 191(186) 187(176) 174(123) 177(162)  
Aviva International Insurance Ltd                         21(226) 16(221) 
Aviva Investors Pensions Ltd 87(81) 138(88) 136(100) 59(39) 54(33) 56(33) 45(22) 39(22) 48(27) 48(30) 55(40) 39(26) 40(32) 42(25) 42(19) 42(20) 42(23) 40(25) 42(13) 43(21) 43(27) 44(27) 52(34) 62(48) 53(31) 49(44) 
Aviva Life and Pensions UK Ltd 3(115) 3(141) 4(149) 4(7) 4(6) 5(7) 6(12) 5(13) 5(9) 5(6) 6(9) 5(6) 6(7) 6(9)             
Avon Insurance plc                    119(139) 118(121) 134(178) 126(111) 126(105) 131(141) 128(97) 
AXA Annuity Co Ltd    114(94)                       
AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc           38(31) 44(41) 45(48) 19(40) 21(227) 24(217) 25(225) 28(231) 32(236) 71(243) 81(241) 8(4) 11(6) 10(9) 8(5) 14(28) 
AXA Wealth Ltd 138(107) 141(97) 138(88) 154(134) 44(37) 49(51) 54(79) 58(168) 66(181) 60(75) 82(72) 72(65) 77(65) 76(57) 79(49) 80(52) 87(55) 90(61) 89(42) 100(85) 109(41) 117(71) 132(67) 137(68) 124(86) 129(96) 
BandCE Insurance Ltd 94(90) 95(76) 94(74) 112(116) 118(118) 128(114) 136(119) 144(110) 137(80) 158(145) 195(203) 198(185) 209(184) 216(192) 209(147) 191(131)           
BA (GI) Ltd      46(45) 35(29) 32(19) 29(16) 33(21) 37(41) 45(66) 39(84) 40(243) 36(242) 46(229) 40(227) 44(241) 35(233) 32(238) 32(234) 39(243) 37(245) 36(223) 35(223) 31(215) 
Baillie Gifford Life Ltd 32(10) 36(7) 143(120) 48(33) 50(27) 55(32) 81(145) 119(172) 205(186) 119(195) 131(220) 111(111) 127(138)              
Barclays Life Assurance Co Ltd 29(13) 29(9) 30(15) 39(20) 40(23) 44(34) 47(40) 44(166) 94(152) 102(177) 109(109) 112(115) 122(125) 129(132) 125(162) 133(167) 134(151) 147(129) 151(79) 187(55)   203(115) 205(118) 211(133) 124(164) 
BLAC Ltd         36(21) 37(20) 39(22) 37(21) 37(25) 37(20) 39(18) 39(22) 43(37) 38(27) 48(180) 61(215) 74(216) 43(29) 46(26) 54(30) 55(24) 57(17) 
Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd               200(168) 186(158) 186(135) 201(164) 203(114) 206(84) 207(73) 224(171) 222(159) 207(148) 208(165) 207(128) 
BlackRock Asset Management Pensions Ltd 10(6) 17(136) 153(152) 7(3) 8(3) 8(9) 106(192) 203(203) 211(211) 215(215) 28(48) 25(16) 50(45) 83(68) 115(80) 130(93)           
BlackRock Pensions Ltd 47(19) 55(15) 69(22) 57(29) 71(41) 74(41) 70(43) 82(147) 199(178) 83(67) 85(66) 81(63) 91(75) 78(51) 107(74) 114(70) 142(92) 164(118) 169(66) 202(82) 205(51) 230(146)     
Bradford Insurance Co Ltd       179(115) 186(105) 178(96) 196(150) 215(190) 213(195) 222(208) 220(202) 219(177) 198(157) 198(134) 207(158) 210(103) 217(76) 216(68) 228(162) 226(150) 208(133) 210(160) 205(126) 
Britannia Life Association of Scotland Ltd                  118(225) 106(214) 80(220) 71(214) 89(230) 80(231) 74(211) 76(212) 61(203) 
Britannia Life Ltd (pre1994)                  91(51) 98(33) 101(27) 111(32) 119(74) 120(66) 127(69) 137(84) 145(76) 
Britannia Life Managed Pension Funds Ltd                  209(135) 226(110) 238(124) 240(129) 207(195) 181(209) 170(198) 152(124) 155(141) 
Britannic Unit Linked Assurance Ltd      121(163) 190(172) 198(182) 204(193) 93(210) 75(144) 113(102) 118(105) 119(95) 121(85) 121(84) 128(71) 140(95) 132(53) 150(44) 158(42) 158(102) 163(90) 153(98) 165(105) 183(83) 
British and European Reinsurance Co Ltd            226(203) 164(144) 171(144) 184(213) 165(184) 168(158) 172(180) 158(139) 159(123) 169(115) 181(167) 168(174) 154(136) 158(137) 149(154) 
British Airways Benefit Fund          180(122) 196(165) 200(167) 208(174) 211(166) 205(137)            
British Equitable Assurance Co Ltd          191(129) 206(184) 209(187) 218(197) 219(183) 211(154) 196(139) 195(112) 206(140) 206(85) 210(56) 214(53) 226(140) 225(130) 211(134) 212(161) 209(114) 
British Friendly Society Ltd 93(91) 93(77) 82(71) 106(102) 112(108) 122(131) 126(141) 124(131) 186(131) 203(166) 192(163) 190(160) 201(164) 205(161) 202(178)            
British Life Office Ltd        101(56) 101(62) 109(78) 115(101) 118(107) 128(120) 134(118) 133(103) 134(98) 143(97) 144(106) 146(68) 165(94) 176(78) 197(125) 204(114) 192(109) 195(128) 196(94) 
British National Life Assurance Co Ltd                  132(90) 145(74) 173(126) 195(126) 172(110) 172(108) 160(103) 157(95) 169(79) 
BUPA Health Assurance Ltd 127(87) 130(75) 121(66) 145(115) 154(133) 144(139) 151(134) 168(122) 192(134) 183(155) 198(191) 224(209) 195(211) 193(205) 218(175) 194(142) 192(113)          
Caledonian Insurance Co Ltd            123(120) 125(124) 131(223) 130(221) 132(201) 135(198) 139(204) 129(199) 128(180) 126(169) 138(216) 135(215) 132(197)   
Canada Life Assurance Co              65(50) 73(48) 67(26) 67(25) 57(13) 66(32) 57(9) 55(8) 55(7) 80(34) 82(24) 86(26) 98(36) 103(23) 
Canada Life Irish Operations Ltd                93(64) 95(65) 99(67) 94(69) 98(152) 103(146) 105(66) 110(61) 108(58) 106(63) 111(48) 
Canada Life Ltd 25(136) 26(142) 27(141) 31(147) 29(66) 31(53) 39(170) 37(181) 37(187) 40(70) 44(50) 42(47) 61(58) 68(56) 71(64) 84(60) 83(58) 95(80) 90(159) 96(171) 86(127) 86(55) 91(46) 100(54) 104(67) 109(70) 
Canterbury Life Assurance Co Ltd           164(136) 165(143) 178(158) 186(164) 191(188) 181(163) 215(153) 195(169) 189(143) 182(119) 181(106) 200(150) 208(167) 194(155) 191(135) 193(147) 
CCL Assurance Ltd                    240(198) 235(177) 149(204) 170(220) 166(203) 141(108) 146(80) 
Century Life Assurance        151(77) 127(97) 131(101) 129(116) 137(130) 149(136) 156(127) 177(159) 171           
Century Life plc      60(64) 60(63) 57(148) 50(163) 54(73) 63(93) 77(84) 64(73) 63(64) 56(60) 54(63) 53(80) 51(72) 37(36) 41(160) 116(137) 147(161) 133(184) 120(199) 118(126) 131(166) 
CGNU Life Assurance Ltd   18(86) 23(22) 33(72) 28(166) 26(174) 30(186) 28(161) 28(24) 30(32) 35(57) 35(80) 35(240) 33(240) 40(225) 45(223) 53(237) 51(232) 49(237) 42(233) 62(242) 45(244) 46(222) 46(221) 36(214) 
Cirencester Friendly Society Ltd 101(74) 107(61) 95(47) 116(84) 124(94) 134(106) 145(95) 146(84) 155(71) 172(117) 179(149) 178(150) 191(160) 201(185) 193(131)            
City of London Insurance Co Ltd       180(114) 187(101) 176(90) 198(144) 216(188) 218(189) 231(204) 232(195) 230(161) 210(149) 205(121) 216(152) 216(96) 223(64) 218(62) 234(158) 232(146) 218(138) 218(156) 216(118) 
City of Westminster Assurance Co Ltd      84(83) 83(151) 80(155) 68(158) 82(91) 92(100) 89(106) 90(108) 91(113) 153(216) 146(195) 148(186) 157(201) 133(171) 126(155) 121(140) 131(119) 122(104) 124(171) 123(186) 114(172) 
City of Westminster Assurance Society Ltd                  179(139) 171(122) 168(98) 174(92) 185(127) 177(116) 164(112) 163(132) 161(105) 
Civil Servants Annuities Assurance Society           177(155) 180(163) 189(167) 194(162)             
Clerical Medical and General Life Assurance Society                18(8) 17(6) 20(7) 18(5) 19(3) 19(3) 20(8) 20(3) 24(6) 24(4) 28(14) 
Clerical Medical Investment Group Ltd 23(22) 20(107) 22(65) 29(36) 25(36) 16(27) 11(19) 10(14) 14(34) 13(15) 14(23) 17(37) 17(28) 18(47) 17            
Clerical Medical Managed Fund Ltd 38(18) 42(21) 26(125) 26(18) 28(21) 30(23) 37(28) 36(29) 45(167) 42(26) 46(30) 47(31) 53(37) 51(30) 53(24) 51(21) 56(20) 48(26) 59(19) 74(29) 97(156) 75(39) 88(52) 90(64) 79(38) 86(52) 
Colonial Mutual Life (Unit Assurances) Ltd               148(105) 147(104) 156(142) 162(120) 173(149) 181(127) 179(118) 173(111) 180(121) 171(114) 178(125) 177(106) 
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd               47(23) 45(18) 46(18) 45(28) 34(8) 30(6) 30(8) 24(6) 24(2) 35(35) 40(104) 34(193) 
Combined Insurance Co of America (UK Branch) 113(61) 118(45) 108(34) 135(86) 144(97) 149(104) 161(92) 140(71) 140(73) 160(125) 224(210) 230(216) 197(214) 214(219) 245(198) 222(170) 190(154) 177(125) 168(119) 174(122) 144(102) 176(126) 179(109) 163(93) 160(98) 150(49) 
Commercial Union Assurance (Unit Trusts) Ltd                          183(174) 168(100) 
Commercial Union Life Assurance Co Ltd   11(5) 18(16) 26(34) 23(38) 16(30) 15(32) 16(15) 15(13) 17(20) 29(32) 27(36) 26(41) 25(84) 26(96) 21(178) 27(213) 23(216) 26(231) 25(229) 30(239) 25(234) 23(139) 221(158) 218(120) 
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Communication Workers Friendly Society Ltd 124(100) 124(87) 98(81) 108(119) 115(129) 123(127) 129(135) 130(127) 126(133) 143(172) 143(131) 147(142) 157(152) 162(143) 164(120) 154(118) 166(143) 188(171) 176(120) 172(87) 170(44) 192(135) 189(123)    
Compass Friendly Society Ltd 117(68) 127(51) 116(39) 142(91) 150(102) 163(118) 176(104) 182(94) 175(83) 195(135) 214(181) 216(184) 227(195) 227(181) 222            
Confederation Life Insurance Co                  241(222) 240(231) 246(234) 244(228) 248(234) 252(235) 234(212) 233(214) 229(204) 
Confederation Life Insurance Co (UK) Ltd            90(97) 75(69) 93(78) 89(72) 86(67) 85(56) 78(53) 91(30) 91(22) 92(23) 87(48) 96(43) 95(47) 114(50) 125(41) 
Consolidated Life Assurance Co Ltd               244(226) 160(205) 180(201) 173(210) 152(175) 156(166) 155(139) 188(196) 200(182) 202(163) 205(177) 202(142) 
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd 18(11) 16(108) 14(4) 22(21) 17(18) 12(12) 9(11) 9(8) 8(7) 11(9) 9(10) 10(14) 10(14) 10(19) 10(20) 10(32) 9(98) 14(235) 13(226) 12(232) 10(230) 18(240) 14(246) 14(224) 13(218) 12(192) 
Countrywide Assured plc 73(97) 75(98) 133(106) 78(69) 84(73) 106(144) 113(157) 113(158) 132(159) 113(179) 118(113) 124(119) 129(129) 133(128) 146(122) 175(127) 219(152) 231(166) 230(137) 235(113) 237(99) 189(144) 237(135)    
Criterion Insurance Co Ltd                      235(155) 234(145) 216(137) 223(155) 221(121) 
Crown Life Assurance Co Ltd                 131(59) 134(76) 127(48) 133(46) 129(37) 106(54) 105(53) 99(63) 100(49) 102(39) 
Crown Life Insurance Co            164(168) 167(180) 174(218) 170(203) 159(179) 161(159) 171(181) 155(115) 149(100) 143(82) 168(132) 154(103) 146(94) 143(107) 133(55) 
Crown Life Pensions Ltd                 124(87) 120(84) 123(160) 94(195) 93(184) 85(61) 97(81) 112(173) 108(85) 110(74) 
Cuna Mutual Insurance Society      162(132) 173(125) 179(114) 174(107) 197(157) 211(196) 220(202) 230(215) 236(207) 214(182) 197(160) 197(138) 210(163) 208(109) 215(78) 215(66) 229(159) 233(147) 219(140) 222(157) 220(117) 
Customs Annuity and Benevolent Fund Inc        148(76) 138(64) 154(106) 169(146) 174(157) 180(162) 182(159) 181(129) 170(121) 172(120) 189(131) 178(82) 177(68) 180(71) 199(130) 193(125) 181(111) 182(142) 176(137) 
Dentists and General Mutual Benefit Society Ltd 107(78) 113(65) 103(56) 123(99) 130(110) 140(123) 148(126) 156(121) 180(111) 181(149) 186(162) 206(199) 199(170) 203(167) 201(136)            
Dentists Provident Society Ltd 85(46) 86(34) 79(29) 101(67) 108(80) 119(94) 123(80) 121(66) 139(68) 140(89) 154(128) 152(138) 160(139) 166(134) 171(119)            
Direct Line Life Insurance Co Ltd 130(92) 132(79) 119(67) 138(117) 143(132) 145(145) 149(136) 184(134) 145(108) 176(159) 218(200) 204(198) 219(212) 233(204) 231(180) 185(153)           
Domestic and General Life Assurance Co Ltd    132(85) 141(96) 152(108) 160(98) 165(87) 151(70) 166(113) 183(157) 192(164) 207(181) 209(172) 206(140) 192(136) 191(109)          
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd 125(75) 131(60) 123(49) 148(104) 157(115) 168(133) 183(127) 199(170) 201(171) 213(202) 228(224) 233(231) 243(240) 250(244) 251(237) 232(221) 232(219) 242(232) 239(223) 245(233) 8(243) 11(247) 9(251) 5(233) 6(229) 6(226) 
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc         95(44) 115(84) 130(118) 138(134) 141(141) 143(146) 141(191) 138(172) 139(155) 149(187) 134(161) 132(140) 131(132) 151(192) 145(195) 143(186) 147(200) 141(171) 
Ecclesiastical Life Ltd 100(54) 79(86) 71(83) 95(121) 99(135) 111(153) 109(148) 107(149) 159(146) 152(188) 160(215) 157(224) 161(232) 164(231) 159(218) 150(198) 153(188) 158(207) 144(173) 145(168) 159(163) 175(214) 167(206) 162(170) 169(184) 165(153) 
Edinburgh Assurance Co Ltd               249(224) 230(204) 229(204) 238(217) 237(202) 243(210) 243(211) 194(228) 250(233) 149(215) 113(213) 90(207) 
Equitable Life Assurance Society (The) 135(98) 145(113) 131(73) 90(49) 79(43) 24(16) 21(9) 20(6) 12(4) 8(7) 5(6) 6(7) 5(5) 5(5) 5(8) 5(15) 5(53) 6(8) 7(219) 7(218) 7(220) 6(13) 8(11) 9(14) 15(13) 15(4) 
Equity and Law (Managed Funds) Ltd                    56(15) 65(18) 69(36) 74(38) 60(46) 45(25) 47(31) 
Esano London Friendly Society        171(91) 164(84) 186(140)                 
Eurolife Assurance Co Ltd       130(76) 126(58) 99(37) 114(72) 103(92) 115(109) 117(109) 126(111) 129(118) 158(117) 218(157) 227(190) 225(140) 192(117) 184(103) 205(183) 207(179) 190(165) 192(181) 188(155) 
Exeter Friendly Society Ltd 109(64) 115(48) 104(37)                        
FandC Managed Pension Funds Ltd 98(53) 109(80) 135(92) 85(59) 87(62) 94(73) 111(146) 110(157) 118(172) 78(65) 78(67) 68(60) 83(63) 82(61) 86(52) 90(51) 94(54) 100(64) 105(43) 129(54) 142(96) 139(92) 152(88) 158(101) 159(100) 170(91) 
Family Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 65(41) 62(26) 58(82) 71(52) 76(55) 76(62) 74(51) 67(45) 56(40) 65(54) 76(69) 69(71) 71(79) 74(80) 73(82) 71(90) 73(192) 84(85) 77(197) 90(203) 98(195) 95(96) 98(199)    
Fidelity Life Assurance Ltd       162(94) 166(81) 158(67) 174(112) 184(153) 188(161) 196(163) 197(151) 192(124) 180(119) 182(102) 197(132) 195(80) 204(53) 201(47) 214(134) 216(122) 200(117) 200(134) 198(101) 
FIL Life Insurance Ltd 67(29) 83(31) 59(12) 68(37) 77(46) 80(48) 103(64) 131(145) 196(166) 209(184) 159(134) 158(137) 216(179)              
Financial Assurance Co Ltd 140(113) 142(105) 137(97) 156(137) 163(149) 174(162) 117(120)                    
First National Assurance Ltd             233(200) 235(191) 233(160) 212(147) 208(122) 223(153) 220(97) 226(65) 228(59) 243(154) 244(141) 229(132) 229(153) 227(108) 
Fleming Life Ltd           125(123) 128(129) 135(134) 154(130) 175(171) 200(144) 202(114) 217(146) 217(90) 224(61) 220(56) 236(149) 236(137) 223(128) 226(149) 223(110) 
Forester Life Ltd 72(48) 69(39) 66(68) 91(71) 94(77) 103(89) 105(75) 99(57) 86(48) 106(83) 121(110) 126(121) 126(121) 130(124) 128(200) 120(100)           
Friends Life Assurance Society Ltd 36(120) 28(116) 17(94) 24(38) 27(50) 19(25) 15(18) 14(15) 15(13) 14(16) 16(26) 15(35) 15(43) 14(246) 13(249) 11(228) 11(228) 12(240) 12(238) 11(244) 14(242) 19(248) 15(250) 13(232) 12(230) 10(225) 
Friends Life Co Ltd 8(139) 8(146) 8(153) 9(152) 43(162) 36(173) 27(189) 27(194) 25(185) 29(60) 225(214) 231(221) 237(228) 247(226)             
Friends Provident (London and Manchester) Assurance Ltd            66(62) 68(60) 70(53) 59(38) 55(36) 50(27) 50(42) 43(22) 39(13) 36(13) 41(43) 39(44) 42(59) 41(47) 35(196) 
Friends Provident Life and Pensions Ltd 33(137) 27(143) 15(144) 16(154) 14(160) 9(161) 8(185) 8(197) 7(202) 9(207)                 
Friends Provident Life Assurance Ltd 50(122) 46(122) 68(117) 62(130) 57(63) 67(93) 73(168) 81(174) 81(177) 71(194) 72(86) 67(83) 78(117) 86(242) 96(239) 91(219) 86(220) 65(227) 67(222) 44(221) 53(225) 40(47) 41(56) 38(13) 59(32) 66(176) 
Friends Provident Life Office           11(18) 13(48) 11(18) 15(76) 15(244) 13(216) 13(217) 19(234) 15(235) 15(242) 16(239) 12(244) 10(249) 21(231) 22(228) 21(222) 
Friends Provident Linked Life Assurance Ltd             92(70) 101(70) 103(61) 113(73) 121(76) 123(73) 142(95) 195(157) 239(160) 132(80) 156(110) 155(164) 150(80) 162(61) 
Friends Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd             69(54) 75(49) 63(34) 69(38) 67(31) 67(41) 66(24) 79(30) 76(39) 71(40) 79(37) 78(37) 71(34) 69(33) 
Friends Provident Pensions Ltd 35(135) 40(140) 146(146) 30(25) 31(29) 38(44) 48(175) 55(190) 85(199) 58(204) 54(71) 56(58) 70(61) 72(63) 77(62) 76(62) 82(106) 75(57) 86(169) 106(202) 119(201) 116(215) 116(216) 116(184) 116(188) 115(177) 
Friends Provident Reinsurance Services Ltd  99(40) 65(16) 93(55) 93(59) 89(55) 79(33)                    
GE Frankona Reassurance Ltd      108(156) 116(154) 115(150) 103(140) 125(183) 136(209) 143(217) 142(140) 146(138) 139(113) 128(103) 137(167) 205(151) 209(91) 218       
GE Keynes Holdings Ltd        75(27) 89(32) 104(62) 111(95) 104(104) 94(102) 100(114) 126(223) 227(208) 228(205) 174(214) 140(188) 163(181) 171(159) 190(212) 190(213) 184(192) 185(196) 174(167) 
General Accident Pensions Management               226(145) 202(131) 119(63) 121(82) 110(47) 109(33) 114(35) 111(68) 106(58) 102(56) 96(68) 91(56) 
General Reinsurance Life UK Ltd    125(112) 134(122) 131(115) 134(101) 138(89) 119(60) 141(108) 155(139) 166(154) 168(151) 177(152) 178(130) 182           
General Reinsurance UK Ltd                179(122) 183(125)          
Gisborne Life Assurance Co Ltd            85(86) 84(86) 90(90) 84(83) 89(99) 84(164) 94(111) 92(198) 84(183) 100(188) 112(202) 102(120) 98(172) 99(82) 85(46) 
GL and P plc              64(39) 62(30) 72(44) 68(30) 88(56) 117(194) 108(154) 102(33) 129(94) 151(107) 135(57) 162(102) 171(95) 
Global General and Reinsurance Co Ltd       181(109) 190(109) 183(102) 206(163) 221(199) 227(204) 240(218) 243(209) 239(190) 219(164) 222(146) 234(178) 232(138) 236(115) 238(113) 246(200) 247(208) 230(193) 231(204) 228(190) 
Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd                    86(173) 80(153) 103(189) 85(98) 84(83) 86(179) 75(163) 
Gresham Unit Assurance Ltd                    155(42) 173(87) 144(83) 147(73) 148(78) 139(71) 147(57) 
Growth and Secured Life Assurance Society Ltd            221(193) 229(206) 230(200) 221(173) 199(155) 194(132) 199(156) 199(108) 200(71) 200(60) 215(143) 215(133) 199(122) 201(147) 197(124) 
Guardian Assurance plc 55(132) 53(131) 37(123) 46(144) 48(155) 48(159) 38(164) 28(167) 27(169) 30(51) 31(55) 33(61) 24(46) 21(91) 19(235) 17(215) 18(218) 17(126) 17(228) 14(235) 15(237) 14(227) 12(237) 11(226) 14(231) 5(1) 
Guardian Eastern Insurance Co Ltd            222(192) 235(205) 238(197) 236(169) 215(156) 212(130) 224(157) 221(102) 230(72) 231(65) 245(160) 246(153) 206(149) 209(168) 208(139) 
Guardian Linked Life Assurance Ltd 70(37) 67(25) 64(28) 74(46) 80(52) 83(60) 82(50) 79(47) 69(136) 76(58) 86(73) 82(70) 82(66) 81(71) 80(54) 77(58) 80(83) 73(60) 76(174) 97(206) 91(206) 61(42) 66(69) 77(207) 67(46) 77(37) 
Guardian Pensions Management Ltd 133(94) 137(83) 132(80) 151(118) 160(131) 157(121) 158(89) 105(50) 100(49) 101(66) 107(89) 101(89) 108(90) 114(85) 110(69) 96(59) 93(49) 93(59) 81(46) 78(177) 72(171) 54(30) 63(39) 73(73) 66(40) 64(21) 
Halifax Life Ltd 141(116) 147(125) 152(129) 80(44) 88(51) 45(43) 61(180) 85(193) 208(203) 81(208) 90(82) 91(85) 110(101) 125(110) 142(109) 155(112)           
Hamilton Life Assurance Co Ltd   128(64) 110(74) 114(81) 124(95) 131(81) 129(60) 128(53) 121(82) 137(115) 141(127) 150(123) 153(122) 162(121) 226(176) 181(168) 186(184) 174(134) 175(112) 162(90) 208(180) 212(162) 201(150) 213(170) 213(134) 
Hannover Life Reassurance (UK) Ltd 92(99) 97(85) 86(77) 115(122) 122(134) 127(142) 138(143) 132(136) 125(122) 148(174) 170(208) 187(214) 185(217) 218(220) 240(201) 221(177) 223(156) 232(183) 228(135) 233(109) 217(100) 220(182) 214(172) 198(152) 202(169) 210(123) 
Hannover Standard Life        193(133) 191(127) 207(170) 223(205)                
Health Shield Friendly Society Ltd 105(58) 114(52) 120(55) 113(79) 123(89) 141(105) 157(111) 164(113) 157(105) 164(116) 174(147) 181(155) 187(159) 188(148) 189(125)            
Hearts of Oak Insurance Co Ltd     95(78) 100(86) 95(74) 93(63) 84(59) 105(86) 114(106) 117(114) 121(115) 121(115) 119(111)            
Hermes Assured Ltd     12(7) 17(10) 34(16) 38(24) 200(188) 67(98) 65(62) 61(54) 76(76) 84(84)             
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (from1995)              56(46) 55(37) 58(49) 77(70) 86(102) 100(210) 53(197) 85(198) 74(56) 71(55) 40(11) 57(26) 72(32) 
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (pre 1995)                 65(41) 63(46) 60(41) 52(26) 57(172) 57(46) 49(29) 58(39) 42(12) 46(3) 
Hiscox Insurance Co Ltd            177(210) 184(225) 184(222) 183(204) 173(180) 178(161) 192(188) 184(145) 179(116) 182(117) 195(187) 188(187) 172(176) 176(183) 158(157) 
Hodge Life Assurance Co Ltd 83(43) 82(29) 72(23) 99(66) 106(74) 115(88) 121(69) 116(61) 115(55) 137(99) 153(150) 168(212) 171(227) 176(224) 174(212) 164(190) 169(171) 181(191) 183(157) 186(135) 187(128) 193(191) 192(183) 188(175) 194(180) 195(99) 
Homeowners Friendly Society Ltd 80(108) 94(100) 90(93) 94(131) 97(143) 104(160) 100(162) 98(163) 107(164) 112(197) 122(219) 121(226) 123(238) 123(239) 113(233) 112(212) 96(211) 101(220) 78(207) 73(208) 69(189) 98(217) 93(212)    
HSBC Life (UK) Ltd 43(15) 44(11) 40(11) 41(19) 47(25) 52(28) 57(27) 56(23) 52(25) 53(31) 57(43) 58(40) 56(40) 59(36) 78(50) 92(77) 91(66) 110(91) 177(200) 120(118) 168(155) 169(114) 223(157)    
Ideal Benefit Society (The)        134(69) 116(57) 133(90) 145(137) 148(148) 155(156) 159(157) 156(167)            
Imperial Life (UK) Ltd                       248(170) 231(166) 154(97) 167(84) 
Independent Order of Foresters                 127(199) 126(194) 119(196) 124(190) 123(182) 136(218) 125(224) 119(200) 122(203) 113(178) 
Independent Order of Odd Fellows Manchester Unity Friendly Society        128(123) 113(119) 132(138) 142(151) 144(149) 159(165) 167(163) 166(132)            
IntegraLife UK Ltd 41(39) 41(82) 41(96) 56(53) 81(67) 97(87) 119(87) 120(132) 122(126) 147(121) 158(138) 163(162) 166(171) 169(213) 169(205) 162(189) 167(173) 176(197) 167(163) 161(144) 151(138) 178(198) 157(185) 139(96) 142(123) 143(159) 
Invesco Life Ltd           202                
Invesco Perpetual Life Ltd 75(40) 72(28) 78(33) 84(51) 92(60) 101(72) 118(65) 125(68) 153(137) 156(169) 156(127) 176(156)               
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Investment Solutions Ltd 90(49) 89(37) 134(85) 105(75) 107(75) 116(85) 128(83) 150(86) 188(121) 167(119) 197(168) 201(173) 211(187) 213(175)             
Irish Life Assurance plc                  109(74) 111(78) 115(130) 113(76) 122(93) 139(191) 142(177) 138(111) 140(81) 
Irish Progressive Life Assurance Co Ltd             101(85) 108(83) 118(94) 125(113) 133(182) 131(119) 233(204) 127(188) 117(178) 93(64) 89(45) 105(84) 107(72)  
JPMorgan Life Ltd 69(34) 87(101) 145(119) 61(40) 69(44) 85(61) 187(160) 196(171) 206(189) 116(198) 108(105) 99(93) 137(137) 172(150)             
Just Retirement Ltd 60(27) 74(36) 84(84) 111(127) 119(121) 138                     
Kensington Friendly Collecting Society Ltd 111(65) 117(50) 107(42) 130(88) 142(98) 154(112) 165(105) 169(97) 161(94) 175(124) 190(164) 196(169) 206(182) 206(171)             
Kingston Unity Friendly Society        155(125) 143(117) 162(162) 176(194)                
Lancashire and Yorkshire Assurance Society                 171(166) 167(179) 154(153) 153(142) 147(130) 165(156) 166(173)    
LAS Investment Assurance Ltd                  175(193) 235(187) 242(191) 242(183) 155(108) 184(217) 189(204) 146(81) 186(180) 
LAS Pensions Management Ltd                  146(113) 136(118) 138(114) 128(112) 128(91) 131(79) 134(88) 130(87) 137(73) 
Leeds Life Assurance Ltd                 176(123)          
Legal and General (Unit Assurance) Ltd                     64(116) 46(25) 50(31) 49(27) 38(15) 42(15) 
Legal and General (Unit Pensions) Ltd                     127(196) 104(67) 127(210) 133(195) 129(94) 139(131) 
Legal and General Assurance (Pensions Management) Ltd 1(2) 1(13) 1(155) 1(1) 1(1) 1(2) 2(6) 3(201) 3(210) 2(8) 2(2) 1(1) 2(2) 3(2) 6(3) 8(3) 10(8) 10(4) 19(7) 20(17) 26(34) 25(10) 31(13) 32(29) 18(17) 13(201) 
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 6(4) 5(2) 5(99) 6(5) 6(8) 4(4) 4(3) 4(3) 4(3) 4(2) 4(5) 4(4) 4(4) 4(6) 4(16) 4(14) 4(50) 4(13) 4(227) 4(230) 4(217) 5(79) 4(19) 4(21) 4(62) 4(227) 
Liberty Life Assurance Co Ltd                 110(47) 117(83) 116(62) 113(34) 110(22) 133(84) 137(65) 114(41) 109(57) 120(40) 
Liberty Re Ltd           204(170) 182(223) 152(149) 157(156)             
Life Insurance Corporation of India 104(96) 106(84) 97(78) 120(123) 129(137) 137(154) 143(149) 145(142) 135(139) 155(181) 171(212) 179(220) 182(231) 183(229) 179(215) 168(193) 170(177) 187(200) 172(162) 167(138) 166(131) 187(197) 175(196) 165(180) 161(191) 156(160) 
Lincoln Assurance Ltd (pre 1996)               70(45) 66(45) 74(45) 87(52) 87(37) 92(47) 96(104) 88(50) 90(50) 93(52) 91(56) 99(198) 
Lindsey House Friendly Society        175(115) 181(115) 184(153)                 
Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society Ltd 40(133) 38(132) 35(132) 77(153) 74(161) 73(174) 59(188) 52(195) 42(195) 55(214) 68(228) 76(233) 67(243) 57(250) 50(248) 49(226) 44(224) 49(238) 40(225) 33(228) 29(223) 36(232) 32(230)    
Liverpool Victoria Life Co Ltd 136(102) 143(104) 140(104) 66(64) 70(68) 72(70) 72(155) 73(160) 60(160) 69(88) 133(122) 139(131) 136(127) 150(145) 151(183) 151(175) 154(148) 166(170) 160(141) 160(108) 157(79) 180(122) 182(112) 178(129) 180(136) 173(146) 
Lloyds Bowmaker Assurance Ltd                 213(131) 230(167) 202(125) 205(96) 199(88) 209(177) 206(168) 193(157) 193(173) 192(138) 
London and Edinburgh Life Assurance Co Ltd            175(219) 179(229) 195(227) 212(211) 225(187) 220(169) 220(195) 196(136) 193(106) 189(83) 211(169) 224(144) 221   
London Aberdeen and Northern Mutual Assurance Society Ltd     135(116) 135(128) 144(132) 143(124) 133(116) 144(109) 144(126) 145(133) 154(143) 161(137) 167(116) 157(114) 164(127) 184(133) 182(126) 191(107) 193(107) 201(170) 201(177) 186(168) 186(159) 184(140) 
London General Life Co Ltd 120(71) 123(53) 113(40) 137(89) 147(100) 158(111) 171(102) 174(90) 167(76) 177(115) 194(159) 202(165) 210(172) 208(158) 197(123) 137(83) 147(64) 153(94) 159(55) 194(49)       
London Life Association Ltd                       29(25) 28(17) 31(44) 32(75) 
London Life Linked Assurances Ltd      114(91) 120(77) 112(64) 106(69) 110(80) 117(104) 119(110) 120(107) 120(101) 117(92) 116(88) 105(81) 113(93) 108(67) 104(97) 105(101) 110(77) 112(72) 107(81) 111(73) 118(60) 
London Life Ltd 88(121) 101(123) 76(115) 81(140) 65(156) 61(167) 58(177) 50(185) 38(179) 43(192) 48(99) 51(94) 44(112) 41(125) 127(102) 123(94) 123(86) 133(104) 128(71) 136(99) 146(97) 118(73) 109(63) 88(53) 81(51) 68(53) 
Lucida plc 77(45) 77(35) 75(25)                        
M and G Life Assurance Co Ltd           70(54) 74(59) 72(55) 58(31) 57(22) 57(24) 55(15) 56(31) 70(38) 45(10) 52(14) 42(17) 44(17) 33(3) 60(19) 73(22) 
M and G Pensions and Annuity Co Ltd           66(52) 60(56) 57(57) 50(33) 52(25) 52(26) 48(16) 54(35) 54(27) 42(11) 51(17) 49(26) 54(23) 39(7) 70(33) 76(45) 
Managed Pension Funds Ltd 11(3) 14(3) 19(13) 10(4) 10(4) 11(5) 20(8) 31(12)                   
Manchester Unity Life Insurance Collecting Society             186(220) 185(217) 182(196) 174(168) 173(145) 190(176) 179(124) 178(91) 185(81) 206(172) 202(152)    
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co Ltd                 107(52) 98(54) 85(28) 83(19) 75(11) 96(62) 92(47) 89(55) 87(59) 87(30) 
Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance Society 59(42) 60(32) 53(26) 67(47) 72(56) 75(59) 69(47) 68(43) 57(42) 72(63) 88(90) 94(103) 93(99) 103(120) 100(222) 107(209) 112(210) 108(219) 102(211) 85(216) 66(212) 73(222) 61(225) 61(194) 63(185) 52(194) 
Markel International Insurance Co Ltd    144(92) 151(101) 164(117) 177(103) 181(92) 173(79) 192(131) 212(177) 214(179) 226(192) 229(179) 228(151) 193(134) 196(108) 211(144) 213(89) 219(60) 224(55) 238(147) 241   225(111) 
Marks and Spencer Life Assurance Ltd 86(57) 90(74) 85(79) 103(73) 109(83) 117(101) 124(122) 123(135) 129(138) 138(152) 152(142) 160(144) 173(150) 180(140) 188(117) 177(111)           
Medical Sickness Annuity and Life Assurance Society Ltd               90(77) 88(68) 92(74) 111(198) 99(170) 89(148) 84(109) 113(193) 108(197) 109(189) 110(193) 100(184) 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Ltd (The)              249(248) 250(241) 231(222) 231(222) 240(233) 238(221) 244(226) 236(226) 123(235) 113(239) 96(217) 93(216) 80(209) 
Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd 46(24) 48(16) 46(14) 52(32) 60(40) 66(46) 68(37) 70(38) 65(46) 68(45) 80(64) 79(67) 88(83) 85(73) 83(63) 82(57) 79(48) 74(50) 95(181) 95(196) 90(175) 84(60) 94(75) 103(190) 95(65) 95(182) 
MetLife Assurance Ltd 68(50) 68(38) 73(31) 155(135)                       
MetLife Ltd 129(82) 134(70) 122(63) 147(110) 156(125) 167(146) 178(137) 185(126) 182(114) 205(165) 222(204) 229(207) 241(224) 245(214) 242(194) 224(169) 221(147) 233(175) 231(128) 234(105) 234(93) 225(184) 228(175) 215(161) 220(176) 203(148) 
Metropolitan Police Friendly Society Ltd 95(56) 96(44) 88(32) 107(76) 120(93) 133(143) 140(124) 139(103) 131(86) 146(110) 161(145) 167(153) 169(155) 170(149) 176(184) 169(171) 174(149) 193(174) 187(131) 183(103) 192(98) 196(137) 194(166)    
Monarch Assurance plc 82(44) 80(33) 70(24) 98(68) 104(79) 113(92) 114(68) 108(54) 108(56) 127(96) 140(132) 142(139) 153(153) 152(135) 150(114)            
Munich Reinsurance Co United Kingdom Life Branch        96(156) 98(145) 117(187) 135(218) 151(227) 151(234) 165(233) 163(219) 166(196) 189(189) 185(209) 180(168) 171(150) 178(143) 213(205) 213(205) 196(182) 196(195) 175(169) 
National Deposit Friendly Society Ltd 84(55) 84(41) 77(60) 97(72) 103(82) 112(98) 115(84) 111(72) 105(91) 122(103) 134(129) 136(136) 140(146) 139(139) 136(128)            
National Employers' Life Assurance Co Ltd                    99(178) 94(166) 109(203) 95(202) 92(191) 90(198) 84(187) 
National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 24(23) 24(18) 24(7) 34(26) 38(30) 40(31) 36(25) 35(17) 32(17) 35(27) 40(34) 41(34) 38(31) 36(21) 41(33) 38(30) 36(25) 39(40) 39(172) 40(211) 39(203) 55(220) 43(84) 47(67) 49(117) 41(62) 
National Financial Management Corporation plc                     150(190) 97(58) 114(68) 79(22) 112(55) 136(59) 
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd                        51(19) 62(194) 53(168) 
National Mutual Life Assurance Society         35(26) 45(47) 49(61) 55(64) 51(67) 53(112) 54(228) 60(206) 60(202) 72(211) 62(201) 58(179) 48(114) 78(100) 69(62) 67(51) 80(118) 71(185) 
National Mutual Pensions Ltd                204(133) 116(95) 128(87) 137(49) 154(36) 160(30) 179(101) 186(92) 179(90) 175(92) 157(90) 
National Provident Institution            11(9) 13(11) 12(18) 12(13) 15(17) 16(19) 16(19) 14(14) 17(25) 17(28) 22(41) 22(40) 22(32) 26(48) 26(191) 
National Provident Life Ltd 137(131) 43(128) 33(121) 44(142) 42(148) 35(65) 29(166) 26(175) 22(156) 20(59) 13(57)                
National Westminster Life Assurance Ltd 139(106) 144(106) 147(111) 100(63) 110(71) 172(149) 191(171) 201(179) 82(201) 44(53) 42(33) 38(25) 43(39) 61(50) 72(53) 81(54) 130(197) 119(105)         
Nationwide Life Ltd 96(51) 88(30) 62(19) 82(60) 86(61) 86(67) 88(61) 84(59) 74(110) 100(95) 112(108) 109(101) 115(104) 127(104) 168(193) 178(146)           
NEL Britannia Assurance Co Ltd                    239(147) 241(147) 170(105) 199(186) 224(188) 167(99) 189(113) 
NEL Pensions Ltd                    76(212) 68(208) 82(223) 75(228) 69(209) 74(208) 58(200) 
NM Life Ltd     82(109) 81(80) 71(44) 72(34) 62(29) 94(79) 110(124) 130(218) 139(226) 246(230) 248(217) 229(199) 227(185) 236(212) 229(176) 189(159) 188(144) 182(163) 162(87) 176(113) 189(178) 185(156) 
NM Pensions Ltd     51(154) 53(169) 55(183) 43(176) 41(180)                  
Northern Assurance Co Ltd             62(59) 71(60) 74(57) 73(74) 78(195) 71(70) 84(206) 116(219) 141(221) 91(226) 99(236) 87(213) 85(209) 88(205) 
Norwich Union Asset Management Ltd                   69(29) 70(32) 62(38) 56(38) 60(51) 57(86) 48(37) 70(43) 
Norwich Union Life (RBS) Ltd           100(78) 98(78) 102(78) 104(62) 104(44) 97(41) 102(32) 41(23) 22(17) 18(153) 18(207) 13(7) 18(7) 20(8) 23(7) 30(6) 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society                2(236) 2(223) 2(231) 2(5) 2(237) 2(241) 2(215) 2(5) 2(20) 2(214) 2(232) 2(228) 
Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Ltd       12(169) 16(196) 24(208) 17(35) 12(15) 12(18) 23(21) 24(23) 26(35) 85(79) 90(88) 92(68) 93(65) 88(129) 87(91) 94(70) 83(48) 80(38) 78(41) 79(183) 
Nottingham Oddfellows Assurance Friendly Society Ltd   101(48) 127(93) 137(104) 148(122) 154(116) 162(100) 149(93) 173(142) 187(186) 194(188) 203(203) 198(193) 194(164)            
NPI Annuities Ltd             99(114) 107(234) 106(231) 105(210) 97(209) 83(99) 139(76) 139(125) 132(133) 125(88) 129(94) 130(97) 125(83) 135(64) 
NPI Ltd 66(125) 78(126) 141(130) 58(139) 55(157) 71(172) 77(187) 78(198) 124(204) 66(213) 67(225)                
NRG London Reinsurance Co Ltd             228(194) 222(186) 220(153) 211(140) 207(119) 222(150) 198(133) 185(110) 172(110) 203(188) 196(181) 185(169) 184(182) 178(152) 
NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd                  137(202) 126(186) 147(187) 140(170) 163(210) 153(211) 141(178) 133(144) 121(170) 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Ltd            92(96) 87(92) 94(99) 87(96) 87(194)  68(58) 71(191) 75(200) 82(192) 101(103) 101(178) 110(183) 103(79) 104(127) 
Omnilife Insurance Co Ltd 118(73) 125(57) 111(41) 146(101) 153(112) 165(125) 182(117) 188(102) 171(87) 187(130) 208(182) 219(190) 234(207) 224(187) 225(157) 205(141) 199(111) 213(142)         
Original Holloway Friendly Society Ltd (The) 116(80) 119(64) 109(50) 131(103) 140(113) 151(130) 156(121) 154(106) 162(99) 178(146) 191(175) 193(171) 204(183) 202(173) 199(149)            
PA (GI) Ltd       108(167) 94(164) 71(154) 79(193) 84(98) 88(122) 89(236) 92(241) 81(234) 79(214) 75(212) 80(221) 75(212) 63(214) 49(202) 68(211) 57(221) 53(74) 54(187) 40(206) 
Pacific Life Re Ltd 102(95) 103(81) 92(75) 152(125) 161(138) 173(155) 188(150) 195(143) 194(143) 211(182) 226(213) 232(222) 242(233) 248(232) 246(220) 220(197) 224(184) 196(205) 185(167) 197(149) 167(148) 186(206) 178(200) 175(181) 172(189) 166(162) 
Partnership Life Assurance Co Ltd 89(88) 92(42) 124(76) 128(113) 138(117) 142(113)                     
Paternoster UK Ltd 63(118) 58(112) 56(109) 76(124) 113(106)                      
Pearl Assurance (Unit Funds) Ltd      107(68) 104(49) 97(44) 87(36) 91(55) 98(80) 95(79) 98(71) 95(67) 88(48) 83(48) 81(39) 82(48) 80(32) 87(51) 88(142) 72(44) 77(49) 75(50) 82(43) 96(38) 
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Pearl Assurance (Unit Linked Pensions) Ltd      99(79) 96(73) 100(75) 97(144) 103(81) 113(103) 116(108) 119(110) 124(107) 122(95) 122(92) 125(78) 136(98) 130(60) 143(50) 153(49) 164(106) 171(105) 168(104) 170(113) 179(88) 
Pearl Assurance Ltd 21(9) 18(5) 21(2) 25(13) 15(13) 10(6) 7(5) 7(4) 6(2) 6(3) 8(7) 8(8) 9(6) 9(4) 8(4) 9(5) 6(4) 8(9) 5(6) 6(7) 6(6) 9(33) 7(30) 6(44) 7(202) 7(213) 
Pegasus Assurance Ltd             213(199) 234(189) 216(156) 189(152) 210(128) 208(136) 223(111) 231(86) 230(74) 232(145)     
Pension Annuity Friendly Society Ltd (The)      130(102) 137(88) 141(74) 136(61) 157(107) 175(143) 185(152) 193(154) 210(165) 207(135) 195(126)           
Pension Insurance Corporation Ltd 57(36) 63(27) 57(21)                        
Pensions Management (SWF) Ltd 48(17) 50(8) 48(6) 47(24) 56(28) 59(30) 66(23) 64(18) 58(18) 52(23) 51(29) 49(27) 46(26) 34(13) 20(6) 14(4) 15(5) 9(3) 10(2) 13(4) 13(4) 10(3) 16(5) 15(4) 11(2) 17(5) 
PFM Assurance Ltd                 193(136) 203(138) 207(94) 212(59) 213(50) 227(139) 229(126) 182(119) 179(112) 187(93) 
Pharmaceutical and General Provident Society Ltd 106(63) 110(58) 106(53) 117(81) 126(92) 139(109) 152(128) 159(120) 165(124) 159(126) 173(161) 172(147) 181(161) 187(153) 187(133)            
Phoenix and London Assurance Ltd 31(20) 25(10) 23(3) 38(23) 37(22) 27(19) 18(7) 18(7) 18(5) 19(12) 18(14) 16(20) 12(12) 11(10) 11(17) 12(19) 12(11) 11(20) 11(40) 10(28) 9(16) 17(52) 17(54) 16(33) 16(75) 18(210) 
Phoenix Life and Pensions Ltd      43(56) 25(52) 23(169) 21(20) 24(29) 19(25) 19(33) 19(34) 16(88) 16(245) 20(227) 14(84) 15(229) 16(234) 16(239) 12(236) 16(238) 13(241) 12(229) 10(227) 8(224) 
Phoenix Life Assurance Ltd    75(61) 83(65) 88(78) 97(158) 104(161) 110(170) 75(61) 83(70) 83(73) 86(81) 102(86) 99(71) 103(56) 149(176) 161(117)         
Phoenix Life Ltd 12(128) 9(135) 20(142) 14(141) 9(53) 42(84) 52(176) 51(188) 49(198) 39(199) 43(60) 40(49) 41(93) 96(89) 85(81) 78(81) 72(100) 69(71) 65(185) 65(205) 63(200) 63(53) 56(59) 52(49) 50(27) 65(69) 
Phoenix Pensions Ltd 45(109) 45(110) 39(101) 51(65)  87(96) 87(99) 87(73) 80(54) 128(139) 168(156)                
Pinnacle Insurance plc 132(93) 139(89) 87(91) 92(132) 102(142) 105(99) 102(72) 135(146) 120(142) 134(175) 146(206) 169(213) 172(198) 181(206) 190(189) 216(161) 216(140) 228(165) 227(112) 232(83) 232(72) 244(165) 238(156) 214(143) 215(143) 214(104) 
Pioneer Friendly Society Ltd    133(100) 145(111) 155(126) 167(118) 183(107) 179(101) 194(148) 205(187) 205(183) 215(185) 217(178) 217(158)            
POIS Assurance Ltd          130(104) 139(125) 140(135) 145(135) 140(126) 138(107) 136(106) 145(163) 151(172) 135(151) 131(131) 125(108) 140(118) 130(113)    
Police Mutual Assurance Society Ltd 134(114) 102(109) 81(102) 88(129) 89(144) 90(158) 90(161) 86(159) 70(153) 85(97) 93(96) 86(88) 97(100) 98(100) 98(126) 99(102) 98(183) 97(88) 83(129) 93(165) 95(157) 99(76) 103(192)    
PPP Lifetime Care plc     111(86) 118(97) 122(82) 118(67) 114(58) 136(102) 148(130) 154(145) 158(142) 173(147) 185(181) 184(124) 187(137) 204(154) 200        
Premium Life Assurance Co Ltd               154(112) 156(116) 158(99) 182(137) 191(146) 188(111) 165(40) 183(112) 183(102) 156(79) 171(114) 180(150) 
Professional Life Assurance Co Ltd            125(113) 144(118) 148(116) 152(98) 149(95) 160(93) 169(115) 190(77) 199(67) 222(86) 204(120) 211(119) 187(99) 198(129) 219(145) 
Property Growth Assurance Co Ltd                       195(97) 177(82) 174(90) 82(174) 
Prosperity Life Assurance Ltd                  156(114) 157(147) 162(141) 163(136) 152(109) 165(160) 161(154) 153(101) 164(129) 
Proteus Insurance Co Ltd             225(190) 228(177) 224(144) 203(135) 200(110) 214(143) 214(88) 222(58) 225(54) 240(148) 242(136) 226(126) 227(150) 224(112) 
Provident Mutual Life Assurance Ltd                23(31) 22(160) 21(22) 20(209) 21(224) 20(219) 15(11) 19(8) 17(10) 19(11) 22(19) 
Prudential (AN) Ltd  104(43) 93(30) 119(80) 128(88) 95(71) 94(58) 92(49) 83(50) 96(68) 105(94) 105(99) 107(98) 109(92) 102(75) 102(71) 100(61) 107(79) 103(70) 103(146) 101(145) 107(72) 107(74) 111(72) 115(70) 122(58) 
Prudential Annuities Ltd 17(126) 15(130) 13(133) 20(50) 18(26) 15(18) 13(13) 12(11) 13(10) 16(25) 22(42) 21(46) 16(23) 17(27) 24(47) 25(43) 26(101) 22(18) 25(21)        
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The) 2(1) 2(1) 2(1) 2(2) 2(2) 2(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 2(2) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 1(13) 
Prudential Holborn Life Ltd  54(91) 50(98) 55(45) 61(48) 68(54) 75(41) 83(41) 75(33) 92(57) 101(84) 103(91) 109(88) 111(74) 108(56) 111(53) 109(42) 85(44) 79(26) 81(20) 73(19) 59(32) 55(28) 45(25) 39(18) 43(18) 
Prudential Pensions Ltd 30(105) 33(119) 42(127) 40(35) 41(24) 37(26) 44(26) 40(26) 46(31) 49(33) 47(39) 48(36) 49(38) 48(28) 48(21) 48(23) 47(21) 42(24) 46(25) 50(184) 50(204) 37(19) 47(33) 55(179) 44(64) 50(223) 
Prudential Retirement Income Ltd 13(134) 13(137) 16(143) 21(148) 23(90) 26(42) 30(48) 42(53) 44(47) 77(176) 119(141)  163(132) 144(108) 105(46) 106(46) 108(34) 104(45) 97(56) 38(43) 27(25) 21(9) 23(9) 25(12) 17(8) 19(9) 
Railway Enginemens Assurance Society Ltd 108(83) 112(69) 100(58) 124(105) 133(119) 143(140) 155(138) 158(129) 154(123) 169(168) 185(202) 189(208) 202(222) 199(215) 198(197) 183(173) 184(150) 198(177) 197(127) 198(95) 198(85) 210(173) 205(158)    
Rational Shelley Friendly Society Ltd       142(93) 142(79) 134(65) 151(111) 167(152) 170(158) 177(168)              
Reassure UK Life Assurance Co Ltd       125(66) 109(48) 96(39) 95(64) 102(91) 106(100) 104(97) 118(103) 124(195) 131(185) 163(194) 168(208) 224(192) 207(175) 175(162) 167(207) 148(198) 136(95) 135(109) 130(50) 
Rechabite Friendly Society Ltd 97(72) 100(59) 96(52) 121(97) 136(114) 146(134) 153(131) 157(119) 147(113) 163(158) 180(192) 186(196) 192(201) 190(196) 186(170)            
Red Rose Friendly Society Ltd 112(69) 120(56) 110(46) 134(96) 146(105) 156(120) 168(112) 170(99) 160(88) 179(137) 193(167) 197(176)               
Refuge Assurance Ltd           50(46) 54(50) 48(51) 47(43) 46(66) 53(211) 52(213) 59(230) 56(224) 46(229) 41(227) 53(237) 42(240) 43(220) 43(219) 33(211) 
Refuge Investments Ltd           96(88) 100(95) 106(94) 112(87) 111(76) 109(76) 113(75) 112(81) 113(73) 121(133) 124(94) 121(78) 136(89) 129(102) 136(88) 148(78) 
Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 56(52) 56(90) 52(90) 64(58) 78(64) 82(69) 84(67) 117(139) 117(141) 126(133) 132(119) 134(123) 148(147) 145(133) 147(214) 145(191) 150(179) 148(185) 148(166) 146(162) 135(149) 141(133) 142(189) 138(160) 126(139) 119(165) 
RGA Reinsurance UK Ltd 103(84) 108(71) 91(57) 118(114) 125(127) 132(136) 147(133) 147(117) 144(92) 171(143) 181(174)                
RM Life Assurance Ltd     121(87) 102(76) 98(60) 95(51) 102(100) 98(69) 99(85) 96(87) 103(95) 105(94) 95(78) 95(78) 103(175) 141(121) 188(83) 196(75) 204(70) 222(141) 227(148) 217(145)   
Rothesay Life Ltd 79(47) 81(66) 83(72)                        
Royal and Sun Alliance Life Holdings                       100(70) 97(80) 92(54) 126(51) 
Royal Artillery Widows Insurance Society 110(60) 116(46) 105(35) 129(83) 139(95) 150(107) 159(96) 161(83) 150(72) 168(114) 182(158) 191(166) 198(169) 200(169)             
Royal Life (Unit Linked Assurance)              122(96) 120(86) 119(86) 122(77) 127(89) 120(116) 137(161) 148(164) 114(75) 115(106) 106(89) 101(61) 116(71) 
Royal Life (Unit Linked Pension Fund)              99(77) 93(67) 94(65) 99(67) 103(69) 104(144) 112(170) 99(186) 81(57) 86(60) 94(156) 89(69) 97(195) 
Royal Liver Assurance Ltd 53(110) 47(102) 36(69) 49(78) 58(146) 63(165) 64(173) 62(178) 55(182) 73(209) 95(226) 110(232) 105(242) 110(245) 101(238) 101(218) 89(214) 102(226) 73(215) 69(217) 56(210) 77(225) 64(226)    
Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd (The) 15(140) 11(144) 10(147) 15(149) 13(147) 14(81) 14(184) 13(199) 10(194) 12(38) 41(38) 46(52) 33(27) 33(32) 37(90) 37(200) 34(203) 31(33) 27(52) 24(40) 24(10) 28(23) 27(21) 27(28) 28(39) 29(29) 
Royal London Pooled Pensions Co Ltd 52(104) 52(99) 47(95) 72(77) 85(70) 98(74) 101(59) 74(42) 92(45) 107(76) 116(102) 120(112) 124(111) 128(106) 123(91) 124(89) 126(73) 135(96) 122(59) 125(45) 130(43) 127(87) 124(85) 122(91) 117(77) 117(72) 
Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses           79(77) 84(92) 73(74) 77(81) 76(65) 75(72) 71(60) 89(103) 68(64) 68(41) 70(31) 92(95) 87(83) 91(100) 97(131) 89(175) 
Royal Scottish Assurance plc 71(32) 66(20) 61(20) 69(42) 75(47) 78(52) 78(39) 77(35) 64(30) 64(41) 71(58) 80(74) 85(87) 80(69) 92(70) 110(82) 111(69) 130(100) 161(148) 184(80)       
Save and Prosper Insurance Ltd 76(38) 73(23) 67(18) 89(48) 91(54) 91(58) 91(42) 89(37) 77(28) 89(52) 97(79) 97(81) 100(77) 89(58) 82(42) 74(39) 70(29) 76(43) 53(16) 51(14) 40(9) 47(31) 38(16) 44(18) 37(16) 37(20) 
Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd 64(35) 64(24) 55(27) 63(41) 66(42) 64(47) 62(38) 63(40) 53(38) 63(48) 69(68) 65(68) 63(68) 60(52) 64(59) 61(50) 58(51) 60(63) 52(45) 54(176) 46(21) 70(63) 58(32) 66(45) 68(45) 60(36) 
Schoolteachers Friendly Society        189(104) 177(89) 200(151) 203(171) 211(178) 194(166) 204(160) 204(134)            
Schroder Pension Management Ltd 42(14) 65(22) 148(116) 87(56) 101(76)                      
SCOR Global Life Reinsurance UK Ltd   114(61) 140(108) 155(126) 153(137) 164(129) 163(118) 148(103) 199(164) 219(198) 228(206) 232(219) 240(211) 215(166) 201(151)           
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society               14(247) 16(230) 20(229) 18(236) 24(239) 25(245) 21(240) 23(245) 21(248) 18(230) 20(222) 20(219) 
Scottish Amicable Life plc          84(211) 60(81) 73(77) 96(116) 106(237)             
Scottish Equitable (Managed Funds) Ltd  49(14) 45(8) 54(28) 63(35) 70(37) 40(159) 53(189) 202(207) 38(32) 32(16) 27(12) 32(17) 30(12) 32(10) 35(12) 41(14) 35(15) 50(23) 62(93) 77(154) 52(22) 78(35) 82(40) 65(21) 92(12) 
Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society                   29(229) 28(240) 31(238) 32(236) 30(247) 30(228) 30(225) 25(218) 
Scottish Equitable plc 5(33) 7(138) 7(151) 8(11) 7(14) 7(17) 19(14) 19(10) 20(8) 22(14) 23(17) 30(28) 20(15) 25(22) 28(43) 28(47) 30(193) 25(21)         
Scottish Friendly Assurance Society Ltd 78(112) 76(103) 74(103) 83(128) 98(140) 109(151) 107(144) 103(108) 91(66) 111(85) 126(114) 132(124) 134(126) 142(123) 134(106) 139(107) 136(91) 155(128) 138(121) 135(101) 134(95) 159(179) 150(169)    
Scottish Legal Life Assurance Society Ltd     131(136) 129(150) 141(152) 153(152) 190(151) 145(191) 149(216) 153(225) 170(235) 196(235) 243(225) 223(202) 225(196) 235(215) 234(190) 237(182) 209(181) 153(185) 149(201)    
Scottish Life Assurance Co           34(36) 36(42) 34(44) 39(228) 43(243) 44(224) 51(226) 46(239) 45(230) 47(236) 45(235) 58(241) 48(243) 48(221) 47(220) 39(212) 
Scottish Life Investment Assurance Co Ltd                     194(134) 142(85) 169(95) 173(110) 151(74) 172(68) 
Scottish Mutual Assurance Ltd   150(126) 73(146) 52(153) 39(82) 31(186) 22(162) 23(168) 18(18) 20(21) 32(38) 31(35) 32(66) 31(87) 34(192) 35(208) 34(78) 36(217) 37(222) 34(218) 35(81) 34(207) 34(70) 34(30) 38(47) 
Scottish Mutual Pension Funds Investment Ltd                 140(72) 145(97) 131(54) 141(38) 122(36) 126(86) 128(71) 131(75) 120(76) 107(151) 
Scottish Mutual Pensions Ltd      169(135) 127(147) 127(140) 193(147) 153(178) 165(211) 156(215)   131(93) 129(91) 138(85) 142(101) 143(61) 157(88) 190(77)  240(140) 225(130) 225(152) 226(115) 
Scottish Provident Assurance Ltd                 88(46) 81(49) 88(58) 105(189) 106(191) 67(35) 70(36) 72(43) 64(23) 83(27) 
Scottish Provident Institution          21(10) 25(19) 28(23) 21(20) 23(24) 23(41) 21(42) 24(44) 26(34) 21(179) 23(199) 22(123) 29(59) 26(41) 26(34) 27(42) 27(189) 
Scottish Provident Ltd   139(139) 79(156) 59(163) 51(175) 42(190) 25(200) 26(206) 26(206)                 
Scottish Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd                 165(90) 165(108) 193(99) 229(104) 208(105) 148(90) 141(86) 115(71) 88(60) 59(67) 
Scottish Widows Administration Services Ltd        65(191) 76(200) 41(71) 33(28) 23(19) 28(30) 44(26) 45(27) 47(27) 54(36) 43(30) 49(31) 66(185) 89(185) 102(69) 123(117) 104(42) 145(89) 152(77) 
Scottish Widows Annuities Ltd 34(129) 32(129) 31(131) 42(145) 45(150) 47(66) 43(71) 41(137) 39(43) 57(185) 73(135)                
Scottish Widows' Fund and Life Assurance Society         197(162) 212(200) 227(222) 9(17) 8(9) 8(7) 9(14) 7(11) 8(17) 7(6) 6(15) 5(12) 5(5) 7(20) 5(14) 8(23) 9(215) 9(216) 
Scottish Widows plc 26(143) 23(147) 25(150) 28(157) 24(164) 13(176) 10(191) 11(202) 11(209) 10(201) 10(35)                
Scottish Widows Unit Funds Ltd 20(16) 21(115) 28(140) 12(9) 16(11) 20(15) 28(24) 45(33) 54(174) 56(44) 59(53) 59(44) 59(49) 65(45) 66(36) 62(35) 63(40) 57(38) 61(34) 67(151) 67(141) 48(24) 73(42) 71(36) 73(28) 94(26) 
Security Assurance Ltd              241(203) 237(179) 217(159) 214(133) 225(161) 222(105) 228(69) 229(61) 241(152) 243(138) 227(125) 228  
Shepherds Friendly Society Ltd (The) 131(86) 136(73) 127(62) 150(111) 159(123) 170(141) 184(130) 191(116) 184(104) 201(154) 217(193) 223(197) 236(209) 237(199) 232(163)            
Skandia Life Assurance Co Ltd 22(7) 22(6) 43(128) 19(8) 22(9) 25(13) 41(20) 49(46) 198(197) 47(36) 45(27) 43(24) 55(42) 55(37) 60(31) 59(29) 69(38) 62(37) 101(150) 152(204) 233(199) 90(49) 117(80) 121(167) 94(35) 127(35) 
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Skandia MultiFUNDS Assurance Ltd 61(26) 91(63) 142(105) 104(70) 105(69) 120(90) 139(85) 160(80) 168(78)                  
SL Liverpool plc       80(45) 71(39) 63(35) 74(49) 87(75) 87(80) 95(82) 97(75) 97(68) 100(66) 101(79) 96(66) 96(51) 123(39)  137(174) 161(223) 145(201) 128(192) 123(181) 
SLFC Assurance (UK) Ltd 39(31) 39(92) 44(114) 43(30) 46(38) 50(49) 53(163) 59(177) 78(190) 62(77) 56(56) 52(45) 47(56) 43(72) 68(232) 64(213) 64(215) 61(223) 63(220) 77(227) 78(231) 64(231) 67(242) 65(225)   
St Andrews Life Assurance plc 44(127) 37(134) 80(137) 33(43) 39(45) 166(129) 186(142) 122(138) 109(130) 129(173) 150(197) 173(200) 188(210) 191(190) 195            
St George Assurance                  160(107) 150(57) 148(35) 145(29) 157(97) 155(76) 150(76) 155(93) 154(63) 
St James Place UK plc 19(5) 19(4) 29(10) 27(10) 32(16) 41(20) 49(21) 54(28) 79(175) 59(39) 61(47) 63(51) 80(62) 87(65) 94(58) 104(61) 115(68) 124(75) 166(86)        
Standard Life Assurance Co 2006 (The)      3(3) 3(2) 2(2) 2(11) 3(5) 3(3) 3(5) 3(8) 2(54) 3(251) 3(232) 3(232) 3(242) 3(240) 3(246) 3(244) 3(246) 3(252) 3(234) 3(233) 3(229) 
Standard Life Assurance Ltd 4(142) 4(145) 3(148) 3(155) 3(151)                      
Standard Life Investment Funds Ltd 16(141) 34(148) 155(154) 11(12) 11(15) 58(35) 85(53) 197(173) 207(183) 99(56) 15(8) 14(10) 22(10) 20(8) 18(5) 22(7) 23(7) 29(12) 30(10) 29(9) 38(161) 33(14) 36(18) 41(24) 36(10) 54(7) 
Standard Life Pension Funds Ltd 128(76) 135(68) 126(54) 149(106) 158(128) 171(147) 185(139) 192(130) 189(118) 208(167) 172(201) 184(205) 183(175) 175(155) 172(127) 163(120) 162(104) 170(123) 165(72) 166(48) 177(46)    230(171) 78(24) 
State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan          189(127) 199(169) 203(172) 212(178) 212(168) 208(148) 188(123) 188(107) 200(134) 204(84) 209(66) 206(52) 219(138) 219(129) 203(120) 204(140) 206(103) 
Sterling Life Ltd 122(85) 111(72) 99(59) 122(107) 127(120) 136(138) 146(123) 149(111) 141(98) 165(147) 189(189) 199(191) 214(202) 223(194) 234(165) 213(150) 211(126) 226(159) 201(107) 227(79) 226(67) 239(166) 239(155) 213(147) 217(163) 215(122) 
Strand Friendly Society         152(128) 142(128) 157(148) 159(151) 176(216) 179(208) 180(187) 176(162) 177(141) 194(160) 192(117) 201(90) 202(80) 217(168) 218(149)    
Suffolk Life Annuities Ltd 49(111) 51(114) 49(112) 50(54) 64(58) 79(75) 86(86) 88(141) 90(148) 120(180) 138(154) 149(146) 174(177) 192(201) 196(174) 187(145) 185(116) 202(147) 205(106) 213(81) 203(48) 218(136) 220(124) 209(121) 214(146) 212(107) 
Sun Alliance Linked Life Insurance Ltd              113(102) 109(110) 108(181) 106(206) 105(199) 107(208) 107(213) 104(213) 79(194) 251(204) 233(185) 232(199) 101(66) 
Sun Alliance Pensions Ltd              66(59) 69(55) 68(55) 62(96) 58(55) 58(193) 59(209) 61(209) 65(65) 62(82) 68(62) 69(58) 112(65) 
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada            50(30) 42(24) 45(16) 34(7) 32(6) 29(3) 36(11) 31(3) 27(2) 28(2) 38(16) 40(10) 50(15) 61(22) 56(2) 
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada - Irish Business            135(117) 138(113) 141(105) 144(89) 141(85) 141(57) 152(92) 141(39) 130(23) 133(20) 160(89) 159(64) 159(65) 173(91)  
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd 51(59) 59(120) 54(118) 35(27) 36(31) 33(36) 33(56) 33(65) 30(165) 32(34) 36(44) 53(43) 52(47) 49(44) 49(39) 50(40) 49(33) 52(47) 47(35) 48(156) 47(152) 66(51) 68(57) 76(142) 77(53) 81(34) 
Sun Life Pensions Management Ltd     20(12) 22(14) 24(15) 29(20) 34(176) 31(17) 27(12) 22(13) 29(19) 29(15) 29(11) 29(9) 32(10) 30(14) 33(12) 35(24) 35(24) 31(15) 33(15) 37(16) 33(9) 45(10) 
Sun Life Unit Assurance Ltd     21(10) 21(11) 23(10) 24(9) 31(14) 27(11) 26(11) 26(15) 25(13) 28(11) 30(15) 30(16) 33(22) 32(16) 44(20) 57(192) 59(194) 50(37) 72(164) 83(208) 72(29) 93(42) 
Swiss Life (UK) Group plc                    140(164) 138(151) 143(116) 191(128) 183(159) 181(116) 182(85) 
Swiss Life Insurance and Pension Co                      247(201) 134(218) 123(196) 121(206) 108(188) 
Swiss Re Life and Health Ltd    70(62) 67(49) 69(77) 63(62) 60(55) 51(51) 61(50) 77(87) 78(90) 79(89)              
Swiss Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd              132(129) 132(202) 127(174) 129(180) 129(109) 125(130) 134(128) 139(111) 145(104) 144(91) 140(85) 149(106) 151(102) 
Teachers Assurance Co Ltd             114(106) 115(98) 112(88) 115(87) 114(89) 125(110) 118(165) 110(120) 120(150) 124(123) 121(193) 118(66) 134(175) 142(149) 
Teachers Provident Society Ltd 74(101) 70(94) 63(87) 86(120) 90(130) 93(152) 93(156) 90(154) 73(150) 90(100) 104(111) 108(118) 147(128) 149(131) 149(108) 148(108) 146(82) 180(186) 163(154) 164(137) 154(125) 171(190) 158(180)    
Threadneedle Pensions Ltd 54(28) 57(19) 51(17) 53(31) 53(32) 62(39) 65(34) 66(31) 67(41) 80(46) 91(74) 93(82) 113(96) 117(93) 116(79) 118(80) 117(62) 106(65) 109(132) 82(158) 83(174) 51(28) 59(27) 63(31) 51(20) 51(16) 
TPFL Ltd       166(108) 176(112) 187(112) 202(161) 201(185) 217(194) 238(213)              
Transatlantic Life Assurance Co Ltd 114(62) 122(47) 112(36) 136(87) 148(99) 159(110) 170(100) 173(88) 166(75) 185(123) 209(173) 208(175) 220(186) 226(176) 229(152) 208(137) 206(118) 219(145) 194(98) 214(74) 211(69) 221(142) 221(154) 210(151) 203(145) 199(119) 
Transport Friendly Society Ltd 99(79) 98(67) 89(51) 109(82) 116(91) 125(103) 133(91) 136(78) 123(63) 139(105) 147(133) 150(141) 156(145) 158(136) 165(138) 153(115) 157(139) 178(130) 170(101) 170(77)       
TSB Life Ltd              38(14) 40(9) 43(13) 39(9) 37(17) 41(11) 34(5) 44(15) 34(12) 35(12) 19(1) 32(6) 55(25) 
TSB Pensions Ltd              54(34) 58(28) 63(34) 59(26) 64(39) 82(44) 102(52) 221(176) 146(98) 176(96) 151(61) 188(119) 201(92) 
Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society Ltd 91(103) 105(96) 130(89) 96(126) 100(139) 110(157) 112(153) 106(151) 104(149) 108(92) 123(121) 127(128) 130(148) 136(221) 135(210) 140(188) 144(174) 150(168) 149(158) 151(136) 149(120) 184(131) 185(171)    
Tunstall Assurance Friendly Society Ltd         142(95) 161(120) 178(166) 183(170) 190(189) 189(188)             
UBS Global Asset Management Life Ltd 58(30) 71(111) 151(134) 37(17) 34(20) 34(24) 51(57) 76(180) 203(196) 70(189) 64(65) 70(72) 116(230)              
UIA (Insurance) Ltd       135(90) 137(82) 130(106) 149(160) 162(160) 161(159) 165(157) 168(154) 160(115) 152(109) 155(103) 163(124) 153(81) 144(89) 136(45) 150(107) 146(99) 147(106) 148(122) 144(130) 
UK Life Assurance Co Ltd                      174(121) 174(118) 167(115) 166(120) 163(135) 
UK Provident Pensions Ltd                      216(129) 164(93) 157(92) 156(96) 153(82) 
United Friendly Insurance plc           53(51) 57(53) 54(52) 46(29) 44(29) 41(28) 37(24) 47(86) 38(63) 36(145) 37(193) 60(229) 51(232) 56(216) 56(217) 44(208) 
United Friendly Life Assurance Ltd           127(107) 131(116) 133(119) 138(117) 143(101) 143(101) 152(94) 159(112) 162(113) 169(102) 196(89) 198(124) 209(127) 191(108) 207(138)  
United Kingdom Civil Service Benefit Society Ltd         111(120) 123(94) 128(117) 133(126) 131(133) 137(141) 137(206) 135(178) 132(172) 138(127) 121(155) 117(132) 115(122) 120(99) 118(100)    
United Kingdom Temperance and General Provident Institution                        31(227) 29(224) 23(220) 
University Life Assurance Society     117(84) 126(100) 132(78) 133(62) 121(52) 135(87) 151(120) 155(132) 162(130) 163(121) 158(97) 126(75) 118(43) 114(62) 124(75) 114(37) 107(26) 135(199) 119(188) 117(107) 119(205) 105(186) 
UNUM Ltd 81(119) 85(118) 129(110) 102(138) 96(152) 96(164) 92(165) 102(165) 93(157) 124(196) 141(221) 146(228) 146(237) 151(236) 161(230) 144(207) 159(207) 143(206) 147(195) 158(194) 152(180) 161(219) 140(214) 125(141) 127(115) 132(132) 
Wesleyan Assurance Society 37(25) 35(17) 32(9) 45(34) 49(39) 54(40) 50(31) 47(25) 40(19) 50(40) 58(63) 62(75) 58(72) 62(82) 75(100) 70(105) 66(191) 79(218) 64(205) 64(207) 60(197) 83(221) 76(227) 70(206) 75(207) 62(202) 
Wessex Life Assurance Co Ltd              239(198) 235(172) 214(154) 209(129) 212(162) 211(104) 211(73) 212(63) 231(157) 231(142) 220(131) 224(151) 222(108) 
Wiltshire Friendly Society Ltd 115(66) 128(55) 117(45) 141(95) 149(103) 160(119) 172(107) 178(95) 170(82) 190(134) 210(180) 212(182) 221(193) 221(180) 213(146)            
Windsor Life Assurance Co Ltd 14(21) 12(95) 12(124) 13(15) 30(19) 29(22) 32(17) 34(16) 33(22) 34(19) 35(24) 34(22) 36(33) 52(55) 51(51) 56(69) 76(181) 70(77) 74(178) 142(186) 156(179) 154(213) 143(219) 152(202) 144(197) 138(173) 
Winterthur Life UK Ltd 27(123) 30(127) 34(135) 36(57) 62(57) 57(50) 56(36) 48(30) 43(24) 51(42) 62(59) 64(69) 60(64) 69(79)             
WLUK Ltd           74(76) 71(76) 81(91) 88(97) 91(207) 98(110) 104(187) 115(189) 114(183) 111(172) 108(158) 115(117) 111(101) 101(87) 105(103) 98(89) 
XL RE Ltd 62(124) 61(124) 60(122) 65(136) 68(85) 65(63) 67(55) 69(70) 59(129) 88(190) 124(217) 122               
XSMA Ltd       163(110) 167(98) 156(77) 170(141) 188(172) 195(174) 205(176) 207(170) 203(176)            
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd       175(106) 180(93) 172(81) 193(132) 213(179) 215(181) 224(188) 225(174) 223(139) 206(138) 201(115) 215(148) 215(92) 220(62) 223(57) 237(153) 235(143) 222(135) 219(154) 217(116) 
Zurich Assurance (2004) plc       110(70) 194(153) 195(155) 210(186) 163(140) 162(140) 200(173)              
Zurich Assurance Ltd 7(8) 6(121) 6(145) 5(6) 5(5) 6(8) 22(182) 21(183) 19(173) 23(43) 24(45) 24(55) 18(41) 22(249) 22(250) 19(231) 19(230) 13(228) 9(213) 8(31)       
Source: the author. 
Where:  
LegandGen Pens is included in the SynThesys life but there no data provided. 
Barclays Life terminated its operations in 1989 and did not provide t returns in 1990. 
Markel Int Ins terminated its operations in 1986 and did not provide returns in 1987. 
Old Mutual Life did not provide returns in 1994. 
Phoenix Pens Ltd terminated its operations in 2006. 
Pru Retire Income terminated its operations in 1999. 
Scot Mut Pens terminated its operations in 1989. 
SL Liverpool plc did not provide t returns in 1990. 
Stand LifePensFd terminated its operations in 1987 and did not provide returns in 1988 and 1987.  
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Table 35: Value Creation (Capital Gain in Parenthesis) for all the UK Life Insurers over the Period 1985-2010 £(m) 
Year (Number of Firm)/Firm Name 
Number 
 of  
year  
Full  
Creation 
Semi  
Value   
Creation 
Value 
Destroying Tobin’s Q 2010(143) 2009(148) 2008(155) 2007(157) 2006(164) 2005(176) 2004(192) 2003(203) 2002(211) 2001(215) 2000(228) 1999(233) 1998(243) 1997(250) 1996(251) 1995(232) 1994(232) 1993(242) 1992(240) 1991(246) 1990(244) 1989(248) 1988(252) 1987(234) 1986(233) 1985(229) 
Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 69% 31% 0% 1.081 2143(974) 1771(528) 807(-432) 3426(2216) 3526(2238) 3361(1926) 1851(374) 1467(-28) 447(-990) 2768(1252) 5307(3566) 6344(4557) 4669(2871) 3313(1660) 2808(1213) 2608(1093) 2005(566) 2664(1286) 1300(-59) 817(-499) 708(-561) 1671(471) 1178(0.04) 1038(-155) 1280(41) 1088(-146) 
Abbey Life Pension and Annuities Ltd 12 0% 50% 50% 0.555               -12(-12) -12(-13) -13(-13) -13(-13) -46(-47) -46(-46) 187(-126) 207(-95) 216(-75) 218(-56) 222(-40) 221(-26) 
Aberdeen Asset Management Life and Pensions Ltd 13 23% 8% 69% 0.920 -306(-332) -350(-387) -388(-397) -94(-94) -146(-146) -345(-386) -212(-547) -308(-1070) -1004(-1920) 376(-448) 907(323) 309(200) 89(53)              
Aberdeen Asset Management Pooled Pensions Ltd 17 0% 47% 53% 0.724  -69(-69) -542(-542) -545(-545) -568(-568) -586(-586) -711(-711) -775(-775) -910(-910) -802(-802) 637(-664) 1062(-195) 864(-373) 634(-501) 905(-816) 2082(-471) 1984(-582) 2630(0)         
ACE Europe Life Ltd 4 25% 25% 50% 0.967 -0.01(-0.02) 0.06(0.05) -0.43(-0.46) 0.01(0)                       
AEGON Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 13 15% 0% 85% 0.858              -0.08(-0.12) -0.07(-0.12) -0.05(-0.12) -0.07(-0.13) -0.07(-0.11) -0.08(-0.1) -0.09(-0.1) -0.09(-0.09) -0.07(-0.07) -0.04(-0.04) -0.01(-0.01) 7(3) 5(2) 
Aetna Life Insurance Co Ltd 8 38% 63% 0% 0.951                   18(-26) 1(-48) 7(-51) 88(10) 58(-7) 65(-4) 59(2) 3(0.4) 
Aetna Pensions Ltd 6 83% 17% 0% 1.051                     5(-1) 10(3) 10(0.2) 13(1) 19(4) 18(2) 
Ageas Protect Ltd 3 0% 33% 67% 0.969 -0.49(-1) -0.2(-0.27) 0.12(0)                        
ALAC (UK) Ltd 13 54% 46% 0% 1.020              66(36) 57(25) 63(25) 43(1) 57(17) 28(-15) 6(-25) 9(-19) 35(8) 23(-2) 20(-1) 22(8) 17(-1) 
Alba Life Ltd 21 52% 48% 0% 1.002      564(316) 480(197) 764(215) 974(267) 1608(624) 2165(1032) 5028(2214) 4171(1644) 2937(745) 1890(130) 1671(0.2) 1214(-390) 429(-261) 290(-391) 252(-371) 294(-307) 374(-219) 357(-203) 351(-178) 417(-50) 364(-25) 
Albany Life Assurance Co Ltd 14 100% 0% 0% 1.237             1043(771) 948(671) 787(524) 686(428) 510(263) 804(527) 454(189) 328(81) 320(89) 653(430) 446(232) 407(198) 459(270) 235(72) 
All Counties Insurance Co Ltd 18 0% 44% 56% 0.767         -2(-2) -2(-2) -2(-2) -2(-2) -1(-4) -1(-4) -2(-4) -1(-4) -1(-3) -1(-3) 0.1(-4) 0.5(-4) 1(-3) 1(-2) 3(-1) 2(-1) 2(-0.3) 2(-0.3) 
Alliance and Leicester Life Assurance Co Ltd 8 63% 38% 0% 1.065         46(-10) 98(17) 193(68) 157(61) 109(33) 52(8) 34(-2) 11(0)           
Allianz Insurance plc 20 70% 30% 0% 1.068       261(106) 214(54) 137(-14) 259(112) 359(212) 442(274) 319(154) 247(75) 195(18) 173(-3) 116(-53) 161(11) 100(-66) 71(-81) 80(-57) 172(44) 140(19) 113(32) 139(64) 85(11) 
Allied Dunbar Assurance plc 20 95% 5% 0% 1.219       11959(6034) 10590(4701) 8035(2288) 12922(7425) 16230(10998) 17328(12269) 12812(7971) 10696(6001) 8872(4332) 8129(3728) 6272(2088) 7531(3691) 4483(927) 3332(85) 2544(-370) 4677(2034) 3067(674) 2814(595) 2912(810) 2050(90) 
Allied Dunbar Provident plc 5 0% 100% 0% 0.931                      4(-2) 4(-1) 5(-0.2) 4(-0.3) 4(-0.4) 
Ambassador Life Assurance Co Ltd 13 0% 85% 15% 0.909              -3(-5) -3(-7) 1(-10) 4(-16) 10(-11) 11(-18) 9(-18) 17(-13) 38(-4) 33(-6) 45(-2) 50(-1) 47(-1) 
American Life Insurance Co UK Branch 26 0% 73% 27% 0.902 -1196(-1196) -1452(-1527) -1996(-2568) 704(-946) 572(-639) 257(-583) 148(-590) 64(-592) 235(-617) 378(-358) 517(-222) 399(-164) 340(-136) 106(-121) 71(-89) 17(-66) -74(-74) -66(-66) 7(-119) 3(-106) 18(-83) 43(-25) -5(-33) -8(-31) 8(-10) 8(-8) 
Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society Ltd (The) 15 0% 80% 20% 0.912 -3(-14) -3(-15) -4(-16) 6(-6) 7(-5) 5(-7) 5(-5) 7(-5) 4(-6) 15(-7) 16(-6) 16(-6) 16(-5) 15(-3) 16(-2)            
Assicurazioni Generali 9 0% 100% 0% 0.914                  180(-27) 107(-55) 62(-60) 35(-49) 27(-24) 9(-11) 4(-10) 3(-4) 5(-2) 
Assurant Life Ltd 13 0% 77% 23% 0.928 -1(-3) 1(-3) 3(-0.46) 0.48(-1) -0.14(-1) 0.04(-1) 0(-1) 0.1(-0.28) 0.24(-0.13) 0.28(-0.09) 0.24(-0.04) 0.19(-0.04) 0.05(-0.01)              
Australian Mutual Provident Society 12 75% 25% 0% 1.051               1829(344) 1839(351) 1660(167) 1894(412) 1542(25) 1448(-39) 1366(-51) 1510(185) 249(18) 239(18) 224(25) 189(-3) 
Aviva Annuity UK Ltd 14 64% 36% 0% 1.037 7739(-2437) 6728(-2328) 6314(-2219) 6349(-1149) 6740(-40) 7377(1114) 6046(450) 5794(608) 6108(1306) 5429(969) 6795(1585) 6416(1551) 6762(2219) 5005(801)             
Aviva Insurance Ltd 20 20% 60% 20% 2.562       1(0.9) 0.9(0.9) 1(1) 1.1(1.1) 0.7(-0.2) 0.4(-0.2) 0.5(-0.1) 0.6(-0.1) 0.4(-0.1) -0.1(-0.3) -0.1(-0.3) -0.1(-0.4) -0.1(-0.4) 0(-0.4) 0.3(-0.4) 0.4(-0.4) 0.6(-0.3) 0.7(-0.3) 0.8(-0.2) 0.9(-0.1) 
Aviva Insurance UK Ltd 12 8% 92% 0% 0.879              37(-14) 37(-13) 10(-12) 9(-14) 17(-6) 13(-10) 11(-12) 10(-11) 14(-5) 15(-3) 16(0.03) 15(-0.2)  
Aviva International Insurance Ltd 2 0% 100% 0% 0.936                         1490(-277) 1481(-171) 
Aviva Investors Pensions Ltd 26 88% 4% 8% 1.194 51(-5) -45(-45) -77(-215) 718(471) 1136(820) 1333(1024) 1898(813) 1652(580) 840(177) 1519(901) 1668(1364) 3620(2456) 2524(1521) 2001(1083) 1555(733) 1407(660) 1041(355) 1230(621) 738(229) 499(50) 429(21) 695(352) 456(133) 374(53) 457(143) 352(15) 
Aviva Life and Pensions UK Ltd 14 79% 21% 0% 1.082 27185(-270) 26525(-2567) 15037(-5069) 25055(4598) 26297(5802) 24469(4454) 11550(1623) 11727(1042) 12694(1492) 16399(4912) 17219(5759) 18074(6857) 16328(5548) 12910(2494)             
Avon Insurance plc 7 57% 43% 0% 0.978                    65(-21) 68(-11) 72(-3) 73(4) 70(5) 61(0.5) 56(0.5) 
AXA Annuity Co Ltd 1 0% 100% 0% 1.000    13(-0.2)                       
AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc 16 56% 44% 0% 1.014           3644(1891) 3085(1430) 2261(909) 4238(717) 3246(-70) 2729(-376) 2030(-811) 2155(-507) 1086(-1322) 257(-1567) 175(-1473) 3483(1400) 2567(644) 2323(443) 2336(564) 1630(32) 
AXA Wealth Ltd 26 73% 12% 15% 0.986 -100(-122) -122(-122) -123(-123) -122(-122) 2209(650) 1781(390) 1215(23) 878(-211) 305(-543) 984(105) 889(512) 1096(733) 826(473) 760(413) 532(250) 446(187) 293(69) 364(169) 200(38) 119(-1) 85(2) 121(66) 65(28) 56(22) 70(18) 55(1) 
BandCE Insurance Ltd 16 13% 88% 0% 0.941 28(-14) 27(-11) 10(-21) 16(-10) 20(-3) 23(0.3) 18(-1) 12(-1) 9(-0.04) 9(-1) 2(-5) 2(-0.1) 1.7(0.2) 0.6(-0.3) 0.7(-0.03) 0.8(0)           
BA (GI) Ltd 21 38% 62% 0% 0.968      2432(556) 2573(612) 2992(717) 3264(926) 3710(1417) 3722(1342) 3078(703) 2698(321) 2101(-332) 1868(-578) 1321(-1075) 1186(-1099) 1072(-1018) 875(-938) 796(-804) 781(-606) 799(-447) 765(-343) 764(-249) 770(-169) 751(-106) 
Baillie Gifford Life Ltd 13 54% 31% 15% 1.037 1922(1403) 1283(865) -313(-769) 1093(640) 1629(1088) 1548(1079) 392(-13) 47(-294) -462(-730) 89(-135) 99(-101) 327(167) 136(22)              
Barclays Life Assurance Co Ltd 24 71% 29% 0% 1.062 2137(878) 1977(616) 1498(162) 2680(1360) 2846(1416) 2501(1006) 1825(249) 1509(-182) 109(-106) 213(-18) 308(74) 325(110) 204(42) 151(15) 119(-0.3) 87(-4) 72(-6) 65(3) 34(2) 7(1)   6(3) 2(1) 2(2) 63(-4) 
BLAC Ltd 18 83% 17% 0% 1.159         1608(443) 2666(1489) 3603(2447) 4019(2891) 3093(2003) 2396(1346) 1789(806) 1541(622) 1035(163) 1343(598) 608(-51) 313(-245) 216(-256) 745(336) 536(176) 472(140) 456(175) 294(50) 
Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd 12 0% 100% 0% 0.840               2(-0.4) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 1(-1) 2(-1) 2(-0.4) 2(-0.3) 2(-0.2) 
BlackRock Asset Management Pensions Ltd 16 63% 13% 25% 1.004 7186(2419) 3415(-1882) -1888(-7588) 14947(8202) 13240(6893) 11561(4231) 133(-6356) -4720(-10644) -11937(-17248) -2304(-7083) 5536(1038) 5823(3760) 1813(991) 574(343) 195(106) 96(36)           
BlackRock Pensions Ltd 22 86% 9% 5% 1.133 731(652) 455(415) 99(69) 749(722) 606(566) 710(634) 574(221) 308(-36) -206(-478) 446(150) 824(610) 961(758) 614(411) 639(453) 257(128) 197(114) 59(11) 36(15) 16(9) 3(-1) 2(0.1) 1(0.03)     
Bradford Insurance Co Ltd 20 0% 70% 30% 0.738       -0.3(-1) -0.3(-1) -0.3(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.1(-1) -0.02(-1) 0.1(-1) 0.1(-1) 0.2(-1) 0.3(-1) 0.2(-1) 1(-1) 0.5(-1) 0.4(-1) 1(-1) 1(-0.4) 1(-0.3) 1(-0.1) 2(-0.1) 2(-0.2) 
Britannia Life Association of Scotland Ltd 9 0% 100% 0% 0.838                  168(-314) 132(-295) 199(-274) 229(-209) 254(-156) 262(-118) 267(-84) 266(-56) 245(-34) 
Britannia Life Ltd (pre1994) 9 100% 0% 0% 1.107                  343(207) 168(68) 118(30) 83(9) 114(51) 85(28) 67(22) 56(19) 32(3) 
Britannia Life Managed Pension Funds Ltd 9 22% 44% 33% 0.861                  0.5(0.5) -1(-1) -12(-12) -11(-16) 7(-11) 20(-17) 19(-22) 35(3) 23(-0.5) 
Britannic Unit Linked Assurance Ltd 21 76% 10% 14% 1.109      45(-155) -255(-352) -225(-567) -398(-1077) 283(-620) 1014(6) 312(221) 235(148) 204(127) 142(73) 126(66) 85(31) 95(55) 51(22) 27(5) 21(2) 42(22) 32(12) 31(7) 22(10) 7(2) 
British and European Reinsurance Co Ltd 15 20% 73% 7% 0.949            -3(-3) 29(16) 20(8) 8(-16) 13(-12) 15(-10) 25(-5) 23(-9) 20(-12) 16(-9) 24(-0.5) 27(-3) 29(-0.1) 30(1) 26(-2) 
British Airways Benefit Fund 6 100% 0% 0% 1.199          1(1) 2(1) 2(1) 2(1) 1(1) 1(0.1)            
British Equitable Assurance Co Ltd 17 41% 59% 0% 1.030          0.02(0.01) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.4(-0.1) 0.4(-0.1) 0.5(-0.1) 1(-0.04) 1(0.1) 1(0.2) 1(0.2) 1(0.02) 1(0.3) 1(0.3) 1(-0.1) 1(-0.1) 1(-0.01) 
British Friendly Society Ltd 15 27% 60% 13% 1.653 31(-14) 33(-14) 38(-17) 46(-2) 46(-1) 44(-2) 42(-6) 40(-7) -2(-10) -2(-4) 3(1) 4(4) 4(4) 2(1) 2(-1)            
British Life Office Ltd 19 89% 11% 0% 1.178        140(39) 92(5) 155(77) 229(152) 256(181) 134(61) 110(41) 83(20) 82(24) 58(8) 80(38) 39(7) 17(-4) 12(-2) 13(5) 6(3) 6(3) 5(2) 3(1) 
British National Life Assurance Co Ltd 9 78% 22% 0% 1.033                  123(64) 39(5) 12(-14) 6(-16) 31(12) 23(4) 26(6) 31(12) 13(3) 
BUPA Health Assurance Ltd 17 0% 59% 41% 0.916 -3(-12) -2(-11) -2(-10) -1(-8) -2(-11) 6(-4) 5(-3) 2(-3) -6(-10) 1(-2) 1(-1) -1(-4) 6(-1) 6(-1) 0.2(-1) 1(-0.1) 1(-0.04)          
Caledonian Insurance Co Ltd 13 15% 85% 0% 0.894            194(75) 185(47) 119(-8) 97(-49) 91(-54) 69(-67) 96(-28) 57(-80) 53(-63) 53(-53) 70(-36) 63(-24) 62(-21)   
Canada Life Assurance Co  14 100% 0% 0% 1.436             1047(840) 780(603) 758(615) 671(547) 612(551) 571(515) 443(395) 340(295) 318(274) 318(272) 244(200) 213(166) 164(112) 92(35) 
Canada Life Irish Operations Ltd 11 82% 18% 0% 1.082                325(135) 233(45) 300(120) 186(7) 136(-31) 101(-26) 189(83) 129(35) 121(35) 122(47) 77(13) 
Canada Life Ltd 26 62% 38% 0% 1.043 2556(-2369) 2156(-2624) 1745(-2854) 3732(-677) 4369(103) 3401(348) 2213(-269) 1879(-496) 1463(-785) 2227(140) 3027(1029) 3160(1195) 1115(627) 926(420) 658(160) 416(149) 315(59) 321(86) 198(-20) 140(-55) 156(-16) 269(129) 188(70) 133(38) 126(41) 81(4) 
Canterbury Life Assurance Co Ltd 16 31% 63% 6% 0.982           21(10) 23(13) 13(5) 9(1) 4(-2) 4(-3) -1(-8) 7(-2) 7(-10) 8(-11) 10(-7) 12(-0.1) 5(-2) 5(-1) 6(1) 4(-1) 
CCL Assurance Ltd 7 29% 43% 29% 0.894                    -29(-89) -4(-65) 50(-17) 24(-28) 22(-25) 50(9) 32(3) 
Century Life Assurance 9 67% 33% 0% 1.077        7(3) 23(-1) 53(9) 106(50) 95(40) 76(26) 50(20) 13(-0.2) 10(0)           
Century Life plc 21 62% 38% 0% 1.054      1145(212) 1014(67) 944(-42) 799(-186) 1148(119) 1330(229) 1049(443) 1049(420) 1041(368) 951(187) 956(135) 808(24) 886(106) 868(52) 544(-35) 69(-20) 52(-0.4) 64(-5) 74(-23) 89(3) 50(-4) 
CGNU Life Assurance Ltd 24 25% 75% 0% 0.952   3658(-77) 4812(1286) 3686(69) 3848(-261) 3271(-453) 3043(-761) 3591(-168) 4596(1210) 4966(1849) 4069(924) 3388(378) 2559(-175) 1908(-508) 1470(-683) 986(-755) 870(-712) 507(-935) 401(-801) 431(-605) 502(-445) 539(-335) 549(-237) 544(-158) 509(-98) 
Cirencester Friendly Society Ltd 15 73% 27% 0% 1.130 10(-2) 8(-3) 9(-2) 11(2) 12(2) 11(2) 10(2) 9(1) 2(1) 3(2) 7(5) 9(7) 8(5) 3(-0.1) 3(1)            
City of London Insurance Co Ltd 20 0% 30% 70% 0.605       -0.3(-1) -0.3(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.1(-0.5) -0.2(-0.5) -0.1(-0.4) -0.1(-0.3) -0.1(-0.3) -0.1(-0.2) -0.1(-0.2) -0.05(-0.2) -0.03(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.1) 0.3(-0.1) 0.4(-0.1) 0.4(-0.04) 
City of Westminster Assurance Co Ltd 21 38% 62% 0% 0.955      473(68) 381(-32) 353(-74) 282(-150) 454(18) 600(153) 693(192) 617(125) 535(50) 44(-34) 49(-35) 48(-41) 51(-26) 50(-41) 54(-33) 60(-23) 85(7) 80(5) 70(-4) 76(-3) 74(-6) 
City of Westminster Assurance Society Ltd 9 67% 33% 0% 0.986                  18(0.2) 15(-4) 15(-4) 14(-5) 22(4) 21(2) 23(2) 23(2) 17(0.1) 
Civil Servants Annuities Assurance Society 4 100% 0% 0% 1.150           8(3) 9(3) 8(3) 6(1)             
Clerical Medical and General Life Assurance Society 11 100% 0% 0% 1.154                3322(1321) 2999(1169) 3086(1432) 2314(860) 1934(671) 1759(670) 1994(1021) 1731(868) 1317(528) 1334(643) 992(63) 
Clerical Medical Investment Group Ltd 15 80% 20% 0% 1.049 3534(473) 3178(-230) 3092(-9) 4174(519) 5730(776) 7730(1292) 8038(1075) 8067(972) 6990(119) 8749(2205) 8048(2417) 6817(1728) 5945(1797) 4327(606) 3484(0)            
Clerical Medical Managed Fund Ltd 26 88% 12% 0% 1.166 1364(669) 985(163) 1832(-1066) 4407(1643) 4611(1876) 3737(1781) 2459(652) 1936(333) 1105(-221) 1964(1061) 2533(1909) 2615(2071) 1704(1192) 1357(896) 1076(626) 1019(623) 713(378) 925(619) 417(164) 237(25) 128(-37) 377(231) 198(62) 188(26) 258(109) 161(12) 
Colonial Mutual Life (Unit Assurances) Ltd 12 67% 33% 0% 1.011               53(18) 45(11) 29(-3) 42(12) 14(-13) 9(-15) 11(-10) 30(11) 20(1) 18(1) 15(3) 10(0.03) 
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 12 92% 8% 0% 1.334               1204(645) 1354(802) 973(435) 1067(563) 925(404) 924(399) 817(239) 1732(1211) 1423(890) 766(91) 639(10) 552(-19) 
Combined Insurance Co of America (UK Branch) 26 62% 23% 15% 1.012 1(1) 2(1) 2(2) 1(1) 2(1) 4(4) 2(2) 14(7) 8(1) 7(0.4) -7(-13) -5(-12) 4(-2) 1(-5) -7(-7) -4(-5) 1(-9) 20(8) 16(-3) 12(-12) 30(-6) 28(4) 20(4) 24(9) 25(11) 25(13) 
Commercial Union Assurance (Unit Trusts) Ltd  2 50% 50% 0% 0.992                         11(-1) 14(0.3) 
Commercial Union Life Assurance Co Ltd 24 58% 42% 0% 1.031   4942(524) 6069(1844) 5239(794) 5782(690) 6047(555) 5971(272) 6686(1021) 7598(2366) 7143(2771) 5467(1867) 4483(1307) 3754(715) 2941(78) 2659(26) 2361(-27) 2179(-57) 1765(-344) 1236(-606) 1259(-471) 1324(-341) 1363(-156) 1439(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 0.3(-0.1) 
Communication Workers Friendly Society Ltd 23 39% 57% 4% 0.964 -2(-49) 0.1(-45) 6(-40) 30(-17) 37(-7) 40(-1) 35(-3) 32(-4) 25(-10) 26(-8) 47(15) 45(15) 37(9) 35(8) 28(3) 26(3) 18(-3) 14(-3) 12(-3) 13(-1) 15(1) 14(2) 13(1)    
Compass Friendly Society Ltd 15 0% 47% 53% 0.763 0.1(-0.04) 0.04(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0.1(0) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(-0.1) 0(0) 0(0)            
Confederation Life Insurance Co 9 0% 0% 100% 0.866                  -190(-190) -843(-906) -668(-718) -430(-469) -223(-258) -147(-168) -89(-104) -51(-62) -30(-38) 
Confederation Life Insurance Co (UK) Ltd 15 100% 0% 0% 1.207            647(282) 858(459) 508(233) 387(133) 376(127) 312(62) 428(193) 196(91) 152(49) 139(31) 267(160) 169(83) 146(69) 109(66) 61(15) 
Consolidated Life Assurance Co Ltd 12 0% 92% 8% 0.924               -7(-68) 19(-71) 4(-80) 25(-44) 34(-44) 23(-41) 25(-22) 19(-11) 8(-5) 2(-2) 2(-2) 2(-0.5) 
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd 26 62% 38% 0% 1.067 4631(996) 3564(-230) 4307(611) 5456(1347) 7558(2064) 8852(3128) 8850(2148) 8657(1853) 8366(1651) 10145(3498) 11681(5218) 10189(4082) 8729(3009) 7087(1628) 5909(695) 5421(450) 4648(7) 3671(-656) 3198(-669) 2765(-644) 2556(-498) 2446(-419) 2260(-361) 2153(-262) 2113(-128) 2029(-18) 
Countrywide Assured plc 23 39% 35% 26% 0.962 207(-32) 124(-129) -37(-310) 332(49) 381(67) 151(-5) 92(-72) 70(-96) 15(-152) 128(-23) 202(62) 192(80) 133(34) 111(20) 55(3) 9(0.003) -3(-7) -2(-2) -5(-9) -5(-9) -6(-6) 17(0.1) 0.1(-0.002)    
Criterion Insurance Co Ltd 5 0% 100% 0% 0.860                      0.2(-0.1) 0.3(-0.1) 0.4(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 
Crown Life Assurance Co Ltd 10 100% 0% 0% 1.155                 76(57) 110(90) 62(30) 44(5) 45(4) 186(130) 140(60) 138(26) 162(67) 94(17) 
Crown Life Insurance Co 15 47% 53% 0% 0.982            23(1) 24(1) 20(-5) 18(-10) 20(-9) 21(-10) 26(-6) 31(-2) 28(-5) 30(-2) 34(2) 38(6) 41(9) 46(9) 48(10) 
Crown Life Pensions Ltd 10 60% 40% 0% 1.018                 94(19) 162(76) 72(-21) 146(-84) 136(-70) 289(109) 167(17) 113(-4) 114(18) 77(4) 
Cuna Mutual Insurance Society 21 0% 76% 24% 0.805      0.03(-2) 0.03(-2) 0.02(-2) -0.04(-2) -0.2(-2) 0.1(-2) -0.2(-2) -0.2(-2) -0.4(-2) 0.3(-1) 0.4(-1) 0.4(-1) 0.4(-1) 0.5(-1) 0.5(-1) 1(-0.4) 1(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 0.2(-0.04) 
Customs Annuity and Benevolent Fund Inc 19 79% 21% 0% 1.121        8(3) 9(3) 12(5) 12(5) 12(5) 11(4) 10(2) 10(1) 10(1) 10(-0.2) 12(2) 11(1) 11(-0.3) 10(-1) 12(3) 12(1) 12(2) 11(0.4) 10(-0.4) 
Dentists and General Mutual Benefit Society Ltd 15 27% 67% 7% 0.948 6(-4) 4(-5) 3(-6) 7(-2) 7(-1) 8(-1) 6(-2) 5(-3) -1(-3) 1(-1) 4(1) 0.4(-2) 4(2) 2(1) 2(0.1)            
Dentists Provident Society Ltd 15 100% 0% 0% 1.276 70(37) 60(29) 46(15) 83(52) 77(46) 70(38) 53(22) 43(13) 9(1) 30(21) 29(18) 35(21) 34(21) 27(13) 17(4)            
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Direct Line Life Insurance Co Ltd 16 0% 56% 44% 0.923 -6(-18) -3(-15) -0.5(-13) 1(-11) 2(-9) 5(-6) 6(-4) -0.2(-9) 4(-2) 2(-2) -1(-4) 1(-1) 0.2(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.2(-1) 2(-0.5)           
Domestic and General Life Assurance Co Ltd 14 93% 7% 0% 1.248    2(1) 3(1) 3(1) 3(1) 2(1) 3(1) 4(2) 4(2) 3(2) 2(1) 2(0.2) 1(0.01) 1(-0.02) 1(0.01)          
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd 26 0% 23% 77% 0.292 -2(-3) -2(-3) -2(-3) -2(-3) -2(-2) -2(-2) -2(-2) -251(-251) -254(-255) -259(-259) -262(-262) -263(-263) -361(-361) -373(-373) -432(-432) -532(-532) -533(-534) -531(-531) -588(-588) -665(-665) 3084(-1672) 3236(-1103) 2823(-899) 2977(-656) 2779(-416) 2494(-276) 
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc 18 33% 67% 0% 1.016         105(43) 109(49) 103(40) 92(27) 90(19) 79(6) 71(-3) 71(-5) 66(-9) 63(-9) 49(-22) 46(-21) 44(-17) 50(-9) 48(-8) 46(-9) 42(-9) 37(-6) 
Ecclesiastical Life Ltd 26 4% 96% 0% 0.840 16(16) 100(-41) 86(-56) 113(-25) 120(-20) 113(-21) 114(-23) 98(-45) 1(-52) 15(-42) 23(-39) 29(-40) 33(-40) 30(-44) 32(-45) 38(-43) 41(-45) 49(-35) 41(-41) 31(-48) 20(-47) 28(-32) 27(-14) 24(-3) 19(-3) 16(-2) 
Edinburgh Assurance Co Ltd 12 0% 33% 67% 0.714               -33(-60) -47(-69) -68(-86) -48(-71) -76(-108) -77(-162) -65(-184) 14(-130) -7(-144) 39(-150) 111(-58) 138(-51) 
Equitable Life Assurance Society (The) 26 77% 12% 12% 1.084 -35(-35) -310(-310) -19(-19) 227(227) 470(470) 4593(2554) 4752(2459) 5221(2401) 7423(3449) 11575(4716) 20769(9094) 17998(6666) 16343(5804) 13101(3555) 10012(1436) 8600(924) 6890(73) 7281(1348) 4666(-433) 3991(-266) 3192(-295) 3689(779) 2851(429) 2445(349) 2070(278) 1613(122) 
Equity and Law (Managed Funds) Ltd 7 100% 0% 0% 1.125                    340(85) 254(44) 434(246) 303(113) 380(72) 563(167) 399(24) 
Esano London Friendly Society 3 33% 67% 0% 0.982        1(0.1) 1(-0.1) 0.5(-0.3)                 
Eurolife Assurance Co Ltd 20 50% 35% 15% 1.096       29(29) 34(34) 95(95) 125(125) 374(245) 307(173) 235(121) 169(64) 99(4) 21(3) -3(-10) -1(-10) -1(-10) 4(-10) 9(-7) 9(-4) 5(-4) 7(-3) 6(-2) 6(-2) 
Exeter Friendly Society Ltd 3 100% 0% 0% 1.009 3(0.4) 3(0.1) 3(0.4)                        
FandC Managed Pension Funds Ltd 26 77% 19% 4% 1.134 20(20) 6(-20) -51(-160) 258(139) 316(169) 243(118) 110(-16) 84(-87) 34(-263) 514(164) 978(602) 1177(848) 751(532) 581(379) 427(234) 363(187) 234(71) 293(150) 138(38) 48(1) 31(-6) 70(35) 40(12) 28(6) 26(11) 13(1) 
Family Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 23 74% 26% 0% 1.087 347(113) 347(83) 230(-49) 491(201) 549(248) 569(232) 499(120) 628(105) 587(64) 747(273) 1009(523) 1174(642) 931(397) 774(224) 621(93) 557(54) 403(-54) 401(69) 241(-76) 155(-107) 127(-99) 221(27) 165(-10)    
Fidelity Life Assurance Ltd 20 100% 0% 0% 1.767       2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 3(3) 4(3) 4(4) 4(4) 4(3) 3(2) 4(2) 3(2) 4(2) 3(2) 3(1) 3(1) 4(2) 3(1) 3(1) 3(1) 3(0.3) 
FIL Life Insurance Ltd 13 77% 8% 15% 1.096 286(252) 81(52) 229(207) 538(506) 509(427) 524(441) 137(65) 28(-31) -171(-214) -11(-37) 25(12) 28(22) 1(1)              
Financial Assurance Co Ltd 7 0% 14% 86% 0.771 -170(-251) -129(-224) -93(-187) -137(-231) -146(-239) -52(-137) 87(-1)                    
First National Assurance Ltd 14 0% 7% 93% 0.820             -0.3(-0.3) -0.3(-0.3) -0.3(-0.3) -0.3(-0.3) -0.2(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) -0.04(-0.1) -0.02(-0.03) -0.002(-0.01) 0.01(0) 
Fleming Life Ltd 16 25% 50% 25% 0.911           153(27) 157(40) 98(29) 52(18) 15(-1) 0.1(-0.2) -0.04(0) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.2(-0.05) 0.1(-0.03) 0.1(-0.01) 0.1(-0.01) 0.04(-0.001) 
Forester Life Ltd 16 88% 13% 0% 1.111 238(31) 199(15) 151(-14) 188(41) 181(51) 160(50) 135(29) 144(35) 148(35) 165(50) 187(73) 182(69) 171(58) 137(24) 104(-8) 132(23)           
Friends Life Assurance Society Ltd 26 38% 62% 0% 0.982 1772(-418) 2011(-352) 3766(-166) 4706(488) 4896(331) 6275(1395) 6214(1110) 6286(919) 6799(1226) 7741(2089) 7699(2098) 7226(1744) 6411(1020) 4892(-462) 4233(-1026) 4294(-1019) 4086(-1107) 4076(-938) 3388(-1529) 2859(-1620) 2228(-1539) 2238(-1142) 2259(-868) 2273(-617) 2149(-416) 2052(-258) 
Friends Life Co Ltd 14 7% 64% 29% 0.744 9661(-3650) 9044(-5744) 6866(-8131) 13621(-1229) 2259(-1489) 3122(-1218) 3249(-1255) 3449(-1141) 3974(-718) 4532(212) -17(-39) -16(-36) -1(-11) -10(-17)             
Friends Provident (London and  
Manchester) Assurance Ltd 15 93% 7% 0% 1.178            1184(766) 1029(587) 912(443) 918(373) 924(366) 850(291) 892(323) 712(140) 665(102) 625(88) 762(207) 647(77) 606(33) 630(76) 510(-22) 
Friends Provident Life and Pensions Ltd 10 0% 100% 0% 0.917 1880(-2409) 2103(-2882) 4157(-2999) 6355(-1496) 7644(-985) 9340(-133) 9265(-954) 9551(-1409) 9587(-1594) 11097(-491)                 
Friends Provident Life Assurance Ltd 26 35% 65% 0% 0.955 718(-516) 739(-578) 103(-709) 683(-76) 1005(158) 868(43) 520(-219) 341(-327) 171(-473) 626(-88) 1034(295) 1183(447) 814(68) 558(-248) 337(-460) 360(-444) 296(-571) 581(-369) 309(-583) 489(-332) 327(-395) 795(161) 617(47) 678(369) 415(123) 221(-7) 
Friends Provident Life Office 16 25% 75% 0% 0.972           10636(2965) 7471(1160) 7676(2762) 4869(236) 3816(-630) 3849(-373) 3614(-448) 3244(-629) 2521(-1232) 2301(-1198) 2113(-1108) 2828(-705) 2575(-731) 1458(-522) 1410(-309) 1229(-202) 
Friends Provident Linked Life Assurance Ltd 14 71% 21% 7% 1.105             584(450) 438(319) 283(181) 199(111) 103(27) 154(96) 45(-0.2) 4(-35) -7(-43) 82(46) 36(4) 29(-2) 37(22) 17(5) 
Friends Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd 14 100% 0% 0% 1.226             1016(709) 765(532) 808(464) 657(344) 467(188) 562(336) 320(123) 200(24) 202(3) 398(229) 270(115) 255(84) 312(120) 210(23) 
Friends Provident Pensions Ltd 26 42% 54% 4% 0.999 1792(-1676) 1000(-2343) -516(-3654) 3982(1068) 3902(1033) 3088(590) 1709(-459) 997(-929) 148(-1525) 1039(-382) 1688(513) 1959(905) 1001(585) 800(368) 552(177) 486(137) 318(0.4) 458(178) 205(-40) 102(-106) 66(-121) 128(-33) 106(-24) 104(-9) 93(-4) 74(-7) 
Friends Provident Reinsurance Services Ltd 6 100% 0% 0% 13.291  14(14) 163(157) 168(164) 203(198) 343(329) 460(441)                    
GE Frankona Reassurance Ltd 15 27% 73% 0% 0.986      146(-28) 88(-43) 61(-48) 77(-25) 68(-29) 87(-12) 59(-19) 89(20) 72(10) 71(7) 103(13) 68(-15) 1(-0.2) 0.5(-0.1) 0.3(0)       
GE Keynes Holdings Ltd 19 37% 53% 11% 1.007        424(424) 131(131) 196(196) 298(220) 415(205) 566(173) 439(46) 114(-56) -9(-89) -35(-92) 24(-60) 46(-63) 18(-63) 15(-43) 16(-29) 13(-19) 10(-13) 10(-8) 10(-5) 
General Accident Pensions Management 12 83% 0% 17% 1.162               -0.01(-0.01) -0.01(-0.01) 120(48) 162(78) 111(30) 90(14) 76(7) 150(70) 135(40) 130(36) 170(39) 136(9) 
General Reinsurance Life UK Ltd 13 77% 23% 0% 1.026    6(-6) 6(-5) 13(0.3) 19(1) 18(1) 30(6) 28(5) 28(7) 22(5) 23(9) 16(3) 13(1) 3(0)           
General Reinsurance UK Ltd 2 50% 50% 0% 1.028                4(1) 3(-0.3)          
Gisborne Life Assurance Co Ltd 15 60% 40% 0% 1.046            788(418) 659(291) 537(171) 444(82) 368(23) 315(-13) 324(22) 195(-78) 172(-65) 112(-85) 148(-16) 145(1) 138(-4) 164(21) 161(14) 
GL and P plc 13 85% 15% 0% 1.090              1031(721) 835(541) 544(266) 455(219) 370(179) 92(-69) 91(-32) 102(9) 89(29) 41(4) 58(36) 24(10) 11(1) 
Global General and Reinsurance Co Ltd 20 0% 0% 100% 0.360       -0.3(-0.3) -1(-1) -1(-1) -2(-3) -3(-3) -3(-3) -3(-3) -3(-3) -3(-3) -3(-3) -4(-4) -5(-5) -7(-9) -7(-9) -7(-9) -4(-16) -1(-17) -2(-17) -1(-17) -1(-17) 
Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd 7 29% 71% 0% 0.977                    166(-59) 182(-33) 200(-8) 211(8) 226(14) 203(-2) 189(-3) 
Gresham Unit Assurance Ltd 7 86% 14% 0% 1.116                    25(7) 14(-3) 61(43) 44(20) 40(17) 53(29) 29(8) 
Growth and Secured Life Assurance Society Ltd 15 27% 53% 20% 0.840            -0.2(-1) -0.1(-1) -0.1(-1) 0.1(-1) 0.2(-1) 1(-1) 2(-0.4) 3(-1) 3(-1) 3(-0.2) 3(0.1) 3(0.04) 3(0.2) 3(0.01) 3(-0.1) 
Guardian Assurance plc 26 27% 73% 0% 0.953 606(-1305) 580(-1283) 900(-944) 1403(-582) 1788(-385) 2282(-75) 2359(-163) 3395(-204) 3598(-247) 4187(287) 4826(870) 4821(816) 4859(973) 4012(162) 3415(-333) 3339(-317) 2969(-530) 3306(7) 2416(-817) 2314(-719) 2188(-639) 2688(-118) 2496(-197) 2277(-315) 2089(-530) 2649(207) 
Guardian Eastern Insurance Co Ltd 15 0% 20% 80% 0.588            -1(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.5(-1) -1(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.4(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.4(-0.4) -0.3(-0.3) -0.4(-0.4) 2(-0.4) 2(-0.4) 2(-0.4) 
Guardian Linked Life Assurance Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 1.153 256(155) 244(112) 179(27) 447(287) 470(285) 480(260) 383(130) 365(88) 280(-18) 528(229) 812(512) 944(646) 760(469) 618(315) 510(202) 466(152) 340(23) 475(173) 242(-43) 139(-127) 142(-130) 510(208) 348(22) 257(-46) 331(83) 183(19) 
Guardian Pensions Management Ltd 26 69% 12% 19% 1.111 -23(-25) -24(-25) -30(-30) -15(-15) -8(-8) 1(-0.4) 4(4) 107(70) 92(35) 216(154) 339(270) 454(369) 355(266) 282(185) 230(139) 302(151) 237(80) 335(175) 219(31) 207(-61) 225(-55) 576(316) 368(100) 284(19) 348(102) 234(39) 
Halifax Life Ltd 16 56% 19% 25% 1.005 -267(-275) -620(-666) -1256(-1287) 327(317) 292(292) 2464(591) 932(-647) 247(-1095) -581(-1729) 472(-498) 622(334) 627(436) 343(187) 180(71) 70(11) 25(5)           
Hamilton Life Assurance Co Ltd 24 50% 42% 8% 1.084   -8(-8) 24(24) 38(38) 37(37) 27(22) 32(30) 23(23) 89(60) 87(60) 80(54) 75(50) 54(26) 29(3) -5(-8) 4(-15) 15(-7) 14(-8) 11(-8) 18(-3) 7(-3) 4(-1) 3(-1) 1(-0.5) 1(-0.3) 
Hannover Life Reassurance (UK) Ltd 26 0% 77% 23% 0.897 33(-41) 19(-39) 23(-27) 12(-26) 15(-17) 24(-4) 15(-8) 27(-10) 26(-6) 17(-10) 12(-8) 6(-10) 9(-2) 0.4(-7) -3(-9) -4(-9) -5(-9) -2(-7) -1(-8) -2(-8) 1(-6) 2(-4) 3(-2) 4(-1) 3(-0.5) 1(-0.1) 
Hannover Standard Life 4 0% 0% 100% 0.623        -5(-8) -5(-8) -4(-7) -4(-6)                
Health Shield Friendly Society Ltd 15 67% 27% 7% 1.066 7(3) 4(-0.2) -1(-5) 14(10) 13(9) 7(3) 4(-0.3) 2(-2) 2(-2) 5(2) 9(5) 9(5) 9(5) 8(5) 5(2)            
Hearts of Oak Insurance Co Ltd 11 100% 0% 0% 1.157     177(51) 196(59) 167(29) 160(19) 153(8) 189(42) 230(89) 256(118) 221(80) 198(45) 164(10)            
Hermes Assured Ltd 10 90% 0% 10% 1.130     9108(5768) 7656(4228) 2751(1198) 1830(550) -232(-812) 666(10) 1292(681) 1622(1046) 843(404) 573(193)             
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (from1995) 13 77% 23% 0% 1.087              1159(616) 955(377) 836(193) 366(35) 376(45) 153(-205) 363(-88) 159(-107) 378(119) 323(47) 666(403) 422(164) 195(23) 
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Ltd (pre 1995) 10 90% 10% 0% 1.118                 477(138) 609(254) 393(39) 390(36) 298(-56) 543(182) 502(156) 419(81) 610(279) 412(128) 
Hiscox Insurance Co Ltd 15 0% 100% 0% 0.793            10(-5) 9(-7) 9(-8) 9(-10) 10(-10) 7(-12) 10(-9) 8(-11) 9(-10) 10(-10) 14(-6) 14(-6) 17(-5) 16(-3) 20(-2) 
Hodge Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 46% 54% 0% 1.140 94(73) 86(67) 86(66) 90(69) 88(63) 82(55) 68(40) 54(29) 37(14) 32(9) 30(5) 22(-6) 20(-9) 19(-11) 15(-16) 15(-16) 14(-16) 18(-11) 9(-19) 8(-19) 8(-16) 14(-9) 12(-5) 7(-4) 5(-2) 4(0.4) 
Homeowners Friendly Society Ltd 23 0% 100% 0% 0.852 131(-132) 27(-141) 16(-164) 114(-80) 139(-81) 160(-92) 145(-137) 146(-158) 63(-190) 129(-140) 186(-93) 227(-66) 196(-102) 188(-132) 197(-158) 224(-158) 229(-189) 282(-135) 239(-154) 237(-136) 240(-88) 214(-37) 180(-19)    
HSBC Life (UK) Ltd 23 83% 17% 0% 1.180 1046(801) 834(569) 738(233) 2018(1391) 1841(1338) 1624(1184) 1114(704) 961(553) 646(249) 1235(867) 1551(1267) 1783(1499) 1349(1067) 1100(771) 534(245) 350(97) 262(45) 210(64) 12(-87) 63(-10) 16(-35) 33(9) 1(-0.4)    
Ideal Benefit Society (The) 8 88% 13% 0% 1.164        26(9) 36(11) 46(19) 43(10) 44(8) 41(5) 38(2) 36(-0.4)            
Imperial Life (UK) Ltd 4 50% 0% 50% 0.979                       -2(-2) -3(-3) 33(11) 15(2) 
Independent Order of Foresters 10 0% 100% 0% 0.861                 91(-67) 142(-11) 76(-71) 57(-80) 56(-69) 71(-44) 74(-33) 76(-24) 77(-17) 75(-7) 
Independent Order of Odd Fellows 
 Manchester Unity Friendly Society 8 63% 38% 0% 1.018        33(-3) 44(-5) 49(-0.2) 54(5) 56(7) 35(3) 26(1) 25(0.4)            
IntegraLife UK Ltd 26 42% 58% 0% 0.969 1257(131) 986(-25) 688(-184) 813(196) 465(102) 220(55) 74(6) 47(-7) 28(-7) 21(1) 26(9) 23(3) 24(1) 22(-4) 19(-10) 17(-15) 16(-18) 22(-14) 17(-24) 20(-28) 27(-21) 27(-14) 36(-5) 53(7) 47(3) 35(-3) 
Invesco Life Ltd 1 0% 100% 0% 1.000           1(0)                
Invesco Perpetual Life Ltd 12 83% 17% 0% 1.133 187(115) 154(77) 65(2) 263(203) 244(194) 169(118) 82(47) 38(10) 2(-20) 10(-6) 28(18) 10(5)               
Investment Solutions Ltd 14 86% 0% 14% 1.042 38(23) 50(22) -43(-72) 51(21) 86(56) 81(61) 35(20) 8(1) -2(-6) 4(1) 2(1) 2(0.4) 1(0.2) 1(0.01)             
Irish Life Assurance plc 9 56% 44% 0% 1.018                  223(94) 110(2) 75(-15) 76(-1) 101(30) 55(-7) 46(-5) 55(8) 38(2) 
Irish Progressive Life Assurance Co Ltd 13 69% 23% 8% 1.052             447(295) 332(197) 164(47) 118(4) 74(-38) 124(14) -8(-120) 53(-75) 69(-65) 229(98) 192(75) 127(13) 121(29)  
JPMorgan Life Ltd 14 57% 14% 29% 1.004 276(182) 57(-146) -503(-768) 684(442) 668(469) 363(238) -17(-125) -109(-292) -484(-837) 107(-156) 323(91) 506(348) 96(24) 20(4)             
Just Retirement Ltd 6 33% 67% 0% 1.025 419(298) 130(23) 24(-65) 19(-38) 20(-4) 8(0)                     
Kensington Friendly Collecting Society Ltd 14 64% 36% 0% 1.043 2(0.2) 2(-0.001) 2(-0.1) 2(1) 3(1) 2(0.4) 2(-0.1) 1(-0.4) 1(-1) 2(0.5) 3(1) 3(1) 2(0.5) 2(0.3)             
Kingston Unity Friendly Society 4 0% 100% 0% 0.786        5(-4) 4(-4) 6(-3) 9(-1)                
Lancashire and Yorkshire Assurance Society 7 0% 100% 0% 0.920                 11(-14) 32(-5) 33(-16) 25(-24) 27(-16) 36(-0.1) 28(-2)    
LAS Investment Assurance Ltd 9 22% 44% 33% 0.915                  23(-11) -30(-62) -53(-80) -45(-69) 44(14) 17(-24) 7(-31) 45(22) 6(-8) 
LAS Pensions Management Ltd 9 67% 33% 0% 1.064                  66(21) 47(-3) 39(-9) 45(-9) 90(36) 66(18) 59(11) 61(18) 42(4) 
Leeds Life Assurance Ltd 1 0% 100% 0% 0.993                 7(-0.3)          
Legal and General (Unit Assurance) Ltd 6 83% 17% 0% 1.123                     258(-10) 649(356) 484(143) 530(162) 647(263) 434(61) 
Legal and General (Unit Pensions) Ltd 6 33% 67% 0% 0.995                     49(-101) 193(76) 73(-17) 60(-17) 62(13) 39(-0.2) 
Legal and General Assurance  
(Pensions Management) Ltd 26 85% 15% 0% 1.115 89378(12367) 78649(518) 54749(-18851) 95870(25742) 72569(23277) 62426(18284) 41760(3158) 29798(-2840) 19669(-11527) 31201(4226) 39080(15827) 40187(20403) 25521(11191) 15566(6626) 9770(3625) 6870(2802) 4364(1132) 4577(2160) 2247(562) 1688(83) 1220(8) 1692(914) 986(384) 919(147) 1591(249) 1704(-28) 
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 1.093 15097(4187) 14366(3226) 10629(-211) 17108(6243) 16419(5761) 26302(9576) 22009(6747) 20242(5895) 18188(4765) 20567(8078) 21170(9441) 20157(8977) 18577(7948) 13644(3441) 10587(957) 9802(943) 8358(80) 8862(1228) 6219(-694) 5615(-593) 4399(-262) 4265(47) 4123(313) 3740(195) 3370(51) 2866(-297) 
Liberty Life Assurance Co Ltd 10 100% 0% 0% 1.186                 166(89) 171(78) 99(12) 80(14) 84(32) 79(43) 59(29) 111(79) 114(57) 67(16) 
Liberty Re Ltd 4 75% 25% 0% 1.085           0.4(0.4) 9(-37) 55(11) 46(2)             
Life Insurance Corporation of India 26 0% 100% 0% 0.703 7(-29) 8(-27) 7(-28) 8(-26) 9(-25) 9(-25) 10(-23) 11(-23) 12(-24) 11(-25) 12(-25) 9(-28) 10(-28) 10(-29) 11(-28) 11(-27) 12(-26) 14(-24) 15(-23) 15(-20) 17(-16) 19(-13) 22(-9) 23(-6) 24(-4) 23(-3) 
Lincoln Assurance Ltd (pre 1996) 12 83% 17% 0% 1.096               715(270) 686(262) 395(99) 373(198) 204(46) 149(4) 129(-7) 267(142) 190(63) 170(40) 186(58) 99(-25) 
Lindsey House Friendly Society 3 0% 67% 33% 0.822        0.1(-2) -1(-4) 1(-1)                 
Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society Ltd 23 0% 100% 0% 0.799 1303(-1348) 1145(-1327) 995(-1380) 362(-1244) 565(-1253) 733(-1301) 1015(-1220) 1112(-1198) 1219(-1169) 1138(-1138) 1148(-1101) 1056(-1076) 1036(-1034) 1157(-1000) 1104(-942) 1053(-867) 1030(-784) 904(-722) 774(-660) 789(-549) 860(-370) 928(-216) 953(-105)    
Liverpool Victoria Life Co Ltd 26 42% 46% 12% 0.966 -69(-69) -215(-215) -254(-254) 570(86) 656(102) 745(146) 541(-67) 481(-137) 460(-160) 657(27) 94(31) 92(34) 98(39) 62(7) 47(-2) 36(-8) 35(-5) 33(-2) 21(-10) 20(-7) 21(-2) 25(6) 19(4) 14(-0.02) 13(1) 10(-1) 
Lloyds Bowmaker Assurance Ltd 10 0% 80% 20% 0.809                 -1(-1) -1(-2) 2(-4) 3(-4) 4(-3) 5(-2) 5(-2) 5(-1) 5(-1) 4(-0.4) 
London and Edinburgh Life Assurance Co Ltd 13 0% 77% 23% 0.906            10(-26) 12(-20) 5(-18) 0.3(-16) -5(-15) -4(-16) -0.1(-12) 3(-9) 4(-7) 7(-2) 4(-1) 1(-0.1) 0.3(0)   
London Aberdeen and Northern 
 Mutual Assurance Society Ltd 22 36% 64% 0% 1.009     6(-2) 10(-2) 10(-3) 12(-4) 14(-4) 25(5) 45(18) 56(27) 44(16) 36(11) 25(6) 22(4) 19(-1) 15(2) 9(-4) 5(-7) 6(-7) 11(-1) 7(-3) 9(-3) 10(-0.1) 7(-0.4) 
London General Life Co Ltd 20 85% 10% 5% 1.259 -0.4(-1) 0.1(-0.2) 0.4(-0.1) 1(0.2) 1(1) 1(1) 0.5(0.3) 0.5(0.3) 1(1) 2(2) 2(2) 2(2) 1(1) 2(2) 3(3) 73(70) 49(46) 59(57) 21(20) 4(3)       
London Life Association Ltd 4 100% 0% 0% 1.065                       1025(189) 1054(240) 865(87) 719(3) 
London Life Linked Assurances Ltd 21 90% 10% 0% 1.206      82(45) 73(27) 77(18) 72(1) 145(66) 214(132) 255(170) 221(126) 202(95) 181(58) 193(54) 181(24) 195(57) 131(8) 110(-4) 99(-6) 152(50) 127(21) 121(14) 113(28) 68(6) 
London Life Ltd 26 54% 46% 0% 0.984 51(-455) 13(-595) 68(-633) 301(-443) 837(-465) 1065(-348) 1083(-498) 1164(-599) 1406(-485) 1947(-66) 2243(201) 2387(339) 2267(110) 2015(22) 110(20) 120(29) 95(19) 111(44) 60(6) 42(-4) 28(-6) 115(54) 129(35) 197(38) 246(66) 216(11) 
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Lucida plc 3 100% 0% 0% 1.055 147(47) 113(24) 79(42)                        
M and G Life Assurance Co Ltd 16 100% 0% 0% 1.505           1115(965) 1063(874) 891(671) 1123(874) 947(676) 887(610) 794(523) 748(520) 301(45) 477(228) 333(83) 758(540) 542(351) 846(688) 407(246) 191(37) 
M and G Pensions and Annuity Co Ltd 16 100% 0% 0% 1.332           1288(1021) 1640(949) 1328(646) 1404(852) 1082(625) 983(533) 879(459) 833(451) 455(99) 523(201) 337(48) 611(354) 445(219) 670(462) 314(122) 187(14) 
Managed Pension Funds Ltd 8 100% 0% 0% 1.174 6978(4333) 4906(2582) 3638(189) 10618(7189) 9826(6633) 8999(5746) 4760(2530) 3039(1315)                   
Manchester Unity Life Insurance Collecting Society 11 0% 100% 0% 0.879             9(-4) 9(-5) 9(-5) 10(-4) 9(-4) 12(-4) 11(-4) 10(-3) 9(-2) 8(-1) 7(-0.3)    
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co Ltd 10 100% 0% 0% 1.146                 168(74) 301(189) 206(96) 183(78) 209(111) 220(107) 186(67) 189(37) 198(56) 160(24) 
Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance Society 26 54% 46% 0% 1.025 421(83) 362(51) 337(40) 556(232) 593(233) 672(268) 601(170) 570(131) 502(57) 626(182) 681(259) 596(218) 567(200) 395(35) 297(-53) 246(-90) 157(-164) 230(-111) 149(-227) 172(-252) 250(-192) 379(-60) 379(-42) 380(-17) 363(-3) 336(-20) 
Markel International Insurance Co Ltd 21 5% 38% 57% 0.833    -0.03(-0.03) -0.03(-0.03) -0.03(-0.03) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(0) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(-0.02) -0.02(-0.02) -0.1(-0.1) 1(-0.01) 0.5(0.04) 0.3(-0.04) 0.04(-0.03) 0.02(-0.03) 0.02(0) 0.04(-0.001) 0.01(0)   0.01(-0.002) 
Marks and Spencer Life Assurance Ltd 16 63% 38% 0% 1.112 62(9) 44(-10) 24(-28) 77(27) 74(26) 77(24) 53(-2) 40(-9) 20(-21) 32(-1) 31(6) 25(9) 19(10) 12(8) 6(5) 7(5)           
Medical Sickness Annuity and Life Assurance Society Ltd 12 25% 75% 0% 1.006               380(112) 369(117) 261(30) 198(-15) 159(-41) 156(-29) 160(-7) 146(-9) 131(-10) 118(-11) 113(-5) 95(-11) 
Mercantile and General Reinsurance Co Ltd (The) 13 0% 38% 62% 0.826              -44(-513) -97(-575) -105(-599) -248(-739) -148(-554) -130(-518) -148(-514) -5(-405) 99(-287) 118(-217) 142(-154) 178(-103) 175(-68) 
Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 1.200 762(430) 677(345) 501(164) 965(643) 957(639) 870(543) 620(297) 522(203) 355(42) 660(349) 923(614) 987(687) 634(337) 565(267) 463(175) 432(154) 347(81) 462(213) 186(-52) 146(-85) 145(-62) 290(110) 173(19) 128(-12) 173(46) 117(-9) 
MetLife Assurance Ltd 4 75% 0% 25% 0.778 277(23) 202(21) 84(9) -123(-152)                       
MetLife Ltd 26 0% 19% 81% 0.789 -6(-6) -3(-7) -2(-8) -2(-6) -2(-6) -2(-6) -0.2(-4) -0.3(-4) -1(-4) -2(-4) -4(-5) -3(-3) -5(-5) -4(-4) -4(-4) -4(-4) -4(-4) -4(-4) -5(-5) -5(-7) -3(-5) 1(-4) 1(-3) 0.4(-2) 0.3(-1) 2(-1) 
Metropolitan Police Friendly Society Ltd 23 48% 52% 0% 1.013 26(11) 24(9) 19(4) 32(17) 19(3) 12(-4) 15(-2) 16(-1) 16(-0.2) 21(4) 23(6) 22(5) 22(5) 20(5) 14(-2) 10(-5) 9(-5) 10(-3) 7(-5) 8(-5) 7(-6) 14(1) 10(-2)    
Monarch Assurance plc 15 100% 0% 0% 1.334 95(48) 95(49) 91(44) 97(51) 97(50) 90(44) 91(44) 97(51) 62(14) 64(16) 61(14) 62(17) 51(8) 56(13) 49(6)            
Munich Reinsurance Co United Kingdom Life Branch 19 0% 100% 0% 0.899        150(-80) 97(-48) 99(-42) 90(-61) 39(-96) 59(-59) 28(-52) 28(-45) 13(-39) 1(-47) 15(-43) 11(-39) 14(-30) 11(-24) 4(-18) 4(-13) 5(-8) 5(-7) 10(-5) 
National Deposit Friendly Society Ltd 15 87% 13% 0% 1.083 74(16) 76(9) 67(-7) 102(28) 106(31) 106(29) 90(14) 78(7) 72(-1) 82(8) 92(17) 98(22) 91(15) 86(9) 79(1)            
National Employers' Life Assurance Co Ltd 7 0% 100% 0% 0.929                    128(-62) 135(-51) 167(-17) 173(-11) 177(-12) 186(-9) 162(-12) 
National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 26 85% 15% 0% 1.162 2610(455) 2445(299) 2563(426) 3045(1036) 2962(1017) 2977(1082) 2556(723) 2591(776) 2543(785) 2789(1049) 3463(1820) 3352(1793) 2920(1528) 2524(1276) 1648(473) 1556(482) 1309(326) 1267(372) 775(-41) 569(-164) 541(-122) 560(-48) 575(15) 544(24) 496(5) 449(5) 
National Financial Management Corporation plc 6 83% 17% 0% 1.144                     27(-88) 218(114) 111(26) 253(186) 111(59) 45(7) 
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd 3 33% 67% 0% 1.135                        478(214) 372(-6) 328(-5) 
National Mutual Life Assurance Society 18 56% 44% 0% 1.022         1854(241) 1935(328) 2196(696) 2123(733) 1761(465) 1245(63) 958(-83) 809(-86) 511(-81) 478(-46) 372(-92) 336(-63) 348(-9) 353(22) 333(35) 312(45) 247(5) 202(-11) 
National Mutual Pensions Ltd 11 91% 0% 9% 1.201                -0.01(-0.01) 130(9) 134(69) 47(27) 25(13) 19(11) 27(22) 15(11) 13(11) 16(14) 21(1) 
National Provident Institution 15 93% 7% 0% 1.102            9695(5903) 7269(3595) 5086(1636) 4353(1174) 3742(825) 3084(428) 3323(853) 2661(219) 2098(37) 1829(16) 1861(221) 1552(94) 1442(98) 1266(67) 1032(-17) 
National Provident Life Ltd 11 27% 64% 9% 0.932 -90(-1301) 897(-1165) 1234(-791) 1763(-531) 2452(-199) 3150(193) 3158(-198) 3547(-356) 4971(-120) 6078(213) 8182(773)                
National Westminster Life Assurance Ltd 18 56% 11% 33% 1.019 -112(-112) -227(-227) -524(-524) 88(88) 73(73) -9(-9) -298(-309) -421(-421) 167(-1589) 1941(279) 3271(1844) 3776(2523) 2311(1111) 1060(498) 642(229) 434(163) 79(-65) 168(41)         
Nationwide Life Ltd 16 81% 19% 0% 1.112 21(21) 53(52) 198(83) 282(136) 347(182) 354(164) 292(71) 279(33) 207(-3) 229(17) 291(77) 390(226) 258(150) 155(85) 22(-4) 6(-0.2)           
NEL Britannia Assurance Co Ltd 7 29% 43% 29% 0.952                    -19(-28) -14(-27) 33(18) 8(-5) 0.1(-11) 21(11) 5(-0.01) 
NEL Pensions Ltd 7 0% 100% 0% 0.875                    230(-172) 246(-144) 300(-76) 288(-73) 295(-51) 296(-31) 277(-26) 
NM Life Ltd 22 36% 36% 27% 0.935     441(-1) 504(74) 544(216) 504(224) 404(168) 283(68) 304(22) 148(-20) 92(-8) -10(-37) -19(-41) -27(-46) -15(-40) -7(-48) -2(-45) 6(-35) 8(-25) 24(-0.4) 33(14) 15(1) 8(-2) 7(-2) 
NM Pensions Ltd 5 0% 100% 0% 0.914     1577(-357) 1576(-448) 1190(-816) 1547(-375) 1379(-524)                  
Northern Assurance Co Ltd 14 36% 64% 0% 0.986             1110(622) 870(387) 618(194) 532(107) 354(-64) 493(112) 206(-139) 74(-267) 32(-302) 250(-102) 157(-172) 197(-127) 218(-35) 157(-45) 
Norwich Union Asset Management Ltd 8 100% 0% 0% 1.078                   301(96) 262(23) 270(4) 545(239) 411(63) 429(13) 520(109) 204(15) 
Norwich Union Life (RBS) Ltd 16 88% 13% 0% 1.270           402(402) 524(524) 402(402) 368(368) 270(270) 302(302) 198(187) 1182(640) 1770(191) 1939(-32) 1785(-140) 2813(1040) 2014(607) 1515(461) 1363(469) 903(115) 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society  12 25% 75% 0% 0.987               13916(-401) 12735(-602) 11151(-1651) 14052(1866) 9799(-1525) 9121(-1078) 8418(-216) 8964(1354) 6803(261) 5852(-142) 4661(-889) 4081(-576) 
Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Ltd 20 70% 30% 0% 1.076       7909(-267) 5949(-1384) 4082(-2486) 6668(680) 8355(3274) 7525(3578) 5120(2242) 3900(1249) 2928(428) 389(96) 277(18) 337(119) 192(10) 157(-15) 156(-4) 221(66) 219(64) 240(83) 262(99) 176(-9) 
Nottingham Oddfellows Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 13 0% 100% 0% 0.952   4(-2) 5(-0.04) 5(-0.3) 5(-1) 4(-1) 3(-1) 3(-1) 3(-0.4) 3(-0.3) 3(-0.4) 3(-0.4) 3(-0.3) 3(-0.3)            
NPI Annuities Ltd 14 57% 43% 0% 1.005             531(93) 342(-59) 267(-126) 271(-97) 227(-150) 404(47) 47(3) 37(-13) 40(-19) 96(38) 71(10) 62(7) 67(20) 47(5) 
NPI Ltd 11 0% 91% 9% 0.812 288(-664) 106(-930) -261(-1321) 735(-390) 1100(-525) 757(-654) 478(-1173) 387(-1547) 26(-1821) 666(-1018) 1215(-320)                
NRG London Reinsurance Co Ltd 14 0% 71% 29% 0.865             -0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) -0.2(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2) 3(-8) 8(-8) 15(-8) 10(-6) 10(-4) 10(-3) 10(-2) 10(-1) 
NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd 9 11% 89% 0% 0.939                  100(-27) 62(-60) 30(-70) 33(-54) 37(-26) 38(-19) 49(-5) 59(0.2) 66(-5) 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co Ltd 14 50% 50% 0% 1.038            610(296) 635(260) 479(103) 426(41) 376(-28)  554(176) 295(-67) 233(-103) 167(-93) 206(21) 149(-4) 117(-8) 131(23) 90(-0.2) 
Omnilife Insurance Co Ltd 18 0% 50% 50% 0.916 0.01(-1) 0.1(-1) 1(-0.1) -1(-2) -1(-2) -0.3(-1) -1(-1) -0.4(-1) 0.004(-0.3) 0.3(-0.01) 0.2(-0.1) -0.2(-0.5) -0.4(-1) 0.05(-0.2) -0.01(-0.2) -0.01(-0.1) 0.1(-0.03) 0.05(-0.01)         
Original Holloway Friendly Society Ltd (The) 15 27% 73% 0% 0.953 0.3(-5) 1(-4) 1(-4) 2(-2) 3(-2) 3(-2) 4(-1) 6(-1) 1(-1) 2(-1) 3(0.1) 3(1) 3(0.5) 2(0.1) 2(-0.1)            
PA (GI) Ltd 20 15% 85% 0% 0.935       127(-201) 158(-167) 258(-107) 511(-67) 837(204) 696(65) 621(-66) 516(-197) 507(-208) 450(-230) 390(-249) 411(-143) 270(-260) 300(-195) 347(-121) 434(-26) 428(-29) 473(19) 456(-4) 451(-48) 
Pacific Life Re Ltd 26 0% 46% 54% 0.809 9(-28) 10(-22) 12(-21) -28(-28) -25(-30) -22(-26) -24(-25) -27(-27) -30(-31) -21(-26) -22(-31) -33(-36) -28(-43) -19(-48) -10(-46) -3(-39) -6(-40) 5(-30) 8(-34) 3(-29) 17(-28) 22(-19) 21(-10) 16(-7) 17(-4) 15(-3) 
Partnership Life Assurance Co Ltd 6 33% 50% 17% 0.959 44(-12) 39(9) -4(-23) 3(-7) 4(-3) 6(0.4)                     
Paternoster UK Ltd 5 0% 100% 0% 0.928 373(-374) 434(-281) 259(-454) 376(-26) 38(-1)                      
Pearl Assurance (Unit Funds) Ltd 21 95% 5% 0% 1.330      149(149) 135(135) 148(128) 140(97) 300(250) 441(391) 591(521) 532(436) 471(354) 414(254) 422(242) 331(148) 406(245) 221(69) 157(2) 154(-24) 397(202) 280(64) 260(46) 237(96) 109(19) 
Pearl Assurance (Unit Linked Pensions) Ltd 21 95% 5% 0% 1.156      200(82) 158(32) 140(4) 104(-34) 197(64) 270(145) 298(178) 231(117) 184(82) 133(45) 123(46) 92(25) 102(48) 53(14) 32(2) 26(1) 37(15) 24(5) 20(5) 17(6) 9(2) 
Pearl Assurance Ltd 26 92% 8% 0% 1.285 4104(1575) 3290(1237) 3549(1332) 4620(2274) 7629(3500) 9230(4565) 9940(4925) 10177(4815) 11614(5963) 13526(7843) 12721(7583) 11833(6661) 10556(5626) 9063(4186) 7469(2654) 6841(2049) 6457(1779) 5824(1334) 4864(646) 4081(369) 3668(312) 3408(298) 3061(155) 2874(78) 2655(-12) 2433(-94) 
Pegasus Assurance Ltd 10 20% 30% 50% 0.946             1(-0.2) -0.2(-0.2) 0.2(-0.1) 1(-0.3) -0.3(-1) 0.5(0.3) -1(-1) -1(-1) -0.3(-1) 0.5(0.05)     
Pension Annuity Friendly Society Ltd (The) 11 100% 0% 0% 1.612      19(4) 17(4) 14(4) 12(5) 9(5) 9(6) 7(6) 7(6) 2(1) 1(0.1) 0.5(0.05)           
Pension Insurance Corporation Ltd 3 100% 0% 0% 1.041 463(162) 346(81) 256(70)                        
Pensions Management (SWF) Ltd 26 100% 0% 0% 1.402 720(720) 633(633) 474(474) 1123(1080) 1087(1080) 1146(1097) 758(758) 722(722) 487(487) 1295(1219) 2175(1998) 2523(2380) 2195(1983) 2614(2016) 3361(2012) 3793(2091) 3292(1420) 4844(2598) 3443(1154) 2681(545) 2232(526) 3242(1688) 2195(647) 2088(610) 2161(752) 1441(120) 
PFM Assurance Ltd 10 70% 30% 0% 1.069                 1(-1) 1(0.2) 1(-0.1) 1(-0.02) 1(0.2) 1(1) 1(1) 11(1) 13(6) 6(1) 
Pharmaceutical and General Provident Society Ltd 15 67% 33% 0% 1.035 6(0.5) 5(-1) 2(-5) 10(4) 10(3) 8(1) 5(-2) 3(-3) 1(-6) 7(0.3) 9(1) 15(8) 11(5) 9(3) 6(0.3)            
Phoenix and London Assurance Ltd 26 96% 4% 0% 1.188 2080(612) 2192(608) 2849(1239) 2721(1081) 3252(1607) 3899(2183) 5612(2577) 5592(2372) 5904(2464) 6103(2443) 7064(3274) 6969(3082) 7352(3440) 6153(2259) 4571(866) 4282(698) 4035(567) 4299(843) 3415(41) 2958(25) 2664(66) 2484(136) 2179(59) 2022(97) 1732(27) 1404(-73) 
Phoenix Life and Pensions Ltd 21 43% 57% 0% 0.995      2604(319) 3797(116) 3876(-216) 4986(446) 5743(916) 7038(2298) 6349(1840) 5667(1414) 4351(175) 3517(-705) 3157(-953) 3482(21) 3356(-409) 2478(-956) 2248(-879) 2355(-607) 2514(-332) 2428(-306) 2274(-380) 2263(-281) 2098(-241) 
Phoenix Life Assurance Ltd 15 73% 27% 0% 1.070    418(134) 398(125) 343(90) 155(-83) 122(-140) 55(-254) 544(208) 850(520) 935(621) 639(372) 432(182) 306(134) 277(160) 44(-25) 43(16)         
Phoenix Life Ltd 26 58% 42% 0% 1.008 6561(-1104) 7135(-1777) 3579(-2915) 6978(-454) 10080(282) 2619(67) 1235(-488) 1130(-792) 810(-1308) 2293(-176) 3131(707) 3509(1133) 2512(251) 471(171) 431(102) 454(84) 408(5) 510(110) 333(-60) 281(-119) 260(-115) 499(132) 434(40) 473(47) 484(163) 226(4) 
Phoenix Pensions Ltd 10 60% 40% 0% 0.997 908(-145) 784(-246) 773(-221) 986(77)  349(36) 317(1) 236(5) 180(14) 63(-0.2) 16(2)                
Pinnacle Insurance plc 26 15% 50% 35% 0.870 -23(-23) -49(-49) 23(-158) 187(-93) 106(-67) 154(26) 142(34) 26(-34) 29(-31) 36(-14) 40(-6) 19(-6) 20(-0.2) 11(-2) 4(-2) -1(-2) -1(-2) -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -0.3(-0.4) 0.1(-0.4) 0.4(-0.2) 1(0.2) 1(0.1) 
Pioneer Friendly Society Ltd 12 8% 67% 25% 0.942    2(-2) 1(-2) 2(-1) 1(-1) -0.1(-1) -0.4(-1) -0.05(-1) 0.3(-0.3) 0.5(-0.1) 1(0.2) 0.4(-0.01) 0.2(-0.2)            
POIS Assurance Ltd 14 64% 36% 0% 1.033          56(8) 71(19) 81(25) 88(26) 86(22) 77(12) 77(10) 53(-13) 61(-3) 47(-15) 46(-15) 54(-7) 70(7) 67(4)    
Police Mutual Assurance Society Ltd 23 39% 57% 4% 0.982 -24(-258) 12(-241) 41(-237) 234(-76) 265(-83) 311(-63) 244(-131) 244(-136) 273(-107) 389(11) 578(213) 753(387) 542(189) 442(101) 317(2) 298(14) 217(-39) 301(69) 207(-5) 148(-39) 134(-38) 212(50) 144(-7)    
PPP Lifetime Care plc 15 73% 27% 0% 1.037     56(18) 75(31) 64(20) 54(12) 41(9) 35(9) 40(16) 32(9) 36(18) 20(5) 8(-1) 3(0.3) 1(-1) 1(-0.3) 2(0)        
Premium Life Assurance Co Ltd 12 75% 25% 0% 1.036               38(8) 24(3) 24(5) 18(0.2) 5(-12) 7(-8) 17(3) 24(11) 18(6) 29(16) 17(6) 8(-1) 
Professional Life Assurance Co Ltd 15 80% 20% 0% 1.173            187(160) 88(65) 64(45) 46(31) 39(26) 21(10) 27(17) 6(2) 3(-0.3) 0.1(-3) 9(7) 4(2) 8(6) 4(2) 0.3(-1) 
Property Growth Assurance Co Ltd 4 75% 25% 0% 1.135                       10(10) 14(14) 16(16) 170(-6) 
Prosperity Life Assurance Ltd 9 33% 67% 0% 0.997                  52(20) 27(-12) 18(-24) 18(-20) 48(13) 29(-1) 25(-1) 34(10) 17(-0.2) 
Proteus Insurance Co Ltd 14 0% 36% 64% 0.642             -0.004(-0.004) -0.004(-0.004) -0.01(-0.01) -0.01(-0.01) -0.01(-0.01) -0.01(-0.01) -0.004(-0.01) 0(-0.01) -0.002(-0.01) 0.002(-0.01) 0.003(-0.01) 0.01(0) 0.02(-0.01) 0.03(-0.004) 
Provident Mutual Life Assurance Ltd 11 64% 36% 0% 1.049                2906(468) 2342(-12) 2995(753) 1965(-164) 1585(-398) 1546(-278) 2519(837) 1985(516) 1756(410) 1581(349) 1171(48) 
Prudential (AN) Ltd 25 92% 8% 0% 2.486  9(9) 10(9) 10(9) 10(10) 223(136) 187(86) 187(74) 157(33) 276(144) 363(226) 414(268) 357(201) 321(160) 286(125) 278(113) 214(52) 239(87) 148(6) 110(-28) 105(-26) 184(64) 131(20) 115(20) 109(33) 66(7) 
Prudential Annuities Ltd 19 84% 16% 0% 1.066 4669(-966) 4727(-1226) 4450(-1578) 5989(221) 7128(1229) 8316(2249) 7794(1605) 7509(1348) 7250(1337) 6880(1104) 6724(1299) 6225(1248) 6045(2149) 4345(955) 3074(261) 2659(276) 2026(4) 2754(916) 1613(148)        
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The) 26 100% 0% 0% 1.216 41013(17116) 40296(16944) 40788(16803) 44188(21991) 43805(21780) 46642(23159) 44230(20353) 44141(19503) 42830(17701) 44999(22293) 42987(20540) 39474(17543) 34811(14011) 30494(10555) 20633(6572) 18812(6084) 20815(6080) 19065(5360) 16157(3515) 15226(2987) 13632(2632) 13563(3032) 11122(1384) 10178(1099) 9601(690) 8482(68) 
Prudential Holborn Life Ltd 25 92% 8% 0% 1.265  471(-61) 370(-192) 859(313) 895(396) 797(336) 498(229) 293(176) 205(123) 295(233) 386(316) 438(359) 354(278) 316(248) 251(198) 225(185) 167(128) 384(270) 226(116) 191(58) 219(44) 522(308) 442(161) 562(169) 645(249) 424(49) 
Prudential Pensions Ltd 26 73% 27% 0% 1.130 2112(-110) 1501(-456) 657(-1166) 2211(624) 2726(1354) 3113(1337) 1932(707) 1580(455) 983(134) 1502(726) 2278(1416) 2604(1731) 1843(1142) 1508(923) 1192(689) 1171(619) 884(368) 1144(636) 627(122) 396(-65) 343(-125) 906(455) 528(137) 469(-5) 563(47) 349(-234) 
Prudential Retirement Income Ltd 25 80% 20% 0% 1.304 6265(-1622) 5218(-2049) 3917(-2962) 5686(-831) 5782(4) 4385(626) 3000(152) 1553(52) 1198(41) 516(-17) 195(6)  30(30) 79(79) 270(270) 261(261) 167(167) 264(264) 175(18) 674(6) 880(26) 1930(978) 1425(487) 1299(378) 1687(454) 1356(81) 
Railway Enginemens Assurance Society Ltd 23 0% 100% 0% 0.833 5(-7) 4(-7) 4(-7) 6(-4) 6(-3) 6(-4) 4(-4) 4(-5) 2(-6) 3(-4) 4(-4) 4(-4) 4(-4) 3(-5) 3(-5) 3(-5) 3(-5) 3(-4) 3(-4) 3(-4) 4(-3) 5(-1) 6(-1)    
Rational Shelley Friendly Society Ltd 7 100% 0% 0% 1.207       11(2) 13(3) 14(3) 15(4) 16(4) 16(4) 14(2)              
Reassure UK Life Assurance Co Ltd 20 55% 40% 5% 1.049       46(46) 90(77) 104(76) 280(180) 374(248) 404(230) 370(203) 227(87) 129(-4) 94(-13) 19(-59) 31(-39) -1(-67) 1(-61) 13(-45) 35(-20) 43(-10) 56(7) 56(8) 54(12) 
Rechabite Friendly Society Ltd 15 0% 100% 0% 0.905 21(-1) 14(-3) 7(-5) 8(-1) 5(-2) 5(-2) 4(-3) 4(-3) 4(-4) 6(-2) 6(-1) 6(-1) 7(-0.4) 6(-0.4) 6(-1)            
Red Rose Friendly Society Ltd 12 17% 83% 0% 0.967 2(-0.3) 1(-1) 1(-1) 1(-0.3) 1(-0.3) 2(-0.2) 1(-0.5) 1(-1) 1(-0.4) 2(-0.1) 2(1) 2(0.1)               
Refuge Assurance Ltd 16 31% 69% 0% 1.003           2175(1189) 2145(1127) 1888(813) 1781(665) 1287(156) 961(-154) 834(-281) 646(-465) 449(-650) 466(-569) 520(-441) 582(-331) 601(-255) 588(-186) 595(-129) 591(-81) 
Refuge Investments Ltd 16 88% 13% 0% 1.173           448(289) 489(335) 360(229) 293(179) 219(119) 236(100) 156(29) 195(80) 106(5) 62(-16) 54(-6) 102(49) 60(12) 62(6) 56(17) 26(3) 
Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 26 42% 58% 0% 0.994 519(21) 453(-51) 352(-157) 628(140) 497(147) 502(149) 372(45) 54(-13) 36(-30) 66(-0.1) 99(34) 126(63) 82(14) 78(14) 54(-20) 51(-22) 44(-27) 64(-8) 37(-33) 31(-37) 36(-28) 64(2) 50(-6) 55(-2) 66(1) 68(-4) 
RGA Reinsurance UK Ltd 11 9% 91% 0% 0.925 9(-8) 7(-7) 13(-6) 10(-7) 11(-6) 13(-3) 8(-3) 8(-2) 4(-1) 3(-1) 5(0.2)                
RM Life Assurance Ltd 20 70% 30% 0% 1.173     16(16) 166(112) 153(75) 154(60) 87(-1) 242(140) 421(304) 555(417) 402(214) 365(148) 341(109) 304(97) 189(-22) 86(12) 7(0.5) 4(-1) 2(-1) 2(0.3) 1(-0.3) 0.4(-0.3)   
Rothesay Life Ltd 3 33% 67% 0% 0.998 133(34) 89(-5) 36(-18)                        
Royal and Sun Alliance Life Holdings 4 100% 0% 0% 1.040                       152(22) 140(16) 181(63) 60(12) 
Royal Artillery Widows Insurance Society 14 100% 0% 0% 1.420 2(1) 2(1) 2(1) 3(2) 3(2) 3(2) 3(1) 3(1) 3(1) 4(2) 4(2) 4(1) 4(2) 3(1)             
Royal Life (Unit Linked Assurance) 13 77% 23% 0% 1.062              189(112) 146(72) 136(61) 100(26) 141(65) 75(-2) 41(-35) 27(-49) 132(51) 106(5) 122(11) 147(52) 73(4) 
Royal Life (Unit Linked Pension Fund) 13 62% 38% 0% 1.070              441(234) 348(154) 323(133) 217(44) 278(114) 142(-11) 84(-55) 116(-82) 317(118) 208(37) 166(-1) 189(38) 107(-21) 
Royal Liver Assurance Ltd 23 4% 96% 0% 0.864 648(-147) 711(-174) 992(-15) 1083(12) 996(-156) 970(-217) 766(-423) 764(-417) 611(-559) 605(-536) 459(-516) 356(-504) 368(-484) 316(-460) 289(-436) 295(-404) 291(-369) 278(-341) 277(-310) 264(-258) 302(-175) 354(-101) 363(-50)    
Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd (The) 26 62% 38% 0% 1.040 5616(-3818) 5569(-3670) 5200(-3990) 6936(-904) 7736(-195) 8444(72) 7355(-940) 7329(-1703) 7913(-1103) 9522(552) 3315(1506) 2851(1087) 3734(1937) 2664(858) 1838(63) 1661(-51) 1527(-84) 2001(504) 1417(24) 1284(9) 1353(188) 1491(398) 1285(241) 1162(148) 1071(104) 943(28) 
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Royal London Pooled Pensions Co Ltd 26 88% 12% 0% 1.208 650(-88) 606(-132) 499(-178) 475(16) 358(75) 216(113) 144(85) 470(136) 110(43) 160(91) 216(146) 231(161) 187(114) 155(84) 131(63) 120(54) 92(30) 110(52) 73(17) 55(5) 45(2) 92(40) 75(14) 73(10) 91(26) 69(4) 
Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses 16 94% 6% 0% 1.087           957(429) 861(358) 888(417) 656(220) 564(160) 506(111) 416(54) 367(45) 307(10) 271(8) 238(10) 235(28) 201(15) 187(6) 166(2) 138(-6) 
Royal Scottish Assurance plc 20 90% 10% 0% 1.189 252(203) 269(186) 204(76) 538(385) 559(401) 544(362) 463(261) 409(219) 379(141) 779(476) 1098(737) 973(569) 645(282) 622(333) 349(138) 232(76) 166(36) 126(47) 21(-12) 8(-1)       
Save and Prosper Insurance Ltd 26 100% 0% 0% 1.697 149(149) 146(146) 127(127) 229(229) 262(262) 270(270) 225(225) 224(214) 196(176) 312(282) 447(394) 549(476) 511(403) 541(409) 498(315) 523(317) 448(233) 441(275) 465(202) 395(94) 528(215) 632(312) 695(353) 576(214) 651(250) 504(45) 
Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd 26 96% 4% 0% 1.185 361(171) 324(115) 268(32) 679(402) 817(481) 952(473) 779(270) 746(201) 644(76) 901(316) 1138(543) 1273(666) 1092(462) 1077(445) 804(188) 774(189) 610(79) 629(152) 482(33) 342(-61) 395(34) 417(101) 423(143) 328(73) 326(86) 246(20) 
Schoolteachers Friendly Society 8 50% 13% 38% 1.100        -0.5(-1) -0.2(-0.5) -1(-1) 1(0.4) 0.2(-0.002) 6(3) 2(2) 1(0.2)            
Schroder Pension Management Ltd 5 80% 0% 20% 1.015 1051(839) 320(156) -542(-673) 235(145) 106(53)                      
SCOR Global Life Reinsurance UK Ltd 14 0% 57% 43% 0.902   0.4(-8) 0.3(-6) -2(-6) 3(-3) 2(-2) 2(-3) 4(-2) -1(-3) -1(-2) -3(-3) -0.3(-3) -1(-4) 0.3(-0.4) 0.1(-0.3)           
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society 12 0% 100% 0% 0.908               3994(-940) 3407(-1277) 2798(-1582) 3303(-701) 1683(-1945) 1277(-1923) 1430(-1386) 1803(-736) 1696(-618) 1602(-430) 1563(-167) 1325(-151) 
Scottish Amicable Life plc 5 60% 40% 0% 1.017          415(-753) 1452(364) 1076(531) 563(75) 358(-92)             
Scottish Equitable (Managed Funds) Ltd 25 80% 16% 4% 1.299  670(513) 563(401) 878(746) 873(782) 766(719) 2176(-85) 1095(-876) -295(-2090) 2479(821) 4630(3174) 5679(4421) 3904(2808) 2949(2024) 2046(1231) 1721(1037) 1106(535) 1419(971) 522(127) 302(-4) 197(-34) 601(423) 274(119) 235(81) 349(230) 135(69) 
Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society 8 0% 100% 0% 0.881                   1234(-832) 961(-916) 815(-864) 1264(-328) 989(-517) 1000(-372) 1025(-249) 1058(-148) 
Scottish Equitable plc 18 83% 17% 0% 1.106 15333(194) 11649(-2258) 7215(-5780) 14639(2733) 14315(3176) 13088(2505) 5244(1522) 5461(1743) 5168(1518) 5803(2291) 6379(3104) 5328(2336) 5611(2895) 3829(1254) 2695(306) 2453(261) 1886(-59) 2490(785)         
Scottish Friendly Assurance Society Ltd 23 43% 57% 0% 1.016 140(-191) 119(-208) 81(-250) 270(-47) 139(-35) 142(-19) 128(-12) 123(-1) 113(3) 138(43) 139(60) 130(62) 102(41) 81(25) 79(18) 69(9) 68(14) 57(4) 47(-4) 43(-5) 39(-6) 40(-3) 41(-2)    
Scottish Legal Life Assurance Society Ltd 19 0% 63% 37% 0.779     7(-21) 21(-19) 14(-36) 7(-58) -4(-89) 21(-61) 39(-40) 34(-51) 21(-59) 4(-62) -4(-65) -4(-64) -7(-65) -6(-62) -8(-66) -8(-63) 1(-68) 48(-5) 42(-11)    
Scottish Life Assurance Co 16 19% 81% 0% 0.935           4400(1622) 4022(1386) 3432(996) 2262(-25) 1522(-622) 1395(-623) 844(-1031) 1056(-853) 629(-892) 461(-801) 401(-606) 535(-429) 517(-321) 543(-222) 524(-142) 468(-89) 
Scottish Life Investment Assurance Co Ltd 6 83% 17% 0% 1.092                     6(-19) 63(43) 26(10) 17(3) 37(27) 11(4) 
Scottish Mutual Assurance Ltd 24 50% 46% 4% 1.004   -823(-1107) 468(-648) 1568(-336) 3025(70) 2956(-1151) 4709(-149) 4899(-244) 6470(1598) 6799(2683) 4903(1652) 3963(1375) 2742(363) 2161(71) 1781(-25) 1459(-133) 1492(89) 868(-388) 682(-354) 679(-273) 952(45) 832(-17) 832(22) 778(152) 502(14) 
Scottish Mutual Pension Funds Investment Ltd 10 90% 10% 0% 1.188                 62(31) 80(49) 51(22) 34(11) 60(4) 95(43) 72(22) 62(18) 85(26) 85(-1) 
Scottish Mutual Pensions Ltd 18 28% 61% 11% 0.936      -2(-2) 41(-17) 33(-21) -8(-53) 13(-21) 17(-15) 30(-11)   91(48) 100(48) 67(20) 85(45) 44(14) 22(-1) 7(-2)  0.03(-0.05) 0.1(-0.03) 0.1(-0.01) 0.01(-0.01) 
Scottish Provident Assurance Ltd 10 80% 20% 0% 1.077                 292(99) 409(222) 204(18) 108(-79) 97(-91) 471(265) 329(118) 289(78) 363(182) 163(32) 
Scottish Provident Institution 17 76% 24% 0% 1.112          5987(2961) 5899(2932) 5510(2577) 5220(2322) 3926(1120) 3102(332) 3017(300) 2199(102) 2452(461) 1817(-51) 1441(-91) 1380(-11) 1424(113) 1321(93) 1262(94) 1192(97) 1010(-14) 
Scottish Provident Ltd 8 0% 88% 13% 0.723   -193(-2750) 329(-2918) 973(-3391) 1661(-3515) 2100(-3323) 3627(-1892) 3622(-1953) 5210(-460)                 
Scottish Provident Managed Pension Funds Ltd 10 70% 20% 10% 1.082                 18(14) 34(31) 4(-0.4) -0.4(-6) 1(-7) 52(37) 53(14) 104(20) 191(54) 253(4) 
Scottish Widows Administration Services Ltd 19 79% 21% 0% 1.083        685(-972) 196(-1553) 2180(132) 4440(2010) 5974(3256) 4320(1580) 1895(1050) 1388(591) 1224(506) 800(165) 1083(520) 561(85) 276(-70) 153(-77) 206(69) 78(2) 128(78) 46(17) 24(3) 
Scottish Widows Annuities Ltd 11 36% 64% 0% 0.948 1835(-1160) 1707(-1220) 1437(-1376) 1982(-628) 2113(-239) 2364(179) 2021(35) 1576(-11) 1403(49) 1061(-37) 1017(10)                
Scottish Widows' Fund and Life Assurance Society 18 72% 11% 17% 0.894         -181(-181) -184(-184) -186(-186) 11660(3707) 12294(5000) 9774(2953) 7459(1120) 7008(1051) 5772(444) 6553(1641) 4688(209) 4107(169) 3783(342) 3491(432) 3088(373) 2662(182) 2276(-65) 2054(-106) 
Scottish Widows plc 11 9% 91% 0% 0.865 2487(-5546) 2839(-5970) 1955(-5667) 4198(-4317) 5739(-4305) 8513(-3520) 8163(-4516) 7872(-3284) 7543(-3323) 10240(-192) 11173(1638)                
Scottish Widows Unit Funds Ltd 26 81% 19% 0% 1.136 4358(775) 3121(-320) 1743(-2750) 7845(3761) 7627(3981) 5976(2865) 3217(727) 1497(228) 632(-305) 1079(439) 1484(1001) 1706(1290) 1234(843) 989(616) 766(408) 729(375) 495(139) 742(399) 393(67) 273(-30) 249(-23) 630(385) 315(89) 290(86) 296(160) 133(33) 
Security Assurance Ltd 12 0% 17% 83% 0.892              -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.3(-0.4) -0.1(-0.2) -0.03(-0.1) -0.01(-0.03) 0.01(-0.004) 0.002(0)  
Shepherds Friendly Society Ltd (The) 15 0% 0% 100% 0.929 -7(-8) -8(-8) -7(-8) -6(-6) -4(-5) -3(-4) -2(-3) -2(-2) -2(-2) -1(-2) -1(-1) -1(-1) -1(-1) -0.4(-1) -0.2(-0.3)            
Skandia Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 77% 15% 8% 1.117 3936(2385) 2925(1164) 649(-1207) 5995(4200) 5956(4341) 4455(3031) 2170(921) 1189(103) -204(-1200) 1553(651) 2840(2058) 3100(2543) 1510(1023) 1197(756) 915(526) 814(484) 450(156) 619(407) 150(-14) 26(-111) -1(-112) 252(155) 99(18) 74(-3) 175(117) 58(20) 
Skandia MultiFUNDS Assurance Ltd 9 78% 11% 11% 1.037 390(310) 42(-4) -268(-295) 67(47) 95(84) 50(45) 15(12) 3(2) 0.4(0.1)                  
SL Liverpool plc 19 74% 26% 0% 1.122       441(212) 512(203) 404(111) 601(297) 713(445) 725(496) 565(357) 442(246) 334(145) 298(127) 202(25) 304(129) 185(24) 60(10)  70(-2) 33(-33) 42(-24) 63(-5) 63(-8) 
SLFC Assurance (UK) Ltd 24 38% 63% 0% 0.972 1312(215) 1131(-65) 594(-557) 1848(675) 1911(642) 1752(399) 1234(-162) 870(-398) 183(-895) 920(91) 1628(841) 2247(1270) 2158(658) 1914(286) 739(-141) 707(-184) 484(-377) 627(-201) 344(-461) 228(-537) 188(-533) 489(-215) 348(-311) 335(-312)   
St Andrews Life Assurance plc 15 13% 73% 13% 0.964 997(-1089) 1162(-1601) 41(-2538) 3392(338) 2865(435) -2(-2) -6(-6) 42(-12) 58(-9) 56(-8) 36(-2) 14(-2) 8(-1) 6(-0.3) 3(0)            
St George Assurance 9 100% 0% 0% 1.346                  47(32) 35(18) 29(13) 28(11) 43(26) 37(19) 38(18) 33(13) 24(5) 
St James Place UK plc 19 95% 5% 0% 1.178 4556(2798) 3247(1742) 1568(273) 4299(3203) 3833(2922) 2873(2098) 1564(882) 1020(408) 183(-366) 1005(531) 1450(1078) 1405(1109) 783(547) 557(367) 341(188) 271(146) 136(39) 144(91) 17(0.2)        
Standard Life Assurance Co 2006 (The) 21 43% 57% 0% 1.000      40279(15251) 32895(9373) 31872(6117) 25696(1311) 30245(7212) 28542(11129) 25259(8372) 21446(5037) 16481(441) 13186(-2276) 11855(-3002) 10301(-3482) 10274(-2716) 7554(-4277) 6509(-3809) 5434(-3442) 7286(-911) 5601(-1320) 4548(-1670) 4343(-1639) 3928(-1381) 
Standard Life Assurance Ltd 5 0% 100% 0% 0.919 16198(-5074) 17585(-4721) 19669(-4597) 28582(-2258) 33701(-248)                      
Standard Life Investment Funds Ltd 26 77% 12% 12% 1.114 5292(-3872) 1475(-7115) -4112(-12268) 9679(2369) 9514(3175) 1253(939) 331(111) -149(-311) -522(-601) 234(234) 7886(5883) 7341(5597) 5217(3703) 4085(2726) 3433(2188) 2934(1774) 2283(1155) 2153(1237) 1136(381) 942(295) 543(-44) 1256(753) 779(317) 620(178) 715(354) 327(114) 
Standard Life Pension Funds Ltd 23 43% 9% 48% 0.921 -3(-3) -4(-5) -4(-5) -4(-4) -4(-7) -4(-6) -5(-5) -4(-7) -4(-5) -4(-4) 9(-4) 8(-3) 10(1) 20(3) 17(2) 15(2) 20(1) 26(11) 18(6) 16(4) 11(1)    -0.5(-0.5) 176(34) 
State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan 17 88% 12% 0% 1.161          0.2(0.2) 1(0.5) 1(0.5) 1(1) 1(1) 1(-0.05) 1(0.4) 1(0.2) 2(1) 2(0.3) 1(-0.3) 2(0.1) 2(1) 2(0.4) 2(1) 2(1) 2(0.2) 
Sterling Life Ltd 26 0% 73% 27% 0.888 -1(-8) 4(-8) 5(-7) 7(-5) 10(-4) 9(-3) 9(-2) 8(-1) 6(-1) 4(-1) 3(-1) 2(-0.5) 1(-0.4) 0.1(-0.4) -0.3(-0.4) -0.3(-0.3) -0.3(-0.3) -1(-1) 2(-1) -0.2(-1) -0.1(-1) 0.004(-0.4) 0.04(-0.4) 0.4(-0.3) 0.4(-0.2) 0.4(-0.1) 
Strand Friendly Society 15 20% 80% 0% 0.955         3(-9) 26(0.01) 27(5) 25(6) 15(-2) 14(-2) 10(-2) 9(-2) 7(-2) 7(-1) 5(-3) 3(-3) 3(-2) 3(-1) 2(-0.3)    
Suffolk Life Annuities Ltd 26 50% 50% 0% 1.010 718(-160) 620(-319) 388(-524) 1047(183) 850(203) 537(113) 329(12) 225(-21) 116(-61) 89(-24) 73(3) 44(9) 16(1) 6(-1) 3(-1) 2(-0.2) 2(-0.1) 2(-0.1) 1(-1) 1(-1) 2(1) 3(1) 2(1) 1(0.4) 1(0.1) 1(0.01) 
Sun Alliance Linked Life Insurance Ltd 13 23% 54% 23% 0.836              287(89) 239(11) 238(-10) 172(-96) 262(-20) 131(-156) 98(-183) 100(-198) 337(-10) -11(-12) -8(-9) -9(-9) 94(4) 
Sun Alliance Pensions Ltd 13 77% 23% 0% 1.041              951(391) 723(201) 663(161) 496(9) 684(179) 442(-68) 329(-150) 270(-151) 486(86) 374(16) 300(27) 315(56) 75(5) 
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada 15 100% 0% 0% 1.801            2390(2188) 2313(2119) 1875(1709) 1905(1734) 2018(1870) 1957(1834) 1392(1270) 1130(1003) 971(836) 867(732) 818(675) 644(480) 522(347) 404(217) 305(128) 
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada - Irish Business 14 100% 0% 0% 2.470            102(101) 93(93) 85(84) 65(64) 65(64) 60(59) 60(58) 46(44) 47(46) 40(39) 39(38) 35(33) 27(26) 17(15)  
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd 26 77% 23% 0% 1.098 680(3) 411(-499) 333(-722) 2998(787) 3344(957) 3343(796) 2803(93) 2905(15) 3095(-202) 4067(705) 4038(1253) 2164(1298) 1753(913) 1453(648) 1131(365) 1027(307) 852(169) 881(250) 622(58) 450(-34) 372(-32) 480(140) 334(47) 258(-0.2) 264(64) 174(22) 
Sun Life Pensions Management Ltd 22 95% 5% 0% 1.192     6521(3662) 5788(2962) 3950(1297) 3201(666) 1939(-419) 4161(1940) 5730(3703) 6043(4194) 4201(2480) 2970(1750) 2360(1225) 2216(1139) 1639(670) 2014(1172) 1034(284) 728(45) 653(30) 1267(700) 836(363) 726(303) 780(403) 416(78) 
Sun Life Unit Assurance Ltd 22 82% 18% 0% 1.184     6429(3998) 5810(3510) 4489(2333) 3873(1802) 3000(1054) 4641(2688) 5804(3875) 5728(3870) 4836(3158) 3274(2069) 2291(1074) 2096(862) 1579(365) 1900(939) 709(163) 338(-80) 281(-96) 604(244) 317(-1) 229(-51) 301(155) 134(15) 
Swiss Life (UK) Group plc 7 57% 43% 0% 1.003                    36(-39) 33(-31) 62(8) 12(1) 10(-1) 13(5) 8(2) 
Swiss Life Insurance and Pension Co 5 0% 80% 20% 0.890                      -16(-16) 64(-25) 70(-18) 79(-18) 82(-14) 
Swiss Re Life and Health Ltd 10 100% 0% 0% 1.078    507(118) 809(373) 772(99) 778(69) 823(50) 746(29) 950(291) 992(292) 995(359) 799(276)              
Swiss Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd 13 54% 46% 0% 1.020              117(19) 84(-9) 106(-6) 83(-27) 133(31) 64(-5) 44(-15) 33(-9) 55(21) 49(11) 52(13) 39(9) 24(0.2) 
Teachers Assurance Co Ltd 14 57% 43% 0% 1.054             269(135) 250(109) 208(68) 193(55) 144(15) 143(25) 81(-27) 88(-11) 63(-30) 99(6) 80(-7) 100(24) 57(-1) 35(-1) 
Teachers Provident Society Ltd 23 35% 65% 0% 0.985 201(-56) 194(-70) 181(-83) 246(-17) 262(-7) 251(-20) 209(-67) 219(-66) 213(-81) 309(9) 371(70) 395(98) 83(34) 63(17) 52(11) 44(8) 52(24) 18(-9) 19(-17) 18(-20) 26(-14) 31(-9) 35(-4)    
Threadneedle Pensions Ltd 26 88% 12% 0% 1.214 622(260) 445(187) 357(133) 916(654) 1212(833) 1043(674) 761(397) 674(284) 293(63) 476(331) 600(473) 601(475) 314(211) 239(149) 192(107) 166(93) 126(50) 241(134) 128(-7) 188(-35) 164(-59) 604(352) 412(173) 366(137) 465(244) 343(52) 
TPFL Ltd 7 0% 43% 57% 0.868       2(-0.2) 0.1(-2) -2(-4) -1(-2) 1(-0.2) -0.1(-1) -1(-1)              
Transatlantic Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 62% 23% 15% 1.264 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 0.5(0.5) 0.2(0.2) 0.3(0.3) 0.2(0.2) 0.003(0.003) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) -0.1(-0.1) 4(-0.3) 1(-1) 1(-1) 2(0.2) 2(-0.4) 1(-1) 3(0.2) 3(-0.05) 
Transport Friendly Society Ltd 20 70% 30% 0% 1.081 17(-4) 15(-5) 16(-4) 24(4) 26(4) 26(4) 24(3) 25(3) 26(4) 30(7) 40(13) 43(17) 41(16) 40(12) 27(0.01) 30(3) 24(-2) 19(3) 15(-0.5) 14(-1)       
TSB Life Ltd 13 100% 0% 0% 1.294              2279(1865) 1689(1274) 1395(963) 1206(783) 1352(928) 757(359) 741(404) 416(73) 1179(817) 804(417) 1541(1179) 800(484) 321(33) 
TSB Pensions Ltd 13 92% 8% 0% 1.165              1221(852) 923(587) 708(406) 559(299) 597(374) 207(37) 115(1) 0.1(-62) 53(25) 22(10) 38(30) 8(5) 2(1) 
Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society Ltd 23 22% 74% 4% 0.951 35(-71) 9(-114) -14(-147) 106(-29) 109(-32) 117(-29) 109(-42) 104(-50) 77(-63) 157(18) 167(32) 173(48) 127(13) 98(-8) 79(-14) 69(-15) 54(-22) 61(-2) 35(-19) 26(-19) 27(-11) 24(3) 16(-2)    
Tunstall Assurance Friendly Society Ltd 6 50% 50% 0% 1.012         5(-1) 7(1) 8(1) 8(1) 8(-0.003) 8(-0.2)             
UBS Global Asset Management Life Ltd 13 54% 31% 15% 1.020 422(217) 169(-273) -859(-1767) 2779(1686) 3572(2031) 3220(1675) 1241(88) 416(-469) -368(-1180) 649(-52) 1296(613) 1111(627) 241(-22)              
UIA (Insurance) Ltd 20 80% 20% 0% 1.067       19(3) 19(1) 17(-2) 16(-2) 21(2) 24(4) 27(5) 26(3) 32(6) 34(6) 32(2) 40(9) 34(1) 31(-2) 35(1) 50(14) 45(8) 41(4) 40(4) 35(-0.2) 
UK Life Assurance Co Ltd 5 80% 20% 0% 1.054                      29(7) 22(2) 20(1) 21(4) 17(-0.3) 
UK Provident Pensions Ltd 5 100% 0% 0% 8.479                      3(3) 30(11) 28(9) 31(11) 24(2) 
United Friendly Insurance plc 16 56% 44% 0% 1.118           1836(1022) 1878(1055) 1698(796) 1834(919) 1484(585) 1410(503) 1221(333) 932(69) 825(11) 722(-28) 607(-93) 514(-140) 465(-140) 432(-151) 423(-103) 420(-65) 
United Friendly Life Assurance Ltd 15 80% 20% 0% 1.134           123(89) 145(109) 102(64) 93(44) 69(24) 60(22) 43(9) 48(21) 20(-1) 14(-5) 6(-3) 13(6) 5(1) 6(4) 2(1)  
United Kingdom Civil Service  
Benefit Society Ltd 15 53% 47% 0% 1.039         47(-5) 76(17) 110(46) 127(56) 110(30) 95(8) 77(-10) 79(-9) 74(-17) 97(6) 73(-17) 72(-16) 73(-11) 109(24) 90(7)    
United Kingdom Temperance and 
 General Provident Institution 3 0% 100% 0% 0.933                        956(-320) 1061(-218) 1150(-155) 
University Life Assurance Society 22 82% 18% 0% 3.059     24(24) 25(25) 26(26) 26(26) 28(28) 35(35) 32(32) 31(31) 33(33) 33(33) 34(34) 107(106) 125(112) 180(157) 69(4) 79(11) 96(25) 71(-14) 86(-6) 103(4) 85(-17) 89(-11) 
UNUM Ltd 26 4% 92% 4% 0.876 111(-376) 72(-404) -11(-479) 78(-353) 149(-300) 220(-191) 221(-172) 134(-181) 109(-131) 76(-137) 59(-126) 46(-120) 87(-68) 56(-88) 32(-102) 55(-88) 21(-110) 81(-34) 39(-71) 21(-82) 26(-67) 39(-47) 55(-24) 70(-0.1) 66(6) 50(-0.3) 
Wesleyan Assurance Society 26 62% 38% 0% 1.085 1506(357) 1410(310) 1375(308) 1673(638) 1659(640) 1562(663) 1364(478) 1411(503) 1387(477) 1448(530) 1532(630) 1440(552) 1289(430) 1051(219) 598(24) 561(10) 473(-53) 415(-77) 333(-122) 286(-132) 274(-103) 299(-54) 284(-51) 291(-33) 279(-18) 244(-29) 
Wessex Life Assurance Co Ltd 13 0% 69% 31% 0.856              -1(-1) -0.5(-1) -0.4(-0.5) -0.3(-1) 0.1(-1) 0.2(-1) 1(-1) 1(-0.3) 1(-0.2) 0.4(-0.1) 0.3(-0.03) 0.2(-0.01) 0.1(0) 
Wiltshire Friendly Society Ltd 15 7% 80% 13% 0.908 0.5(0.05) -0.1(-1) -0.1(-0.5) 0.2(-0.2) 0.3(-0.2) 0.3(-0.1) 0.04(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.04) 0.3(-0.03)            
Windsor Life Assurance Co Ltd 26 58% 42% 0% 1.078 5711(512) 5356(-104) 4579(-1012) 7752(2019) 3978(2060) 3784(1844) 2952(1141) 2647(819) 2101(298) 3383(1565) 4197(2359) 4491(2610) 3371(1422) 1283(431) 1085(237) 896(115) 378(-37) 504(89) 272(-50) 33(-70) 23(-66) 48(-30) 50(-25) 37(-25) 46(-8) 41(-6) 
Winterthur Life UK Ltd 14 79% 21% 0% 1.089 2403(-543) 1841(-1082) 1085(-1808) 2803(142) 873(205) 1266(394) 1190(321) 1194(286) 1204(249) 1431(468) 1361(731) 1302(664) 1198(520) 916(232)             
WLUK Ltd 16 63% 38% 0% 1.022           1014(437) 1105(534) 769(266) 553(109) 351(-12) 302(6) 188(-43) 180(-10) 104(-57) 86(-57) 91(-39) 131(8) 127(6) 132(12) 123(10) 104(1) 
XL RE Ltd 12 33% 67% 0% 0.936 380(-577) 360(-654) 215(-938) 581(-221) 757(21) 930(229) 701(98) 563(9) 483(-9) 374(-52) 164(-44) 198(0)               
XSMA Ltd 9 56% 44% 0% 1.006       2(-0.3) 2(-0.5) 2(0.2) 3(-0.4) 3(0.4) 3(0.3) 3(1) 2(0.4) 1(-1)            
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd 20 15% 35% 50% 0.756       -0.01(-0.1) -0.02(-0.1) -0.01(-0.05) -0.02(-0.05) -0.04(-0.05) -0.04(0) 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.02(0.01) -0.04(-0.1) -0.03(-0.1) -0.01(-0.1) -0.01(-0.1) 0.01(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.1(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 0.2(-0.1) 0.3(-0.05) 0.3(-0.03) 
Zurich Assurance (2004) plc 7 57% 0% 43% 0.974       112(35) -21(-63) -92(-115) -21(-42) 21(7) 23(17) 4(1)              
Zurich Assurance Ltd 20 45% 55% 0% 1.002 14505(2090) 12476(-547) 10299(-3202) 20102(5817) 23322(6201) 21972(4408) 4654(-728) 5117(-574) 5394(-303) 5786(467) 6303(1234) 5886(990) 5729(1061) 3992(-630) 3183(-1360) 3167(-1321) 2851(-1593) 3962(-389) 3562(-280) 3440(24)       
Source: the author. 
